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The aim of this thosis is to investigate the dramatic and 
dialectical techniques of the dialogues of Uanßeville, Shaftesbury 
and Berkeley. In the process of examining these writers, as well 
as important contemporary authorities on the genre, such as Richard 
Hurd, Hugh Blair, William Gilpin and Shaftesbury himself, the 
salient characteristics of philosophical dialogue in the neo- 
classical mode will emerge. The study of this genre will show not 
only its great intrinsic value but its historical significance in 
preparing the way for the greatest British masterpiece of the genre, 
i: ume's rialogrues Concerninp Natural Religion. 
Broadly speaking, there are two important characteristics that 
distinguish the neo-classical dialogue from the Platonic and 
Ciceronian models of the genre. Firstly, the elaborate Ciceronian 
rhetoric is rejected in favour of a dialectic strictly subordinated 
to logic. Such a dialectic was recommended as the basis of prose 
style by the Voyal Society and the cornerstone of valid reasoning 
by Locke. Secon ly, however, there is also a rejection of Socratic 
hair-splitting in favour of reproducing the flow of cultivated, and 
broad-minded, conversation. The emphasis on rigorous logic 
inevitably clashed with the requirements of conversational 
verisimilitude but it is the very tension between these two aims 
that produced interesting work in the genre. 
Uandeville, Shaftesbury an Berkeley all found different ways 
of resolving this tension. For tiandeville, it consists in 
codifying other genres, notably Restoration comedy, in order to 
iii 
reproduce exchanges where logic is disguised as outrageous paradox 
which serves as bait to entice the evasive "honnäte homme" into 
desultory repartee turning into serious philosophical argument when 
it is too late for him (or the reader) to withdraw. Berkeley 
solved the problem in two very different ways. In the Three 
Dialogues both interlocutors are rigorously logical but they also 
display an earnestness about the moral consequences of their 
philosophical opinions that makes their exchanges more dramatic than 
purely intellectual. It is as if both were staking all their most 
cherished beliefs on the final outcome of their arguments for or 
against immaterialism. In the Alciphron, two modes of argument are 
contrasted. One, that of the two Christian interlocutors, is 
strictly based on reason, and the other, that of the "freethinkers, " 
is based simultaneously on emotional prejudice and "minute" logic- 
chopping. It is the contrast between these two modes of argument, 
and their variations, which is the centre of interest and lends 
itself to very lively conversational exchanges of every variety. 
Finally, it is one of the conclusions of this thesis that 
Shaftesbury in The Moralists evades rather than solves the problem 
because the exchanges in his dialogue result in a kind of Romantic 
monologue rather than true dialectical confrontation. 
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CIHAPTiß I. INTRODUCTION: TIM PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE IN THE 
WIGIPPF E TTH CENTURY 
"A dialogue ... on some philosophical, 
moral, or critical subject, when it is well 
conducted, stands in a high rank among the 
works of taste; but is much more difficult in 
the execution than is commonly imagined. For 
it requires more, than merely the introduction 
of different persons speaking in succession. 
It ought to be a natural and spirited 
representation of real conversation; exhibiting 
the character and manners of the several speakers, 
and suiting to the characters of each that 
peculiarity of thought and expression which 
distinguishes him from another. A dialoc; ue, thus 
conducted, gives the reader a very agreeable 
entertainment; as by means of the debate going on 
among the personages, he receives a fair and full 
view of both sides of the argument; and is, at 
the same time, amused with polite conversation, 
and with a display of consistent and well 
supported characters. An author, therefore, who 
has genius for executing such a composition 
after this manner, has it in his power both to 
instruct and to please. " 
Hugh Blair in Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres(1783) 
1. Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (London, 1823), 
pp-499-500. 
2 
At least until the middle of the eighteenth century, the dialogue 
was almost as protean a literary form as the novel or short story. 
Comprehensive theories as to its nature were, however, remaxkabl, ý' 
scarce. In his preface to The corks of thotan, Dryden outlined the 
problems of dealing critically with the dialogue in the following 
Manners 
I will not here take notice of the several 
kinds of dialogue, and the whole art of its 
which would ask an entire volume to perform. 
This has been a work long wanted, and much 
desired, of which the ancients have not 
sufficiently informed us, and I question 
whether any man now li. vin«can treat it 
accurately. 
l 
According to Fugeno R. ilurpua, this state of affairs has not changed 
tauch since Dryden'c day though hey himself, has extensively examined 
the theory and practice of dialogue in English literature from 1660 
to 1725.2 He dexon3trates that critical comments on the dialogue 
usually concentrated on that was considered to be its unique way of 
presenting; abstruse matter in a "plain, easy, and familiar way" and 
that 
the word was used to designate ptublicetion3 
which ranted from completely undramatic half 
sheets of questions and answers to elaborate 
conversations in which characters were fully 
developed, action was clearly indicated, and 
background was carefully drawn. 
3 
1. Quoted in 'Sugene R. Fury2, "The 'Plain, Easy, and Familiar Way's 
The Dialogue in "nglieh Literature, 1660--1725, " rn linh Literary 
A; Oat 71iator , 17 (1950), 47" Iiereinaftor to be cited as Pur pus. 
Toý.. ý. 
,s 
wt 6-. ýZwti L3ýýC 
O, we$ ' (1ta(, C-i. ý /162 , p"L1Z . . 
Gam. 6vß ý"<, * - 
. yin. t 1. 
2a Par=vs, ý7;: sa. 
S2, 
3 
The definition, based on critical observations of the period, which 
Purpus finally adopts is predictably open-ended: 
It is a force of expository writing, commonly 
in a plain and familiar style, presented 
entirely through the conversation of two or 
more persons, dramatic only to the extent 
of attempting to present an impression of 
the talk of real people, and aimed at the 
communication of information or points of 
view through the interplay of arguments on 
more than one side of the issue at hand. 
1 
It should be emphasized that Purpus's definition is especially 
applicable to the dialogue in the eighteenth century and not far 
from the conclusions reached about the dialogue form by the 
neo-classical critic Richard Hurd. _. .° 
Apart from Shaftesbury, ý Hurd is probably the most 
interesting and consistent theoretician of the dialogue form in the 
eighteenth century. For Hurd, dialogue was an expository 
, 
literary 
method used by the Ancients to render abstruse subjects "either of 
morals or government" more palatable and entertaining. He does, 
however, distinguish between the aims of "Dissertation" and "Dialogue" 
for in Dissertation, truth is presented directly while in Dialogue 
though Truth be not formally delivered ..., 
it may be insinuated; and a capable writer 
will find means to do this so effectually 
asp in discussing both sides of a question, 
to engage the reader insensibly on that 
1. Pu us, 53. 
4 
side, where the Truth lies. "1 
As a neo-classical critic, Hurd felt that the dialogue, to be 
successful as a literary work, must have an air of decorous 
verisimilitude and that the failure of Modern dialogues, even by those 
whom Hurd considered the "best" practitioners of it, Shaftesbury, 
Berkeley, and Addison, lies in their use of characters who, being 
fictitious, violate the decorum of verisimilitude because 
when a writer undertakes to instruct or 
entertain us in the way of Dialogue, he 
obliges himself to keep up the idea, at 
least, of what he professes. The 
conversation may not have really been 
such as is represented; but we expect 
it to have all the forms of reality. 
2 
In short, for Hurd dialogue must resemble or at least give the 
illusion of conversation between familiar and historical personalities 
recognizable to the reader, though he also warns against an overly % 
accurate depiction of character, which would only result in indecorous 
"miaicry". 
3 
Hurd's definition of dialogue, accordingly, is 
predictably lofty and decorous: "An imitated, and mannered conversation 
between certain real, known, and respected persons, on some useful or 
serious subject, in an elegant, and suitably adorned, but not 
1. Richard Hurd, Moral and Political Dialogues with Letters on 
Chivalry and Romance, fourth edition, vol. T London, 177179 p. xvii. 
Hereinafter to be cited as Hurd (I, II, or III). 
2. Eurd I, xxiii. 
3. Hurd I, 1. 
5 
characteristic styles"' Such a definition, of course, eaphasizea 
the conversational and expository elements of the dialogue at the 
oxpen$e of polemical and dramatic oneal so that it Is probably no 
accident that flurd mentions his fallos bishop, Berkeley and the 
aristocratically culturod Shaftesbury as the best dialogue writers of 
their time, but not Mandeville whose dialogues, as will be seen, are 
highly polemical and even aggressive in tone; 
2 
nevertheless, Hurd's 
notion of dialogue as a raethod of "insinuating truth"t if not his 
definition by itself, does some justice to the dialectical complexities 
of Berkeley's and $haftssbury's philosophical dialogues and, indeed, 
the philosophical dialogue in general. Before taking a closer look 
at philosophical dialogue, however, other forms of dialogue, elements 
of which are often Pound in philosophical dialogue itself, should be 
briefly investigated. 
Olizaboth ? erri11's doctoral dissertation on the ? hiaio'ue in 
'% (pub. 1911) containa some useful classifications of dialogues. 
She broadly categoriso3 all dialo, ýwu©s as basically polemical, 
expository, or philosophical and considers the expository ones to be 
closest to the 1Rnglish literary genius, with W'alton's Compleat Angler, 
Dennis's Impartial Critic, Drydon's T; sssy of 1)r atic Posy and 
Bosw©ll's Life of Johnson as important examples. Her definition of 
the Principal aim of the expository dialogue is as follows$ "not to 
elicit truth through argument, but rather to not forth facts or 
principles or theories already existent in the rund of the writer 9""011 
1. I1ur Iý liii. 
2. As noted before, third also mentions Addison as a great dialogue 
writer but his highly expository Treatise on Vadals cannot properly 
be considered a philosophical dialogue. 
3. Elizabeth Merrill, The nialapue in Fngliah Literature (New York, 
1911), p. 59. Hereinafter to be cited as Merrill. 
6 
As such, accordire to Verrill, the expository dialogue differs from 
tho polemical only in that it lacks a "satirical or ironical. "1 vein. 
Bartµolow V. Crawford is more specific In his description of tho 
polemical d, ialo, uo anti, on the basis of his research on the political 
dialoguos of the Cc onwealth and Restoration, concludes that "Almost 
nevor was the puz oae of the 5o1e mica? dialcguo anythir but 
utilitarian. Its object, to defeat or discomfit an antar. othst, 
might be in various wayes now serious, now jocular; by satire, personal 
or general. " 
2 Both Verrill ant. Crawford agree that the polemical 
dialo uo has little literary value3 but, as will be seen later, 
Mandeville's philosophical dialogues,, as well as Berkeley's Alciphron, 
skilfully exploit polerIcal and satirical techniques for dialectical 
and philosophically legitimate purposea. 
4 
Perhaps a more consciouo1y "literary" type of polemical dialogue 
was the "dialogue of the dead'" -a form directly inspired by Lucian'e 
fanous device of sattin, C dialogues in the after-lifo of Hades for 
1. Verrill, 57. 
2. i? artholow V. Crawford, "The Prose ')ialoCue of the Com. ^. onwealth and 
Restoration, " Publications of the "lodern Lan/~ua .e Association of America, 34 (1919), 605, Hereinafter to be cited as Crawford. 
3. Verrill, 57 and Crawford, 605. Crawford also demonstrates 
statistically that the polemical dialogue was most common during 
periods of the greatest political and social stress Crawford, 602). 
4. Polemical dialo; uos also flourished during the Reformation but, as 
far as literary morst is concerned, those published in Germany 
(Erasmus and Putten beinT won the most prominent authors of such 
dialozuea) far outstrip any British example. Those that do achieve 
literary distinction, mainly in the work of Thomas Lore, are, in 
fact, more expository than polemical, which seems to confirm 
Verrill's view that the English genius is more suited to the 
expository than the polemical dialogue. Sao Charles H. Herford, 
StuAieo in the Literary Relations of s gland and Lerman (Cambridge, 
1666), pp"21-7O. 
7 
scurrilous and satirical purpoces. It is a vozod question whether 
"dialogues of the dead" have more in co=on with the polemical type 
or with what Benjamin Boyce calls "Lucianic satire", much of which 
woo written in the form of letters and "visions" as well as dialogue. 
A glance at boyce'o comprehensive bibliography of "dialogues of the 
dead" and other t. cianic wovor .a shore that in England at least, these 
dialogues seam to have served vainly polc=ica1 purposes. Ccnerally 
tho French, especially Fontonello with his "elegant cynicism#"2 were 
buch better at writing "dialorues of the dead" than their vritiah 
counterparts who could boast only of latthew Prior and, arguably, 
Lyttolton as azu3ters of the fors. Prior$ however, wrote only four 
such dialogues and though Lyttelton is sometimes elegant and 
perceptive, he is noro often dull and : cralictic. Tf, cato prized 
with other forms of Lucianic satirc Boyce is probably right in 
declaring that "Oo co=on feature of these pieces ... is not their 
form but their subject matter and thetroathent given it. "3 Tith 
their subtle handling of philosophical ideas and, despite their 
underworld setting, worldly social mores, Fonternlle's ari Prior's 
dialogues, in any caao, seem far closer to the philosophical than the 
polemical type. 
4 One relatively recent book on Fontenello, in fact, 
has been mildly criticized for re1atin, his use of dtalo&ue more to 
1. Benjamin I3oycow "Item from Ife12s Satiric Corraunication3 with the 
Nether World in EýnCIißh writing of the Seventeenth and Pirhteenth 
Centurioc, " Vublications of the "odeorn to uag+ý Association of 
America, 58 (1943)p 407. Hereinafter to be cited as __ R" 
2. Prvcm. 4424" 
3. ? oven, 406. 
4. For an interesting analyu1o of Prior's Dialogues of tho Dead, see 
Richard. Morton, " atthev Prior's Tialoguezi of the Dead, " Ia11 State 
University Forum# 8 (1967), 73-8. 
a 
Plato'o dialectical techniques than Lucian's satirical ones*1 
As for the philosophical dialogue, Merrill defines it in the 
following manner, taking Plato's dialogues as ideal modelax "The 
Platonic dialogue may almost be described as drama in which the 
character-element in strong, the action of minor importance, and the 
leading motive a struggle for intellectual and ethical truth. "2 
She considers the philosophical dialogue as more truly a form in its 
own right than the expository, which she calls a literary method. 
3 
My her insistence on the uniqueness of philosophical dialogue as an 
entirely separate kind of literary work, however, she seems to be 
using; the word "form" in the sense of "genre" and, indeed, the word 
"method" in the sense of "form. " 
Although L`orrill'a recognition of the uniqueness of philosophical 
dialogue is justified, hoar tendency to Judge all philosophical 
dialogues in terns of Plato's often leads her to miss out other 
possibilities of the genre and even to assert that "The English 
philosophers succeeded in different degrees in attaining power in their 
use of the dialoguo-fort, but they were always directly imitative 
rather than creative in their literary methods, because they were 
philosophers, and not poets"4 and that 
The. fltndtzental wea'cnoss of eighteenth-century 
philosophical dialoCuos ... iss that they represent, 
1. Henry Knight hiller, Pssays on rialdir is "+iscnllanis3" 
(Princeton, New Jersey, 1961) p. 39 no on Cosenti. ni'o Fontenelle'o 
Art of' ialogue (New York, 1952). Hereinafter to be cited a 
1+1ý1nrý 
2. ?!, 4- 





in too many cases, the atto. ipt to or new 
wine into old bottles; it is but too evident 
that their writor3 did not create anew to 
meet new and changed conditions of life. ' 
Whatever the truth of her assertions, and it is ono of our aims to 
demonstrate that eichteenth-century philosophical dialogues were no 
more 4irectly irritative than such typically Au&ustan works as Pope's 
Horatian epiotles, 
2 
one would do well to heed J. 7. Cosentini's 
warning against taking Plato as an "ideal model" for all other 
philosophical dialogues to follow. As a criticism of terrill's 
s othodology, he points out that 
The safest think to do is to avoid setting 
up the dialogues of any one writer as a norm 
by %thich to judge those of others, a rule, 
however, which does not mean we cannot make 
comparisons between then. Euch a procedure 
can be most fruitful. The above formula is,. 
sufficiently broad and elastic to do justice 
to the dialogues of all writers, for it 
concentrates upon what 1s essential to the 
, Fonro. When Plato, Fontanelle, Fenelon, 
Diderot write good dialogue, they moot on one 
1. werriil, 65- 
2. As Is well known, in the eiihtoenth century a "man of letters" 
and a "philosorher" were often the name person. Buie is a case 
in point and his self-confessed ambition to succeed as a "man of 
letters" was often erroneously thought (especially in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries) to be Incompatible with a 
sincere search for truth in his philosophical investigations. 
For an interesting discussion of this azF-ect of Tiume, sea Ernest 
Campbell Lossnor, "Philosophy and 13iographyt The Case of David 
Fume" in Tume: A Collection of Critical resa s, ed. by V. C. 
Choppol (London and Melbourne) 19 , -34" 
10 
common erduni, no matter hair different they 
r1y bo in other rc3pcct31 they have succeeded 
in ex; res zing to advantngo the drw tic 
possibilities of the tie, though they may not 
use the same means in all case* to achieve 
this 0114"1 
Pur 'us makes a similar point when he remarks that "A real understanding 
of the growth and itPortanoe of the dialowue In : nglinh has been 
prevented by a prooccupation with what ,,; 
ft have boon inßtoad of what 
actually was, " 
2 
The ei, ghtoenth'-centuzy philo3ophical dialo;; uoi in tact, was 
"Imitative" only in the sonne of imitation where, in T)r'den'D words 
about tran31atore applied to dialogue writers, "the translator (it 
now he ba3 not loot that n=o) ==moo the liborty, not only to v+ r 
from the vor Ja ani ßenAo, but to forsake them both as ho seas QCCasiOml 
and takit only some general hints from the original, to run division 
on tba g ounrdwork, . as he plcase3o 
3 At first ßi#; ht= one dialog u® 
writer, George =tubbes, in aus introduction to bia Tis1oý-vm on Benutyi 
seems to disapprove of imitation in iryden'a souses "'Saxo row 
rialccuss have indhad been received with just AFplause; but none of 
then are strict imitations of Plato, or much doaigncd to resemble him. "4 
1. John W. Co3ontiniy Fontnnglle'n Art of riialo ut (New York, 1952), 
p. 227.1orotna for to be cited ai Coa nt1ni_. 
2. - lur lus, 58. 
3. ýuotod in John Butt (ed. ), fihm Pon, of A1¢, xai er Pope: Imitations 
of c, vol. iv (wickerhaa Edition, London, 193 xxvii.. zzviii. 
C, 173; )) P. -P. ý'ý, v ýý; ""ý' ýc. , tý--eýc , c, ý; ýýýC s'-s, ____ 
h, 
11 
An examination of the dialogue, however, soon reveals that although 
the interlocutors, Socrates and Aspasia, are drawn from Plato's time, 
Stubbes's "strict" imitation is so obviously set in an eighteenth- 
century drawing"*-room that Aspasia, at one point, even 
anachronistically refers to Newton, 
1 
Thus, for Stubbes, and 
probably for many other dialogue writers, "imitation" meant only an 
attempt to reproduce Plato's dialectical method rather than a 
translation. Dialectical reasoning, however, whether closely based 
on Plato's method or not, does not automatically constitute the slavish 
imitation that Merrill implies, since dialogue by its very nature is 
dialectical when not exclusively expository. 
To return to Cosentini, his definition of Dialogue (i. e. the 
philosophical dialogue) is as follows: "Dialogue is a literary form 
that reflects to perfection the intellectual manoeuvrings (perhaps 
even meanderings) of the human mind in its efforts to roach the elusive 
truth" and he supplements this definition with a comment to the effect 
that "In the Dialogue two or more characters converse and argue, but 
actually the author of the Dialogue is convorsing and arguing with 
himself. "2 Cosentini's view of the dialogue form seems to hark back 
to Shaftesbury's notion of it as an "inward colloquy" where the author 
devises dramatic characters to symbolize a debate between the nobler 
and baser sides of his soul, thus malting the dialogue serve as a form 
of self-examination. 
3 
Even Shaftesbury's notions of philosophical 
1. St ubb_s, 8. 
29 Cosentinif 21.. 
39 For a brief and illuminating discussion of Shaftesbury's notions 
of philosophical dialogue, see Robert Marsh, Four Dialectical 
Theories of Poetry: An Aspect of English Neoclassical Criticism 
(Chicago and London, 1970 t pp. 27-32. Also, see chapter eight of 
this dissertation. 
12 
dialo'uo, hoaavar, are not quito 00 introopective na Coaentini'a for, 
aacoztiinW to Shafteabury, portruing the hazer aide of a hu=n soul 
demands "of neco35it a kin1 of mirror or looks 
1 
y rj; 3Iaaa to the ago, " 
which, in tern of dialogs, as a literary form, implies dramatic 
voriaimiliturte. Cosentini, in any aase, does treat tho dialogue 
form as a ge+nr© ans, It is primarily philosophical dialogue which he 
treats as a genre. 
Goldsworthy Loves Dickinson, a writer of philosophical dialogues 
himself, Pinted out that though the Philosophical dialo, 'sue represents 
the form at its beat, it nevertheless "suffers from a certain 
incompatibility between its dramatic and controversial elements, which 
prevents it ... from being a pure and ierfect form of art. "2 Unlike 
2errill, he relates the dialojue more clouely to conversation rather 
than to dramas "dialoi-, ue Is argument and discussion purged of its 
chaos and intemperance. A good dialogue will therefore preserve the 
manner of conversation and also its dramatic qualities. 3 Another 
gray of saying, arch the same thing, though parhays not to felicitously, 
was Rudolf ilirzel's definition of dialoiue as "strictly speaking a 
discussion in the fern of a conversation. "4 
From the stanlroint of conversational style, the Augustan ago 
I. Anthony Ashloy Cooper, Earl of Zhaftesbury, Characteristics of rasen, 
t'ýºnners, 
_Oriniana, 
Tiima, ed. by John U. Robertson and introduced 
by Stanley Crean, vol. i (iewr York, 1964), p. 131. Uereinafter to 
be cited as Characteristics I or 11. The Characteristics, which is 
a collection of ý5hatte3tury'g trestieesy gras first published in 1711. 
; he Aobertson edition gran first published In 1900. 
2. Goldsworthy Loves 1ickinson, "I: ialoguo as a Literary Forms" 
Transactions of the Fo ttl Society of Literature, New Series, 11 
(1932)l l9. weroinaftor to be cited as Pick ir3on. 
3. Tick n on, 4. 
4. Rudolf tiirzol, Dar Malm (Lairzig, 1895), 7. The translation is 
taken from Cosintini, 13. 
13 
was a period especially suited for the writing of good formal dialogue. 
It should be notes, for example that, especially among literary men, 
coffee-house discussions undoubtedly induced a lively flair for good 
conversation as distinctly reflected in much Augustan prose, whether 
ev9n-tempered, auch as Addison's or sharply ironic, such as Swift's. 
l 
As'Crawford points out about the inter-relationship of conversation 
and prose in the Augustan age, 
The solid prose of the period is full of 
questions and answers, objections and 
answers, first personal pronouns; printed 
versions of trials sold with readiness; 
there was about the prose a dialogical 
tone adapted alike to discussion and 
pedagogy. This tendency shows itself in 
every field of thought; in politics, 
religion, philosophy$ and criticism. 
2 
The conversational prose of the period, then, was highly favourable to 
the production of philosophical dialogues intended to bring philosophy, 
as Addison claimed of his periodical essays, "out of closets and 
libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at 
tea-tables and in coffee-houses. "3 Furthermore, again as Crawford 
points out, 
1. For an analysis of the contrasting styles of Addison and Swift 
and their common basis on conversational "good mannerso" see 
James Sutherland, "äome Aspects of Eighteenth-Century Prose" in 
says on thi Eighteenth Century Presented to David Nichol Smith 
Oxford, 1945)ß P"97" Hereinafter to be cited as Sutherland. 
2. Bartholow V. Crawford, "Tho Use of Formal Dialogue in Narrative" 
Philological Quarterly, 1 (1922), 179. Also, see Sutherland, 100-01. 
3. Quoted in Sutherland, 94. 
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Zn its essence the dialoLma is more than a 
contest or exchange. The speech mot 
approximate the speech of man; the speakers 
raust be differentiated sufficiently to 
,; Iva their speech the semblance of reality. 
Inasmuch as the period during, which the 
style of T: nglioh prose most plainly 
exhibits this quality is also the period 
of supremacy of the dialogue, a sympathetic 
relationship is not hard to postulate. 
I"utual influence there tust have been. 
If Crawford is right, it is the Augustan flair for conversational 
prose and itu lttfluance on dialogue writers which, more than any 
other factor, makes eighteenth-century philosophical dialogues far 
more rewarding arg works of literature than the polemical ones of the 
Commonwealth arr3 . restoration. Although Crawford's remarks about the 
relationship of prose dialogue to conversation are useful however, 
'they are more applicable to a relationship between dialogue and the 
conventions of conversational prose. This becomes evident in the 
light of Louis P. Vi ic's warning that "the tern 'conversational etyle' 
provides no very adequate de3cripticn of a writer's linguistic 
procedure" and that "The most diverse writers are lumped together as 
conversational and conversation itself in visualized under such 
varying aspects that nothing o erge but a memo of gcnoralizod 
a%prova1. "2 , ýi1ic'o ve11-argued view, 'which is also supported by 
1. Bartholow V. Crawford, "Questions and Cbßectioru, " Publications 
of the federn tancusrre Association of America, 41 (-1-9-2-6-79-125- 
2. Louis To : 1,11ic, "Observations on Convorzationsl Style" in John H. 
Middendorf (e3. ), ýn lash Writers of thn I? i hteenth Century (New 
York and London, 1971)9 P"2&3. Hereinafter to be cited as It. `i1tc. 
15 
strong evidence from the field of 1incuistica, suggests that Crawford's 
remarks should be amended to apply more to the popularizing tendency 
of early eighteenth--century prose. 
Part of the popularizing tendency, however, was based on notions 
of conversational , rood-breeding and ideal conversation promoted by 
the highly-polished talk of coffee-house conversationalists. Good 
conversation, in fact, was considered not merely as entortainnant but 
as the basis of social intercourse in a manner related to the older, 
and more narrovr, aristocratic concept of good-breeding. Whatever 
"good-breeding" may have meant in aristocratic social mores, for 
Augustan literary men it seemed to mean, amongst other things, 
conversational good-runners. Thus William ccple, aristocrat and 
amateur man of letters, could write in his unfinished "Heads Designed 
for an Essay on Conversation" that "Good breeding is as necessary a 
quality to accomplish all the rest, as grace in motion or dancing" 
and add that the "good senao" of "easy and agreeable conversation" is 
harder to achieve than conversation spice' with the "meaner parts" of 
"wit" and "ridicule" in the same way that it is easier to dance a "jig" 
than the "corrant. "1 ^ven a work like rieldin 's less exclusively 
1. William Temple, t! iccellanea, od. by Jonathan Swift (London, 1701)t 
pp. 325-6. According; to the article on the "dance" in the eleventh 
edition of the Brita, h-dcaq the "Courante" was a very 
popular dance in the court of Louis XIV. It is described as "a 
court dance performed on tiptoe with slightly jumpine steps and 
many bows and courtesys. " The article also mentions that "a 
nobleman's education could hardly have been said to be begun until 
be had mastered the Courante. " For an acute analysis of dancing 
not only as an essontial part of polite behaviour but as the very 
emblem of a gentleman's education, which included a temporary, but 
nonetheless embarrassing, dekendence on socially inferior darcing- 
masters, see C. J. Rawson, "Gentlemen and Dancing-Mastorst Thoughts 
on Fielding, Chesterfield, and the Genteel, " -ighteenth-Century 
std, 1 (1967-68), 127-58. 
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aristocratic " oaay on Conversation" has been plausibly described 
as "a kince, of courtesy-book in little, an amiable guide to manners 
In everyday relations with others. "1 In short, the aristocratic 
concept of "good brcadini" applied to conversation :: Gant urbanely 
graceful dioquioition metaphorically related to the highly elaborate, 
yet graceful, courtly dances. 
Tho tetrphor of the dance also implied the notion of conversation 
as a polite relation3hip between people, so that not even admirable 
disquisition, by itaolf, was quite enough to tally with the 
requirements of ; ood breedit . Thua Swift could condemn in his 
"c! ints Towards an ý'us37 on Conversation" the conversational practice 
of 'f a Man of it" 
who is never easy but where he can be allowed 
to dictate and preoido; ho neither expocteth 
to be informed or entertained, but to display 
his own Talents. Hic Businec s is to be good 
Conp^xny rnd Not brood Conversation; and, 
therefore, he chuseth to frequent those who 
are content to list©na arui profess themselves 
his Ai1! irere. 
2 (italics adided) 
The uoae1 for the "man of Wit" was probably Addison at Button's coffoc- 
houso, 
3 
eepeaially au Popo sattrizod hic for similar, roasonss 
1.11er, 117. 
2. Jonathan Swift, A Fropo3a1 for Corroctin the I n't1ish Ton 
Polito Ccnv. rsation, ? etc., oäe by Norbert D vio with Louis 
coxfor., 1957)9 p. 904 
3" Raymond F. 1: owea, "Jonathan Swift and the conversation of the 
Coffeo-iiauso, " Quarterly Journil of speech, 18 
(19309 16. 
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Like Cato gives his little Senate Laic, 
And sits attentivo to his on Applause; 
While Wits and Templara ev'ry Sentence raise, 
And wonder with a foolish Face of Praise. 
That Pity, iieav'nt if such a Man there be. 
Who would not weep, if A-n were be? 
("Fragment of a Satire, " 11.61-6)1 
Pope's last line is ironic precisely because he actually admires 
Addison's conversational talents, 
Bleat with each Talent, and each Art to please, 
And born to write, converse, and live with ease ... 
(1i. 45-6) 
even if not his self-centred, way of using them. In short, Addison 
was attacked by Swift and Pope for his lack of good-breedings 
And so obliging that he ne'er obliged: (1.58) 
The observations of both Swift and Pope suggest that there may well 
have been a significant correlation between Addison's conversational 
practice and his habit of writing periodical essays in which he 
displayed opinions on countless subjects, in a manner informally 
expository and univocal rather than familiarly dialectical, as 
Mandeville did in the short-lived Female Ta tler. Thus, if eighteenth- 
century dialogue at its best had any significant relationship with the 
conventions of conversational good-breeding, it is more likely to 
correspond to po_ lite, urbane conversation taking others into account 
than admirable disquisition of a more self-centred kind. 
Whore Swift and Pope singled out a transparently-disguised 
individual for censure, Shaftesbury, through the persona of "Philoclos" 
1. Alexander Pope$ The Poems of Alexander Pope, ed. by John Butt 
(London, 1970), P. 492. _. r" .'' 
ý'' 
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in his dialogue, Th Vorelistß, seeds to have con waned the 
conversational practice of his day in general art, more to the point, 
as part of an attack on what ho took to be the lack of first-class 
dialcgueo by his contemporaries, 
'"his brings to any rind a reason I have 
often sought for, why we moderns who 
abound so much in treatises and essays 
are so sparing in the way of dialogue, 
which heretofore was found the politest 
and test way of minarin, -, oven the Craver 
subjects. The truth is, 'twould be an 
aborwinable falsehood and belying of the 
age to put co cuch good sense together 
in any one convaroation av right make it 
hold out steadily and with plain coherence 
for an hour's tire, till any one subject 
had boon rationally examined. 
1 
Shaftesbury made a similar point in his "treatise, " Advice to an Author, 
but in a somewhat more moderate tone: "Our co=erce and manner of 
conversation, which we think the politest ina inable is such, it seems, 
as wo ouruolves cannot er1uro to yea represented to the life. "2 
Shafte3bury'a claim actually seams to have been amore appficuble 
to tim rougher mannero of the Restoration period, which are indirectly 
reflected in nryt en'a assay of Traratic : Poesy. One of its chief 
defects, as dialogue or conversation-piece, according to Donald Davie, 
is its failure, as a result of trying; to be faithful to the best kind 
of conversation in Dryden'e age, to render the cut anri thrust of 
I. Characteristics fly 6, 
2. Characteristics It 134" 
" 
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conversational debate. As Shaftesbury would have expressed it, 
there is not enough "good sense" among the interlocutors for the 
conversation to flow smoothly ors more accurately, for the conversation 
to turn from polite exchanges of opinion to a genuine debate of the 
mutually incompatible, positions implied by the point-of-view of each 
speaker. In short, the urbane tor, of the conversation is only 
superficial because genuine urbanity welcomes opposiný, r points-of-view 
by which each interlocutor can clarify, defend, and even modify his 
own opinions. 
Dryden's failure to recreate a discussion sufficiently urbane to 
be genuinely dialectical was perhaps due to his fear that, in Davie's 
Nords, "in reality the cut and thrust would not have been verbal only. "1 
By Busen Anne's day, however, the rougher elements of aristocratic 
minners were already being conaiderably modified by more restrained and 
lose rigid ideals of conduct as advocated in Addison's Zpectator, 
2 
so that 5haftesbury'a strictures seem to have been considerably 
exaggerated and perhaps attributable to "the erous dialogues which 
were used for scurrilous attacks upon his faraoua grandfather. "3 
whatever the level of exaggeration in dhaftesbury's claim, he did, in 
any case, significantly link dialo, ue to the conversational practice 
of his doy. 
1. Donald A. Davis, "Dramatic Poetry: Drydon'a Converiation-Piece, " 
C, ambridg Journal, 5 (1951-52), 554" Another way of describing 
'Dryden's failure is to say that his dialohio on Dramatic Poesy is 
too expository to to considered legitimately philosophical. 
2. See C. 3. Lewis, "Addison" in 'sways of the fii hteenth Century 
Prea rated to David Nichol Smith Oxford, 1945)9 p"7. This is not 
to deny that there may have been a large residue or aristocratic 
bad-manners, and many dull conversationalists, in queen Anne's day. 
3. Purr-us, 58 n. 
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Conversational decorum, however, is not the only decisive 
characteristic of the philosophical dialogue in the eighteenth century. 
What also has to be taken into account is the techniques of 
rhetorical persuasion inherent in, the formal dialogue, and it has a 
long history of such use, ranging from the highly formalized question- 
and-answer techniques of catechisms to the dialectical subtleties Of 
Plato's dialogues. 
I 
Those dialogues which resemble ordinary 
conversation can be considered as expository and akin to the essay, 
while those which resemble argumentative conversation are usually 
philosophical and akin to the drama. Furthermore, the dramatic nature 
of philosophical dialogue is intimately bound up with its heuristic 
function. In the words of Albert 'Nilliam Levi, "The dramatic 
imagination ... has its cognitive tasks also, and these are suggested 
by that passage from idle conversation to formal dialo, uet and from 
formal dialogue to dialectical method as this movement is exemplified 
in the works of Plato. "2 Thus, an essential characteristic of the 
philosophical dialogue is that it combines the requirements of 
rhetorical exposition with dialectical subtlety to create the 
illusion of valuable, entertaining, and dramatic conversation, nor 
are the requirements of rhetoric and dialectic conflicting for, as 
the first sentence of Aristotle's Rhetoric declares, "Rhetoric is 
the counterpart of dialectic. " 
As far as rhetorical exposition is concerned, Augustan theories 
1. Bartholow V. Crawford, "Teaching by Dialogue, " rhilological 
Quarterly, erly, 3 (1924), 23. 
2. Albert Villiam Levi, Literature Philosophy, and the Imagination 
(Bloomington, Indiana, 1962)q p. 125. 
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of dialogue as a technique of "plain, easy, and familiar" exposition 
are adequate. Such thoorio3, in fact, suggest that dialogue, though 
ostensibly an "ancient" foxy, waa considered far from incompatible 
with the now rhetoric of direct plainness advocated by the Royal 
Society. This new rhotoric was largely super3odinj the older one 
of elaborately ornarigntal "tropes and figures"1 which, itself, had 
largely replaced the centuries-old classical tradition of rhetoric. 
2 
The refor a of ]'otor Remus and other fenaissance gra=aarians, however, 
had turned rhetoric into a process dealing; with mainly orn!. ntal 
considerations, such as the tropos arJ figures, while dials tic dealt 
mainly with ne thoda of arrant and, Qoreover, methods of argument 
werd intendod to be strictly laical, so that dialectic, itself, camp 
to be scarcely distinguished fron loýic. 3 It may wall be that the 
eighteenth-century philosophical dialoCue, at least to some extent, 
restored dialectic as a rIrocess distinct from loh-icy even though 
based on it. 
1. W. S. 11oro11, T: i ., htcenth Century British Logic and I? hotoric (Princoton, New Jorßoy, 10,71), PP-44b-502. Hereinafter to bo cited 
as Howell. I'orhaj: s it is not amiss to point out hare that there 
in much truth in : ilio's statement to tho affect that "the 
realization of the drunction between what are really only two 
ways of writing - the simple and the ornate - is not located at 
any point in time but occurs over and over in the history of 
rnglish prose" (? 'slic, 2C6). 
2. It should ba pointed out, in this context, that, broadly speaking, 
for Aristotle, Cicero and other classical theoreticians of 
discourso, rhetoric a dl dialectic differed mainly in that 
dialectic was a strict ("close-fisted") mode of discourse, while 
rhetoric was a loooer ("open-handed") and more popular mode, but 
the rules for the handling of both were similar, hence Aristotle's 
dictum. Cn this point see W. K. Virrsatt Jr. and Cleanth Brooks, 
Literary Criticism: A Short Vista, vol. 1 (London, 1970), p. 67 
n. 2. 
3" Piorro Albert Duharael, "The Logic srd Rhetoric of Pater Raus, " 
Iodern FhiloloLy, 46 (1948-49), 171. 
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As mentioned before, it was men prominent in the activities of 
the Royal Society who played a large part in replacing the ornamental 
rhetoric of tropes and figures in'favour of what Robert Boyle, the 
great physicist, called the "eloquence of plainness" and which another 
famous member of the Royal Society, John Locke, formulated as an 
alternative rhetoric addressed, in Howells words, "to the communi- 
cation of truth and knowledge by means of coherent and stylistic 
1 
plainness. " Thus, the new rhetoric emerging at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century tended to be closer to dialectic in its more 
rigorous treatment of argumentative discourse and closer to logic in 
its emphasis on clear exposition, and it is in the eighteenth-century 
philosophical dialogue that the emphasis of the new rhetoric on 
exposition and dialectical reasoning can perhaps be best appreciated. 
There is not likely to be a work as useful as John Locke's 
Conduct of the Understanding to gain an insight into the constellation 
of qualities possible in the eighteenth-century philosophical 
dialogue. This is so because Locke's Conduct served as a popular 
guide to clear thinking and the search for truth, on the premiss 
that all reasoning tends to be "partial" and only becomes less so 
when one is willing to test one's ideas in conversation with others. 
As Locke put it, 
We see but in part, and we know but in part, 
and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not 
right from our partial views. This might 
instruct the proudest este©mor of his own 
parts, how useful it is to talk and consult 
1. Powell, 492" 
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with ` others, even such as 6diva' short of him 
in capacity, quickness and penetrations for, 
since no one noon all, and we generally have 
different prospects of the acme thing, 
according to our different, I may say, 
positions to it; it is not incor^"rous to 
think, nor beneath any man to try,, whether 
another may not havo notions of thin rap 
which have escaped hits, and which his reason 
would mike use of, if they ca into his nind. 
l 
This is not to say that Locke necessarily favoured tho writing of 
dialogue, especially a he warned, ogain3t arguing on more than one 
side of a question, ao a dialogue writer Inevitably has to do. Lccke's 
stricture, in fact, alt reads like a condo nation of dlalo-'uo ors 
at least, the writing of its 
Intoreot an Passion d azz1os; tho custom of 
arguing on any aide, even apainut our 
persuasions, dices the unrorstanding, and 
soaked it by dogroes lose the faculty of 
discerning clearly betwoon truth and 
falsehood, and so of tdhsrin, * to the right 
Bids. 
2 
1. John Locke, Conduct of the tUnderstaniinr, r, ad. by Thomas Fowler, 
third edition (Oxford, 16909 sec. 3, p. 7. In an amusing set-piece 
dialogue on charity between Parson Adams and the morose Peter 
Pounce in Joseph Andres a (Bk. 111, ch. XIII ), Adams mentions a 
"Prospect" he has enjoyed, but Pounce in only i. ntorestod in the 
"prospects" available on bis own estate. As the dialogue progresses, 
and it may legitimately be called ' "p'uilosophical, " it becomes 
evident that Pounce's enjoyment only of prospects he owns, is 
reflected in his very narrow-minded attitude to chärit_y, and. AdamSts'far 
broader interpretation of its moaning, so that his appalling selfish- 
ness is intimately connected with his conversational intolerance, 
the opposite being true of Adams. Mus Fielding, like Locke, found 
the notion of physical prospects a good metaphor for broadmindedness 
and impartiality in conversation. hereinafter, Locke's Conduct 
will be cited as Locke. 
2. Locke, sec. 33,74" For an analysis of Locke's preference for the 
essay-form, see Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his *g" in John 
I. Tolton (ei- )q John Locker 'roblAms any! Parsrective3 Cambridge, 
1969), pp"234-61. 
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Tho dialogue at its bnstt nevertheless, dogs allow the realer to 
exnmino various ; oints-of-view from a highly advantageous position. 
In Lockean terms, the reader is exposed to different arguments and 
thereby gains a high enough "prospect" from thich he can judge their 
validity. It seorcs likely that Locke would have considered dialogue 
h; trrmfu1 to the writer but beneficial to the realer. ! To did not, in 
any case, write any dialojues himself. 
As for the dialectical method of philosophical dialogue, it 
conforrs with Locke's emphasis on Fßrsevoring with a proble-i no matter 
how difficults "=he understanding shculd bo brought to the difficult 
and knotty parts of knowledge, that try the strength of thought, and 
a full bent of the lindp by insensible degrees; and in auch a gradual 
proceeding nothing is too hard for it. "1 Locke's prescriptions 
ho never, - does not tally so well with the dialectical method of 
Socratic or Lucia iC irony as with the gentler dialectical method of 
a work like : erkeley's Threg Tnialonies between Hylas and Philonoua 
where there is no personal antagonism between the interlocutors but a 
highly-idealized, yet mutually-opposing, castor-disciple relationship. 
2 
It is very possible that Locke would have agreed with H: urd's remark 
that 
The Sade 5ocrateý would have dropped his 
Irony, in the company of the good and wise: 
The Rhetorician jiucian7, is never more 
pleased than in confounding both, by his 
intemperate Satire. 
3 
1. Locke, see. 28,63. 
2. Donald Davie, "Berkeley and the Style of Dialogue, " in Hush Sykes 
Davies and Ceorge Watson, eds., The ' n'l1sh rinnt ^tulie3 in the 
Fngilioh 'oralists PrescrntAC1 to !?, ani1 Willer Canhridgo, 1964), p. 93. 
3" Burd I, xxxi. One cannot help feeling that both Locke and Hurd 
would have preferred üocratea to associate =ore cften with the 
"good and wise. " 
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Locke's version of the dialectical iothod, in fact, may well be 
what he defines as the process of "bottoming out. " It consists of 
finding the pre lss or "proposition" on which an arum"ent or set of 
arrumints Is ba3ed, coupled with a distrust of informal conversations 
Most of tho difficulties that come in our 
way, when well considered and traced, lead 
us to some proposition, which, known to 
be truo, clears the doubt, and gives an 
easy solution of the question; whilst 
topical and superficial arguments, of 
which there is store to be found on both 
aides, filling the head with variety of 
thoughtag and the mouth with copious 
discourse, serve only to =use the 
unierstanding, and entertain company 
without coin to the bottoi of the 
question, the only place cf rest and 
stability for an inquisitive mind, whose 
tendency 13 only to truth and knowledge. 
1 
Then questions are too complex to bo rociucod to certain prerisses, 
Locke recon end3 the "balancing" of arCu: ae, nts, a rrocess closer to 
ordinary converoations 
Where a truth is made out by one 
de: onetration, there needs no farther 
injuirys but in probabilities, where 
there wants demcn3tration to establish 
the truth beyond doubt, there it is not 
enough to trace one argument to its 
source, and observe its strength and 
veatna3s, but all the argumanta, after 
having been so examined on both sides, 
1. Locket see* 44,95-6" 
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twat be laid in balance one against another, 
and, upon the whole, the understanding 
determine its assent. 
I 
While "bottoming" roserblc3 Platonic dialectic shorn of its Socratic 
irony, 
2 
"balancing" Seems to correspond to Cicoro'a broader dialectic. 
Sinco one of the osoential characteristica of Cicero's dialogues is 
that they almost all display an attempt to have opposing philosophical 
positions rendered a3 fairly and accurately as po3sible, 
3 
it would 
seem that there is very little difference between Cicero's dialectic 
and Locke's method of "balancinas" Locke's dialectical method, 
however, is a more straightforward affair because, unlike Cicero, he 
does not look for truth in the rhetorical eloquence of the arguments 
put forward but in discovering; the lorio of each argueent and only 
then "balancing" one against another. 
1. Locke, sec. 7t 23. 
2. Locke would also have probably objectel to the hair-splitting; 
equivocations and distinctions often ccmprising plato's dialectic; 
indeed, what Locke disparagin ly calla "the art of disputinj;, " 
though meant mainly against the last vestiges of scholasticism, 
could also have referred to Plato's dialectic: 
In arguing, the opponont uses as comprehensive 
and equivocal terms as he can, to involve his 
adversary in the doubtfulness of his expres3ionss 
this is expected, and therefore the answerer on 
his side makes it his play to distinguish as 
much as he can, and thinks he can never do it 
too much; nor can he indeed in that way wherein 
victory may be had without truth and without 
knowledge. (Locke, see. 31,70-1) 
Although Plato also condemned this kind of disputation, especially 
as practised by the Sophists, his dialectic could not escape a 
certain amount of disputational hair-splitting. Anon; other things, 
this was because of the primitive state of logic in Plato's time. 
On this point see Richard Robinson, Plato's t'arlior I'ialectic, 
second edition (Oxford, 1970), pp. 2-3. 
3. Cicero, in his more philosophical and leas expository dialogues, 
such as DA Natura Deorum and Tusculanae Disputations, did not 
overtly take side3 but probably expected that the most eloquently 
expressed point-of-view would win out in the reader's mind. 
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Loclce's dialectical method In well illustrated by Richard Hurd 
in a "moral dialogue" On the Uses of roreei-gn 'ravel botween 
interlocutors representing Shaftesbury and Locke. In this dialogue 
Locke, before delivering his own point-of-view on the question, 
reassembles the flatulent rhetoric of "3haftosbury's argument into 
simpler anl more logically rigorous termas 
Your Lordship has so many good words at 
co=ar. d upon all cccasion3, that one cannot 
but be enterta lnedt at least, with your 
rhetoric, if not convinced by it. But ray 
present concern is$ to have a clear 
conception of your argument, which in plain 
terms, as I apprehend it, stands thus; 
"'That every nation has many vices and 
follies to correct in itself; that this is 
perhaps more especially the case of our 
orrn; and that early Travel is the only, at 
least the most proper, cure for them, " 
Shaf°tesbury, as might be expected, dories that his rhetoric is 
superfluous but unwittingly betrays his on lack of understanding of 
Locko'3 points "TEAS, Sir, is try meaning; and thourch expras od in 
more words than may bey it is surely not coloured by any rhetorical 
ex3ggeration3. "I In other words, ähafte bury does not realize that 
by Lockeis rigorous standards, superfluous words and rhetorical 
oxaggoraticn3 are almost identical onni that what Lacke is really 
doa3andine;, albeit in a very polite and deferential ton©, is a mors 
dialectical fora of argutont based on bis mcthodu of "balancing" and 







"bottoming out" rather than Socratic Irony or the copiousness of 
Ciceronian rhetoric. ' 
If we return to the Auguatan notion of good-breeding in 
conversational practice, it will be seem that "impartiality, " which 
was considered an essential attribute of dialog uo in theory if not 
always in practice, 
2 
was an important a3tect not only of conversat- 
ional good manners but of the Lockaars dialectic as 'well. Locke's 
Conduct repeatedly exhorts the reader to be "irilifferent" to -any 
opinion, including; his own, until it is thorough1y oxa. -nined. 
Rarely was Looks's exhortation more eloquently oxpreosod than in the 
following pan are: 
In those two things, namely, an equal 
indifferercy for all truth, I mean týe 
receiving it in the love of it as truth, 
but not loving it for am other reason 
before we know it to be true, and in the 
examination of our crincipleo, and not 
receivinýg any for euch nor building on 
theca till we are fully convinced, as 
rational creatures, of their solidity, 
truth, and certainty, consists that 
froadox of the understanding which it 
necessary to a rational creature, and 
without which it is not truly an 
3 
underotandin; -7 .
1. Samuel Johnson, for ono, seems to have considered dialectic a 
crucial part of dials ; uo when he complained about Lyttelton's 
Dialog, uea of the Teaii that "The names of his persona too often 
enable the roader to anticipate their conversation; and when they 
have met, they too often part without any conclusion. " See 
Johnson's Lives of the Poets, ed. by Arthur T'augh,. vo1.6 (London, 
1896)ß p"202. 
2. Pur Fs j 51. 
3. Lei sec. 12P 33-4" 
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Like his remarks on the need to gain a "prospect" from which truth 
may be survoyed, Locke's advocacy of "iMifferency" is closely 
connected to conversational Cood-breading arKi its urbane tolerance 
of the opinion of others. 
euch "inciifferency" could take many forts and ono ma3 a 
rro£ession of "scepticism" as in 1`ryr'cn's Defence of an ''aster on 
Dramatic Poc3ys "I oust crave leave to say, that cy whole discourse 
Ras sc9ptical, accorlirV; to the way of reasoning zhIch Wss used by 
Socrateal Flatop and all the Academics of old, which Tully aad the 
best of the Ancients followed, ... "1 That this scepticism was more 
of an attitude of tolerant im; artiality than a critical weapon becomes 
evident when one examines Uurd's notions of scepticism and impartiality 
in the rhilosophio i1 dialogue. "choine Dryden, '4urd associates 
Cicero's impartiality with "scepticism" and approves of it whol9- 
hoartedlym except in matters of Serious religious and moral import, 
which show that ho wa3 not prepared to entortain a more thoroughgoin , 
iconoclastic scepticioi. 
2 
In his ComrronpInce Bock, he even interprets 
the Socratic method as a weapon ultimately directed acainst 
acCptici m 
Socrates shows finely that ace; ticiam and 
misanthropy arise from similar causes; the 
1attpr from a want of knowin, <; the true 
state of human nituro; the for. "or from not 
perceiving the true state of human reazon. 
3 
1. quoted in Purpunt 51. 
2. Yuri To xiii-xvi " 
3. Francis Kilvort, ?. emoirs of *, e RI ft nvcrnnd Richard Furd D. D. 
(London, 18(9)ß p. 266. Hereinafter to be cited ars Xis. 
Y 
30 
Perhaps it was a nineteenth-century figure, Walter Savage Landor, 
'who best expressed why impartiality was ideally suited to the 
dialogue form: 
I approve of the Dialoguo for the reason 
you have given aye, just now; the fewne33 
of settled truthn, arr-I the facility of 
turning the cycle of our thounhts to what 
aspect we wish, as geometers an 
astronomers the g1obe. 
1 
Landor's viewt in fact, is quintessentially oiehtocnth-century for, 
in the above paa3ajef an "imaginary conversation" betwoon Cicero and 
his brother, he oxtola the dialogue basically for its leisurely 
qualities of impartiality and urbanity. Thus, "impartiality" was 
considered to be not only conducive to goo: convorsation but to the 
reproaucinj of it, given the rhetorical conventiona necessary to do 
so, in dialogue form. chit Hurd and, later, Landor really demanded 
of dialo, ryue : was civilized, urbane discourse rather than dialectical 
disputation. Ilurd says as much in his C=monplaca 300k: "The geniun 
of the Dialogue carts, moral, in3tructiv©; not diarutative or contro- 
versial{ the end, a reasoned opinion to be taken up, not a question 
to be casuiotically discussed. "2 Though Hurdle concoption of 
philosophical dialogue relies heavily on convor3ational decor=, 
however, it does not nccessarily eliminate dialectic. This is because 
truth "insinuated" by good conversation cannot be all that different 
from Locko's dialectical method of "balancing"3 and a "reaaoned 
1. Walter Savawe Landor, Ira inary Conversations of areoýki ani Romana 
(London, 1853), p"429" 
2. JZiý, 252- 
3. As`montioned before, Hurd, himself utilized the "balancing cothod" 
in hie; imaginary "rural dialogue" between Shaftesbury and Locke. ', 
H- .-- 
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opinion to be taken up" implies a dialectical process, even if a 
modest one. If Hurd actually advocates not the elimination of 
dialectic but a "hidden" version of it distinct from an "open, " 
dinutatioua kind, then 1urd'a observations on the nature of 
philosophical dialogue can be generally applied to the widely- 
divergent dialo,, ues of Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Berkeley; all 
of whom have at least this in co=on, that they are attempts to 
simulate conversstion where "raillery" of varyin; ý degrees of 
abrasiveness is included (Generally less co in Berkeley's Three 
I)ielozuea Between T1v1, *r sind Philonouo ans'. Zhaftesbury's The Moralists 
than in ýsn+ievlllo'o dia1o uosr a: xi Onrkeley's Älciphron) but truth 
is nevertheless "in3inuated" rather than rhetorically imposed. 
One consequence of Furd's sorup1ou3 irpartiality, already 
r-ontionod earlier one was his insistence on the subordination of 
character to the requirements of conversational decorum* and this 
seems to be true of any of the best philosophical dialogues including 
Fume's Dialo- uec Concs±rnin-7 Natural '? elision and those of Mandeville, 
Shaftesbury, and Berkeley. It is such an insistence that rakes the 
eighteenth-century philosoVhiccl dialogue often neea almost more 
expository than dialectical but the intricacies of rejroducin ideal 
conversation, at the expense of character, imply an emphasis on 
dialectic. T use In Hurd's "amoral dialogue" tatween taller and tore, 
'aller does almost all the talking, but his attesl2pt to justify 
insincerity, and his on well-known insincere acts as a politician, 
as an inevitable mode of survival in the "co=o rco of the world, " 
sufficiently condemns hin in the eyes of the reader, so that the 
piece could easily have been a dramatic monologue. Fore's infrequent 
32 
interpolations, in any case, simply leaä Waller to more improbable 
words of self-justification, so that a genuin dialectic is 
generated uharoby More serves the function of allowing "kaller "more 
rope by which to hang himself. " In short, because of ý, oro's restraint, 
a very eontloranly dialectic develops anI it is not so such the 
characters of 'lore a& `. 'allor which fa3cinate the reador, as ho would 
he faxiliar with thoi in any case, as the twists and turn3 of . caller's 
conversation, its "casuistry. " 
Swift's ComPlont Collection of nnta 1 arai In onious conversation 
ir3 a good, though obviously satirical, example of what the eighteenth- 
century philosophical dialogue trin4 to avoid. It consists of 
skilfully composed conversations which never develop beyond compliments, 
commonplace oxpressions, superficial discussions of the weather, and 
other such trivial tatters. It is full of verbal go3turiMr but 
devoid or developing ideas, full of urbane conversation but of an 
urbanity so artificial that it never develops into dialectic. 
Besides the pitfalls of oxtroTc conversational decoxurm, Swift's 
target may also havo been the tendency of the wind to warier too 
fast fron on, 3 subjoct to another. As Vocke warnodt 
The eagarnes3 and Strong bent of the 
mind after knowledge, if not warily regulated, 
is often an hindrance to it. It still 
presses into farther discoverlea and now 
objects, and catcies at the variety of 
knowledCo; and therefore often stays not 
lorkT enough on -what is before it, to look 
into it as it should, for haste to pursue 
what is yet out of sight. 
I 
1" Locke, see- 25,5F-" 
- -S, -- 
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At its bests the philosophical dialogue could satisfy such a. 
tendency in the reader's mind and still ovontually reach the goal of 
its dialectic. Signs of this tendency are ragst evident in 
1aniovillo'e dialogues, especially in the opposing interlocutors. 
As will be shown in subsequent chaptorn, u'anloville'a effect is not 
one of static exposition but one of rhetorical exuber3neal on the 
part of the opposing interlocutor, lubricating the dialectical 
"engine" generated by ". andeville's porcona. In chort* as Turd 
implied, the hallmark of eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue 
is a unique combination of conversational urbanity and dialectical 
rigor. 
Among twentieth-century critics who have examinel the dialocu© 
fora, including i'errill, Dickinson, aR ller and Cosentini, there seems 
to be a consensus of opinion that the philosophical dialogue is a 
literary genre because of its unique blend of two ordinarily 
incompatible elements, one from the realm or literature (dramatic 
characterization) and one from philosophy (dialectical development 
of ideas). In this, they differ little'from Aristotle who recognized 
the brbrid nature of philosophical dialogue as a literary genre and, 
according to the fragments of Diogenao Laertius, considered "that 
tho genre of Plato's dialogues Iioo tatween poetry and proso" 
because of its poetically imitativo qualitioa. 
1 
As far as modern 
literary theory is conoornod, it provides an evon caoro solid basis 
for declaring the philosophical dialo um a one for, as Tellek and 
Warren point out, 
1. The '? corks of Aristotle Translatod into , n, glich, ed. by David Rose, 
vol. 12 Oxford, 1952)y 73-4" 
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Lodern genre theory iss clearly, 
descriptive. It doesn't limit the 
number of possible kinds and doesn't 
prescribe rules to authors. It 
supposes that traditional kinds may 
be'bixedD and produce a now kind 
(like trau. -comedy). It see.: that 
gonrea can be built up on the basis 
of inclusiveness or "richness" as 
well as that of "purity" (genre by 
accretion as well as by reduction). 
Instead of oaphaaizinj the distinction 
between kind and kind, it Is 
interested - after the Romantic 
emphasis on the uniqueness of each 
"original genius" and each work of 
art - in finding the coon 
denominator of a kind, its sl; arod 
literary devices and literary purposo. 
1 
In this context, Dickinson's cotient to t: io affect that though 
jhilosophic31 dia1oºue represents the form at its best, it novortho- 
loss "Suffers from a certain incompatibility botvein its dramatic 
and controvor3iax elements, which prevents it ... from being a pure 
and perfect form of art, "2 is highly significant for it confirms 
that philosophical dialo6, ue partakes of a genro by virtue of its 
"richness" rather than it3 "purity. " Thu3, formal dialogue, by 
itself and in all its many manifeotation3, partakeu of genro, 
philosophical dialogue being undoubtedly the best example of the 
1. Rene T*e11ok an Austin Warrens Theory of Literature, third ed. 
(New York, 1956), PP"234-5" 
2. Pickinsonj 1q. 
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genre at its richest as a litera'p art-farm. 
With their blend of dialectical disputation and rhetorical 
per3uasion, philosophical dialo oa are eapecially prone to analysis 
in terra of rhetoric. 2chae1 Morrioroa Jr., for oxezpla, has 
analyzoa ? iumo'u DiMloy zoe Concert aural T e1i ion not only in 
relation to its lo ; pica) objections aj ainzt the argument from design, 
but also in tern of its rhetoric which, in thi context of Hume's 
arßuont, in not logically or ihiloaoph1iCally ntecessary, but serves 
t, he of urxiexminint; tho reader's ppycholo, 3ioal proponsity to 
accept tho argumant from design F? u a'a ex p1o, by itso1ft 
confirms that Restoration and Augustan theories of dialogue as a 
"plain, easy, and familiar way" of dealing; with weighty ursatter are 
inadequate. That only accounts for their tendency to popularize 
difficult ideas in the spirit of Loc'k's "rhetoric of plainness" 
but not the remarkable varieties of r va that diaio-us writers tried 
to achieve euch an aim. 't'hey hardly, be , in to describe the 
rhetorical and dialectical complexities of philosophical dialogue, 
of which Hums) was not the only great practitionor in the eighteenth 
century. Mandoville, if not as great, was more prolific and highly 
inventive. Shaftoobury has only one philocophical dialogue to his 
credit, The Lcralists, but it introduced an almost Romantic 
aesthetic dimension, partly derived from Plato, to the philosophical 
dialoCue which was not talon up again until Lcndor's monumental 
1. '! ichaol ý'arxiGroa Jr., "iiuro'; 1 Rhetorical 3tratejs .A olution to tho Riddle of tho tinloi uo, Cor rnin g x: aturtl Rat ricn, " 
Toxaa Studios in LittraturA and LLanpuaa-o, 11 (1969-70)t 963-74* 
.- 
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series of SMar; inary conversations* Berkeley's contributions to 
the philosophical dialogue range from the vigorously dialectical 
Three Dialogues 1 otween fl las an3 Philonous to that engagin work 
of Christian apologetics, Alciphron. 
These three authors are linked in having uinilar moral concerns 
oxpro ed in many ways, but tost irtere tingly, certainly . most 
dramatically, within the frai ework of philoccphical dialogue where 
their moral conoern3 are presented in term: -3 of the inter-action of 
persona1itiaa rlotorically rather than naturali3t1o 11y depicted. 
All three expanded the poazibilitie of philooophical dialogue 
beyond slavish imitation of Platonic and Ciceronian modele and all 
three had critical opinions about it, äbaftesbury'o being the most 
elaborately developed. Even minor writers of philosophical 
dialo,, ues, such as Hurd, the little-known Ceorge ºtubbe3, 
Shafteubury's disciple, David Fordyce, and William Gilpin someticos 
achieved effects worthy of examination. 
It is in th3 firnt half of the eighteenth century, however, 
that the most important of these dialoL-ue writers flourished co 
that, as a writer of ihilooophical dialogue, F, ucc is a rather 
isolated figure in the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
1. For an illuzinatiri; analysis of how the characters of Hume's 
n! lojies Concernin! t'atural Pelipicn aro given just enough 
pr2onfility, in the sense that Kurd advocated, although this is 
not mentioned t, y the article, to enliven the rhetoric and 
dialectic of the debate, see Michael L: orrisroe, Jr., "Character- 
ization as Zihotoricul Device in Hume'o Plalopunn Concernir; 
aturnl Roli, 7ian, " : alt htpn^mnt spays, 1 1970 , 95-107. 
2. one should t *o into account, however, another Scotaxan, the 
painter Allan ! ay s whose "iR1o tu on Taste 
(1763), thcuch 
npparontly nover popular with the robin public, is nevertheless 
a vary oloCantly-written and highly entortcining philosophical 
dialojue. 
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unless one groups hin with such continental masters of the genre 
as Voltaire and Diderot. One interesting reason why the dialogue 
was a more successful literary mode in France was suggested 
anonymously in a contemporary review of Lyttelton's "1a1ouns of the 
. ho 7F'n32i3h being generally reserved 
and uncom. -unicativa in their aiepouitions, 
are sententious not nervous in their 
expressions; which naturally inclines 
theme to deliver their sentiments in set 
dissortotion3. The French, on the 
contrary, aºho, in some particulars, core 
nearer the polite Athenians, being more 
open, co. nr unicative, and social in their 
nature, have carried the ck ri; of 
conversation to higher perfection, and 
are conze; uontly better capable of 
writing in the familiar way of dialogue. 
l 
In Britain, at any rata, the philooophical dialogue wa39 apparently, 
rapidly superseded by other forms of discursive writing such as the 
periodical essay and formal philosophical treatise in a "belle- 
lottriat" mould. Thus, iutlor'o Analo r of Polio-ion was far more 
popular than Berkeley's Aloiphron with the generality of readers 
and, possibly, the ton: ency to acorn intellectual arguments in 
favour of assertive pronouncements, such as that displayed by 
1. , Owen Ituffhe iJ, "Dia1opues of the 'read, " no Vonthly Peviaw, 
22 (1760)9 409. The author has b3en identified by i enjo 1n 
Christie Nang1e, Th© ? onthly Review First Serieot 1J49-1782s 
Int3exes of Contributors and Articles Cxfordl 1934), P"39. 
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Johnson or Durkee became more acute as the century pro sse3.1 
hatev©r the reasons for the decline of the dialotue form in 
the latter half of the eighteenth century, a clone analysis of the 
ihilooophics1 dialoLues of `.. `andoville, Shaftesbury, and Berkeley 
in their Akugrustan context should yield now perspectivo3 on a 
major genre of the time and its relationship to othor genres 
destined to supersede it. It is intorestin, 3 to note, in this 
connection, that ?! anleville's first substantial series of dialogues, 
apart from The Virgin tInrnask'd, appeared anonymously in a 
periodical, The i male Tatler. This set of dialoguc33 and their 
relationship with the informally disquisitional style of 
periodicals witl be the subject of the next chapter. 
1. Such a statexent, Of necessity, has to be zade with groat care 
as there are many other factors that tust be taken into account 
in analyzing the styles of eighteenth-century writers, but there 
is irobubly a lot of truth in the claim that the argumentative 
rhetoric of Johnson aº Burke was highly ossertivo, certainly 
more so than dialect2cal. For en extreme view of the alleged 
assertiveness, and aver. anti-intellectualism, of eighteenth- 
century style in general, see Russell : raoer, " ationali%. ca and 
the Discursive ; tylo, " !! udnon Review, 18 (1965), 376-86. 
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CHAPTER Il. DI ALOG Ti III '1'E DIS 
, 
tJI3I TI ON AL L OD^ s $": A2d1 VI LL! 'S 
L[Tcx? rA-. & P'? 31 A PAPz«'x'; 3 AND ST aL `': 3 TATL. t 
"I said, it was eausin to see 
the way in which he fell upon 
Steele, Shaftesbury, and other 
amiable writers, and the terror 
you were in for your favourites, 
just as when a hawk is hovering 
over and going to pounce upon 
soro of the more harmless 
feathered tribe. " 
Willi= UazlItt in 
Conver3ations of J&-. es 
IroMhcote, s. R. A. (1530)1 
1.1si1lit t flazlitt, The Complete "Works, ad. by P.?. rioTe, vol. II 
(London and Toronto, 1932), p. 242. 
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One aspect of the polemical dialogue that hai influenced the 
development not only of philosophical dialogue but of the novel and 
periodical essay in the eighteenth century as well, was its occasional 
tendency to deal with a set-topic in a more exploratory am] disquis- 
iticnaZ than purely iolexical manner. Ouch a tendency was especially 
diaplaye. by the polemical "dialogue-journals" of the Restoration, the 
most prominent am innovative of which was Roger L'Estrange'a Cbservator. 
l 
In spite of tho fact that the Cbservitor was a partisan publication 
cupportinV the policies of Charles 11,2 L'retrango's dialogues were 
often witty and even dialectically subtle. One issue, for example, 
deals with the topic of political manipulation of public opinion, 
with special reference to that practised by the Whig Oppooition. The 
protagonists are the "Cboervator" himself and. "Trimmer, " who represents 
the whigo. Although L'Estrange's aim in the diolo6ue, is to discredit 
the Thies, he does so in an oblique manner, as in the exchange where 
Trimmer describes the technique of manipulationo 
Tri`a. ... Eck is i`ignified -with the Name of 
Consoienco, the Story of their Criov&nce3, is tho 
Bittorest of Satyrs; Their vary Potitiona daue the 
force of Tnvectiv. 3; and the Smoatherr$ the Softer, 
You find the : urfý of then, the Falaer, and the 
morn Iran ? orous they are at the Bottom; For betwixt 
the Persecution that is Insinuated, on the part of 
the CovernmAnt, & the 7nnocpneo, the x'i i 
amity, 
and the 
k"oýlestg9 on that of the Sufferor3, Nothing can more 
1. The first dialogue-journals appeared only seventy-two days b3foro 
the ^haervator in Dialogue (to give it its füll title), which first 
appeared on 13 April 1 661. See the editor's introduction to 
Roger L'Eatrante, "Ooloctionn frcra the Observatort ed. by Violet 
Jordeln, Th Au, rust an T eparint Soclet yi no. 141 (1970) t 1. 
hereinafter to be cited as Ch3ervator. 
2. Sea Gbsorvator, iv-v. 
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Provoke, a Porror, and Indignation for the One, or 
a Tenderness, & Compassion, for the Other. 
Ctrs. That is to say, = Ong Those that are not 
Well . ntorr'd, in the Reuen, and acuity of the 
Cause in Cuestion. 
Trim. Come Come. T tell ye 23akAdly how thin«a 
-ArAq 
and not how they Aught to be: and I speak of 
Those 1Aen too, that neither Po, nor will, nor Can 
aaste a flight Jut} t upon the ratter in Issue. 
They do not take down Reasons in Conte; neither 
do their Teachers so much as Offer at 'em; But their 
"ork is, only to Fend Itchin^T 7*ar3, and humours, 
with ? dew uoyn'd ? "oxds, Affectate Phi: And 
briofly, to Instruct their Disciples, by äiona und 
To ns, like so many 1)anoin º ? ýorses to fall Lyme 
upon all Four, for the Po . e; to come-Over, 
for the (IraM Vizier; and at the very Sound 
of Babylon, Ant Christ, or Absolute Power, 
to Snort, and Dop le, as if they Smelt Fire. ... 
1 
. 
Tri=er is not condemned Outright hero. Instead, L'. strange Presents 
a discussion, racily colloquial in style and gentlemanly in tone, the 
draiatic 'point of which is to expose Trimmer's cynicism about row 
the Whigs exploit popular prejudices for their own ends. The whole 
seems intended to arouse the reader's suspicions about Rhig motives, 
however legitimate they may seem on the surface. Despite L'Estrange's 
evident partisanship hero, in any case, the disloEuo is so finely 
dramatic and dialectically acute in what it ina1nuatez about the 
y pigs, that it works as an informal disquisition on Political 
manipulation. As Violet Jordain puts it, "L''strange ... creatos 
both ady+ rsariusP3 as dr. atis rrßonae rather than an simple straw 
reh, a departure from tose xvn-of-the'Mill Restoraticn dialogue. "2 
1. Ohservator, 36-7. The issue is that of 21 . %ucust 1686. 
2. Cb rvator, viii. 
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Thus, although the Cbssrvator, and other dialogue-journals, were, in 
R. F. Bon's phrase, "vohicles of partisanship" undoubtedly related 
to the polemical paaphlots of the Co=onwealth and Fteatoration, 
l 
the 
dialoguo3 in Mrstrango, 5 journal, at least, are not always devoid 
of artistry. 
Later journals influenced ty the fbeervator, such as Defoe's 
Review and Steels's Tatler did not confine discourse on a set--topic 
to dialogue but to the essay as well. Defoe and Steele, nevertheless, 
were very adert in their use of the ton. Before examining the 
dialogues in the Review and Tatl. r, however, it should be noted that 
though dialogue declined in periodical essays in the first half of 
the eighteenth century, the pelf-contained dialogue on a set-topic 
continued to be a frequent device in the eighteenth-century novel* 
it would be misleading to say, however, that the intoraal essay and 
the self-contained dialogue competed for porulcrity in periodical 
publications, or that the frequency of self-contained dialogue in 
wt 
novels compensated for its in periodical assays. This is 
because, all theca forms, far from beint, mutually-axcluaive, shared 
a similar presentation of argument, nixely informal disquisition on 
a set-topic. ) a device not only very popular with readero'but also 
fully consonant with the neo-classic emchaais on conversational ease 
and rational tidiness. 
According to Jiartholow V. Crawford, the calf-contained dialogue 
within a narrative "was a factor of real iarortanoe in England from 
1. Rich--ond P. Bond, "Introduction, " in Richmond P. Bonds ed", 
Studies in thA V*r2 r'n! -1iah Periodical (Chipol U119 North 
Carolina, 195T )s P"31. 
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1600 to 1750. "1 Crawford describes such diilogues as being mainly 
discussions of abstract topics in vhich characterization in non- 
exietent, though they made an i=portant contribution to the 
development of the novel. He does not, however, consider the 
contribution to have been wholly positive: 
in a senge, instructive conversation was an 
experiment, not wholly 2ucce33fu1, but at the 
same time useful to the developing novel. It 
tended on the ono hand to break up straight 
narration by introducin,; eituation3 involving 
two or more persona in an intellectual 
rolation: 2hip; on the other hand it developed 
Into real converuation which advanced 
characterization and plot. 
2 
This is probably true as far as it goes, but Crawford neglects the 
strong pooaibility that auch "formal dia1o6mes" ccsdo one other 
contribution to the eiuhtpenth-cantury novel in that the infam 
disquisitions in dialogue in which obaractcr playa a part, though 
they do not contribute to the plots cf the novels in which they 
1. 'What Crawford ha3 in mind is not only tho eighteenth-century 
novel but also seventeenth-century rorinces in which self- 
contained d# alo , us occurs, such as those by ücudery and 
Calprenode, which were later satirized by Charlotte Lonnox's 
? Areale Cuixoto (1752), and such _rgliah work3 (to nvus only a few) 
as Howell's Parley of Peasts (1664), Samuel Uiartlib's Peacription 
of thw famous Yin on of Ifacaria (1641), and Jazzes Puckis's Tho 
Club 1711. See BartholorV. Crawford, "Th© Uso of Formal 
Dialogue in Narrative, " Philoloiicil wua ,1 
(1922), 179-91. 
flereinaftor to be cited as cra__, 
_ 
wford. 
2. Crate, 179. Henry 1Cnicht ! i11er confirm Crawford's view of 
tha positive effects of the "fornal dialogue on the develo; Went 
of the novel when he says of . Fioldina'a novels that "tbere in 
no doubt that the dialo6, ue, usually with two or three interlocutors, 
remained a basic structural element with Fielding even in his 
novels; and it is tartly his skill in this form - which by its 
very nature denaruda that action, setting, and character be 
convoyed through the words of the speakers - that rakea the 
conversation of the novels so lively, dra--atia, and revealing of 
character. " See i. 'en y Knight V: 111er, Teeaue on Fialling's 
". xisoellenies" (Princeton, 2+ew Jersey, 1961)9 pp. 415-6- 
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appear, may have directly developed from formal dialogues on set- 
topics which occur in the narratives of the seventoonth century. 
The breaking; -up of straight narration by wolf-contained dialogucu, 
at any rate, should not necessarily be considered a defect. TO do 
so is to judge the eighteenth-century novel by the standards of 
Henry Ja=ea, who a3su. 1ed that the novel at its best must display a 
"fine central intelligence" through which all observations and 
descriptions in the novel are filtered, 
1 
but the eighteenth-century 
novel, which urzioubtedly reached pokes of excellence in the novels 
of Fielding, Richardson, and Sterna, should not be con$idered a3 
merely a stage in the eventual development of the Jaesian novel and 
its successors. 
The role of calf-contained di: iloeue in eighteenth-century novels 
can perhaps best be appreciated in those of Fielding. In Jose h 
Andrews (1742), for example, the dialogues not directly contributing 
to the plot give the reader a sense of the leisurely play of ideas 
for their own sake, which slows down its pace and contributes to 
its overall aesthetic effect on the reader. 'thus, the dialogue 
between the Player and the Foet (Bk. III, ch. X), which has 
to do with the fortunes of the protajonieta, works as an 
entertaining, interlude before the reader is once again plunged into 
the frenetic escapades of Jo3eph Andrews and Parson Adams. Another 
example from Vielding, and one closer to philosophical dialogue, is 
tk. IX, ch. III of Amelia (1751), which is labelled "A conversUion 
between Dr. Earrison and others. " InUt, as soon as "the ladies 
I. See kionry Janes, The Art of the Novel, ed. by R.?. blackmur 
(NLev York, 1962), pp. xviii-xix. 
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withdraw, " including the heroine of the title, a "Colonel Path, who 
had been very brisk with champagne at dinner"I discusses duelling; 
with the clergyman, "Dr. ! arricon" or, rather, attempts to bully 
him into submission to his own views about it. Dr. Ttarriscn, 
hcwever, is more than a catch for hic, as in the following aachanne: 
"Drink about, doctor,  cries the colonel; "and let us 
call a now cause; for I perceive we shall never awe on 
this. You are a Churchain, and I don't expect you to 
speak your mind. " 
"'Ne, are both of the sama Church, I hope, " cries the 
doctor. 
"I am of the Church of tn; 7, larz1, air, " answered the 
colonel, "and will fight for it to th3 last drop of y 
blood. " 
"It 13 vory gencrous in you, colonel, " crie3 the 
doctor, "to tight so zealously for a religion by which 
you are to be damnod. t' 
"It is well for you, doctor, " cries the colonel, 
that you wear a gown; for, by all the dignity of a 
man, if any other person had said the wurde you 
have just uttered, I would have mado'hita eat thorn; 
ray, d---n ne' and my sword into the barg; in. "2 
The colonel's position in favour of duallind is undermined by dramatic 
insinuation because he shows himself toe ready to resort to violence 
in the settling of an argument, which it? lies that duelling cannot 
be justified in rational terms, an well as a coward in threatening 
a clergyman who cannot accept challenges. At the carne time, opposing 
views on the morality of duellir., are succinctly presented, as they 
1. Henry 'ie1din, A'nq1ia, e3o by George Ga. intsbury, vol. III 
(London, 1693), p. 11. Hereinafter to be cited as Amelia. 
2. Amelia III, 14" 
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would be in philosophical dialogue. 
1 
Sarah Fieldin 's The Adventures of David simple (1744) contains 
dialogues that, very much as in the dialogues and essays of Steele's 
Tatter, are sometimes aimed at improving the reader's "taste. " 
Thus, in one dialogue, the shallownoss of drama criticism in the 
conversation of "polite" circles is exposed. At one point, the 
"Ladies, " talkin,; all at the same tine, express their preference 
for Addison's Cato over George Lillo'e sentimantal drama The London 
'rerchantt "Oh intolerable! cry for an odious Apprentice-1 oy, who 
murderod his Uncle, at the Instigation of a common Woman, and yet 
be unmoved, when even Cato bled for his Country. "2 The amusing 
manner in 'which Sarah Fielding convoys the snobbery of the "Ladies, " 
and thereby satirizes it, reveals her preference for Lillo's Flay 
over Addison's. 'i'hers is also the critical judgment implied that 
Lille's play is better because it shown greater sympathy for the 
F"ersonal exºotiona of ordinary people rather than the abstract, 
public ones of a remote historical "hero. " 
One othor characteristic woih'i noting. about David Sipple is 
that, in cocoon with many other eighteenth-century novels, especially 
1. A novel which comes vary close to philosoghical dialogue is 
Sarah Scott's A Description of 'Lillenium Hall (1762). As V1. M. 
Crittenden describes it, it "is an account of a sort of charity 
school conducted in the vest of England by five ladies who joined 
their fortunes in order to finance the work. " It has elements 
of philosophical discussion, as Crittenden points out, on "major 
social, political and religious problems" and: secondly, because 
the discussions take place in idyllic surroundings reminiscent 
of miry philosophicil dialogues, includinM Plato's dialogues, 
! onry score's Divine Dialogues, and Shafteshury's The '. oraliata. 
This is how the traveller who visits it describes his first 
impression of the grounds of "" llonium UIall"s "... the eye is 
so charred with the remarkable verdure and neatness of the fields, 
with tlie beauty of the flowers which are planted all round thorn, 
and seem to prix with the thickset hedges, that time steals away 
insensibly. " See =arch Scott, A Pescri tion of : 'illanium Hall, 
ad. by alter U. Crittenden (; ew York, 1955)t PP-7 and 31. 
2. Sarah Fielding, The Adventures of David Simple, edo by Malcolm 
Kelsall (London, 1969), p. 83. Hereinafter to be cited as Simple. 
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by minor writers, character is subordinated to the demonstration of 
a thesis. 'thus, Simple hinsolf holds the reader's interest less as 
* character than the embodiment of a thesis, namely the instructive 
contrast between moral simplicity and" the double-dealing hypocrisy 
of the world. As a recent editor of the novel ruts it, ": iss 
F'ieldin is aftirable at detecting and analysing malignity and 
pride cloaked by hypocrisy within the human heart, but she does not 
dramatize what she analyses. "1 This dialectical tendency culminated, 
on the one hind, in that "moral tale" (Sarah 'iold. inj harze1f called 
har novel a "I'loral Romance") 
1 
which can scarcely be conaidere3 a 
novel, äaruel Johnson's Rnsaelas (1759) ans, on the other, novels 
illustratinj, by means of set-piece conversitions, radical political 
and social idea3. Th0oe appeared at the and of the century, at a 
tine of political aZitation in 'ngland aryl revolution in France, 
and Include such works as Robert rage's }IoM spronK (1796), Elizabeth 
Inchbald's tature arn! Art (1796), Thomas xrolcroft's Anna . at. Ives 
(1792), and "illiaa Codwin's Caleb 'Xillia. nz (1794)" The role of 
oolf-contained dialo&ue in the ei, hteonth-century novel, at any rate, 
undoubtedly noedo further study. It is sufficient to-note here that the 
self-contained dialogue of the novel and the informally discuißitiona1 
dialogue of the periodical essay both fulfilled an evident demand 
by the rezUng public for entertainment and edification in the form 
1. Siiplg, zii. 
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of 1©isur, ly discussion. i 
The periodical d1a1orues of Defoe'u Review, Stoele's Taw tier 
and, espcciallyg Uandevillos contribution3 to the Female Tatler, 
2 
in any case, 3ometimca went beyond the ciis uisiticn%l rodo in their 
complex patterns of dialectic. This in the case in refco'a dialojae 
(on! ) of a series) between a Jacobit, and a "raabyterian in issue 
no. 164 of the RivImw. The subject wa:, a controversial one, the 
recently-accomplished union of ": r. -land and ! cotlan1. Despite his 
diolike of both protagonistG, Týcpo avoids the Lucianic t©nstation 
of satirizing one or both of theca and only gives then enou h peroon- 
ality to sustain the flow of arZum nt. His reasons for choosing 
two such interlocutors are as straightforward as one could wish: 
In yl at ý5aview 
%, I be, zn tha fatal Dialogue 
between a cunning sly Jack te, ani a gell 
maanin1; but ignorant Preshyterian In 3cotiand; 
in pursuing which Discourse, perhaps the whole 
Uystery of iniquity in that Part of the World 
1. Sterna's 1'riý s try Sher aoezsa to play , havoc with the 
eighteenth-century reader's expectations of leisurely discussion 
for ha is subjected to lore dia; uiaitiona (for example, the ferrous 
one on noses) which are abruptly cut-off and then unexpectedly 
taken up again in other c: aptera, argumont where the characters 
talk at cross-purposes but blithely ignore the fact, Walter Shandy's 
futile attempts to enrage his wife In philosophical discussion, 
and so forth. Unlike Sterne's work, Thomas Amory's The Life of 
John uncle (1756) does not play with the reader's expectation of 
Informal disquisition but it tares the dialogue in the dinquisitional 
mode to such absurd lengths that it is certainly one of the factors 
that accounts for the unintentional comedy that novel is f sous 
for. For a succinct description of the eccentric role of kunclo's 
loquacious disquisitions in the novel, sea Crate, 1C6. 
2. The Fer. *le ''atler appeared roughly twice a week for 115 issues 
from July 6,1709 to Var. 31,1710. In addition, spurious editions 
of issues 19-44 also appeared under the eawe title and at the same 
time as the originals. Sea R. T. '1ilford, "The Fo-male Tatler, " 
Lodern Philology, 29 (1931-32), 350-1" 
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may be laid open, and the Riddles of what 
we call in ''ngland the i'irk opposing, the 
Union, be expounded. 
1 
In abort, Defoe is using dialogue here to dr atize the polemical 
point that the opposition of the Church of Scotland to union with 
' nand in due to the blandiohients of the Jacobites rather than 
outright hostility to the proposal and therefore, presumably,. 
amenable to revision once Jacobite Intrigues are exposed. After 
many exchanges of opinion between the Jacobite and the Presbyterian, 
where the Jacobite tries to convince the Presbyterian that an 
alliance with the lesser evil of "Papist" France would be far more 
advantageous than union with an Wnglýnd dominated by "Prelacy, " the 
Jacobite quickly falls Into a trap laid for him by the Presbyterian 
whose suspicions were undoubtedly earlier aroused: 
Wis. And you will join with use will you? 
. iac. Aye with all our erhole Strength. 
Prei. Arai will you capitulate with us to 
establish the Protestant RelI4on, ? resbitery 
and Church Covernnent? 
Jac. Let us destroy this union, and raise 
the Parliament first, and we'll eaäily 
a ree afterwards to as to please all Parties. 
Pros. Behind me : ratan! Now I have found it all 
out, no air, I have done; ... I see the Drift; 
'tie all Jacobitisx,, Popery, Prelacy und 
1. All the Issues of "rafoe'e ! tw are available in a facsimile 
edition entitled Defoe'a Review, ed. by Arthur Wellesley äecorY1 
(rew York, 1938). All references to Defoe's Rem are to this 
edition. Thus the above cuoto is to be fount in vol. III, no. 
164. 
1toreinsfter to be cited as 'Rmyletwo 
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tyranny, and I have done Sir, and all my 
Friends; my lord for its Sir, you get not a 
Camoronian in all Scotland to side with you 
on that Foot, I should be glad. to have 
Security for the Kirk on good and safe 
Foundation, but not at that Price, Sir, by 
no zieans, 'tis too dear a great deal. 
1 
There is a certain amount of irony, both intended ae far as the 
machinations of the Jacobite are concerned, and probably unintended 
as far as the irony might reflect on the Presbyterian's duplicity, 
in the fact that though Defoe describes the Jacobite as "sly" and 
"cunning, " it is the Presbyterian who wins the arguaent by the very 
shrewd device of leading; the Jacobite to admit unwittingly that an 
independent Scottish Parliament would be established first and any 
other grievances settled later, thus discovering that the re- 
establishment of the Catholic Pretender is uppermost in the Jacobite's 
1. Review, 'vol. III, no. 166. The dialectical pattern of Hurd's 
"moral dialogue" On Retirement between Sprat and Cowley is very 
similar to that of Defoe's dialogue though the subject is 
evidently more urbanely philosophical. Sprat's "mission, " one 
instigated by Cowley's former patron, in this dialogue, iss to 
persuade Cowley that his abrupt retirement from court life was 
an unsociable, selfish act which could only be rectified by 
giving up his retiro cnt in the country. Sprat seems to win the 
argument until he points out to Cowley all the comfortable 
advantages of life at tourt. Cowley pounces on this ploy because 
it exposes Sprat's willing; neas to use any argument to persuade 
him to return. Sprat has fallen into the trap of attempting to 
appeal to Cowley's selfishness, or self-interest, just after all 
attempts to appeal to his moral sense or altruism have failed. 
Part of the effectiveness of this dialogue, as that of Pefoe's, 
is perhaps due to the biblical prototype of the temptation of 
Christ by Satan for, ultimately, it is really political power and 
influence that Sprat is actually offering to Cowley and the same 
can be said of the Jacobite, though the choices faced by the 
Presbyterian are both worldly. See Richard Hurd, : oral and 
Political iii ale ., es . with totters on Chivalry and 
Romance, fourth 
edition London, 1771 t pp. 51-131. 
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rinds not the protection of the Kirk. 
It is the pxoce3s by which the Presbyterian bnlancen, in 
Lockean fa3hion, the advanta ea of union with "; 'ngland or alliance 
with France, which makes refoe's dialocue veer towards the 
philosophic. mhos Jacobite, in fact, supplies good argum4nt3 for 
alliance with France and it Is for that rea3on that deypito the 
humiliation of his defeat, there is a genuine development of ideas 
in the dialogue. In the words of W. L. ? ayne about "efoo'a use of 
dialogue In the T-evi ar: 
To may conclude that he used it au a device 
to lighten arai mice more interesting what 
otherwise would have been bleak, formal 
ar'u ent. Certainly he tust have been 
aware that by its very nature it shows the 
development of an idea, and when employed 
to clarify abstract ideas, allows the 
author to malte his point$ and the reader 
to grasp Sty in a more leisurely fashion 
than would direct exposition. In short, 
4'r. Review used it for the same reason he 
used Definition - as an aid to clarity. 
1 
Cne Hood only aid that though Defoe used dialogue sparingly in his 
periodical, when ho did use its it was with such artiotry that he 
often achieved the dialectical effects of philooophical dialogue. 
Ste®la'a Ttler employed dia1oSuo even leas than Defoe's ? ýAW 
and often in conjunction with other forn3. One Good example is 
T tlcr ro. 165 where 23ickerstaff presents a satirical 
1. William Lytton Payno, F`r. Rnview: n: tnin1 Defoe as Author of 




"character"1 of a literary critic before describir his intru3ion 
into a domestic gathering mIlde up of , ickerntaff, a married couple, 
and their maidenly daughters. As the critic is courting the eldest 
daughter, this dialogue evidently has elements of the comedy of 
manners{ moreover the sitirical aide of the Lucianic mods reveals 
Itself In exchanges like the followings 
It confeao, continued shot (for I found 
ehe waa resolved to ekes; orate him) 2 
laughed very heartily at the last new 
Camely which YOU found ao much Fault with. 
iut, Madmmy says he, you ought not to have 
laughedi and I defy any onq to show me a 
single Rule that you could laugh by. Ought 
not to laughf caps ehe, Pray who should hinder 
me? Uadax, says ho, there are such people In 
the World as ? Rapin, ra eier, and several others, 
that ought to have spoiled your ? 1rth. 2 
The dialogue itself is encapsulated vithin a light-hearted, yet 
eminently eerioua, gickerstaffian essay on the ierilu of pedantry. 
Although in Ta t1 r no. 165 Steele eGploya dialogue to create a 
comic scene illustrating csickerstaff'e essayiotic disquisition oti 
pedantry, he was also very adept at dinlorve in a more diajuieiitional, 
1. The "character" or character-ekatch was a vary froiuont device in 
the Ta__ tlnr and ärrctr tor. Usually such "characters" were 
influenced by those of La Bruyere, chose character-sketches were 
more individualized than those of Theophrastus. Uarrioville, 
himself, made ample uae of the "character, " again in the mode of 
La Druyere, in his contributions to the FPvi1e Tatler. For the 
influence of La i zj re on Steele and P4dison, see t: argaret Turner, 
"The Influonce of La kruyere on thee' Tatler and the Siectator, " 
end rn Lanruamo Reviesl 48 (1953), 1016. For the influence of 
Lýa 1ruylre on the earlier Fern; le Tatlero, see R ;. B. Anderson, "La 
üruyore and is. Crackenthorpe's Fer 'ile Tatler, " Puhiicatfons of 
th. Pcdiarn l. snfveire Association, 52 (19373,71-00-03. 
2. The Lucubrations of Isaac'Bickerstaff Esa. (Dublin 1751), pp. 218-19. 
Hereinafter to be cited as Lucubrations I, II9 III or IV. 
53 
oven if mildly satirical, mode. The finest of these In probably 
the one on duelling in Tatlorr no. 39" iickerstaff'e intention to 
"bottom out" the causes of duelling are clearly stated in his 
introduction to the dialogues "The persona concerned in it are Eden 
of Honour and rx erience in the Vanners of Uen, and have fallen upon 
1 
the truest Foundation, as gell as searched the Bottom of this 1'vil. " 
The conversation centres on what Col. "Plume, " an old Cavalier, has 
to say about the custom in his time, which adroitly servos as a short 
exposition of duelling during the Beatoration. There is a certain 
amount of raillery on the part of the two other converaationalista, 
"Sir lark" and "2r. Sage, " for they hardly conceal their contempt 
for duelling* Thua, at one points Sir tiazk is led to exclaim 
sarcastically$ "IF the Fashion of Quarrelling and Tilting eaa so 
often changed in your Time, Colonel Plume, a an might tight, yet 
lose his Credit for Want of underatandin, the Fachion. "' That, in 
fact, is the conclusion arrived at, that duelling was mainly a 
fashionable custom, closely wedded to aristocratic notions of honour, 
but that like all rashicniible customs, it constantly changed in 
detail so that one style of duelling was deecod honourable one day 
and despicable the next. The corollary. tollows that duelling can 
have very little in co=on with morality, honour, and good sense, 
and it takes the form of an angry rhetorical question from Er. 3v-al 
"BUT what Is the Reason, that Lton of tho most excellent zanse and 
V orals (in other Points) associate their Understandings with the 
very pretty rollose in that Chimera of a 'Duel? " The question 
is 
answered just as rhetorically by Sir Marks "1'RZ 
'$ no dis}-uting 
against so groat a iaajority. "3 1 
1. Lucubrations I, 23,3- 
2. Lucubrations It 23.5. 
3. Lucubrations I, 233. 
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What bas been said thus far about the dialo se only describes 
the direction of its dialectic. it is also very awmusing, as in the 
following exchange, in which Col. P1ute recites an anecdote about 
the customs 
I wac loin,; to tell you, mr. vare, shat 
one Cornot Vodish had dosired his Friend, 
Captain mart's Opinion in some Aff ir, 
but did not follow it; upon which Captain 
Smart sent Major Adroit (a very topping 
Follow or those Tires) to the rerson that 
had alighted his Advice. The Major never 
enquired into the c, uarrel, because it was 
not the manner then among the very toppit ; 
Fellows; but got two 3worda of an equal 
Le-ý$th, and then waited upon Cornet 
L-b81ch, desiring; him to chuse his Sword, 
and coat his Friend Captsin Ste. 
Cornet Modish came with his Friend to the 
Place of Combat; there the Principals put 
on their Pustps, and stripi. ed to their 
Shirts, to show they had. nothing; but 
what ken of '; onour carry about them, and 
then engnged. 
Sir Mark. ? did the Seconds stand by, Sir? 
Col. Plume IT was a received Custom 
till that Time; but the Swords at those Days 
being pretty long, and Principals acting; 
on both Silos upon the Defensive* and 
the Morning being frosty, ! ajor mit 
desired that the other Second, who was 
also a very toppirj. Follows would try a 
Thrust or two only to keep them warm, 
till the Principals had decided the 
hatter, which was agreed to by Vodlshla 
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Socond, who praaontly whipt Adroit 
through tho Body, disa=ed hit, ant 
then parted the ? rincip3la, who had 
received no Hama at all. 
I 
vin the armusin,; anecdote3, however, verve the purpoae of furthering 
tho dialectic# as the ono just quoted is probed by 'r. 3a¬e with the 
result of demonstrating how duels are detear incd by frivolous 
f aahio ne s 
Yr.,,; ne. BUT vas not Adroit laughed, atz 
Col. P1ý. C the contra. r, the very 
topping Fellows were after of Opinion, 
That no an who do3erved that Character, 
could serve aas A Second, without 
fiiht1n ; and the Smarts and.: odirshee 
finding their Account in its the 
Humour took without Opposition. 
Lr.,,, 
_ ., 
PRAY, Colonel, how long 
did the Fazhicn continue? 
Col. Plum. NOT long neither Mr. 
59e-! I for as coon as It became a 
Fashion, the very topping Fe1lown 
thought their Honour reflected upon, 
if thoy did not profer themselves as 
äecom13 when any of their Friends had 
a Quarrel, no that aozeticno3 there 
were a 1ozen of a Sfde 
In short, thin dialogue, despite its brevity$ in not only concise 
and pleasantly conversational in tone but, in its shrewd dialectic, 
it also partakoa of the characteristics of fins philosophloal 
dialor; u . It enis very effectively with an ironic comont 
from Sir 
Vaz4cs "? IIY, aantleman, if they arc ; pan of such nice Honour, (and 
ist fight) there will be 
no tear of foul Play, if they threw up 
Gross or file who should be uhot. " 
3 
1. Iucubrations I, 235-6- 
2, Lucubrations I, 236. 
3. Lucubrations I1 238. 
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In view of the aophisticatai use of dialog by -teole, Defoe, 
and even, at times, L'13strnnge in their periodical journals, it is 
evident that Mandeville had ample precedent for going beyond 
strident political partisanship in his brief excursion into periodical 
journalism. Ile was, however, far more committed to the. dialo, u© 
fors:, both qualitatively and quantitatively, than either refoe or 
Steele. At least seventeen of Mandeville's thirty-two contributions 
to the Female Tatler are cast in dialogue form e1thor in whole or 
considerable Part. He may thus be said to have restored the 
importance of dialo, ^ue, at least briefly, to periodical publications 
but, as will be seen, in a manner more rain to "i)efoo and Steele, 
than to L' h str3nae and the nu'ercus imitators of his dialogue-journal. 
Mandeville, how3ver, rotained much of L'; 'ctran '5 sharpness of 
wit and turned it against what he to doubt conaidored tho exce3eive 
gentility of Steele's Ta tler. The Female Tatler, in fact, rra3 both 
an imitation r'a rival of ; teels's Publication an its articles 
often provide a running, am-1 by no mean uniformly flattering, 
commentary on prscodin; iacue3 of the 'Patler. Steele, in his 
Bickorstaffian porsona, corplaim-1 of the "snipin' " from itdtators, 
Including the Fer In Thtlers 
To enumerate so=e of the3a my douf, hty Antagonists, 
I was threatened to be answered roekly 'i`it f'or Tatt 
I was undermined by the Whisperer, haunted by Tom 
i? rown' a Urrost, soolded at by a Fn-na1e Tatler ... I 
have been anno, retatý, examin d, and condoled: 
But it beire,, my standing "axis never to speak i11 of 
the read, I shall lot these Authors rest in Peace, and 
take groat ? loaouro in thinking that I have sometimes 
been the fean3 of their gettinz a Telly-fulf. .1 
1. : uoted. in 1? ichnoni P. Fond, The Tatlers The tkirj of a 
Literary Journal (Cambridge, Wass., 1971), p. 200. : ierainaftor 
to be cited a3 i; oncl. 
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BickArstaff, however, more usually i6nored rival publications, so 
that it is apparently irro sible to lauge how sericualy the Female 
Tat1Qr was taken by 3teelo in coat arlson with cthAr, far more 
ephA , ra1, Imitatian3. 
i 
"andwilla's contributions to the 'pma1e Tatlar, in any case, 
are consistently critical of thn cccia1 obacrvlti. onz; male by 
Tic': Arstaff thcugh, as in '... ucinia'a favourable co ents on äte41e'a 
na: aing of BIeknr3taffIs reflection3 as "lucubration, " be fully 
rncorn1ze1 the ß1eganc3 az popularizing tendency of -}tee1e's style. 
2 
N3 Lucin'3 a Fata it, 
Tue better sort are of Opinion, that the 
Squire beim an Airy facetious -any that 
Write3 with 3tr3n, th and 1firit, and 
would make the world believe that his 
Papers are °rit off cwnd, has call'd his 
Tatlers Lucubrations, in derision of 
those sower (sic) Laborious Pedants that 
have tekefl such wonderful Pzinsy and 
yet not been so `Diverting or Instructive 
as himself .. 93 
iefore de lin;; with xandoville's contribution3, hcw®ver, a few words 
1. The tendency of the Female Tatler to have each issue devoted 
to one thematic essay, however, was speedily ado; tod by "teele's 
Tatler. On this point, see +'alter Graharm, 'nzliah Literary 
Periodicals (Vew York, 1930), p. 88. 
2. In another contribution (Female Tatler no. 86), however, the 
'! andevillian persona of the "Oxford Gentleman" criticizes the 
type of popularization obviously not written by an expert an 
the subjectt "Those that would Write for Fublick Fntertain; ent, 
I reckon as much obliged to touch upon nothing but what they are 
voll agsur'd of, as if they Writ the most serious pick Foem; 
they ou: -ht never to speak of any Art, otherwise but that those 
Hoho Profess it zilght think they were F1'aaters of it, or at 
least 
have no reason by their ! riting to think the contrary. " 
3. Unlike the Tantlers Female Tatlers have never been reprinted in 
volume form so that one has to rely on bound original copies or 
facsimiles only available in a few librarioe, including the 
Bodleian. The quotation is fron Fa=sle Tatler no. Bl. 
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need to be said about the development azi coneral policy of the 
? Amale Tattor. 
To begin with, it should be noted that the first fifty-one issues, 
published in 1709, were edited by bra. Crackenthorge, "e tally that 
knows everything. " She is usually identified as a pseudonym for 
dither the minor novelist "art' da la Riviera 'aalet' or the minor 
playwright Romau baker. 
I 'o`ho®vor invented °r3. Crackenthorpo, ho 
or oh® diaplayad a con3istently feminist point-of-view awl one 
apparently eti! rulated by Steele's fe=initn in the "Jenny Diataft" papers, 
supposedly by Bick. er5tatf's baff-aiater, in tba Taý, tler. 
2 
Witb issue 
no-52p the editorehip P -rse 
d "to a "society of ladies, " usually 
identified as ' aniovi11e am the playwright 'era. Centlivre. 
3 
The 
pa; ora written by Iucinia rah:! Artesia are usually acknowledged to be 
by L*andeville an' comprise thirty-two of the *Lixty-fiva ISSuea of the 
later Fe 31. ) Tatler. 
4 What did not change, however, was the feminism, 
1. See Walter Graham, "Thom-is Pater, Urs. i anley, and the Female 
Tatler, " Lodern Fhilam, 34 (1937), 267-72 and F. B. Anderson, 
"The Eistory and Authorship of i: ra. Crackenttorpa'a Fan! ilo Tatler, " 
Lodern rht1olo": g 28 (1931), 354.60. As Craha points cut, most 
authorities, includinr contomporarioa, suggest Thomas Baker as 
the early editor, flerefnafter Crshan'e article will ha cited ss 
Graham. 
2. 'üurin;; the short-lived period of the Female Tatler, these comSLst'Qd 
of Tat ler3 no. 10,33,36,37 and 38. 
3" See P. ß. Anderson, "Innocerce an . Artifices or, 
Urs. Centlivre 
uni i'be Fer-, i1e 'atl. r, " i=hilolnrwic"1 C inrt4, rlp, 16 (1937)9 35C-75" 
Since the other to probable oditora of the F*+zrile Tatlor were 
dramatists, it would be intereatin to speculate on how involved 
Uarvleville was with the theatre poraonslitie3 of hia day. ' Possibly 
his partiality for the dialogue form may have been partly in UCOd 
by an avid love of theatre, e$ieoially comedy. 
4. Fcr internal evidence of ", andeville'b authorship, sere p. t. Anderson, 
". Splendor out of. Scandals : 'h, ý) t. uaintl&-Artesse PIº ogra in T hm remale 
º. -300,, rar external, ý 
t. üarter2yp 1 ýý 93ý Nhtlnlr. ^zr. ý1 
see . e. Vichort, "Jose YYecent ünndsvillo 
Attributins, " 
1" hi1olcpici]. Cuarterly, 45 (1966), 461. 
59 
'which ryas not far different from that of Urs. Crackenthorpe. 
1 
Mandeville to feminist, in tact, In important in relation to his use 
of dialogue in the Fe, 'ile T tier because, amon7, othor things, it was 
a useful device by which to oppose not just 3teele's social o; anions, 
but his very attitude to life as expressed by 'ickerstatf, of which 
his treatm3nt of women in the pa 3s of the °i atler was but a symptom* 
Thus, a few observations about the contrasting attitudes to women 
by 3tee1e arx wandeville are necessary as a preliminary to analyzing 
"undevi lle's op; esition, euch of it in dialogues, to Steaie. 
teele's attitudea towards wozcen, as his attitudes towards much 
else, were neither those of a reformer nor a conservative but 
cautiously "liberal. " ''haus, while he did not believe that women are 
equal to non in intelligence nor capable of the same responsible 
social role: as men, he did believe that, a: 3 narrier.. e pr rtngrs, husband 
and wife are equals and have equal resPonalbilities; indeed that 
marriage is a partnership betw, cn two rational beinrs rather than a 
convenient w. y of preserving property, as the conservatives implied, 
1. Gr, 269. "Feminism" is a rather elastic ter. in this context. 
An earlier p'eriodioal, the Athenian Vercu1y, published in the 
1690's, for exaiple, could be called "te: iinist" in that it dealt, 
and with no mincing of words, with tho problems, moral and other- 
wise, of 'omen. & Later one, the Female STctator (1744-46), on 
the other hand, could be called "reTiniat". in that it dealt with 
natters of courtesy and genteel behaviour towards women. Roth 
wore aimed primarily at women. audlancrs. The 'o^tn2e Tatler, however, 
may well have been read, though this has not been corroborated one 
gray or another, costly by men and probably by more intellectually- 
inclined women. Its feminiam was of a more radical kind, possibly 
ahead or its time and, as will be seen, directly opposed to the 
apparent feminism of 3toele's ': atler. For examinations of the 
above-iontiened periodicals, see l: rtha-21on1ca Stearns, "'. "he First 
%n,; fish Periodical for Women, " %'Odern Thiloloaºy, 28 (1930), 45-43 
and Jage Fodges, "The *77em 3lo : gyp ctator, a Courto-sy "'eric'ical" 
in R. P. bond, ed., Stuflios in the '. arl ' n; r1ish Periodical (Chapel 
äi11, forth Carolina, 1957)t PP"151 2. 
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or an a=zIn aexual bond, as some of the Restoration "ants" Fre3entod 
it. 
l 
To the extent that Bioker3taff criticized caltreatant of the 
opposite sex, especially in marriage, ýteole wa3 A Feminist reformer 
but no more so. 
2 
Liko '3ta 1o'a, . 'an cv111Q's attitudes ware equally complex. He 
tended to be both a reformir. ¬ feminist and one who was fully aware, 
and even appreciative, of the Psycholo; -, ical differences, whether 
socially-induced or not, between the sexes. Thus, in Fernale Tatler 
no. &3, Artesia can say that "it is with Virtues as it is with Leautios, 
some become the e'en ad others the 'komien moat" no that there is no 
females "Virtue nor good quality more valuable than Chastity" and 
still maintain that women are capable of equally honourable male 
virtues, such as the courage displayed by lizabeth I against the 
Armada. aandeville's fo, -Iniam, in fact, was entirely con3isteent with 
his tough-minded viers on the role of seif-interest in human 
behaviour. lie could both condemn what he coraiderod to be male 
dominance of 'so-men by trickery and the female propensity to be 
deceived 'by auch trickery. As Artesia its it in issue no. 8$, 
The mom like wary Conquerorrs, keep us Ignorant, 
because they are afraid of us, and that they 
m, V the easier rmintain their TTotinion over us, 
they Complisint us into Idleness, pretending 
those F' rl easants to be the Tokens of their 
affection, which in reality are the Consequences 
of their Tyranny; But what enrages to most is to- 
see our $ex so stupid as to believe the salvos 
1. Rao Blanchard, "Richard Steele art the Status of Women, 
Studies in Philology, 26 (1929), 325-55. riereinafter to be 
cited a 1lanchard. 
2. Londe e4-500. 
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better treated than the Woman in other 
Nations, because we are more agre! iou31y 
Cheated of our Fight and Liberties than 
thoy; ... 
The vividne3s of Artoaia's re az4c points to Vanieville's striking 
succeas In playing, the role of an intellectually emancipated woman 
f rownin{z on other women's unthinking acc' ptanco of their place in 
society anti probably Landeville's awaroness of the more favourable 
otatus of woman in the more egalitarian Dutch society contributed 
in no small measure to tho plausibility of Artesia's resentment. 
As personae, the "maters" t. ucind3 ani Arteeia are individualized 
to the extant that they represent two different to-opera: ants. 
I, ucirdn is usually so: towhst idealistic and conventional; Artesia, 
mors provocative and impotuouo in her attitudes. They are both good 
bosteases, however, or Artesia is not quite an agrs; ssively 
"conservative" as a certain "Col. `Worthy" nor in Artesia as outspoken 
as the Colonel's antz=oriet, an "Oxford ^entlezan. " In their roles 
as hostessoa con1ucting lively conversations on various philosophical, 
political and social topics, Lucinla and Artosiat in tact, curiously 
resemble the "blue-stockings" of the salons which were to become 
popular in the 175018- 
1 
'hero tdi. xed social ; atherir s presont©d in 
the pageu of the : 'eýs1e ': rctl r soon to have been unusual in th? 
Z. On how the sa1ona of ? ». r3. L: cntat"u and other blue-sto&'xing Were 
cases of lively and cccasionally philozophical convor3ation in 
a desert of gamblizi. onnia as a favoured jastime on the part of 
the aristocracy, unto E. Euchon's concluding chapter to his 
"rs. . 'ont, ý u anM bar Fri, Pnds 
(Lordon, 1907). 
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"polite" society of queen Anne's day. 
I Despite the apparent feminism 
of : ̀ andeville'u device, however, the views of Lucinda and Artesia 
are far more prominent in the more conventional essays, and in some 
of the more trivial diuou3 ions, than in the Fhiloaocbical debates 
featuring Col. . Northy and the {oxford (entleman. An extortion is the 
dialogue on mothers-in-law in issue no. 76. Pere \rt©sia generates 
a discussion by talkirv about how young wives often have their lives 
made miserable by their mother. -in-law, even when they are otherwise 
of unimpeachable character. After some argunsnt botwgnn arte to 
and another 10-y on why mothers-in-law behave so peculiarly, Lucinda 
brini-a the di scusaion to a more philosophical pane by searching for 
an explanation "more generally applicable to 'en all that can be 
alledged as a reason of that hatred with which they are so generally 
inspired. " Th3 Gist of I. ucinda's view turne out to be the 
penetratin, <; psychological reason that mothers-in-law are reminded of 
their husbands by their cons, so that the daughter-in-law becomes a 
kind of usurper to their affectiona. As a crowning dramatic touch, 
a mother-in-law challenges Lucinda's analysia in tor-ma thit confirm 
it. 'hero iu certainly a vors careful gradation of aryuaint in 
this dialoCue, fror Artesia'n remar'. ca on what she his board about 
riothors-in-law to Lucinda's genoralized conclu3ion. The mother-in 
1. Swift hi=o1 r complained about the exclusion of women from 
serious: convar*ntions 
, 1! I3 Degeneracy of Converaition, with 
the porniciouo Conoequences thereof upon 
our Humours and tiUto itions, path boon 
owing, among othor Causes, to the Custom 
arisen, for sore Yews Pact, of excluding 
; o: 3n from any ; hare in our Zocioty, 
further than in cartieo at Play, or 
Dancing, or in the Pursuit of an .: Hour. 
Zee Swift's "I{inter Towards an say on Conversation" in A 
Proposal for Correotln the z'r-11sh Tonr^ue Polictq Conversation, 
E: tc., ed* by Uferbart Davis ani Louis Landa Oxford, 19-5-7T9 P"94. 
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2aig in turn, unwittingly supplies the proof of lucini1a'e conclusion. 
In ter 3 of dialectic, it 13 an interesting dramatization of ardent 
by in{4uction ar4 the one philooo;, hic31 dialo , ue 
in the 7o=rile TAtler 
in which the now of aargu ent is dominated by Lucin'la an3 , krtasia. 
1 
in a later issue (no. 98), a dialogue eraua3 botueen an "unmannerly 
Old Fellow" and Artesia over the education of women -a proposal 
that Nteele soemed to be agaiaat, but in tha ruisa of favouring 
education proper to women. 
2 
Thera is a certain mount of conody 
irvalvod In this dialot°uo a the old nan intrudes upon an assembly 
of wogen tryinu; to decide which women to inolume in the xncnsl+ 1"4atler'a 
"Table of Fern, " an abvious rival of the Tat 1 male Table of ? sae, 
but his arguments, though wittily expreaeed, are serious. 'ing 
essence of the old manly artrument is contained in the following wordas 
very body loves "omen that aro ßay =1 'i, ttyr, 
but Solidity and Learning are no more becciainz 
them than Brooches; and Latin 3s as unZenteel 
1. If i: andevillo had a preference for either one of his Creations, 
it vas probably for the more realistic Artesia, even allowing 
for Luciria's tiro prowinont role in the dis1c6-ue discuozed 
above, an ehe In deoned to be the "author" of Mandeville's poem 
on "Grinning Voncur" in Iowa no. 78. 
2. Rao Blanchard conclud©a about toele'u attitude towards the 
education of women that "ehatevor cay have been "Steele's attitude 
toward the feasibility and the desirability of educating eotan, 
his constructive efforts did not go bayend producing another 
coral treatise for her pezuaa1 in the vein of the seventeenth- 
century conservative tradition" Flsnn', nrrt, 342-3). 1: eville'a 
attitude was far core atrsi«htforward) : ar in the last baue of 
the Fowa1e Taller (no-115) Lucin. ia states quite bluntly about the 
feasibility or women learning auch zup o odly unfeminine a subject 
as arithmetio, that "It must be own'd, the Tutah Watten have a 
far better ' othod to attain that Art by counting their Gainal 
and confining it to äradei but when rn. cliah Rusbanda will give a 
sincere account of their Affairs, and cö ult with their 
V. ives 
and confide in their Friendship and Piligenca, I 
dare believe 
they will soon overtake their Neichboura in the use of that 
Cciendab1e ciancel ... " 
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a Furniture for Cho in3tdo of a To man's, Read, 
as a iteard is for the outs Ides Young Women 
shcu'd only Study }pow to get i'usbar a; you 
see Mr. 3iokerotaff'a Sister Jormm to 
happily 'marrieds She Writ ; 'ate almost 
as wall as har Brothor, but unleia he was 
out of the w she never meddled with it, 
and then always rezo berod that ehe Wan a 
To mans 
The reference to Jenny Distaff is there for the huaaaroua puncturing 
of Steale'a pretensions to fominiam, eacocialjy as it cozci from the 
youth of one who can hardly be considered a fcniniatj indeed, the 
scanty nu=ter of Jenny %atatf papers In tho Tatlor display very little 
authentic feminist Conti nt, ani none of it in a blunt, contentious 
tone. In T, a tier no. 35, for eza ple, Jenny ", 'intaff introducers 
herself this ways 
MANY Affairs calling my Brother into the 
Ccuntxr, the Care or our Intelligence with 
the Town is left to me for ooze ? ins; 
therefore you must expect tue Advicea you 
met with in this Paper to be ouch an more 
immediately and naturally fall under 
the Consideration of our 3ele History 
therefore written by a Wo ac3no you vi11 
easily ima, ire to conoiat of Love in 
all Its Forts, both in the Abuse of, 
and Obedionco to that Passion. Aa to 
the Faculty of Writing; itaelf, it will 
not, it is hoped, be detanded, that 
Stile and Ornament shall be so euch 
ý5 13aityf corzulto'l, as Truth and 
which latter qualities w? may more 
justly pratex t to beyom3 the other Sox. 
1. Lucubrations I, 214. 
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In view of Jenny Distaff's deliberate circumscribing of the subjects 
she feels capable of dealing with and her half-apologetic assertion 
that women can be better writers than men, it is an understatement 
to say that bucinda's and A. rtesia's concerns are far broader in 
scope and therefore, by implication and in the context of Queen 
Anne's reign, far more aggressively feminist. 
Artesia's answer to the old man 1s very deft, but not in the 
tradition of philosophical dialogue, for she neatly sidesteps the 
old man's objections to the education of women and makes the point 
that the old man's real objections are to the Female Tatler itself. 
This gives a psychological twist to the argument which leads to an 
impassioned defence of the periodical. In other words, Mandeville 
here creates a miniature comic scene in the Lucianic vein for 
expository purposes. 'What the defence of the female Tatler boils 
down to is that its aims, just like those of any other periodical 
in the vein of the Tatler, is to civilize and polish the manners of 
the age. 
Bickerstaff's expertise in these natters is acknowledged by 
Lucinda but she inaiot3 that he is not the only worthy periodical 
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moralist in the field: 
1 
That Mr Bicker-staff has a more happy Genius 
this way than any body else yet discovered, 
we don't dispute, but his being the greatest 
l: astiff, proves not that all the rest are 
Curs: A ? man of Seven Foot has reason to 
brag of his height, but he is in the wrong 
to call all Dwarfs that are under it. If 
we can but seldom divert People of refin'd 
Palates, we may often instruct those of 
lesser Capacities. 
Lucinda's remarks can be construed as "damning with faint praise" for 
though on the surface she seems to praise Bickerstaff's refinement, 
she also implies that he is over-refined. It is very likely that 
Mandeville considered the r^emale Tatler to have a healthier influence 
on manners because it was not over-refined, thus avoiding the danger of 
1. On this issue, feelings still seem to run high. As recently as 
1971, partiality for the undoubted virtues of the Tatter was 
expressed this way: 
With some readers the Female Tatler 
succeeded better than any of the other 
early imitators. It had within its 
moderate span good social portraiture 
and a more than occasional running wit. 
But its style was frequently stringy 
and at times opaque, and the paper rather 
obviously lacked the Tatlerts richness in 
themes and characters, its coupling of 
utility and delight. This document in 
what we now call feminism could never 
pretend to Tatlerian stature beyond that 
of a clever adjunct or a genuine tribute 
to the one Dickerstaff and his Lucubrations. 
Perhaps the ladies bantered him to gain 
attention, as Isaac must have understood. 
The final significance of this exercise 
in imitation may lie in the conclusion 
that a close mimicry of a celebrated work 
is to a tolerable degree readable. 
(Borx1,198) 
As should be evident even at this stage, Mandeville's opposition 
to the values the Tatler stood for was considerably more serious 
and certainly many of Mandeville's dialogue contributions to the 
Female Tatler had no lack of "richness in themes. " 
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hypocrisy in its analysis of social mores. That Mandeville considered 
the Tatler to be occasionally hypocritical can be discerned from 
Lucinda's remarks in issue no-72 where she has this to say: "But 
above all, what Virtuous Man alive that pretends to give Council to 
People in Love, would advise 'em to go to a t; hore, as was done in 
the Tatler of Thursday last? " That refers to Tatler no. 107 where 
Bickerstaff advises a gentleman visitor suffering from unrequited 
love to "change the Passion itself into some other Passion, that is 
to speak more plainly, find out some other agreeable 'roman. " This 
is only one alternative among others more "respectable" proposed by 
BickerstaffI but Mandeville was undoubtedly not so much shocked by it 
as highly amused at the mincing, and therefore somewhat hypocritical, 
tons in which it was expressed. To sum up, Mandeville's feminism, 
up to this point, can be described as a woapon against Steele's 
genteel moralism but, in the context of Mandeville's contributions 
as a whole, it is also one of many devices in Mandeville's analysis 
of sociability, a trait often found at its most interesting in the 
relations between the sexes. In their views of the nature of 
1. The two other alternatives were to fall in love with someone 
else and to, as we would now call it, sublimate passionate 
feelings in pursuit of "Profit, Preferment, Reputation. " In 
the name issue Mandeville revived the old Swiftian jest about 
Bickerstaff's prediction of the death of Partridge the astrologer 
and turns it on Bickerstaff himself, now a creature of Steels's 
rather than Swift's imagination, because "Wisdom, Virtue and 
Laboriousness, have always been inseparable from the famous 
Bickerstaff, tut if the Characters that have first recommended 
him to the Publick, and by which only he was known to the World, 
are no more to be found in those '.. orks that go under his Name, 
the Author Is Dead, and the Papers are Spurious. " For a highly 
entertaining account of the background to this long--running, and 
eminently confusing, jest at the expense of the hapless Partridge, 
see R. P. Bond, "Isaac Bickerstaff Eaw. " in RAstoration and 
Ei hteenth-Century Literature: F; ssays in Honor of Alan Tugald 
2: cxillop Chicago, 1963)9 pp. 103-24. For observations on the 
Female Tatler's proclamation of Bickerstaff'a "death, " see p. 121. 
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sociability, Mandeville and Steele differed as much as in their 
feminism, and in a way related to their differing use of dialogue. 
There is no doubt that both Steele and Mandeville considered 
sociability, and the rules of good-breeding designed to reinforce 
it, a desirable trait and one, to a greater or lesser extent, 
indispensable to civilized society. Nor can it be said that they 
disagreed as to its artificiality, in the sense that sociability 
needs constant cultivation. There they differed was in their 
notion of the social function of good-breeding. In Steele's view, 
the function of good-breeding was to make conversation as pleasant 
and beneficial a pastime as possible for any given social gathering. 
As`l3ickerstaff puts it, "The most necessary Talent therefore in a 
an of Conversation, which is what we ordinarily intend by a fine 
Gentleman, is a good judgment. " In the character-sketch of a 
certain "Sophronius" in issue no. 21 Bickerstaff makes clear what he 
means by "good judgment" in this context: 
His Judgment is so good and unerring, and 
accompanied with so chearful a Spirit, that 
his Conversation is a continual Feast, at 
which he helps some, and is helped by others, 
in such a , canner that the Equality of Society 
is perfectly kept up, and every an obliges 
as much as he is obliged: For it is the 
greatest and justest Skill in a Taman of 
superior Understanding, to know how to be 
on a Level with his Companions. 
' 
I. - Lucubrations, 123. 
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In short, good judgment promotes good conversation and its result, 
sociability. 
LTandeville would have probably agreed with Steele's description 
of good-breeding but did not consider it either necessarily a virtue 
nor indispensable to the smooth functioning of society. In a 
characteristically dialectical manner, he employs dialogue in 
Female TatlAr no. 62 to make an oblique attack on the importance 
attached by Steele to good-breeding. The dialogue begins with 
Artesia asserting in a Bickerstaffian manner that in the conversation 
she is about to report, "Y{e happen'd to have no Scandal, and were 
agreeably diverted our selves without talking ill of others. " In 
other words, no one violated the demands of good breeding. After 
some arguments on both sides of the question on whether man is a 
sociable creature, Lucinda broadens the scope of the argument by 
not only asserting that man is a sociable creature but also adding 
that "I am of the ingenius Mr. Bickerstaff's Opinion, that none are 
to be counted Alive, -but such as, setting aside all private Interest 
and Personal Pleasure, are Generous enough to labour and exert 
themselves for the benefit of others. " Thus, without even saying 
so directly, Lucinda assumes a connection between altriustt and 
sociability. Her visitors assume much the same connection for, as 
Artesia reports, "Hero Lucinda having found in most of us, what by 
her Looks ehe seem'd to demand, a tacit Applause, left off. " An 
"Oxford gentleman, " however, intervenes in the conversation and 
eloquently argues that it is not sociability which brings man 
together, but self-interest and not self-interest alone but diverse 
interests, even when they take the form of the most deplorable 
70 
vices, skilfully manaCed by politicians to form society. 
1 
Apart 
from attacking the notion of the social importance of good-breeding 
in such an oblique manner, the Oxford Gentleman perhaps even offends 
against the very canons of good-breeding by stating his argument so 
abrasively, even if honestly, that its effect is to atop the flow of 
conversation altogether. In Artesia's words, "He would have gone 
on, but seeing by our Countenances that no body admired his Doctrine, 
he said no more, and in a little while after the Company broke up. " 
The differing treatments of the notion of good-breeding by 
Mandeville and Steele lead one to conclude that, as moral "censor, " 
Pickerstaff dictates, albeit with a velvet glove, what good-breeding 
should consist of and he does so in univocal essay-form with the 
occasional aid of such typical periodical devices as the "character" 
or "episode" to illustrate his points. Lucinda and Artesia, on 
the other hand, do not speak with one voice but generate situations, 
in a good number of papers at least, in which Mandevillian personae, 
euch as the Oxford Gentleman, do not merely illustrate a point but 
articulate it drazatically. Mandeville does this, however, at the 
expense of conventional good-breeding which, at least in Bickerstaff's 
notion of the terra, implies avoidance of controversy. Unlike 
Bickerotaff, then, Lucinda and Artesia do not dictate but expose 
various points-of-view, even potentially offensive ones, on many 
topics to the reader. 
This is how they describe their own role in issue no. l00: 
1. It is the frequent occurrence of this sort of argumont, highly 
reminiscent of the Fable of the Bees, which makes it difficult 
not to attribute the Lucinda-Artesia Papers to Bernard Mandeville. 
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As to the Party we are of9 it is that 
which meddles with no Faction or 
encourages any sort of Rebellion 
whatever, and detests all Trumpeters 
of Sedition: We are of that Party 
that far from siding with any, instead 
of corroding Arguments to uphold one 
against the other, studies how to 
prevent the l`isunderstandings, and 
allay the Anamosities (sic) of all, 
that without wishing ill, much less 
destroying, either Party would 
extirpate the Names of both, and heal 
up the Wounds of our unhappy Divisions, 
with that admirable Panacea of Concord 
and Unanimity. 
There is a certain amount of irony here because Lucinda and Artesia 
are referees of very heated discussions even if they themselves are 
"impartial. " i"andeville's declaration, through Lucinda and Artesia, 
of his own impartiality, however, is not disingenuous bet use his 
general aim in the Female Tatl©r appears to be to articulate various 
viewpoints on the interaction of ethics and social mores in order 
to arrive at a deeper, and philosophically detached, understanding of 
social behaviour - an understanding beyond considerations of party 
or religious belief. It is not surprising, then, that dialogue 
is a far more frequent device in Mandeville's contributions to the 
Female Tatler than in Steele's periodical. 
Even when Mandeville employs the essay-form, he lends it a 
considerable amount of dramatic liveliness. One good example is +m 
Female Tatler no-56 where the resources of the periodical essay are . -" 
skilfully orchestrated. In terms of form, it best fits the' 
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"narrative" type of periodical essay where "the relationship of one 
part of the essay to another is chronological"1 and its underlying 
motif is a satirical jibe against scandalmongering. The scene is 
set with Lucinda relating that "two young Gentlewoman that are 
Cousins of whose Affairs I knew more than either of them imagined" 
had come to see her to complain about the lack of scandalous material 
in the Female 'Patler. Lucinda obliges them by claiming that she 
was just in the process of considering the publication of two 
scandalous stories, but ohs reveals to the reader that she was 
setting a trap in revenge for their criticism of the periodical. 
Both scandalous stories, in fact, are really about Chloe and Celia, 
the two gentlewoman. Celia's malicious reaction to the thinly- 
disguised story about Chloe is vdry humorously described by Lucindas 
I had observ'd, that whilst, as they 
thought, I was reading this Story, Celia 
all along had been wonderfully pleased, 
and continually Sniggering and Nodding 
at her Cousin, who for her part look'd 
very Grave, and seem'd as uneasy as if 
she had sat upon Nettles, and when I 
had finish'd, as the one call'd it, a 
silly Story, and wonder'd Celia could 
laugh at any thing so dull and insipid, 
0o the other extolling it as 
extravagantly, said, it was the best 
she hager heard, and earnestly pressed 
me to go on with the second. 
1. W. Q. S. Sutherland J r. 9 "Essay Forks in the Prompters" in 
Richmond P. I3ond, eä. ß "tuaiea in the Farly F glich Periodical (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1957 9 p. 147" 
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Lucinda gleefully turns to the second story, as requested by Celia, 
but Celia is soon discomfited as it leaves her exposed to the tender 
snorcieo of the injured Chloe: 
When I made an eni of Celia's Character, 
and been particular enough in the 
Description of her Person and Circumstances 
to make her known, I saw that her Lirth 
was over, and all her good Rumour vanishIdt 
but on the other side Chloe by degrees 
recovering from her dumps, assum'd a 
merrier Countenance, and at last seem'd 
to feel the same Satisfaction which her 
Cousin had expressed before. 
The hypooxiey of both ladies having; been exposed, like true scandal- 
mongers they turn against' each other, which results in this farcical 
scene described by Lucinda: 
The clatter of the China, the screaming 
of one Dog, and the barking of another, 
joyn'd to the loudness of the combatants; 
and the Noise of my Parrot, who upon 
occasions is used to joyn in the Chorus, 
made such a hideous Consort, that I was 
glad to quit the Rooa, and get up into 
my Closet, to sat down what had happen'd. 
l 
The high-spirited comedy of this particular piece by Lucinda, 
though highly dramatic, uses to great advantage the conventions of 
the periodical essay such as the anecdotal story that proves a moral 
1. Lucinda's description of farcical chaos is somewhat reminiscent, 
though obviously not quite as extravagntly expressed, of some 
of the high-spirited chaotic scenes in Urquhart's translation of 
Rabelais. 
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point, in this case the exposure of hypocrisy, and the "character. " 
Celia, for example, is described this way: 
Celia was the Reverse of Chloe and seem'd 
as affectedly Cautious as the other was 
over free. She pretended to have a great 
Aversion to )Sen, was very Circumspect in 
their Company,, and thought ill of all 
Women that were not equally Coy, and 
retir'd as herself. 
This kind of "character, " since it is descriptive more of a person 
than a generalized type, follows La Bruyere rather than Theophrastu3, 
just as Steele's and Addison'sl "characters" do. The satirical 
succinctness of Mandeville's use of "character, " however, is highly 
corrosive rather than mildly censorious, as Addison and Steele 
usually are. Even though Mandeville's contributions to the Female 
Tatler do not always reach a high standard of felicittus periodical 
writing, at their best they often genuinely achieve the stylistic 
informality coupled with serious but highly entertaining moralizing 
of the Tatler. That makes the Female Tatler different from Steele's 
periodical, then, is not so much the style, obviously much indebted 
to the Tatler, but the more caustic effect of tandeville's satire 
and his propensity to be more interested in how morality and 
immorality serve larger social ends than in propagating personal 
morality. 
iandeville's first volume of dialogues, The Virgin Uncaask'd, 
1. For an extensive analysis of Addison's use of "character, " see 
Edward Chauncey Baldwin, "La Bruyere's Influence upon Addison, " 
Publications of the Modern Language Association, 19 (1904) 479-95" 
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which appeared just before his first ccntributions to the Female 
Tatler in 17C9, ß has some of the levity of style and miscellaneous 
content of the periodical assay and the periodical dialogue but in 
it can also be discerned Mandeville's first gropings towards a 
mature style of philosophical dialogue. As the two fictional tales, 
which make up almost half of The Virgin Unrnask'd, serve to illustrate 
certain points of moral import made by the older woman, Lucinda, in 
her conversations with her younger proteges Antonia, Mandeville's 
work reverses the usual role of the set-piece dialorue in the 
eighteenth-century novel. As a result, and in view of Mandeville's 
later development, it is more of an experiment in philosophical 
dialogue than a novel-manque. 
2 
The Virgin Untnazk'd, in any case, 
provided excellent training for the style of dialogue in the 
Lucinda-Artesia Papers and the second part of Thy able of the Bees, 
and it is from such a perspective that it will be approached in the 
next chapter. 
1. G. S. Vichort in hie unpublished Ph. D. dissertation on 1Iandeville 
assumes that The Virgin Unmask'd was published sometime before 
Mandeville's first contribution to the Female Tatler because one 
of the editors, Thomas Baker, was probably attractod to the 
feminism of The Virgin Unmask'd before he asked Mandeville to 
share the editorship with Mrs. Centlivre. It is also probable 
that Mandeville's committments to the Female Tatler late in 1709 
did not give him much time for writing such a lengthy book as 
The Virgin Unmask'd. See Gordon S. Vichert, A Critical Study of 
the En lish Works of Bernard Mandeville (University of London, 
1964)t P"71. 
2. This is how Gordon S. Vichert treats The Virgin Unmask1d in his 
unpublished dissertation. 
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D AL^"CT1CAL DIT' J""10111 ttiOV , L13TIC DI AIL IN 
1A', *7VILL%" y 717 V1101-IN UN? ATKID 
ri rciesi fe: ... ' masks ä'o -a woman 
maskeI, liko a covered dish, gives a 
man curiosity anM op titm, when, it 
may be, uncovered, 'tvauld turn his 
stomach; not no. 
Alitheat 7r-deed ycur cot psrison is 
something; a gressy one. But I had a 
gallant used to say, "A beauty marked, 
like the sun in eclipse, gathers more 
gaze'u than It it shino1 out. " 
William wycherloy's 
The Count=, Wife (Act 111, 
äßi x) 
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Mandeville's The Virgin Unmask'd, first published in 1709, is 
not only his first volume of dialogues but his first considerable 
prose work as well. In S ubject-matter it is almost as diffuse as 
the Lucinda-Artesia Papers but the use of dialogue is far more con- 
sistent. In terms of rhetorical technique, it basically employs 
the fictional tale and the Erasmian colloquy. As far as 
dialectical technique is concerned, it employs a highly empirical 
kind of reasoning which, in the fictional tales at least, is 
essentially hostile yet closely-related to the casuistical reasoning 
of "advice" columns in such periodicals as the Athenian Mercury and 
Defoe's Review. Both the elements of colloquy and fictional tale, 
however, are subordinated to a common dialectical pattern which, as 
will be demonstrated, arcounts for the Virgin Unmask'd being a genuine 
philosophical dialogue despite the diversity of topics discussed. 
Before exazainina the role of The Virgin Unmask-Od. as Prasmian 
colloquy, it should be noted that, as has boon pointed out by Vichert, 
the title alone raised expectations of a pornographic work in dialogue 
form such as the R ionanenti of Aretino and its English imitations, 
Nicholas Chorier's Satyra Sotadica (1660), later translated as 
A Dialogue between a Married Lady and a Maid (1668), and The School 
of Love containin sev©rall dialogues between Tullia and Octavia 
(17o7). 1 Both of these productions in an Aretinian vein, and no 
doubt many others, took the form of dialogues between an older and 
younger woman -- a convention "which remained the norm for at least 
1. See G. 5. Vichert's unpublished dissertation, A Critical Study 
of the En. lisp Works of Bernard 1, tandeville (167l733) University 
of London, 1964)t pp. 52-53. Hereinafter to be cited as Vices. 
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150 years. "' It is this framework of scurrilous dialogue between 
an older and a younger woman which The Virgin Unmask'd shares with 
its pornographic forebears, and even the younger woman or "virgin" 
in Mandeville's book is named, unless by sheer coincidence, after 
the younger woman called tkntonia in Aretino's work. 
2 While 
E: andeville'a titillating title probably served to attract many kinds 
of readers, the "unmasking" promised has nothing to do with narrowly 
pornographic considerations but with the dialectical unmasking of 
false ideas about many aspects of the relationship between the sexes. 
Although The Virgin Umnask'd cannot be construed as in any way 
pornographic, it is nevertheless the most pungently colloquial of all 
of Mandeville's dialogues. 
3 
As such, it is chiefly influenced not 
by Aretino but by the Colloquies of Erasmus, as Mandeville himself 
hints at in the preface, 
Erasmus in his Ichthuophagia treats of more 
abstruse utters, than I do in any Part of the 
Dialogues; and yet the Persons in all Probability 
are less accomplish'd than mine; for one is a 
Butcher, and the other a Fishaonger. 
4 
1. D. F. Foxon, "Libertine Literature in England, 1660-17459 "The 
Book Collector, 12 (1963), 165. Also quoted in Vichert, 52. 
Hereinafter to be cited as Foxon. 
2. Mandeville may have been familiar with Aretino'o Ragionamenti 
either in its free English adaptation entitled The Crafty Whore: 
or, the misteryy and iniquity of bawdy houses (London, 1658) or 
the Dutch translation entitled list leven en d'ar listige treken 
der courtisanen to Roman (Leyden, 1680). Both are mentioned in 
Foxon, 167. 
3.2. andeville'a Treatise of the H, gpochond riack and Hysterick Diseases 
is almost as pungently colloquial but includes, as w9119 highly 
technical medical terminology. 
4. Bernard Mandeville, The Virgin Unmask'ds or, Female Dialogues 
Betwixt an Elderly Maiden Lady and her Niece, on several Diverting 
Discourses, second ed. London, 1724)9 p. A Hereinafter to be cited 
as L'. and evi lle . 
I 
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Apart from its colloquial style and dialogue method, what Erasmus's 
"IchthuophagiaSt or "I Fish Diet" also has in common with the Virgin 
Unmask'd is its rhetorical structure since both dialogues deal with 
a very wide range of topics loosely subordinated to a hidden 
dialectical pattern. In Erasmus's colloquy, with its wide variety 
of religious topics, which include the most trivially doctrinal and 
the most profoundly ethical, the unifying factor is, in Craig R. 
Thompson's words, "Christian Liberty - that favorite theme for 
reformers and Protestants - as contrasted with 'Judaism', the 
contrast between Law and Go3pel, letter and spirit. "1 In the Virgin 
Unrask! d, the overall pattern of dialectic centers on the any diverse 
implications of the relationship between the sexes; so much so that 
even an extended discussion of politics in general (and Louis XIV in 
particular) is included. 
Whore colloquies chiefly differ from the more staid varieties of 
philosophical dialogue is that, as the word "colloquy" itself suggests, 
they are more colloquial in style and often employ arguments somewhat 
more rhetorical than dialectical. Thus, it is not surprising that 
Erasmus considered his own colloquies as a medium of popular instruction 
in philosophical matters: "Socrates brought philosophy down from 
heaven to earth; I have brought it even into games, informal 
conversations, and drinking parties. "2 In a similar vein, a 
rhetorical handbook of the Restoration defines the "colloquy" as "a 
feigned discourse betwixt two or more Persons, " one of the rules of 
1. The Colloquies of Fräsmus, trans. by Craig R. Thompson, vol. I 
Chicago and London, 1965ß, p. 373. Hereinafter to be cited as 
Erasmus. 
2. Zuoted by Craig R. Thompson in Erasmus, xxvii. 
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which is that it must be "pleasant, with witty jerks, quibbles and 
fancies (such as you shall often find in irk) joking upon a 
name, action, proverb or the like. "ý Quibbles certainly abound in 
The Vir. 'in Unmask'd, as well as such favoured F; rasmian devices as 
the parable, the proverb, and the "simile" or analogy. ^rasaus's 
view of the colloquy, while not overly concerned with conversational 
decorum, is evidently fully compatible with the eighteenth-century 
ideal of popularizing philosophy for the reading public, whether in 
the form of philosophical dialogue or periodical essay. It is even 
more fully compatible with tandeville's ideal of philosophical 
dialogue, where frankness and plain-speaking count for more than 
conversational decorum. 
For our purpose:, the use of analogy is the most important 
dialectical element of the Erasmian colloquy employed by Mandeville 
in The Virgin Unmask'd. What distit ; wishes Erasmus's use of 
analogy is that it is not always strictly dialectical but often 
amusingly rhetorical, in the sense that the amusing; aspect of an 
analogy is employed to undermine an opponent's argument. Thus, in 
a colloquy between an older and a younger wife, marriage is compared 
to the relationship between a trainer and his animals 
Thus we seo that the beating of a Drum will 
set a I'yger stark raging mad, so that he 
will tear his own Flesh; and thus your 
Jockies have particular Sounds and . 'thistles, 
and Strokes to flatter their Horses when 
they are ill-condition'd. flow much more 
I. Ralph Johnson, The Scholars Guide from the Accidence to the 
University. facsimile reprint edition I. enston, 'England, 1971)9 
p. 13. It was first published in 1665. 
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does it concern us then to use all iia . inable 
snaane to fix our selves In our 11usbanIs Food 
Cr i with whoa, whothor we will or no, we 
must lives all our Lives at Bed and at Board, 
till Death co ea to our 20tI 
'r ras&u analo ; y, however, doe: i not 1o Gaon the Gericuunoss of the 
older wonan'a advice but Ikes it more ento, tairth 71 even more 
acceptable. Another way of puttitg.; it is that the rhetorical 
devices of tb, colloquy rosy often be satirical but at the ea ao time 
servo to further dialectical diucuzzion, and shill this is true of 
r'razm ri, it in oven more true of ! Tevillo. In : andoville'e case, 
hoover, lt is ncro fruitful to discuss tho rhetorical dovicos of 
the colloquy in terns of the overall dialectical pattern of t. -. o 
Virgin Pnmg 'rid. 
If, as aa3u sedl the Tattern of dialoatic in the Vir. in t'mmask'd 
is a consistant onc, what oaken it Coni3iBtant, and the cots of 
dialogues structurally unifioti, is the dialectical de onstration of 
variou3 lovola of deception. The emphasis on dace tion iss already 
hinted at in the preface which attacks thß wholo "raison d'etro" of 
rofaaac: "but why, aVa another, should you hate T'rotaceu? The 
Reason 13 plaint tocauso 1 TIonoot, and In evor saw any, (tho3e 
of Saints erco jted) but wýaot wore full of Ttypoori3y and ]3iosimulation. "2 
Be also wazni aalnot takl: the first dialogue at its face-values 
1. vra1WUs of EotterdL. , 'rw nt ; 'fro Sateot Colloquies, trans. by 
Roar L'Estran 8 and Thorax : roan (Loru one 1711), p. 373. 
2. Uarsdevillet 5-ý47. 
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Then in the First Dialogue you meet 
with any Thing harsh, and, perhaps, 
very disagreeable to the Ladies, suspend 
your Judgement till you come to the 
Second; for there you'll find, that what 
Lucinda has said to her Niece before, 
was only a Sophistical Way of Arguing, 
to put a Young; Beautiful Lady out of 
Conceit with herself, in hopes to make 
her neglect; fal of her Charms. 
1 
The first dialogue, in fact, is highly deceptive about Lucinda's 
real motives for excoriating Antonia and her "sophistical" criticism 
of Antonia's semi-exposed breasts sounds more like hypocritical 
prudery than genuine advice: "If your Breasts were Yellow or 
Freckled you know, they would not be so inviting to the Fellows; but 
I declare its was Ia Man I'd spit at 'em . "2 As ? Mandeville states 
in the passage from the preface and as the succeeding dialogues 
indicate, however, Lucinda's apparent prudery is only a device for 
making Antonia aware of the dangers of her own sexuality. 
Lucinda finds her own deceptive tactics all the more necessary 
because Antonia herself wears the insincere "mask" of unconcern for 
men; a "mask" all too discernible to Lucinda'a experienced eyes but 
one which forces her to adopt a mask of her own to make clear to 
Antonia the dangers she is exposing herself to: 
But when after all my Caro I saw, that 
skilfully you began to manage wilde 
Nature, and grew dextrous at covering 
your eager Wishes with Art and 
Mandeville, J- 
2. E: andeville, 2-3. 
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Diasimulation, I found your four of Man 
vas vaniaih'd; you could speak to then 
without blushing, and look 'am in the 
Face with aoeoingly no more Concern, 
than in your Frimitive innocenco: 
"hen I lost all my Popes, and crow 
outra,,; cous; I knew nothing would rouze 
you soro, than to que ation your Vertue; 
I would loavo nothin» untry'd; and this 
haa boon the ay, that of late, I have 
attacked yc, in hopes to rox4r sozv Charve. 
2 
Luoirvvia'3 emotion-illy-charged explanation of her tactlc3 indicate 
that her duplicity is not only a dialectical devico but, in terms of 
dra. wa, her reaction aZainst Antonia's decek ticn. 7 us, Van3evil1e'e 
use of the term "unma3 Od, " instead of some less sux: g: stivo 
e uiva1cnt such a3 "revealed, " is e3 eCia1l7 sppropriato because of 
the dra~ntlc qualitioc of The Virrin t+ni-tsk+d. 
Though t. cnieville's dialectic in Tlac Virrfn Unm33k'd is maro 
philo3orhical than dramatic, as he is, »ore interester in disnecting 
the erroneous ideas and attic which lead to deceptive behaviour 
than the theatrical rechanics of daceptive behaviour itself, 
i. ucinria'a proccuc of un iwkinC ncvertliclass hau a drazzatically 
plausible motive, n=ely that Lucitda is afraid not only that Antonia 
will tarry tho onr, man bu' that ehe will no long; r have . Antonia 
for company if the r: arricu. The firat two dialo uos, in fact, 
are pcycholo; ically subtle in a dramatic oen; v because, as is , 
evident by the ¬M of the cecort] dialogue, Iuctnda'e bad-tampered 
1. MaM ovi l1 e, 23. 
2. Zoe t'aMoville, 24. 
R4 
railing against Antonia actually brine them closer together and even 
strengthens the basin of their relationship from one in which 
Antonia's "mask" was beginning to intrude, to a moreoopon one. As 
Antonia puts it, 
Indeed you have unmask'd ray Soul, and 
trac'd my Thoughts through every Chink 
and Cranny of my Heart: I own, all 
what you have said is true, but you 
shall not need any more take such Pains 
to search ray Inclinations; henceforth 
I'll keep no Secret from you. 
I 
Thus, from a dramatic viewpoint, the first two dialogues portray an 
e. u. btional crisis between Lucinda and Antonia with duplicity on both 
sides, but any duplicity between Lucinda and Antonia in succeeding 
dialogues is purely heuristic and for the dialectical purposes of 
philosophical dialogue. 
In this connection it should be noted that, as is well known, 
masks were a favoured traditional device in comedy since the time of 
Aristophanes and this was still truo of Restoration comedy. 
Vycherley's plays especially make skilful use of the mask in both a 
literal and metaphorical sense. As J. S. Bowman points out about 
VAycherley's use of the mask$ 
Essentially, almost all of the movement 
within '; ycherley's plays, whether it manifests 
itself in pure spectacle or in plot-action, 
arises out of attempts to deceive or to expose 
deceit. The characters therefore, are 
continually engaged in masking or unmasking - 
often literally. 
2 
1. Mandeville$ 24- 
2. John S. Bowman, "Dance, Chant and L? ask in the Flays of W'ycherley, " 
- Drama survey, 3 (1963), 197" 
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L azd©vi1le'a process of unmasking, then, nsy well have boon derived 
from Reatoration comedy, e3peciall7 ao it csxpaso5 docoptiona in 
what ion after a11o a thome dear to the Ncattraticn atage, the 
relationship between the se, xco. 
l 
From a rnora strictly dialectical viewpoint, `anlevillo'a Process 
of un auking goon evcn dc per, az rationality itself is shown to be 
illu: sorr at titte3, or« for two co=Vlenontary reasons. n no iss that 
arc--en'c rea3oniný, t facultiou are inforior to thoee of on because "In 
faasoninv,, "lemon can never coP) with lan, they have a Thousand 
Advantages beyond us; our fit may be equal to theiro, but in every 
Thin; also they exceed us, a: wall as in Jtrer. ý, yth of Body ... " and 
the other in that women's romoninz faculties are weaker in relation 
to their dAoi, rea. As Lucinda ruts it, "T'auc it is with a '. aid, 
that a an lays ,c to; what Confidence can sto have in her ^noaAon, 
when she feels that her own r ishos within betray and over, -ower it? "2 
Lucinda, however, not only warns t ai*. t auch reaooring, a2; eciaUly in 
the tales, she also em; loyo it herself for tho jurpaso of showing 
Antonin how dooeptivo au . erficially plain rx-oazonin3 can be. 
Allost inevitably, Lucinda'a distrust or rouon in the 
: e1ationahip botwoen the aexea inclulea a atron , ar4 not at all 
philosophically-detached, but rb, torical, antipathy tow, rd3 rarria e. 
It Is especially evident when she reinforces her arguments a5ainai 
it by usin an analo; jy ich not only exposes even the favourable 
as; eats of marriage, as deceptive bat iss itself devicua on ,w levels: 
1, Z; anievillo'a probable collaboration kith Tboao raker in the 
FAnale Tat1Ar m-kea his fa. ýiliarity vAth the mochanicn of comic 
dr=a a distinct possibility. 
2. randevilla, 28. 
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May I not sty of an Angler's Bait, what 
you say of Marriage? There aalst be 
something very inviting in it, or else 
the Fishes would not catch at it so 
greedily. You and I may talk of this, 
till we lose our selves; but Nobody 
shall ever perswade me, to be in love 
with the Bait, if I know that I must 
swallow the fook at the same time. 
1 
1. rhat makes this analogy docoptive is that it is emotionally loaded 
and self-enclosed, in the sense that it clarifies Lucinda's attitude 
to marriage but does not actually logically prove that marriage 
is an evil. As soon as Antonia invokes a more favourable aspect of 
the analogy, in fact, Lucinda cannot answer and instead, supplies 
yet another analogy which keeps the argument self-enclosed: 
Ant. But than do you think there would 
be Pieusuret if it was not for the ilook? 
Luc. That's another Questions I never 
wau marry'd, I can't tell that Experience 
is not to be had at. my rate; 'could you 
dive Anybody tryt whether the Ice vas strong, 
enough to boar him, if he saw People fall 
in before him? 
Ant. That's a cold Simile in 5u=er. 
Thus, Lucinda's angling analogy Is a deviously rhetorical device 
serving not only to defino her attitude to marriage but also to stop 
all eff o. ctive discussion on Antonia's part. 
2 
1. Marrl evi lle , 112. 
2. Earlier one Lucinda uses the saue analogy to describe her own 
deceptiveness in argent: "I con. f'esa, what I s: 31d was a littl© 
suspicious; but I did it to see how soon you would swullow the 
Hook it it was cover'd with that Bait" (Van(3 rillo, 97). She 
can afford to admit her own äcäasional deceptiveness, however, 
because it is for the purpose of educating Antonia to beware 
of far more serious deceptions. 
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Considering Lucinda'a partiality, on the, question of marriage, 
it iss hi, h1y ironic of I'andevi12® to hake har de oxib, horseif as 
juäg3n, "af thint53 123 1 tir1 'car, without beir. ý; influenced by my 
Lave, or my Tttroh. "' Lan! evills, ho ovor, probably intcrlad the 
cage atnat cmrri o to to r ietorically-lo iocj bocmu3e worin 
roatlera, and poosibly even male on: s, could probably not have been 
inducc3 to soriou3ly ox:. jn thn, ir strsan; i3r-h31c iäeas about marriage 
by urclf rational analysis. 
2 
Prccluoly t causc or its strong 
zttrnctionp o pacially to 'i aiccnß, º4 then, Irs: ilcuillo's attack on 
carrimgp is n1co3t wholly directed at the roa' or'c e otion3 rather 
than hia or her intellect. '"als is aZPecinfly trae when arte 
COT2 iucr3 thItp ßz3 will be soon, the rdn thrust of the 2`iction31 
tales, vhich helonY more to tho realm or rhatoric than dialectic, is 
a warnirr, - 'ainut th9 any rea or marri e. 
On political mattorz, howavor, Luciarla'a evaluation of horrelf 
13 rioro acc^urate acc9 tandcvillo$ juctifica the diccuscion 
of political matters in t}F f 111 ii, r manners "I export to be consurai 
for setting `Oman talk of 'Politicks; but firnt mim l, how 1itt1, 
Antý____anirx ;  to the 'iattorp r t! rý rýzýý,. inn >ýs 'a Cbaraoter. M3 
'hst k2an3ovi11o 3e^'20 to i=p1Y horo 10 that 'ucl&la is no ordln: ry 
'vorn Inevitably ignorant about : an; subjects but a highly 
knowledge iblo one. This aspect of Z cinddu, 'i "character, " in any 
1. . andcvilln, 113. 
2., As has been noted in the Introductory chapter to tbia thesis, 
hure used a similar tactic in bis D1 1c. zut--3 ConoernIn 'atural 
it"ln, thou3b a far morn rhetorically-$ophieticatod one, to 
un1ez»-4no "the re ier'za rsycbolo;; 1ca1 propensity to accept the 
ar utent from design. " 
3ý Ya villot jI-g* 
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8aset makes it possible for Mandeville's dialectic to examine 
political matters. Tfaus, the political discussions in The Virgin 
Unmask'd are introduced almost casually when, challenged by Antonia 
for her apparent inconsistency in both hating and admiring men, 
Lucinda remarks, by way of analo j that her attitude is no more 
contradictory than that of politicians who both admire and detest the 
powerful Louis XIV. 
x 
Lucinda's analog, howover, is not merely a species of verbal 
wit but actually relates deception between the sexes to political 
duplicity and leads to a key exchange which acts like an alternating 
current changing the direction of the dialectic to political matters: 
Ant. Then, it seeins, the King of France, 
has given those Princes and States great 
Provocations; and it is very reasonable they 
should be his Enemies. That has Pian'kind done 
to you? How have they deserv'd your Hate? 
Luc. They have enslaved our Sex: In 
Paradice, Man and Wohin were upon an even 
foot; see what they have made of us since: 
Is not every 1rotnan that is narry'd a Slave 
to her Husband; I mean, if she be a good 
Woman, and values her Prociiine. 
2 
Lucinda and Antonia in this exchange may still be basically talking 
about the relationship between the sexes but, coming as it does at 
the end of the sixth dialogue, they also irretrievably add a political 
dimension which dominates the next two dialogues. Just as a machine 
which generates alternating currents always uses the saue electricity 
1. Vandeville, 113. 
2. Landeville, 115. 
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soy toot cnievillG'a dialectic may change its emphasis but is still 
a dialectic whom d; naic force iss the exposure of deception. 
Such a mechanical analo, r to indicate the dialectical conzistancy 
of Mandoville'a elaborate axj a onta in h Vir in tin^askOd may be 
anachronistic, in the coned that alternating current eerteratnru were 
not invented until the early ninatecnth century, but not entirely 
inappropriate a3 "tandovillc, hin3olf, , aces vivid use of mechanical 
analogies. Cre ouch ire in iucinc! a's d3scription of the nature of 
over= ant o 
It is very hard in some Countries to to well 
acquiintcd with the hidden Srrin;, s that eve 
Life to the sevoral Courts of Justice; the 
$cvara7 ? 'ullie , by the help of which, the 
A "oney is hoisted up from the vary Bottom to 
the Top, as well as the many 7olca thro' 
which it is cuf er'd to drop daxrn a in, 
with the Wheels that turn it, arl all the 
other Parts that compose the achino of 
(overnz. ent. 
I 
Such an analogy in rexiniscort of Fri, mimn onoe in it3 satirical 
ovortonon tut it alto has the effect or inducinj, bocauze of the way 
it satirically reduce3 the aweso--s power of governninta to a matter 
of wheels and pulleys, an analytical detach mint tcwaril the que4tion3 
involved, so thzt "anioville's dialectic irdeo: 3 makes full use of 
analoCy, sonetices for the }-urc03e Of advancir the argument in a 
quick and unexpectedly "witty" way ani al= at always for the inräuco- 
m-nnt of a detached analytical spirit in the roa r, rather than for 
1. varonvi11n, 123. 
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purely rhetorical persuasion. In short, despite the rhetorical 
complexities of Uandeville's analogies in The Virgin Unmask1d, 
they usually serve a fundamentally dialectical or "philosophical" 
purpose; so much so, in fact, that though Louis XIV is portraarcd as 
an arch-deceiver and tyrant, tribute is'paid to his courage and 
political capacity - in spite of the fact that Vandeville wrote and 
published The Virgin tlnmask'd at a time when both Holland and Britain 
were at war with France. 
One more effect of 1, andeville's dialectical use of analogy is 
that it considerably weakens the reader's resistance to his ideas. 
The reader, in fact, is very much in the position of Antonia who is 
completely dominated not only by Lucinda's brilliance but by her 
cunning as well. Thus, when Lucinda comraros Louis XIV's skill at 
political deception to those of a doctor administering effective 
medicines, Antonia is understandably puzzled. Lucinda explains that 
the "medicines" are "BrPibery" and "lulling to sleep. " To this 
Antonia counters very straightforwardly and in a seemingly definite 
manner: "If what you say, be true, it is strange that a great many 
People should think him so often mistakent"1 Instead of defensively 
taking issue with Antonia': statement, Lucinda stays on the offensive 
by introducing; yet another analorys to the effect that a gardener 
is always full of predictions about whether his plants will bear 
fruit but that they chance from day to day depending, on the weather, 
so that his long-term predictions are often wrong. Again, the 
analogy puts Antonia on the defensive: "That's a Riddle to )? e. " 
This gives Lucinda an opportunity to continue her argument about 
1. Mandeville, 149" 
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the i r©nch lking'!. s great political skill by explaining that she is 
doalinuz with metaphorically meacurablo political facts not with 
prognostication3. She dons not say so directly, however, but by 
expanding on thn analogy of the Bardon: "I never say or think any 
Thin; of it before the Fruit is ripe, but when they gather it, I 
have it meaaur'd, and then I can tell you what there is to half a 
Peck. "1 In short, When one analol-j its successfully countered, 
another one, or an a3pect of the same one, takes its place and brings 
more hydra-headed complexities into the argument. 
One rust even resort to analogy to ozke the point that arjuin, 
with Lucinda is like playing chaos with a auch superior opronont so 
that no matter what moves one nakeop they are not just countered 
but contained within a restricted range of choices. In view of 
Lucinda's considerable arlvantaCe in argument, it iss hardly surprising 
that at the and of one dialo uo, when, Lucinda cur onto a gma of 
chess, Antonia asks for a rook advantage, at which Lucinda reopondn 
generously by conceding a queen. 
2 
Chile Lucinda's superiority in 
chess is probably intended by Mandeville to reflect her superiority 
in argument, she herself uies the cbosa-analogy in a more direct 
manner to condemn Louis XIV's ruthlessness while admiring his 
political skills 
'T'hat arbitrary, that knowing himself to be 
the Causo of War and Fanino, beholds the 
'Li eries of his own Peoplo with loan Concern 
than you can nee a Play; the Bane of Mancind, 
1. rtn1evilln, 149. 
2. ? °anflhvilln, 117. 
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that can draw whole Schemes of the 
Destruction and Devastation of flourishing 
Cities and plentiful Countries, with the 
sale Tranquility as I can play a Game at 
Chess; and if it but contributes to his 
gigantick Ain, esteem MT the Lives of a 
1undred 'Thousand of the most faithful of 
his Subjects, no more than I value the 
Iosin, ý; of a single Pawnq if it forwards 
ray Design upon your Came. 
I 
In spite of bar condemnation of Louis XIV's indifference to human 
suffering, however, Lucinda's own cannor of discussion is, like 
Louis's policies, in the spirit of a ruthless game of chess but, as 
she implies about herself as a chess-plsyor, bar aimtt are essentially 
benevolent. Lucinda'a argumentative strategy, in fact, is also like 
a game of chess in the sense that it cannot really d=a Co but, on 
the contrary, strengthen the inexperienced Antonia's "virtue" just 
as a game of chess, if played in the proper spirit, can only enhance 
one's mental abilities. 
As mentioned before, the overall dialectical pattern of the 
Virgin Un. ask'd includes the fictional tales which are, in a senee, 
extended analogies though they do have a life of their own 
independent, but not quite, of the rest of the Virgin Un., ask'd. Thus, 
if their contribution to the overall dialectical pattern is to be 
understood, they oust first be discussed as separate entities. 
The two tales are deocribod in t17e table of contents as "The 
Iiistory of Aurelia" and "The Eistory of Leonora" and take up almost 
1. raMoville, 168-9. 
93 
half of The Viten Unuask'd1 It ooews likely, in fact, that 
w'andoville was exporiöentin in The Virgin Unmask-'d to find out 
whether his jurpoae of creating; an ontertainin;,,, vehicle for 
philosophical analysis was better served by the philosophical 
dialogue or the fictional tale. Both tales are narrated by Lucinda 
and, although in terms of plot they are patterned after the 
artificial conventions of novels and romances of thc, 'day, 
2 
they deal 
with psychological motivation in so detailed a way tLat they look 
forward to the kind of roalisn found in the novels of Defoe, 
Richardson and Fieldi'nC and defined by Ian watt in the following; 
manners 
Formal realism ... is the narrative 
embodiment of a premise that Dofoe and 
Richardson accepted very literally, but 
which is im? licit in the novel form in 
general: tie promise, or primary 
convention, that the novel is a full 
and authentic report of human experience, 
and is therefore under an obligation to 
satisfy its render with such details of 
the story as the iniividuality of the 
actors concerned, the particulars of tho 
times and places of their actions, 
details which are presented through a 
more largely referential use of lanru. re 
than is coon in other literary fornu. 
3 
1. They take up five out of ton dialogues (Dials. 3,4,5,9 and 10) 
and ninety-three out of two-hundr©d pages. 
2. Vichort idontifiec "Tho ! istory of Aurelia" as based on and 
reactinr a, -ainst the Augustan fictional device of "the obstacle- 
strewn love intrigue which culminates in marriage" and "The 
History of Leonora" on the anti-roiantic device of the "tale of 
illicit love. " See Vichert, 64- 
3. Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novels Studies in Defoe, Richardson 
and Fielding London, 1963), p. 33. Hereinafter to be citedas Watt. 
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Before apprafaing Lucinda's tales, it should be noted that pro- 
Richardconian "realism" as not quite ¬a exhaustive an the "formal, 
realicza" described by Watt but a hilly rhetorical product in the 
form of the fabliau or picaresque tale where "economic or carnal 
motives are given pride of place in their presentation of human 
behaviour. " Such "realiotic, " fictions, then, are "invertel 
ronancea" rather than novels. 
l 
7hi1a the fiction. z1 tales of The Virgin tJnnatktd are not full- 
fledged novele in : tatt'o sense, they do co beyond the conventions 
of the "invortcd romance. " Lc: cinda herself eoe to be hinting at 
such an aim on I andevi11o'u part when she tells Antonia that 
Had I been telling you a Romance, I would 
have mac3 o use of Art; I know as wall as you, 
Nieoe, what should have been dons according 
to their Rules ... But in a true Story, we 
must relate thine as they happen. 
` 
Further evidence that Mandeville was gropirig towards a mor© 
comprehensive realism is provided in the followin, 9 exchange# where 
Lucinda half apolodz03 for the time she spends in analyzing notivess 
1. Wattq 11. Also see A. J. Tieje, Tho TThao of Characterization 
in Froco Piotior to 1740 nneapolis, 1916)s p. 45. 
: faxinilian S., Novak dissents from '<att's view that formal realism 
in the novels of Defoe, ilchardson, and Fielding is qualitatively 
different from the techniques used in romances, early novellas 
and various other early forms of fiction. However that ratty be, 
'andoville's tales in the Vir rin ilnmask'd do seem to have elements 
of "formal realism" in Watt's sense and, as will be seen, he 
certainly dispara ed the romance for what ho considered to be 
its lack of credible psychological motivation. Novak's argument 
its to be found in "Fiction and Society in the early Fighteenth 
Century" in R. T. $iodenberr, Jr., (ed. ), Fngland in the 
'Restoration and arl '. i hteonth Centu (Los Ang lea and London, 
1972)t pp. 51-70. 
2.1&nftevillei 79, 
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Luc. ... I Irnow you are a Critictc, 
Anntonta, don*t ycu think ry Tale 
teMoua? 
Ant. No indc od, tunt; tar from it. 
Luc. I was afraid you thought me 
ton,; hecau e one should not t: i co 
particular in Circumittrce3 that nro 
i at eri al to the Plot t and torci f; n 
from tarp !r to which a )tory is to1c2. 
Ant. I havok honrci nothir but that 
was vary titor1i1 ... 
Lucint1 's remahk3, in Pact, paint to an a arcncas on Lamlevillols 
part of the tensions between a conventional plot atructýiro äe ged 
to draw a "rural" an a thorcuý- cin' analysis of motives. Thus, 
although he was i. robably not aw rc of thi v, ''anr? nvillo care close to 
Aravin ya distinction between the artificial realis of "Inverted 
romance" arm the fora il realism of the ravel. In this he wont 
b, yon! the dictinctior., hotreen "novel" and "ronanco" drawn by 
Ccngrevc in his preface to Znc t-ts 
!, ovn1n ar4t of a more rnmi1i it ? tur ; 
Casio near u . -if arr5 ro-, mannt to us 
intri ; uen in practicc, delßcbt us 
with Accid. crts and odd ' vonts, but 
not such as are °bo11y unusu. 2 or 
unprocidentod (sic), such which not 
being co di . tart fron our it 1iOf 
brie also the p1eacuro resrcr us. 
T; oaarccc give core of ' osddnr, 
Novels cores c1i, ht. ` 
1. ftn1avtll,, 42. 
2. : i11i: ui Con rove, n' rotn1oto cl. bý L'onta uo Oxu aro, 
vol. --'I (tcr io--n, 1923), P. M. A13o quoted in Vial to 63. 
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There Con vo considers realism as an entartaining device, 
tucirAa's remarks, however hasitatinj in tons, point to a 
"circumstantial" or detailed realism indoperrlent of the exigencies 
of an entertaining plot. In ahort, the realism of Mandeville's 
tales is not one that differs from the schenatism of the romance 
merely in its seamier subject--matter or entertaining verisimil. utude, 
as advocated by Con, eve, but one which probes into the motives of 
character in ouch a way that he or she beco: aesf as in many a novel, 
more of an Imagined inMividual than a typest 
One important point related to the i ue of novelistic realism 
is that Mandeville even seem to have been aware that his attention 
to detail ma-de a qualitative difference in terms of entnrtainxent 
value. 'hat, at anj rata, seems to be the case when Antonia exhorts 
Lucinda In the following manners "But pray don't be more concise; 
for it Is so entertaining, I shan't have enough of it. "2 Antonia'e 
remark, in fact, Deems to reflect a possible 4jection on Mandeville's 
part of conciseness as a literary aim in the writing of fiction, 
again a characteristic of the novel as it was to develop in the hands 
of Defoe and Richardson. As Ian Watt points out about the 
conciseness of Auguatan prose, 
... the prose norm of the Au, u3tan period 
remained much too literary to be the 
natural voice of ß'o11 Flanders or °=o1a 
1. Ad far as t ardovi, 11o'e interest in the individuality of Aur©lia 
is concerned, it should be noted that before even beginnin, T to 
narrate the "hIistory of turelia" Lucinda makes it quite plain 
that when ehe talks about kurelia, she Is talking m; out an 
noquaintance; snoroover, one she rer, obere "when she was yet in 
Hangir, sleeves, and Xa" oman grown ... " A`andhvi21e, 35). On 
the "individualism" of the novel, sea Watts 116-19* 
2. Mandeville, 43. 
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Andrews$ ari although the prose of Addicon, 
for example, or Seift, is simple or direct 
enough, its ordered oconogr tends to suggest 
rq-aetr 
an acute summary4than a full report of what 
it doacribea. 
Although many of Uandevi11o'a prose writings display the Augustan 
conciseness described by watt, it nevertheless seems to be the case 
that in The Virgin Unmask'd Mandeville shove an awareness that 
conciseness would detract from Lucinda's tale being a novelistic 
"true history" rather than just a moral "exemplum. " 
Just how Uandeville's realism operates in the tales, however, 
should become evident upon examining probably the most vivid section 
of "The History of Aurelia" which occurs at the turning-point of the 
tale when Aurelia's romantic illusions about her husband, Dorante, 
are finally dispelled. In terms of plot, what happens is that 
Dorante attempts to convince his wife to commit adultery vith a lord 
willing to pay for the privilege. Mandeville's handling of this 
situation is neither rhetorically moralistic nor pornographically 
satirical but somewhere in between these two alternatives. Dorante's 
attempts to induce Aurelia to commit adultery are described by 
Lucinda as a series of encounters between Aurelia and har husband, 
the full meaning of which she does not comprehend until the. last 
moment. At first be merely flatters her charms and suggests that 
she would be a fit mistress for a king. 
2 Later he introduces her to 
a nobleman and expostulates "on his Wit and other good qualities. " 
1. Watt, 30- 
2. Mandeville, 53. 
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Other gambits on Dorante'e part include his leaving her alone for 
lengthy periods with the nobleman and "ridiculintT the Sinfulness of 
Adultery and unlawful Loves" 
1 
Aurelia puts up with the nobleman for 
Torante'o sake but it never occurs to her that ehe is expected to 
prostitute herself for him. 
1xasperated at Aurelia's ignorance of his design, Doranto 
finally makes his purpose clear and in a most brutal canner: "Would 
you have me to be more plainl Let him lye with you, and you'll 
obliges If not, I can keep you no longer; turn out with your brats. "2 
Ile then roes on to expound on how money is the only real value and 
bow Aurelia's love for hin is meaningless if she is unwilling to do 
hit such a trifling favour. Before even waiting for her reaction, 
Dorante summons the nobleman to their bedroom. Aurelia'a sorrowful 
reaction to torante'e revelation is described in groat detail, 
... ehe was co overwhelm' d with Grief at 
the Thoughts of the unheard of : "reachery 
of the Uan she lov'd with such a violent 
Passion, she was not able to utter a 
Word; but the Tears, not dropping but 
flowing from her Eyes in Streams, wept 
so bitterly sobbing and wringing her 
Hands, with all the Signs of a profound 
and real Sorrow, that any Lean but 
Domente, would have had Compassion on her. 
3 
kandvvillo avoids bathos, however, by making Lucinda d®scribo 
Aurelia'a subsequent action not in an exaggerated rhetorical taßhion 
1" 3 and; evil®, 54" 
2. 'andevillo, 58. 
3. Mandeville, 60-1. 
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but with an almost understated precision: 
She neither made great Noise, Bit or 
Scratch'd, but appoiar'd so resolute, 
and har Resistance was made with so 
much eagerness# und in such good 
earnest, that the Amorous Spark, 
seeing there aao nothing to be done 
without breaking her Handal and 
coming to downright Brutish Force, 
and being pretty well tir'd, let go 
his hold, and came to Perawasious (sic). 
' 
One could go on analyzing this section of the tale but what is really 
worth keeping in mind is that up to the point where Auralia rejects 
the advances of the nobleman and even succeeds in arousing his pity, 
Lucinda acts almost as an omniscient narrator vividly setting forth 
a series of actions described with much realiutic detail. 
Mdandeville's narrative technique, however, also includes 
detailed discussion between Lucinda and Antonia about Aurelia's 
motivationso Antonia, in fact, asks the sort of questions often 
uppermost in any discerning reader's mind. Both Lucinda and 
Antonia are especially thoroughgoing in analyzing Aurelia's reaction 
to Dorante's schene. 
2 
On Antonia's query about how it could be 
possible for Aurelia to be deceived about Dorante's intentions, 
Lucinda has this to says 
As to your other Doubt, how she came 
not to find out his Design before he 
told it her so openly# the same Excess 
of Love answers all; she know how 
1. )andevillet 61. 
2. Mandeville, 64-9. 
100 
little she could have parted with him 
to any other Woman, and measuring his 
Love by her own, how should she think 
that he intended to make a Whore of 
her? That he carry'd her into this 
Nobleman's Company, often left 'em 
together, and ordered her to be marry 
and not disoblige him by being ätarch'ds 
was always constxu'd in Dorms s Favours 
She calla it the great Confidence her 
husband put in her, to put in her, to 
trust her with a Man of ! Il Repute among 
'omens She suffersd his Gallantry, 
because she thought her Husband had some 
end in it, which she never examin'd into; 
and really Dorante had such an ascendant 
over har, he night have made her do any 
thing, and porbaps as Sinful as that, 
as long any it was not inconsistent with 
her Lovet Nobody commits a Sin for the 
sake of its being a Sin. 
1 
Yucindals answer, especially the last sentence, no doubt has its 
moralistic aspect but it also involves a concrateo almost novelistic, 
analysis of Aurelia's motives. 
in short, Mandeville's quasi-novelistic realism In the product 
of an unusual combination of philosophical dialogue and vividly- 
detailed storytelling; so that Lucinda playa the part of 
omniscient narrator and Antonia that of the alert, though somewhat 
romantically-inclined, reader. Mandeville's exporimental attitude 
I. i. °andevillet 67.8. 
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to his fictional tale3, at any rate, seems to be confirmed when 
Antonia eaolain3 at the end of the "History of Aurelia" that "There 
is Variety enough in her Life, to make a Novel of. "1 The 
implication is that Aurelia's "history" should be considered as a 
novel precisely because of its detailed realism but, in spite of 
their realism, the fictional tales primarily serve the rhetorical 
purpose of buttressing Lucinda's arguments in the series of 
dialogues as a whole. The two fictional tales, in fact, especially 
the second one, the "History of Leonora, " are not only quasi- 
novelistic but also exploit the resources of casuistic discourse 
in their detailed analysis of character. From this standpoint the 
two tales read as "cases" to be judged; to be specific, matrimonial 
cases. 
matrimonial case3 were found, and no doubt avidly read, not 
only in casuistical treatises and handbooks such as Joseph Mall's 
Resolutionn and recisions of givers Practical Cases of Conscience in 
Continuall flee Anon; b'en (1650) W Richard Baxter's A Christian 
Directory (1673)2 but in popular periodicals such os Dunton's 
Athenian Mercury and Defoe's Review. 
3 
The aims of casuistry, or 
discussion of difficult "cases" of conscience, undoubtedly cannot be 
equated with those of fiction, however morally "exemplary, " but it 
does seem that the "cases" found in a periodical like the Athenian 
1. Mandeville, 98. 
2. For a survey of the contents of casuistical treatises and 
handbooks, see John T. McNeill, "Casuistry in the Puritan Age, " 
Roligion in Life, 12 (1942-43), '76--89. 
3. Defoe's regular feature in the Review, "Advice from the Scandal 
Club, " often included- casuistical problems. For evidence that 
Defoe and Dunton were.,,, familiar with casuistical manuals and 
treatises, see C. A. Starr, Defoe and Casuistry (Princeton, Now 
Jersey, 1971), pp"12-13. 
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U4=1177 wore not alv&ys cohomatio but sometimes rich enough In 
detail to rosomble short-stories. In the words of Bertha-'onica 
Stearns, 
From the beginning the Athenian }/ercury 
had offered a variety of "cases" for the 
consideration of its readers. With the 
development of the Ve rcuries for ladies, 
these cases became more elaborate in 
detail and if not actually short-stories, 
certainly offered plot material for the 
curious. Dunton had, undoubtedly, a 
narrative gift that enabled him to give 
an air of verisimilitude to fictitious 
material, and to endow it with interost. 
l 
As in the case of the Athenian L'ercury, it may well be that 
Mandeville, apart from his evident philosophical interest in the 
moral and psychological complexities of human behaviour, may have 
been encouraged to provide elaborate analysis of motives in The 
Viren Unmask" d for the benefit of women readers. 
As far as matrimonial cases are concerned, one familiar topic 
for discussion was the question of to what extent parents had the 
right to forbid prospective marriages. One ouch query turns up 
during Lucinda's narration of "ieonora's Uistort" when Antonia 
reacts to the enforced separation of Leonora and her suitor, 
Cleander, by demanding of Lucinda if she "approves of this ricorous 
Way of treating Children? " After a spirited exchange taking in the 
various circumstances that led Cleander's father to forbid the 
match and oven force Cleander to leave the country, Lucinda concludes 
1. Bertha--onioa Stearns, "The First English Periodical for Women, " 
Wodern Philology, 28 (1931)ß 51. `; 
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her deliberations in favour of the father's authority for the following 
reason: "It is not safe for Parents to give their Consent to any 
Thing of Moment that Children may ask, whilst they are under Age, 
unless it brings a visible Advantago to them. "1 Although Lucinda's 
statement its intended as a general rule, it is hedged on all sides 
by casuistical distinctions so that the father's authority is not 
absolute but qualified by circumstances, such as that the con rust 
be under-ace, there is no "visible advantage" in sight and so forth. 
The Athenian Vorcury dealt with quite a number of similar cases, 
though these werd not always hypothetical but often from geniune 
correeponäento, and in a similar rianner. 
2 
In one case concerning 
the rights and wrongs of parental authority and secret engagement 
voso, for example, the advice from the "Athenian Society" begin. 
with this stern upholding of parental authority: 
You have no Power to dispose of your 
S, 1t contrary to your Father's Consent, 
and if he forbid your Proceedings as 
noon as he heard of them, your Vows are 
wholly void, because Cod Almighty has 
in this case given him the Disposal of 
them. 
only to be immediately qualified by the tollowina cdvices 
But on the other Side, we rasch co=end 
those Parents that do not abuse their 
Authority, "m=bering they are 
1. ä'. ar1eville, 179. 
2. A good proportion of the matrimonial cases in the Ath enian 
L3ercu deal with cases of parental authority and in the 
Athenian Oracle collection of queries from the Vercu usually 
come under the heading of Varrie e" in the "Alphabetical Table" 
or index. 
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cot anded not to be bitter against their 
Children, as it would bei to contradict 
them in such an Affair, wherein often 
the Happiness of their Lives depends, 
Without they'd a great deal of Reason for it s 
Although the kind of discussions Lucinda has with Antonia about the 
motivations of the characters in the fictional tales can be considered 
casuistical, in the sense that moral judgemienta are wade, it romaine 
to be seen whether L! andevillo was really a casuist in the arms sense 
as Dunton or Defoe. 
Although 2anievill© never seers to have made any direct state- 
=ants about casuistry as such, he did declare disparagingly in his 
Free Thouahte on Reh ton that the Jesuits were "the easiest casuists" 
among priests. In this he no doubt followed Pascal's satirical 
critique of Jesuit casuistry in the famous Lettrea Provinciales 
and Piorro Bayles highly censorious attitude to casuistry. 
2 
Mandeville's attitude to casuistry, however, could not have been 
, wholly negative because the one casuistical principle he did follow 
, was that motives determine whether an action is sinful or not. 
Pascal, himself, was corrosively ironic about tho casuistical emphasis 
1. The Athenian Oracle, third od., vol. I (London, 1728), P, 105- 
2. Mandeville freely acknowledged a great debt to Bayle for his 
religious opinions. See Free Thourhts on Polarion, second od. (London, 1729), p. 22. hereinafter to be cited as Free Thoushts. 
In an article on Loyola In his t=ous Pictionnaire, Jayle has 
this to say about the casuists: "... ces avocata du barreau do 
la conscience trouve plus do distinctions at do subtilites quo 
lea avocats du barreau civil. Ile font du barreau do la conscience 
un laboratoire do morals oü lea veritos lea plus solides s'en 
vont an fumoe, en 9e18 Volatilos, an vapour. " See Pierre Bayles 
Dictionnaire iiiotorique at Critique, vol. 9 (Paris, 1820), p. 330. 
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on intentional as when be makes a Jesuit declare that 
Car, pour vous tesmoigner quo noun ne 
permettona pas tout, as? aches que, par 
example, noun ne souffrons jamais 
d'avoir 1'intention formelle de pecher 
pour le soul deonein de pecher, at quo 
quiconque s'obatine ä borner non deuir 
done in mal pour le mal mesme, noun 
rompone avec luy; cola eat diaboliques 
voila qui eat sans exception d'age, do 
©exo, do qualite. haie, quancl on `ai'eot 
pas dane cette malheureuse disposition, 
a1x noun essayons do mettro an 
prattique roatre rethode do di rigger 
l'intention, qui consists a no 
proposer pour fin do see action* un 
object pariie. Ce West pas quIeutant 
qu'i1 oat on nostr© pouvoir noun no 
detourniona lea hoes des closes 
doffendues; main, Quant noun ne pouvons 
paa empeschor l'action, nous purifiors 
au moins l'intention; et ainsi noun 
corrigeons le vice du moien par la 
purste de is fin. 
l 
Pascal'a Jesuit, in other words, is all but saying that sinful actions 
are nonexistent except in those who deliberately int©rd to sin. 
Probably few casuists, whether Protestant or Catholic,, actually went 
this tar but Pascal is drawing attention to how the emph is on 
intention could well lead to moral laxity. 
Mandeville's emphasis on intention, however, leads to a very 
different analysis of morality. 'hen Antonia calls Dorante "the 
1. Blaise Pa3cal, I. ettres Provinciales (Manchesters 1951)ß pp. 69-70. 
hereinafter to be cited as Pascal. 
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Devil's own Casuist" for oxa: aple, thoro is no doubt that it is 
partly because just before abandoning Aurelia to her would-be lover, 
he tells her, as a last resort in his protracted efforts to convince 
her to prostitute herself, that if she has no intention to be lustful 
no sin will be involved: " ... and if your Conscience be so foolishly 
scrupulous, as to boggle at Sin, there is no occasion of committing 
any, unless you have a mind to it; for it being an Act of the Soul, 
it is in your Powor to prevent it, by having no Iustful Thoughts ... "1 
As mentioned before in the context of )Sanieville'a quasi-novelistic 
analysis of motives, Lucinda herself remarks about Aurelia's actions 
that "Nobody commits a in for the sake of its being a Sin"2 but, 
unlike Pascal's Jesuit, she weans not that hardly anyone ever sins 
but that the sintulnoes of an action does not depend on a sinful 
intention. Like Pascall in fact, the only intention Uandevilla 
admits to make an action virtuous is the ascetic one of doing it 
solel for the sake of the Gospels 
3 
Thus when ! dandevillo states 
what any casuist would approve of, namely "that to judge from our 
actions, we ouCht to enquire into the motives that set u3 to work, " 
1.4dandeville, 60. 
2. itanievillo, 68. 
3. tbether, like Pascal and Calvin, 1! an4eville waa Augustinian in 
his religious beliefs is a highly controversial question beyond 
our scope but it is generally agreed that hie notion of virtue 
is a rigorous one. Whatever tandeville's religious beliefs or 
lack of them, however, he really did seem to believe that human 
beinZs are capable of disinterested, virtuous actions, however 
rare he thought such actions to be in practice. On this point, 
see John Colman, "Bernard Mandeville and the Reality of Virtue, " 
Philosophy, 47 (1972), 125-39. For a controversial assessment 
of 1 andeville as an Anglican humanist in the tradition of Hooker, 
see i: lias J. Chiasson, "Bernard Mandevilles A Reappraisal, " 
Philological quarterly, 49 (1970), 489-519" 
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it is proceeded by a very strict interpretation of what kind of 
intention coos for a virtuous action, nsmely "that all the rules 
of morality, and other duties incumbent on a christian (sic), are 
not to be perform'd for any worldly consideration, or other reason, 
but the love of GOD and holiness. "' Prom this standpoint, 
Uandeville'o casuistry seems to be an "inverted" one which, instead 
of oeakinv the circumstances of a "case" in order to render a fair 
moral judgment or advice, seeks to analytically expose how far from 
true, disinterested virtue almost every human action tends to be. 
Perhaps the weakness, and a paradoxical one at that, of tlandoville's 
casuistry, from an honest casuist's point-of-view, is that, as has 
been seen in the Lucinda-Artesia Papers, at worst, it seems to 
inspire an attitude, of neutrality and analytical curiosity about 
moral matters ors at bast, acid this was hardly considered desirable 
by the orthodox in the eighteenth century, it secularizes morality 
and makes it dependent on the needs of society, which are not always 
necessarily spiritual. 
Mandevillo's "inverted" casuistry is especially evident in the 
"History of Leonora" which is somewhat rcro schematic than the 
"History of Aurelia. " Cn the most basic lev©l# "Leonora's History" 
is an exemplary coral tale dosianod to prove Lucinda's proposition 
to the effect that "no Voran, tho' of the most exemplary Virtue, is 
able to withstand the Troachci-j of some gent it once she abandons 
that Pear, which is so necessary forher Protection, and thinking,; 
herself secure, ceases to be upon her Guard. "Z The story is divided 
1. Free Thoughts, 9. 
2. L'andeville, 170. 
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into two parts, one dealing with Leonora's abortive engaje ent to 
Cleand©r and this other with her tarried life with Alcandor. ßcth 
parts illuminate certain facets of I. oonorale "virtue. " In the 
first part, she acts according to har Fassions and even when 
Cleander is rorcei to leave the country by his father, she remains 
faithful to him in spite of pressure from her grandmother to marry 
a duke. Lucinda, however, leaven the question of her virtue "open" 
by suggesting various motives, including the most virtuous one, for 
her fidelity: 
Now Leonora was attack'd on both 3ideo; 
yet in epight of the Duke'e A3saultss 
and the old Woman's Treachery, she 
remain'd unmoveabl©; whether a Principle 
of real Vertue, a Dislike to socething 
in the Duka'o Peraont or also the Love 
to Clete r, was the Cause, could not 
easily be determined. 
l 
Only vh®n tricked into believing that Cleander is dead does she marry 
someone else, the somewhat staid but voll-off jeweller, Alcandor. 
The first part shows that though impetuous at first, Leonora 
eventually oottles for a marriage of mainly financial convenience 
but in both her phases she eeoma to bei in the terminology of the 
time, "inclined to virtue. " It is in the record part of the story, 
however, that her virtue really begirz3 to be tooted. nor first 
test is when, rauch to her surprise, she meats Cleared©r again and 
finde that her love for him has not diminished. With great self- 
sacrifice and moral rigour she discourages any further meetings. 
She justifies her decision on the grounds that it is the only way 
to preserve her virtues "I confess I should not have Strength to 
1. Mandeville, 181. 
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resist the Temptaticnf and yet I hope I as vortuouu, because I 
Peel I want not Reaolution to avoid it for ever. "I The second testf 
ho'aover, Is rauch harder to pass ani Lucinda details tho 
circuatame3 which mike it so. For one thin3, Leonora is not 
very satisfied with her husbanI who in somewhat indifferent towardo 
her, so that although ehe can reject C1oander for the sake of virtue, 
ache is not gait's as prepared for the wiles of the cunningly 
hypocritical ttincio. 
}Zinoio, rho insinuates himself into Loonora'a household by 
befrienli her husband is, in fact, a "jilted" lover loth; since 
committed to ruining as many women as possible. It is at this point 
eslocially that Leonora's "history" takes on the aspect of a "case. " 
she is at first suspicicuc of him but he shrewdly wins her trust by 
never making an advance or giving the least appearance of doing; so, 
ms well as never making use "of a double Entendre, or any 
Expre3sion, tho' in the highest of his 2mirth, that had the least 
Tendency to Looseness and Imriorality"2 and even by keeping Alcandor 
at home in perpetual good spirits. Thus, it is as soon as Leonora 
beging to consider hincio a cood friend that her virtue is in its 
greatest dancer. According to Lucinda, it is precisely I1incio's 
hypocritical mask of virtue which deceives Leonora% 
What strange perverse Creatures we Women 
aro1 The chaste and wary Leonora, who 
would so bravely have resisted him, in 
Gage he had assaulted her with Love; ehe 
that prepar'd herself for a vigorous 
1. Fandevi11e, 188. 
2. Mandeville, 194. 
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Defence, whilst she dreaded the Dangers of 
Vice, was foil'd by well diesecibl'd Vertue, 
and envying his cold Indifferency, gras 
ready to quarrel at the Weakness of har 
Charms, 'till quite diearm'd of all her 
rear, she almost could have wish'd him 
le$s insensible*1 
L: inoio does not take Ionjj to prose his alvantage and begins to act 
as i! he were desperately and virtuously hiding his love for 
Leonora. At this Leonora takes pity on him, whereupon he rankes good 
use of a conniving doctor to give the impression that he has fallen 
mortally sick. Blamini herself for his sickness, Leonore reveals 
that she is ready to reciprocate his love for her. He pretends to 
be surprised at being "discovered" and protests hypocritically that 
nothing could torment him more than ruining her virtue. 
2 
It is 
at this point, with Leonora's virtue hanging in the balanco, that 
iuainda'o tale ende an3 ehe anks$ "Now, Antonlaa, tell sae where you 
can blame Le onora yet? Consult your Pillow upon it, and to Vorrov 
you ahall know all. "3 In terms of ! andeville'a strict casuistry, 
I. Uandoville, 194-5. 
2. It has been pointed out by Charles ! 'ish in his introduction to 
Short Fiction of the Seventeenth Century (Neer York, 1963) that 
in the romance "Frustrated love normally leads to dire sickness 
unto death, but luckily the Plots prefer to ent happily" (p. xii). 
Mandeville seems to mike fun of such a convention by allowing 
Cleander to disappear and die abruptly and by having Uincio pretend 
to be dying of love. Antonia, in fact, expects Leonora and 
Cleander to be eventually reunited but Lucinda disabusos her of 
that expectation by declaring that she looks for a happy ending" 
'bocause you are so us'd to Romances, where, in the Beginning, You 
may always see who and who will be together; but in Nature, it 
most commonly happens otherwise" (Uanleville, 184). On the whole, 
"Leonora's History" is more of an "inverted romance" than the far 
more realistic "history" of Aurolia. 
3. Man ovillo, 200. 
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then; Leonora's case in one of deciding at that point she made the 
decision contrary to the dictates of virtue rather than what 
circumstances led her to a situation where her virtue was in danger 
and even possibly lost, at least in her apparent intention to 
satisfy kincio's desires. As all the circumstances in Leonora's 
"case" seem to mitigate her final apparent loss of virtue, this is 
no doubt deliberate on 'andeville's part in order to demonstrate 
that even in such a difficult moral dilemma casuistry is of no avail 
because virtue does not depend on worldly circumstances and 
intentions but on a determinedly ascetic choice to be virtuous in 
all circumstances. For Lucinda, the point at which Leonora made 
the fatal decision was the point at which she decided to trust 
Minoio and this is related not only to Mandeville's strict interpre- 
tation of moral choice but to Lucinda's warnings against the wiles of 
men in other parts of The Virgin UrnaakOd as well. Although 
dan eville's preface promisee a sequel to the "History of Leonora, "' 
it is quite possible that he left the story hen in,; in mid-air because 
the reader has all the evidence needed at his disposal, to judge 
Leonora, and judge her by the strict canons of Aandeville's "inverted" 
casuistry: whether she actually gives in physically to }lncio or not. 
In view of D ari eville'e apparent hostility towards any casuistry 
which dilutes the ascetic rigors of virtue, it is not surprising 
that The Virgin Unmgslc'd is not very casuistical in emphasis when 
compared with tho casuistical dialogues of efoo. " Defoe's Re13nieus 
Courtship, for ez=ple, Äha3 certain points in common with The it n 
1. Hand wwi11©9 J-67. 
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Unnv sk'd_" T, Qu, - :: r. <: tý t-v , ý, e 
ýý2 important difference between the two series of dialoguoa, 
then, lies not in differing objectives but in their different treatment 
of similar objectives. In this instance, in fact, it is Defoe who 
uses more dialogue than ? Uzndeville. The dilemma posed by tefoe, 
namely whether a daughter should disobey her father anä reject a 
highly eligible, but apparently irreligious, suitor, is handled 
dramatically and with full-blooded characters having constant 
discussions with each other. The discussion in the following 
exchange, for example, is both dramatic and fraught with casuistical 
implications as the younger dauc3hterg, who is the one being courted, 
faces a complicated moral choice: 
F-1d. Sint. Doer aiator, what will you do in 
this matter? my father is gone. 
To. Slat. that can I do? I think my father 
is very unkind to me. 
T ld. Slot. 14 father is passionate, 
you know. 
Yo. Sit. But not to hear me, not to ask 
my reason, this is very Nardi to any fathers 
marry their daughters by force? 
F1d. gist. Möy, I'll tall you what my 
father says to that: he says he knows your 
reasons beforehand, and he thinks them of 
no weight. 
To. Slat. Dear sister, do you think 
them of no moment? 
F1d. Si st. It's hard for a daughter to 
make herself judge between her father and 
the rest of his children; I am sorry you 
are so hard pushed at. 
X-13 
To. Sist. What would you do In my 
case? 
E1d. 3ist. Indeed that's hard to say 
too; I would act as my conscience should 
tell me was my duty; I confess there is 
a powerful force in a father's command. 
1 
The discussions between Lucinda and Antonia, on the other hand, have 
no such air of urgoncy as Antonia has no immediate moral choices to 
ma-k8" 
Thus, whatever casuistry there is in The Virgin Urimask'd is 
confined to the tales and serves more to alert Antonia's and, by 
extension, the reader's critical faculties or "judgment" rather than 
to engage his and Antonia's sympathies. Even the quasi-novelistic 
realism of the tales is the result of a kind of detachment which 
emphasizes the emotional complexities of human motivation rather more 
than the relationship of conscience to motivation. Another way of 
putting it is that the reader may be sympathetically drawn to the 
problems of Aurelia and Leonora but is encouraged to be more 
interested in how weaknesses in their emotional make-up determine 
their actions and reactions than in whether they are making correct 
moral choices. Mandoville's description of his own method of 
dialogue, in fact, is inimical to casuistical earnestness in its 
liberal attitude to moral exhortation: 
My Design through the whole, is to let 
young Ladies know whatever is dreadful in 
Marriage; and this could not be done, but 
1. Daniel Defoe, The Novels and 'Miscellaneous Mocks, ed. by Walter 
Scott, "Religious Courtships" vol. 14 London, 1840), pp. 29-30. 
It was first published in 1722. Hereinafter to be cited as Defoe. 
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by introducing one that was an I; noay 
to it. Therefore, thol Lucinda speaks 
altogether against Uatrinony, don't 
thinly that I do so-too. 
1 
The prescriptive casuistry of Defoe's method of dialogue, on the 
other hand, may be attractiv©ly described by Defoe but without in 
the least hiding its primarily didactic aims 
Historical dialogues, it crust be confessed, 
have a very taking elegancy in theme and the 
otory being handed forward in short periods, 
and quick raturns, makes the retaining it in 
the mind the easier, and the impression the 
more lastingf as well as delightful. 
2 
In shorts whatever casuistical discussion appears in The Virgin 
Un ask'd, especially in Lucinda's narratives, it is not, as in 
Defoe's casuistical dialofueo, part of the dramatic situation of 
dialogue between Lucinda and Antonia but subordinated to the broader 
dialectical pattern of the series of dialogues in The Virgin Unxask'd 
as a whole. 
In conclusion, the overall effect of The Virgin Unmaskld is to 
create an overwhelming; sympathy for the plight of women, yet one 
devoid of sentimentality for, with the aid of the rhetorical devices 
of the colloquy and the fictional tale, b: andeville's dialectic 
relentlessly exposes deceptions between men and women not for the 
purpose of apportioning blame but to make clear in the reader's mind, 
especially if she is a woman fond of romances, what complex 
1. ikandeville, LK-67. 
2. nw foci, ix. 
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psychological and social forces are involved in the relationship 
between the sexes. Nevertheless, although the overall effect of 
The Virgin Unmaak'd is worthy of philosophical dialogue, it is 
somewhat too rhetorically discursive and has too large a 
proportion of fictional tale to fit comfortably into the genre. 
With A Treatise of the N, ypochcndriack ani ya ckP ionnss, however, 
r, 'andevillo opted for a purer form of philosophical dialogue, rather 
than novelistic fiction, as a way of popularizing his philosophical 
opinions and attitudes. Althcugh the Treatise, as its title would 
imply, has too many pages of direct oxpo$ition to qualify as a "pure" 
philosophical dialogue, its dialectic, as will be soon in the 
following chapter, is not only stricter than that of The Virgin 
Unmý d, but dramatic in a way genuinely exterding the possibilities 
of the genre. It is with the Fable of the Bees Part Twos which will 
be examined in the next chapter but one, however, that Mandeville 
comes closest to "pure" philosophical dialogue in the eight©enth- 
century sense. In it the raillery and ridicule characteristic of 
the colloquy become fully merged with a highly-sophisticated 
dialectical technique which includes a rich vein of comedy. 
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CHAPTER IV. DIALOGUE AS THERAPEUTIC DISCCUF Es JtksDML `or, 
'i'RF: ATIS'P: fF THE' HTPOCRONDRIACK AND HT3TFRICK DISF, 4ZF3 
Soo. 0 Gorgias, hors I admire the 
surpassing brevity of your answersi 
Car. Ve11f Socrates, I do think 
myself quite good at that. 
Soc. I am glad to hear it; answer 
me in like manner about rhetorici 
with what is rhetoric concerned? 
Coro With discourse. 
Soc. That sort of discourse, Corgias? 
such discourse as would teach by what 
treatment the sick might get well? 
Core No. 
Soo. Then rhetoric is not concerned 
with all kinds of discourse? 
Coro Certainly not. 
Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able 
to speak? 
Gor. Yes. 
Soo. And to understand that about which 
they speak? 
Coro Of course. 
Soc. But does not the art of medicine, 
which we were just now mentioning, also 
make men able to understand and spews about 
the sick? 
Coro Certainly. 
Soo. Then medicine also treats of discourse? 
Gor. Yea. 
Soo. Of discourse concerning diseases? 
core Just so. 
from Plato's Gor asl 
I. The Dialogues of Plato, trans. by Benjamin Jowett,, fourth edition, vol. II Oxford, 1953)9 P"536" 
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It has been said by a biographer of Samuel Johnson, John Hawkins, 
that "He thought highly of Mandeville's Treatise of the Hypochondriacal 
Disease. "1 Presumably Dr. Johnson found Mandeville's sensible 
medical advice agreeable but it is also not unlikely that he would 
have appreciated the very lively way that ; uandeville presented his 
notions of "hypochondriasis, " a disease not far removed in its effects 
from Dr. Johnson's bouts of melancholia. 
2 
It is unfortunate that 
Hawkins did not reveal whether Johnson's recommendation was primarily 
literary or medical. It is, however, interestir4g to note that 
Landeville's Treatise of thR Fiypochondriack and Hlysterick Diseases 
(first edition, 1711) was unusual in its day in being a medical 
treatise in dialogue form. 
13y the end of the seventeenth century, all scientific Writing, 
including medical treatises, tended to follow the Royal Society's 
injunction that scientific prose should be purely expository and avoid 
rhetorical embellishmonts. 
3 
As far as the dialogue form is concerned, 
the use of characterized interlocutors and the sketching of background, 
at the very least, could be regarded as rhetorical embellishments 
1.54ohn Hawkins, Life of Samuel Johnson L. L. D. (London, 1787), p. 263. 
2. For a discussion of the similarities between "hypochondriasis" 
and "melancholia" see Father Fischer-Hornberger, "Iiypochondriasis 
of the Eighteenth Century - Neurosis of the Present Century, " 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 46 (1972), 393-4. Hereinafter 
to be referred to as Fischer-Hornberger. Also see Boswell's Life 
of Johnson, ed* by R. V. Chapman and new edition corr. by J. D. 
Fleeman London, 1970), p. 48" Here Boswell refers to Johnson as 
an "IIYPOCHONDRIACK. " Hereinafter to be cited as Boswell. 
3. At least one famous physician of the time, Francis Glisson, joined 
other scientists . n, their campaign against rhetorical ornament 
in scientific writing. See Richard Foster Jones, "Science and 
English Prose Style" in The Seventeenth Century by Richard Foster 
Jones and Others Writing in his Honor (Stanford, Calif., 1951), 
p. 79 (on Glisson) and pp. 75-110. 
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but, as Purpur has shown, neo-classical critics ger_eraliy ccisidernd 
the dialogue as a "plain, easy, and fcziiliar gray" of pre on": ß. rg 
abstruse matter to general readers. Mandeville's preface in all 
editions wittily justifies his use of. the dialogue fora on the 
grounds that those who suffer from hypochondriasis, or nhat we would 
now call nervous disorders, 
I if not neurosis, 
2 
need to ba ontertained 
. because of their characteristic impatience. That he sri: s htii elf as 
dealing with abstruse matter in an entertaining way is clear from the 
following co-, unent: 
To this end looking out for something both 
serious and diverting that miizht embellish, 
and yet not be too remote from the Subject, 
I pitch'd upon the Physical Remarks, which 
you shall find interwoven with the main 
Matter. 
3 
Thus, on the most immediate level, Mandeville employed the method of 
dialogue because he was addressing general readers'as well a. s*fellow 
doctors. His use of dialogue, then, was not automatically 
incompatible with the loyal Society's efforts to reform scientific 
prose style in the interests of clarity and plainness, even though- 
other medical writers found the expository essay a more convenient 
form of scientific expression. 
1. Mandeville's view of hypochondriasis was close to that of 
Sydenham whose "description of hypochondriacal melancholia ... 
is strongly remindful of the modern definition of depression. In 
Sydenham's day the word hypochondriasis did not yet contain the 
connotation of a morbid preoccupation with physical health. " See 
Ilza Veith, "Cn Hysterical and Hypochondriacal Afflictions, " 
Bulletin of the 4istor7 of Medicine, 30 (1956), 238. 
2. Fisch-r-I! omberger, 391-401. 
3. Bernard Mandeville A Treatise of the H pochondria. w and 1? }steric. 
Diseases, third edition (London, 1730 , PP-116-19- Tl title-p ;e 
of this edition designates it as "The Second : 3dit1 c' Correetec' 
and En1o 'ged by the Author" but there was a sect: i. e,, it2 n with 
the same text as the first edition of 1711 in 1715. Hersinaftcr 
the third edition will be referred to as Diseasey" ccs ýýB" t;, 
"The 1'ritings of Bernard Mandeville: A. Bibliographic, -;! Survey"; 
Journal of t_rv,. lieh and Germanic Philo1o , 20 
(19921), 427-30" 
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In the Treý atise itself, the exigencies of clear and lively 
exposition are combined with the therapeutic uses of conversation. 
As Misomedon, the patient, gratefully tells his doctor, Philopirio, 
You can't imagine, how a pertinent lively 
Discourse, or anything that is sprightly, 
revives my Spttits. I don't know what it 
is that makes me soy whether it be our 
talking together, the Serenity of the Air, 
or both; but I enjoy abundance of Pleasure, 
and this Moment, methinks, I am as well as 
ever I was in my Life. 
l 
hieomedon's enjoyment of conversation with Philopirio is undoubtedly 
the dramatic counterpart of the enjoyment Mandeville hoped the reader, 
whether suffering from "hypochondriasis" or not, would feel from 
reading his "Pertinent, lively discourse" on "hypochondriack" 
diseases. 
Mandeville's aims, however, were not purely expository. The 
Treatise is also an elaborate polemic against what Mandeville took 
to be the propensity of "rationalist" doctors to construct hypotheses 
on the causes of disease without sufficient empirical evidence taken 
into account. Mandeville's polemic against a great number of 
contemporary doctors assumes that on one side were arrayed those 
physicians who emphasized a rationalistic, systematic approach to 
medicine based on Galen and, on the other, those who emphasized the 
everyday practice of medicine as prescribed by Hippocrates. Which 
attitude was more "scientific" is a question not within our scope but 
even a cursory acquaintance with eighteenth-century medicine indicates 
1. Dis eases, 45-6. 
ý_ 
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that the rift was by no means as absolute as Z'andeville made it out 
to be. It could not have been when, as has boon pointed out by an 
authority in the field, even an "empirical" doctor like Sydenhan, 
Whose methods and treatment of "hypochondriaci" Mandeville 
enthusiaotically approved of, 
l 
tonded, in typical rationalist fashion, 
to inter too such from his empirical obaervation$. 
2 For our 
purposes, however, it is enough to point out that Mandeville assumed 
that he was conductintj a legitimate polemic against "rationalists" 
whose practice of iodicino he considerod deceitlul, 
3 
): andeville's polemic, however, is strictly subordinated to 
dialectical purpoooa and one important strand of dialectic by which 
t'isornedon arrives at the "correct" notion of medicine is in the way 
he is forced to re-examine his notion of "method" throughout the 
dialogue. The notion of "method" in medicine was a very old one and 
it is no accident that the argument between Philopirio and Micomodon 
revolves arcund it. The concept of "method" had as much to do with 
the rhetorical expression of theoretical medicine as it did with its 
1. Diseases, 118-19. 
2. Lester S. King, "Empiricicw and Fationalisa in the Works of 
Thomas Sydenhan, " Bulletin of the ! istory of r eflcin©, 44 (1970), 
9-11. 
3. In this, according to C. a. Fousseau, Yancleville was ahea3 of his 
times "By 1740, not much more before, a belief grew that 
oboervationiste were the genuine pioneers in the advancecent of 
medical knowledge. Before that idea was inchoate, appearing only 
occasionally, without significant consequences in the medical 
world, and was underdeveloped in contrast to the elaborate 
propaganda and printed dogma of the rationalists. Handeville, in 
his Treatise-of Hiysterick and Aypochondriack Passions (1711), a 
dialogue between an 'empirical' physician and his skeptical 
patients, had voiced some of these beliefs years before they 
became fashionable. During the subsequent fifty years (1711-60) 
such assertions were more widespread, " See C. S. Rousseau, "'Sowing 
the rind, and Reaping the Whirlwinds: Aspects of Change in 
Eighteenth-Century tedicina" in Paul J. xorshin, ed., Studies 
Ch e'. and Re olutionz: , Aspscts, of. li8h Intellectual History, 1 4` Eenston, England, 197 , p. 142. 
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practice. In the words of 'Walter Ong, "The ancient medical concept 
of 13ethod ... involves, b®a1des tho notion of a routino of efficiency 
in boiling, the broador paralogical notion of an intelligent approach 
(in a social, aphoristic, and More or less po1a ogica. context) to 
a complex problem. "' then Visomedon recounts his experiences with 
rationalist doctors, he talks in terms of their riodical "z othod" as 
in the folloking excerpts "I was p1ea'd with the clear idea I had 
of py condition, thought myself ex Umbra in Solem, and ha8tan'd with 
Alacrity to the rational rothod, which he propoci'd to gut me in. "2 
He goes on to complain somewhat comically that doctors "notoriously .. 
contradict one another to this Day, even in the Method of Curing, 
which is the very End of Physiclc; and this not only in the sarge 
Nations, Univoraities and Cities, but within the hearing of the asao 
Pationts ... "3 Despite his disillusionment, however, Eisomedon 
clings all the more strongly, no doubt because of his disease-induced 
insocurity, to the notion that sorge sort of rationalist method is 
absolutely necessary to "cure distempers. " Thus, when Philopirio 
clnicza that a knowledgo of Anatomy, Chemistry or other sciences is 
not really relevant to medicine but is cultivated by doctors to 
impress their patients, 
' Lioonedon objects that "Ibes© I have look'd 
1. V"lalter Cng, Rerun, L'ethod, aryl the Dec&y of Dialogue (Ca bridLpe, 
Uas., 1958), p. 221. Hereinafter to be referred to as . 
2. Diseases, 17. Mandeville translates the Latin an "Fron TDaxknass 
into Light. " 
3. Diseasºca3,32. 
4. See Richard Foster Jones, Ancients and ! odorns, second edition (St. 
Louie, 1961), p. 216. R. F. Jones writes of a group of moderato 
minded physicians who "applauded chemical expericent3" but "condemned,, ' 
cbczical theories" purporting to explain and lead to the cure of - diseas©s. Mandeville can perhaps be considered as a jcernber of auch 
a group. hereinafter Jones's book will be referred to as-Jones' - 
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upon as the only valuable Branches of Phyaick: Why do you call them 
inconsiderable? Can any an pretend to Methodical Practice without 
them? "1 
Philopirio'a reaction to Misomedon's insistence on rationalist 
method is to employ a devious dialectical procedure by which he at 
first condemns the notion of "method" and reinforces hie objection 
by claiming that such a notion was absent in ancient (presumably 
pre-Galenic) Greek medicines. 
As for curing Distempers immethodically; ... if 
by Method you mean a certain Rule, a qua deviare 
piaculum est, and ask me, whether I have a 
constant Theory, by which I am always directed 
in the Cure, I will answer in the Negative ... 
I must put you in mind, that neither Hippocrates 
himself, ... nor any of the physicians of Old 
Greece, which without dispute were the best that 
ever the World could boast of, follow'd any 
Theory, or what you call Method at all; ... "2 
Near the end of the Tre: nevertheless, it emerges that Yhilopirio 
is not against a methodical approach to medicine but that he has an 
altogether different notion of "method". This becomes clear in the 
following exchange: 
tisom. ... But is this, pray, the general 
Method you take with all Hypochondriacke, 
mu tatis mu tandia, which now you have proscrib'd 
to me? 
Phil. b, u tatis put, _ 
andis it is; but that is all 
in all, for as the Symptoms differ, so I alter 
my Method; and I never saw yet two hypochondriacal 
Cases exactly alike. 
3 
1, Diseases, 37- 
2. Diseases, 38. Mandeville translates the Latin as "Which it would 
be a crime to deviate from. "
3. Dis eases, 343. 
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ihilopirio's "nethod", in other words, is highly flexible and geared 
to, the treatment of individual cases, while the "rationalist method" 
treats diconaca on a more generalized level, abstracted from the 
individual patient. Such a notion of method in highly compatible 
with the dialectical procedure of philoso; hical dialogue. Thus, 
Philopirio's way of arriving at the "true way" or "method" of 
treating Lisomodon'a disease is by the use of questions and discourse 
as soll as, in view of his professed empiricism, physical examinations 
Such an interlocutor as tisomedan is not only a "typical" case of 
hypochondriacia but an individual whom hypochondria affects in a 
combination of ways bound to be different from its effect on any one 
other patient. 
Where the notion of "method" is one important utrand of dialectic, 
the broader dialectical pattern of the dialogue centora on the process 
by which risomodon is "leaned away" from his erroneous rationalisrs. 
It involves Philopirio'n slow process of unfolding; to LYisomedon what 
the "true" practice of medicine, both doctrinally and empirically, 
should consist of. Before the dialogue begins, Mandeville warns 
the roador that Misornedon's "learning" is a disease-induced share 
which, by implication, hinders his appreciation of what the "true" 
practice of modicino consists of: 
.... and as ria onedon is represented as an 
Admirer of polite Literature, and having 
been a lover of Reading fron his Youth, so 
I thought it not unnatural, that such a Man, 
upon the least turn of his Hoed, might 
beco o over-fond of Latin Proverbs, and 
fuller in his Discourse of quotations from 
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the Classicka, than a Man of Sense, that 
understands the World, would chuse to bei 
if his Head was perfectly clear. 
1 
Philopirio, on the other hand, is always rigorously logical and 
consistent, if sometimes devious, forcing }fisomedon to either shift 
his ground or modify his views until be is finally convinced of the 
validity of Philopirio's notions of the theory and practice of 
medicine. 0 
The pattern of dialectic in the argument is already hinted at 
in the Greek names of the two interlocutors. Philopirio is the 
"Lover of Experience"2 while ' somedon" can be roughly rendered as 
"hater of prudence. " A key to Philopirio's dialectical role is 
found in the preface to the first edition where Mandeville mentions 
bow he brought himself into the dialogue in the same wady that Seneca 
brought himself onto the stage in his Oc tavi a3 "with this difference, 
that he kept his own Name, and I changed mine for that of Philopirio 
60. "4 The play depicts Seneca as a political advisor advocating 
moderation to Nero. Similarly, Philopirio has the task of moderating 
b, jeomedon's impulsiveness. Seneca tries to appeal to Nero's better 
nature. He certainly cannot condemn Nero outright nor can the 
doctor deal with bieomedon cavalierly. The pattern of dialectic, 
then, involves Philopirio's attempts to gain L; isomedon's trust in 
him, so that he can convince him of the errors of his rationalist- 
1. Dis eases, xiv. 
2. Bernard )larndeville, A Treatise of the N ochondriack and I sterick 
Passions (London, 1711)p p. xi. This iss of course, the first 
edition of the Treatise, Hereinafter to be referred to as Passions. 
3. According to the Oxford Classical Dictionary, the Octavia is not 
by Seneca but by an anonymous author writing soon after the deaths 
of both Nero and Seneca. 
4. Passsiona, xi. 
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oriented zcoclical viow3. 
Just hoar Philoyirio "weans" °' oomedon away from his impulsivo 
rationillcm can best be obsorved by analyzing certain repro3ontative 
argunants in the dialogue which are crucial to its dialectical and 
rhetorical pattern as a whole. Before doing cso, however, one must 
take, to heart Mancleville'a warning in the Preface: 
From what I have hinted, I don't question 
but coma of my Readers have already taken 
a Prejudice against me: But let me beg of 
those impatient oneep that for what I have 
said yet, and what they shall further see 
upon We Ifoad in the firnt Dialogue, they 
would not censure, or by way of Pun condemn 
as for an Enemy to Beason, before they are 
come to the End of the Second, and that I 
shall have ahew'd them what sort of Reasoning 
it iss I speak againait. 
l 
Such a warrdnk: should alert the reader that Fhilopirio's oppoeition 
to medical rationalism io more of a dialectical device than a philoso- 
phical position. The purpose or Philopirio's dialectical opposition 
to Yisomedon'n rationalises in not fully revealed until the second 
dialogue in the section rohere Pdilopirio's extensively criticirea a 
hypothesis by the rationalist phraioian, 'horstet äiliis. 
2 
This 
section of the Treatise is perhaps the clearest example of Philopirio'e 
1. Disc, vii. 
2. Like UM evilloi Willie was also an anti-Oalonist but he did not 
escape ? Sandoville'a censure because Manc: eville'a position Uraa 
probably close to that of a group of phyaiciana described by 
Foster Jones as holding moderate views about the relative merits 
of Ancients and Moderns and "who, though committed whole- 
heartedly to the new ocienco, werd more roppectful to antiquity 
aM tradition as well as lese severe upon the established 
physicians. " Be* Jones 216. 
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dialectical method of "meaning" Misomedon away from his excessive 
rationalism with the aid of rhetorical devices. It iss therefore, 
well worth examining in detail. 
What fascinates Iisomedon about Willis to his seemingly brilliant 
and highly-detailed comparison of the human body to a still. 
Uisomedon knows in advance that Philopirio will not be pleased by 
such a vague analogy but he is carried away with its supposed 
impressiveness "I know you are no Admirer of those Flights of 
Fhysiok, but I must read you a Passage or two of the fifth Chapter. "1 
As often before in the dialogue, E: isomedon here shows himself to be 
still susceptible to the siren-call of elegantly-expressed analogical 
reasoning. Philopirio's next step, accordingly, is to apply shock 
tactics. Instead of demonstrating the fallacies inherent in Willis's 
analogy, Philopirio first attempts to deflate and ridicule Misomedon'e 
enthusiasm by the rhetorical device of introducing a satirical 
analogy comparing a sexually yielding woman to "a green Faggot that's 
laid upon the Fire. "2 After a bawdily descriptive "refutation" of 
this particular analogy, he asks rhetorically about Willie's analogy: 
"Can a Stan that understands but half so much of Anatomy as one may 
learn at a Butcher' a-Stall, think, that a roman is like a Faggot, or 
the inside of the Body like a Still? "3 Philopirio's amusingly ribald 
analogy deflates Willie's analogy comically so that the reader is put 
into a frame of mind favourable to the subsequent serious refutation. 
The refutation is better described, as Philopirio himself does, 
in metaphorical terms, as a dismantling of Willis's analogy of the still. 
4 
1. Diaeý, 95. 
2. Dis, 98. 
3. Diseases, 99" 
4o ases , m___ e 9g o 
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He does so in painatrkin, detail and a rather scathing tone. Ito 
first uika what comparison there can be between the function of the 
"chimney" (alembic) cf the still and that of the heart. Uisornedon 
aasucues that 'Nillib ream the furnace, or fire-place, of the still 
which, when heated, beýina the proceos of fermentation which is 
eooehor analogous to the function of the heart as the source of the 
circulation of the blood. 
1 
Fhilopirio imediatoly warns Ui onodon 
that "there is taoro Artifice in this than you are agars oV" and points 
out that Willis deliberately avoided mini the word ", furnace" because 
"if he had call'd the Heart the Furnace, as he ought to have done, 
it would have boon too plain, that he had made the Fire between the 
2 
Bead and bottom of the Still. " He similarly examines every other 
ele=nt in the analogy only to find that the implications of it are 
absurd. 
Not 8urpriaingly, entovi11e'e total rejection of Willis's 
hypothesis gives E'isomedon tho impression that Philopirio is against 
any attempt at reasoning about diseases and their cures. Philopirio, 
howevers springs a great surprise at risomedon, but not at the 
attentive reader who has reuierabered Uandevillo's warning, when he 
reveals that he is not against the use of reason but only its hbuso 
In the form of outlandish hypotheses. This is really where 
Lioomedon's "enlightenment" begins. Up to this point, Fhilopirio 
was treating i: ieoaiedon as less than an equal in order to gradually 
1. wi11is, as a physician of tho "iatro-chemical" school, attributes 
nary internal bodily processes, especially those connected with 
digcation and the blood, to various kinds of fe=antation. 2eo 
Hansruodi Ialer, Thomas ''il1ia 1621-. 167 (New York and London, 
1968), P8.52-6. 
2. Di 3,100, 
11-3 
roan him away from his preconceived notiona of reason. His 
dialectical strategy was to pretend that he was against any form of 
roazoning, in order to undermine 'isomodon's predilection for any 
seemingly cell-argued hypothesis and to use rhetorical devices, such 
as raillery and ridicule, to lower Misomedon's confidence in his own 
powers of dialectical disputation. 
This devious mode of argument is certainly moro convincing in 
dialogue since it is not the reader uho directly falls victim to it; 
yet the r oder, too, learns his lesson, especially if up to this 
point he had supported Philopirio unreservedly. The critically alert 
reader should, indeed, neither have supported Philopirio nor Lisomedon. 
By not treating Lisomadon as an intellectual equal, Philopirio is 
dramatically demonstrating Mandoville's conviction that amateurs should 
not indulge in medical reasoning. TO Justify his elaborate deception, 
Philopirio employs an,, Axnalo to the effect that a crooked stick, in 
order to be straightened, reust be bent the other way - an analogy 
apparently derived from Joseph Glanvill's Sco ais Scientifica 
(1665) 
whore the saran analogy was employed to justify scepticism. 
1 
Clanvill's 
point was that a dose of scepticism is nooded to avoid dogmatism and 
arrive at the truth. Philopirio's ar entative strategy, in short, 
was to undermine Philopirio's dogmatic rationalism dialectically and 
rhetorically, in order that a more empirical rationalism could take 
its place. even when Fhilopirio reveals his allegiance to a 
rationalism based on empirical data, he does so rith groat caution, 
taking; care to distinguish between the "prideful" rationalism of 
1. J: argaret L. Wiley, The Subtle Knot 
(London, 1952), p. 213. äcepsis 
5cicntifica gras the revised second edition of Clanvill'o The Vanity 
of Dormatizi=. 
1 ̂9 
the rationalists end the "humble" rationalism of the empiricists: 
I would not have you thinc, that I speak of 
that lofty self-sufficient Reason that boldly 
trusts to its own Tinas, and leaving xperience 
far behind mounts upon Air, and makes 
Conclusions in the Skies; what I make use of is 
plain and humble, not only built upon, but 
likewise surrounded with, and every way limited 
by Observation, from vier of which it never 
cares to stir. 
1 
It is highly likely that Mandeville risked the inattentive reader's 
displeasure at being apparently deceived in order to induce a 
sceptical, critical attitude in him. The reader is forced into such 
an attitude ifs as a result of following the dialectic too closely 
without realizing its real direction, he finds himself sharing, with 
iisomedon, an uncertainty about what position to take in relation to 
the argent. Philopirio could have announced from the beginning 
where he stood but his aim is to show that the "correct" attitude 
towards medicine implies a certain amount of hupible scepticism which 
he induces in 1: isomedon by forcing him to examine what he means by 
"rationalism"s so that he can arrive at "truth" in the form of what 
constitutes a proper dose of reason in the practice of medicine. 
Eesides its dialectical critique of the "method" of medical 
rationalism, M ndeville's Treatise also attacks its characteristic 
rhetoric. Aa will be seen, this involves a critique of the "unholy" 
alliance of "reason" and "wit" where "wit" is the rhetorical zaodo by 
1. Dias $, 130. For a discussion of the role of intellectual 
humility in the rationalism of John Locke, see D. G. James, The 
Life of Reason (London, 1949), p. 90. John Locke began his career 
not as a philosopher but as a phyaician and one of his closest 
associates was the "empyrick" physician Sydonba. m, who is often 
approvingly quoted by Philopirio. 
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which medical rationalints express their erroneous ideas. As 
UaMevillo puts it= his avowed aim is to defend the "silent 
cparience of PAin3-takinj Practitioners" against "the witty 
Speculations of Hypothetical Doctors. "' Thus, Mandeville's unstated 
notion of the thorapeutic effeotivenesm of dialogue also involves an 
attack on the superficially similar "witty" discourse of the 
rationalist doctors, so mush so that his emphasis on the "silence" 
of empirical medicine obscures the fact that, as has already boon 
implied, his dialogue is constructed in such a way that it can be 
interpreted as a dramatic analogy for therapeutic discourse. 
That I . XYIOville12 identification of "grit" with frivolous rhetoric 
is related to his anti-Galenism becomes clear when Philopirio claims 
that Calen's attempts at ayats tiair medicine were an impocturo 
designed to impress his contecporariess 
He was weil acquainted with the state of 
Physiotc and the Palate of his Clariulous Ate, 
az4 found, that nothing would sooner or 
easier establish his Deputation, than his 
Wits Accordingly he left the Observations to 
them that liked them, and tell a writing 
fine Lar uage in a florid Style* 
2 
Such a state int chows that Vancleville took the Rtoyal society's 
injunction to heart and that he identified rationalism with elaborate 
rhetoric. 1170 is eap0ciall7 wary of analc, iies {"e3milea")s as in 
philopirio's refutation of ''i1lia, but what In significant in his 
attack is his downgrading of "sit, " as in the following statementt 
1. !i se , v. 
2. Di a___w, ems 63-4* 
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The witty Philosophero, who can go exactly 
tell you which way the World was madey that 
one would think he must have heul a hand in 
It, In his Talk cures all Diseasoo by 
U ctheeie, ani frightens away the Gout with 
a tine Simile, but when he comes to practice 
oftener reasons a trifling Distemper into a 
Consumption. 
1 
Although bore Thilopirio attacks the "wit" of the medical ratiomiliate, 
he dooa so by being witty himself in a satirical ways nevertheless it 
does seem that Mandeville would have agreed with Locke's downgrading 
of "wit" in relation to Bober-jinded ", judgment": 
For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, 
and putting those together with quickness and 
variety, vheroin can be found any rosemblance 
or cong=ity, thereby to make up pleasant 
pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; 
Judgments on the contrary, lies quite on the 
other Bide, in separating carefully, one from 
another, ideas wherein can be found the least 
difference, thereby to avoid being misled by 
olwilitude. - 2I, xi Conearniyyý 
unaerst iny») 
Mandevi11e's distrust Of "wit" 10 not only anti-rationaliut but anti- 
rhetorical as well,, a3 in Philopiric(3 warning about the limitations 
of 1anjuage$ 
1. rýi ate, 36. 
2. Quoted in William IC. tdiusatt Jr. and Cleanth i3rookst Litern 
Critcicu A Short TTiatory, vol. 2 (London, 1970), p. 231. 
Hereinafter to be referred to as lim. Mandeville's pbye. to- 
logical definition of "wit" seems to be aiailar to Locke's as 
when Fhilopirio tells Nisomedon that "as Thinking, consists in a 
various Disposition of the Images received; no what ve call flit' 
13 nothing but anAptitude of the spirits by which they nicab] 
turn to rind dexterously dis ose of the Im es that m serve 
our purpose nieeaseeý 237)o 
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The Practical 1Cnaxled9of a Physician, or 
at least the kost considerable Part of it, 
Is the Result of a large Collection of 
Cbeervationa, that have been made not only 
on the 1+i, 
_ 
tTuti*e of thin in human Bodies 
both in Health and Sickness, but likewise 
on auch Changes and Differences in those 
:. inutiae, an no Lan ua e can ezpreee; .. 
i 
Ziere again Uandeville show a sympathy for the 1irgu1stio aims of 
the Royal society, one at which aas Sprat 'a tamoues recommendation 
that scientific prose ohoul1 be purified to such an extent that every 
"word" represents a "thing" as far as possible. 
2 Anything 0155, 
accorUUng to Sprat= was ouporXluous rhetoric. 
Basically, Philopirio attributes "wit" to a ki 1 of intellectual 
laziness by which re zon in chained to "wit" in such a way so as to 
bide rather than oM! Iain ditticulties, and which employs lively 
rhetorical devices, including spurious analogies, to camouflage the 
weaknesses of an hypothesis$ ", Vou most £isomedon, how your witty lien 
give every thing a Gloeq and lot not the least Shadow of R®anon slip 
that can assist theme Proverbs vulgar Zia ingst anything to give a 
lift to an Urpothesisr ... "3 Mandeville, hares of course, asgoeos 
himself to the charge that he too is in the habit of employing proverbs 
and "vulgar esyings" but he uses such entertaining rhetorical devices 
to deflate rather than Inflate the scope of reason. In this respects 
1anieville'e dialogue resembles a "colloquies" one of whose rules a 
1, rlsonseso 610 
2. Wig att! 244. ror a survey of the seventeenth-century controversy 
over proeo style und to what extent words should "Present "things" 
rather than "ideas", see A. C. Howell, "BOB et Verba: Words and 
Things" in Stanley B. Fish, eä., Seventeenth Century Prose (ow 
York and London, 1972), pp"287'99. 
3. Dia Dasaß, 103. 
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rhetorical handbook laid down as "Indeavour to make your Colloquia 
pleasant, Faith witty jerks, quibbles aml fancies (auch as you shall 
often find in T'ra ) joking upon a nass, action, proverb or the 
like. "' Zia witty assault on "wit" exposes to what extent logical 
reasoning can be distorted by rhetorical devices, as in the superfluous 
rhetoric of the following exchar.; e: 
Phil. ... The means I order (allow ma to speak 
in the Style of Willis) will draw upon you, toward 
Evening, an agreeable Weariness, the moving Orator 
of sweet Repose, that breathing Health and Peace 
to every Part, persuades the Soul to Rest, and 
having " brib'd the watchful Spirits from their 
Posts# locks up the unguarded Sense* In charmirg 
Bonds of Slumber. 
)doom. I rant no Rhetorick to encouraCe me{ 
the great Desire I have of being cured is more 
eloquent than your Perawasion: I would bear 
an. thing to be blecs'd again with those sound 
ayontanoous Sloop I Zor. erly enjoy'd. 
2 
vioomodon's necative reaction in, of course, precisely the one that 
Philopixio expoota "'r somedon to apply to the less-easily detected 
cuperfluous rhetoric at medical rationalism in genoral, sine s-at this 
point :. isoaedon is finally convinced of the dangore of rationalism. 
1. Ralph Johnson, The Scholars Guide from the Rock naeº to thee 
Vnivorsity (L: enston, England, 1971)t p. 13. his is a facsimil© 
reprint of the first edition of 1665. hereinafter to be referred 
to an Johnson. Mandeville's Treatise could be considered an 
F, raas ian "colloquy" against ratiet 'tolly" except for tho 
fact that Fhilopirio has, no intention of naming a fool out of 
zlsouedon and just leaveat that, as often happens in Eraurua's 
Colloquies, but to employ a complex, if devious, dialectic to make 
him see the error of his views. 
2. T)i egg 342" 
134 
An a satirist, Mandeville was not simply ridiculing rationalist 
"vice" but using "raillery" to defend "virtue" in the form of 
empirical scrupulousness in matters of medical investigation. Here 
again he complied with the requirements of the Royal Society, for 
Sprat had written that "The true Raillery should be a defence of Good 
and Virtuous Works, and should only intend the derision of extravagant, 
and the disgrace of vile and dishonourable things. " For Mandeville, 
almost all types of deductive rationalism were excessive and therefore 
"vile and dishonourable. " To quote Sprat again, Mandeville uses 
witty raillery as a salt "which preserves and keeps sweet the good, 
and sound parts of all Bodies, and only frets, dries up, and destroys 
those humours which petrify and corrupt. "' What remains after 
Philopirio's "salty" raillery is reason closely linked to empirical 
observation rather than wit. Mandeville0s devotion to raillery as a 
satirical mods is perhaps hinted at when 1 hilopirio, in a discussion 
about the harmful effects of reine, casually comments about Horace: 
"I always thought that there was as much good Sense, polite Knowledge, 
and fine Raillery to be met with in his Epistles, his Satyrs and his 
Art of Poetry, as in any other Part of his Wortes. "2 
It does seem as if Mandeville would have agreed with Sprat's 
well-known injunction against the use of "this vicious abundance of 
Phrase, this trick of tletaphors, this volubility of Tongue"3 but he 
did so through the medium of the dialogue form and, in his manner of 
using its it demands the reader's participation far more than a 
1. Quoted in Ian Jack, Aupustan Satire 1660-1750 (Oxford, 1952), P"155" 
2. Diseases, 364" 
3. See J. E. Spingarn (ed. ), Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century 
(Oxford, 1968), p. 117. 
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straightforward essay treatise. The reader of landeville's dialogue 
treatise cannot passively accept information. He is constantly 
forced to keep up with the arguments or risk failing to appreciate 
how many of the minor points debated are related to the main question 
about medical rationalism. A discriminating reader would also 
recognize the cogency of some of Misomedon's objections and, despite 
Mandeville's warning in the preface, feel somewhat puzzled by 
Philopirio's apparent intransigence against any form of rationalism. 
This makes for a certain amount of ambiguity between the reader and 
Mandeville as he can never be sure when Philopirio acts as Mandeville's 
"mouthpiece". This process is most obvious in the first dialogue 
when Misonedon argues against the immortality of the soul 'with scarcely 
an objection from Philopirio, 
l 
only to claim later on in the second 
dialogue that this was a more "Flight of Fancy" on his part and 
unrelated to his "real and settled Sentiments" on the matter. 
2 
randeville's deviousness here as to whether he agrees with Miaomedon's 
earlier views on the immortality of the soul was perhaps a- defence 
against the charge of atheism, but he consistently forces the reader 
to be on the alert as to which direction the argument is going. 
Considering Max evi11e's complex use of dialogue, there can be 
little doubt that he would have only partly agreed with Sprat as to 
the use of rhetorical devices in scientific treatises but, apart 
from the ambiguities inherent in the discourse between Philopirio 
and Misomedon, he does deal with medical and philosophical issues in 
a clear and cogent way as Plato, Erasmus and others had done before 
1. Dis eases, 52-3. 
2. Dis___ eases, 155" 
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4 
hin, The ambiguity lies in the relationship between Fhilopirio 
and ! isonedon in one direction and that between Landevi11o and the 
reader in another, rather than in the philosophical and medical 
arguments. As such, tiandeville's Treatise is a literary work 
eiiploying, in 'N"im3att's words, the "superficially plain form" of 
ccnvercational prose dialot, uo as opposed to the "fully plain form! ' 
of scientific treatises, much like Dryden and Popo used the 
"superficially plain fora" of conversational versa in their literary 
1 
works. 
It remains to examine in what sense Philopirio's thorapcutic 
wie of discourse differs from rationalist rhetoric. Me difference 
has much to do with the importance of listrnin; to what the patient 
has to say. Very early on, Fhilopirio tries to induce an atmosphere 
of sociability na part of his troathsnt. As he tells Misonodon, 
Your Story is co diverting, that I take 
abundance of delight in it, and your Ingenious 
way of telling it, gives ne a greater insight 
into your Disterpor, than you it ine: 
therefore, let me beg of you to go on, Sir; I 
oa all &ttention, Lnd shall not interrupt you. 
2 
Philopirio's willingness to listen to anything Uisomedon has to say, 
whether directly related to his disease or not, has a certain 
correspondence to the psychoanalytic mothod. The "hypochondriasis" 
of the early eighteenth century, in fact, has recently boon plausibly 
identified With that group of psychological disturbances now called 
"neurosis., .3 lZendeville's implied belief in the therapeutic 
1. wi, 244" 
2. Di sea3es, 19. 
3. Fischer-ilombergor, 393. 
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efficacy of conversation is porhap3 nowhere better cu geoted than in 
the following exaban ; o: 
_i 
_ ... How otranf, oly have we boon run 
away from our ºubjcct this halt Hourl But 
whilst I an eeny and diverted, I can never be 
out of my Way. 
Phil. Our grand Affair in your tloalth, 
Linozmnion, and you can never conoult that 
better than by endeavouring to be cheartul. 
1 
, iso: aedon's very nothod of argument consists of alternating 
bouts of overconfidence and despair very rauch connected with his 
"neurotic" state of mind. When L°isoaedon says that "however my 
Temper and Constitution are spoil'd; my ! easonf even when I am at the 
worst, is only clouded, but not impaired. The Consideration of this 
has often been a Solemen miste to co, in the midst of rains and 
othor Troubles, "` he unconsciously betrays his excessive reliance on 
reason because he does not realize that, like his bodily processes, 
his powers of roaaoninZ were also seriously affected by his disease, 
and therefore not to be trusted oven in one of his "lucid" momonts. 
Ito Is conscious, howev©r, in one of his moments of exhilaration, that 
a bout of depression is likely to follow and expresses his anxiety 
in very vivid lang, uaGo: 
'Tis }leaven to ce whon I think how porfectl7 well 
I aii; but then how miserable on the other side 
again is the Thought, of hsrbourlnC some where 
within me, tho' now I fool it not, a vast 
onorcous Lon tsr, whose 3ava; e force mA y in an 
1" Disc ! 206" 
2. Dishes, 50. Zandeville translates the Latin as "A Solace of 
Uisery. 'l 
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Instant bear down my Reason, Judgement, and all 
their boasted Strength before It. 1 
*wisoraodon'n suffor1n , then, is Just as much Psychological a3 
physicals 
"andevillo's capha3in on the doctor-pationt r©lation3hip aryl the 
diclo,,; uo as a rhetorical technique of dramatically presenting a 
hypothetical example of it,, not only prefigures psychoanalysis but, 
ironically enough, also harks back to "Ancient" nadicino even if 
L'andoville's empirical approach is more closely identifiable to that 
of the e, xp©rinontal doctors of the Royal Society. The relationship 
of rhetoric ani psychoanalysis to such a personal approach to medicine 
has been described by Walter Ong in the following manner: 
It (medicine) had a tendency to regard patients 
as psychosomatic wholes and to caake rauch of the 
phy73ician-patient relationship as on3 which 
involved not morely abstract issues but a person- 
to-person situation of the sort traditionally 
handled by rhetoric. This is not to say that 
medicine consciously practiced psychoanalysis or 
other techniques, but only that it h a4 not yet 
learned to favor the mechanical elements over 
the non-cr'caanical, paycholoeioal elements in 
the physician-patient situation, ... 
2 
Although Philopirio accepts the mechanical analogy for bodily 
procession! noverthele$3, when tisomedon aoko him whether he thinks 
"all the Operatione of the Body to be cechanical?, "3 he answers in 
53-4. 
2.2' 226. 
3. Dis, 170-71. 
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t: ib affirmative but with the proviso that, for practical purposeat 
the oporation: of the ruind are too subtle to be explained mechanically. 
It is po3siblo that "ands-Mille felt that the mechanical analogy of 
the human body, though baaically correct, is not a1waya therapeutically 
useful. Here, as In many other places in the Treatise, he displays 
a tendency to accept that he considered to be the best elements in 
the Ancient and `ý¢odern medicines, without coriaittinj himself to one 
or the other. It even aecria that Philopirio's relationship with 
Jisonedon is closer to that of psychoanalyst and patient becauce 
. rhilopirio 
definitely rejects the rhetoric of rationalized medicine 
where the dootor's relationship to his patient depends not co much on 
therareutic discourse but on explaining a disease and its "mothod" of 
cure to a patient in a convincin manner. L'andevijle'a is the 
rhetoric of therapeutic discourse rather than the rhetoric of 
rationalized medicine and it may be that he discovered it while 
writing the dialogue in a manner at first more explicitly expository. 
perhaps his choice of the dialogue form at first rested on the notion 
of it as a convenient device for "plain am familiar" exposition, but 
it ended in his defining himself-as a doctor in a personal, almost 
psychoanalytic, relationship with his patient. 
CCven ! 'anclevi11Otc inclusion or Visomoion'a We Polytheca 
is not oolely for the Furgoze of expoundir; his views on the female 
equivalent of hypochondria is, hysteria, but also for Philopirio to 
cake good therapeutic use of U1so3edon'n strained relationohip with 
his wife. At one point in her quarrel with isomodon about the 
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relative merits of doctors and epothecariee, 
l 
ebe is goaded to 
remark that, "ry Alliga I lend are very trifling, at least in cone 
People's Opinion"2 anrt not much later makes an abrupt exit as the 
result of a sudden heeiaohe. Ulaomedon, of couree, expects 
Fhilopirio to side with him but Philopirio, instead, uses this 
opportunity to show Plaoraodon how self-centred he had becoszo as a 
result of his diseases The whole scene is somewhat farcical and, 
indeed, thoatrical and self-contained enough so that it could probably 
be stnned to very amusing effect. 
fandevill®ta aon3truation of t W3OTadon1O char=ter la so 
carefully worked out that, again in a manner analocoue to psycho- 
analyfuie, his disease could be attributed to his "ruling passion" of 
imprudence. If the "ruling; passion" is to be defined as the dominant 
tendency in the make-up of one's character, as in Popo'a F. aaay on tams 
then aristocratic imprudence is 1iso edon'u ruling passion, as he 
unwittingly reveals when he recounts hieß life in the first dialogue. 
L. 'ong other things, he revcalri that after squandering his inherited 
fortune, he was saved from dire poverty only by unexpectedly inheriting 
another one and that from then on he led a very sober life studying 
the classics and axuainj himself with his wife ors as he puts its 
"inter Venerora b h"uaas. "4 Nair the erA of the second dialose, 
however, Fhi1opi71o Pointe out that "icr odarat" Exerci8e of the Brain" 
ani "xcese of Vener7"5 are among the moat co=on causes of h7po. 
chondriaUio, so that even the later phase of )ieomedon'o life is 
1. I'hilopirio does not arbitrate tho arrumant but he is Aoro on 
Polytheca'a side when be characteristically points out that an 
ox; crienced apothecary may well know just as rauch medicine as 
many a doctor whose training is ; urely theoretical ? aiee wes, 304). 
2. niste, 272" 
3. For a discussion of the "ruling pssf3ion " see Uaynard ? Tack (od. ), 
R'hm Fo, ma of Alexander Pa , Vol. II1i ((London, 1950), PP"=xii-x1 
Twickenham Edition)* 
4. ni®ý 3t 6. 
5. D1_e_ensea. 212. 
141 
actually imprudent, even if not co irrecconciblo. L'icoiodon's 
ruling pvaiion, then, though often making, him a fi, uro of fun, also 
r, kes hire more believable as a full-flecked character whose disease 
is very thoroughly diagnosed. 
" 1ooacdon'a xulint; cation, in fact, is highly compatible with 
the "decorum" of dialoCse as "prosoFopooia" -a type of dialogue, 
probably with some of °: rasmu3oa "colloquies" as models, whore, 
a. ccordin.; to tbo rhetoricalt handbook citol previously, it is essential 
to 
consider the case and condition of the Poroon 
you represent, and ina, ine yourself in such a 
place, so qualified. Observe what tensions the 
person is most affected with, as love, joy, 
sorrow, fear, hatred, nngar, despair; also what 
virtues or vices he iss inclin d to, and by the 
. Rules of movini passions ... mace use of those 
figures and arge. ento which boot suit the 
purpose. Consider the time, place, condition, 
ago, sex, religion, and former state of the 
parson, that all things may be done ad decorum, 
not unsuitably in any circunstances. 
l 
Strict adherence to verisimilitude of character and situation seems 
to be the aim of "prosopopoeia" and, indeed, in the Treatise, 
vandeville did succeed in fusing, the rhetorical requiromant$ of 
dialogue as "prosopopoeia, " including, a certain amount of psychological 
depth in the characterization of "isomodon, with the dialectical flow 
1. Jon, 15. The above quotation is slightly abridgod and taken 
from iartholow V. Crawford, "Teaching by Dialogue, " Philological 
Cmartorlyr, 3 (1924), 27--8. Ralph Johnaon'a definition of dialogue 
prosopopoeia is the followings "A Prosopopoeia is a discourse, 
pathetically, and livelily setting forth what 'wo conceive a person 
might say in ouch or such a case. " 
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of the central (anti-rationalist) arguznont. In short, L! andoville'a 
fusion of rhetorical verisimilitude and anti-rationalist dialectic 
Is what accounts for the literary value of Mandeville's proatioe 
as philot3aphio31 dlalocue. 
nth :1o : orlon is a kira of "test-case, " Ma: uievillala Treatise 
emphasises the psycholo}7iea1 nature of hypochoMMiri iais and itta 
predo.: ºinance anion.? scholars and the leisured aristocracy. Thus, 
at ono point, Phi1op3rio calls it the "Maeaso of tho Learned" and 
also mentions hove those in "sedentary occupation: " are likely to 
Buff or from it as W011.1 Only throe yoars after the third edition of 
tho Treatise, the Thous physician George Choyno would have this to 
say about what he ca11od "the English Malady": 
The title I have chosen for this treatise, is a 
reproach universally thrown on this island by 
foreigners ... by whom nervous distempers, spleen, 
vapours, and lowness of spirits are ... called 
the n fish lady. And I wich there ware not so 
good grounds for this reflection. The moisture 
of our air, ... the rannnesa and fertility of 
our soil, the richness and heaviness of our food, 
the wealth and abundance of the inhabitants (from 
their universal trade) the inactivity and 
sedentary occupations of the better sort (axone 
whom thin evil mostly rages) and the humour of 
living in great, populous and consequently 
unhealthy towns, have brought forth a class and 
sat of distempers, ... scarce known to our 
ancestors, and never rising to such fatal 
heights, nor afflicting such numbers in any 
other known nations 
2 
1. Dish t, 216--17. Also se© Diseases, 106 where Philopirio nantions 
that the word for "the Passio ilypocbondriaca" Bean "the Disease 
of the Learned" in High Dutch. 
2. Qsotod in Fischer-Homberg r, 392. 
ýo 
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Like M'. andeville's . +"r+at1ae, Thy ^ri 1ith i`aiady w another rzedical 
book highly rvcotend3d by 3e +uß1 Johnson 
1 
and its subject, 
hypochondriaaie, has boon called, in a highly L? anievillian phra3eq 
"the fa3hi. onab1e disease of tho century. "2 
By now it should bo evident, however, that unlike Cheyne'a book, 
t'andevillo's Tra atiao is a genuine literary vors: in the mould of 
philosophical dialogue. The subject, as has been noted, felicitously 
lends itself to dramatization of the doctor-patient relationship, and, 
together with dialectical argument about the nature of edicino, 
makes for a unique extension of the genre probably never repeated 
since, at least among English medical writers. Yan; leville's only 
predecessor in medical dialogue of literary merit is the Elizabethan 
physician William 13ullein. Nono of his dialogues, however, are true 
examples of the genre of philosophical dialogue. T'h9 Puiwarke of 
io enco (1562) contains two dialogues, the Book of cimp1ea, which is 
an exrository dialogue between instructor and questioner on medicinal 
herbs, and A rialoru bntw n Sorenos and Chyrur i on Apoatumacions 
and Vounaa. The second dialogue not only expounds on the art of 
surgery (includinc its history and a list of reliable surgeon$ of the 
time) but also, to some extent, dramatizes a doctor-patient relation- 
ship. The doctor's discourse, in fact, is induced by the patient 
aakinC to be cured or his sores, which are illustrated for the 
benefit of the reader. Tho nature of the patient's disease, 
however, leaveo little ocoFo for characterization. 
3 Bullein's mo3t 
z. ? osw11,73G, 782. 
2. Fi3chni- cr h rger, 391. 
3. For a description of Eullein's dialogues, see William S. 'L: itcholl, 
"+ 111ien 1? ullein Elizabethan Physician and Author, " Vedical 
msto ,3 (1959), 193-5. Hereinafter to be cited as Mitchell* 
/ 
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li. t®rury word: 1,0 1118 21212C20 A ainst the Fever Pn3tillnco (1564) 
chioh contains a serioa of dramatic econeß in which a London merchant, 
his fa4i17, and other characters (a dozen in all) combat the plague 
by tcin advice from a doctor and telling each other wr min stories. 
u. 5.1titabell, In his article on rulloing has describe it as a 
"cancel novel in dialogue Sort, "' and= as such, it has more in cocoon 
with 11im trirain t! rnaaskId than UWevillo's radical diaioiue, though 
both at Mandeville's works are con3iderably more p-hiloaophical than 
Iullein's. 1ullein's work$ in : act, In core like an Rrasmain 
colloquy (one of the more boisterous and less philosophical ones) 
than any other kind of dialaue. The second dialouuo in the work in 
es; ocially interesting becauns it highlights one aspect'-of the dootor- 
patient relationship when the plaCue-stricken patient, who is beyond 
rocovery, pathetically hopes that offering the doctor more money will 
lead to his recoverl. 
2 
To sum up about Uandeville's ''reat1 e, it is not just a "plain, - 
oaay, and familiar4expository handbook on various aspects of 
hypochonlriasis and hysteria and roooa ended cethcda of treatientt 
but a philosophical dialogue with complex dialectical and rhetorical 
qualities. As dialogue, it in both expository and discursive, and 
what gives it its dialectical unity is the dramatization of argument 
as therapeutic discourse. Its rhetorical unity stoma from its 
satirical jibes against rationalist modicine which serve to 
dietir. cuiSh in the reader's cindt for the most part implicitly rather 
1. V, itom, che I, 197" 
2. º: i11ia a 1ullein, 1"? 1'alopuow Against the Fever P ntilence, ed. by 
Mark We-and A. ß. 13ulen London, IM), p. 11. Intercatir ly onough 
in this section of Bullein's T ialo ue there", I a' some philo3ophica l 
discussion, mainly of Aristotle's , scientific notions or, in 
Elizabethan terrdnology, "natural philosophy.!? 
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than explicitly# eolf-serving rationalist rhetoric from humbly 
"disinterested" therapeutic discourse. O'andeville's dialoduo 
treatise on hypochondrissia, therofore, not only describes that 
disease but prpoonts one hypothetical caao of a man suffering from 
it and his relationship with his doctor. Philopirio's attempts to 
make 'isomodon aware of his own deficiencies an(' his elaborate 
dialectical process of "weaning" him away from his errors through a 
cerios of arguments spiced with piquant observations and asides, are 
all part of his treatment of , isomedon's disease. Fhilopirio, 
however, is also 'fianleville'a mouthpiece, through which lie makes a 
polemical attack arainat Medical raticnalieza, but, whether inten, - 
Clonally or not, the polemical aims are subordinated to a dramatization 
of therapeutic discourse as philosophical dialojue. As will be seen, 
. fandeville was to continuo iaritir ? philosophical dialogues, and 
become more conscious of doing so, but his initial impetus would 
always be polemical and, in tarn of literary technique, rhetorical. 
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CRAPTM V. DMI ATIC REPM TES AND PICTORIAL IMAGINATION IN 
lW1DEYILLE'S 'I 1 FAHL OF TIM B3, PART I WO 
Trimer,. D'ye call this Reasont , or 
Rldi j 
Observator. "Tie Both in Ones For it is the 
Ridiculous Truth, and the Just Reason, tie. tocll 
end State of the Matters And when People are 
once Juggled Out of their Wits, they must be 
Fool'd Into 'em Main. Now there needs no more 
to the doing of That o*, then the bare Drawing 
of the Cuurrtain, and letting People into the 
Tyriing-Room. For the Cause, is all over, Theatricals 
The Actors are iiyrpoorite3, in their i'anners, as 
well as in the Irtymons and the whole Manage, 
titter for a ". tae, then (siol) a flit. So 
that the most Certain in Nature for the 
making of the Practice, OdicuS; and the 
Disabusing of the UrAlsoarninn Vultitude, is to 
1a-v Epen their False Colours, Shares, & Disguises; 
and ., one Every thing in its Naked Simplicity to 
the LiKht" 
from Roger L'Estrange'e 
Cbservator (28 Sept. 1685) 1 
1. Roger L': strange, Selhctiona from the Cbaervator, ed. by Violet 
Jordain in The Aufustan Reprint Society no. 141 (1970), 28. 
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Though both Ltandeville'a 4 rostiüe of thei Ttypcchorxlriack and 
Nystcrick Diseases axed ? tVirgin TTnmask'd succeed in significantly 
eztorsdizg the range of ; hilmorhical dialogue, it is with the Fable 
of thn Leese Part 'moo that a strong case can be tide for considering 
hie as at least a minor master of the 
fox. ' This is partly because 
the second part of the Fable is a$ "jure" a philosophical dialogue 
as one could wish but alto because it fully explores and is an 
engagingly ironic example c. ' tho Augustan procccupation with applying 
converoational docorum to prosy style. 
?! ar4ov3.21e, hiraelf, Gives a fairly conventional reason for 
adopting dialoi, "uo after the notorious success of the brilliantly 
satirical "rhapsody"' of the first part of the rable: 
1. As In well known, editions of the first part of the Fab la 
expanded in content from the original dogerel poem The Crumbling 
Hive (1705) to the first edition of the Pablo (1714), which 
included the "Enquiry into the Origin of Loral Virtue" and 
extensive "Renarka" by way of cornentary to the poem. The third 
edition (1723) adds,. ", An Essay on Charity and Charity Schools" and 
"A Search into the Nature of Society"; the fourth (1724), a 
"Vindication. " It is probably for this reason that MSandeville's 
preface to the second part describes the first part of the Fable 
an a "rhapsody, " in the sense of not being a clearly unified work. 
The second part, however, never changed substantially and, as will 
be shown, has all the unity of a full-fledged philosophical 
diialogue. Uandevillo's remark occurs in The Fable of the Bensq 
od. by F. D. Kaye, vol. I1 (London, 1966)9 p. 5. its original title 
was The r able of the l eesq Part 11 and first published in 1729. 
Kaye's annotated two-volume edition of both parts of the Fable, 
the standard scholarly one, was first published in 1924. The 
second volume is based on the first edition of the second part of 
the Fable and according to Xaye, "nearest to Mandevillo's text" 
(vol. Iý p. i=). fereina. fter, it will be cited as Fable II and 
the first 'Volume as Fable I. For Kaye's doscription of the 
editions of both parts, see Pablo III 386--400. 
2. In the "Vindication, " a late essay added to the first tart of the 
ý, Mandeville describes it as a "Rhapsody void of Order or 
: othod" but one that "has diverted persons of great Probity and 
Virtue, and unquestionsble good sense. " He does, however, claim 
a serious, not to say philosophically atbitioua, purpose behind 
it. It is to trace "Self-love in its darkest Recesses; I might 
safely add, beyond any other System of Ethics. " See Fable Is 405" 
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The Reader will find, that in this 
Second Part I have endeavoured to 
illustrate and explain several Things, 
that were obscure and only hinted at 
in the First. 
Whilst I was forming this Design, I 
found on the one hand, that, as to my 
self, the easiest way of executing it, 
would be by Dialogue; ... 
1 
This folly complies with the clarifying and popularizing function of 
dialogue favoured by Augustan critics but barely hints at the 
considerable complexity of Mandeville's method of dialogue. To 
begin with, there is the underlying dialectical strategy of defending 
the first part of the Fable, which also involves attack, in the form 
of a polemical and satirical critique af- Shaftesbury's philosophical 
ideas. The critique of Shaftesbury, in tact, Is Mandeville's 
primary polemical aim. His primary expository aim, the only one 
which he straightforwardly admits, is to analyze the social function 
of "polite" behaviour - an aim not far removed from tandeville's 
adamant rejection of Shaftesbury's notion that the social virtues 
are innate, nor from the Augustan concern for conversational decorum. 
Apart from the underlying dialectical strategy of defense-by-attack, 
it is the surface polish of dramatic repartee Which makes a unified 
whole out of the polemical and expository aims. The repartee is 
especially apt when generated in the discussions about "polite" 
behaviour, as brilliant repartee itself was an important element of 
the aristocratic ethos of good-breeding. It also enhances 
Iandeville's dramatization of a strained but friendly relationship. 
1. Fable 119 7 (all in italics). 
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Such, thong are the main facets of "andevilze'o complex style of 
dialogue which, az will be dezonstratecl, decisively contribute to 
the elegance of hin achievement. 
Landeville, hlmsolf, does not seem to have regarded tho second 
part of the rab1A as _, rlE2jil_ a defence of the firnt part$ since he 
clai in tho profaco that a dofonco is roady for publications 
A considerable Part or the X)efenoe I 
montion'd, has been soon by covera2 of my 
Friends, who have boon in `ýcpeotation of it for 
come time. I have etay'd neither for Types 
nor Paper, and yet I have several Reasona, 
why I do not yet publish it; which, having 
touch'd no body's toner, nor wde any Promise 
aonoornin it, I beg leave to keep to my 
self. &oet of my Adversaries, whenever it 
comes out, will think: it soon enough, and 
no body suffers by the relay but my calf. 
I 
micro was, in fact, no such defence forthcor-jinl unless, as Faye 
aroculates, tancieville included it in An rnguirv into the Ori rinn of 
honour and the tlgnfulnnss of Christianity in War, ani the Letter to 
Don, both published in 1732.2 Alternatively, if ono considers that 
the second part of the Pablo, thou ,h not a chapter-and-versa defence 
of the first part, in certainly a defence of the general diroction 
of _andeville's ideas, it may well be possible that hin promise to 
publish a future "defence" is not to be taken literally but as an 
ironic barb against his critics. 
3 
The third dialogue, for earrple, 
1. ? -able Ißt, 5-6 (all in italics). 
2. See Kegels note in Fable 119 4 n. 2. 
3. 'Xith Zha eipor, rets Julius Ca ar in mir At 1 undevi11e might have 
said something along the lines of "I have coma to explain ray 
insights not to defend theta. " 
150 
begins with a discussion of what Mandeville had to say about duelling 
in the first part of the Fable, and expands on its but through the 
dramatic device of "Cleomones" defending what he had read in 
Mandeville's books 
Flor atio . But your Friend makes no 
such Religious Reflections: he actually 
speaks in Favour of Duelling. 
Cleo. What, because he would have 
the Laws against it as severe as 
possible, and no Body pardon'd without 
Exception that offends that way? 
Hore That indeed seems to discourage 
its but he shows the Necessity of 
keeping up that Custom, to punish and 
brighten Society in general. 
Cleo. Don't you see the Irony there? 
Such passages, and others like it, should surely be considered as to 
some extent a defence of the first part of the Fable, including the 
serious purpose of its irony and satire, even though the arguments 
they defend are usually further developed. )Zandeville, in fact, 
comes close to admitting such an aim when he remarks that his method 
of dialogue is similar to that supposedly adopted by Descartes' rival, 
Pierre Gassendis 
But how good soever the excuses are, that 
might be made for this manner of Writing, 
I would never have ventur'd upon it, if I 
had not liked it in the famous Ga. ssendus, 
who by the help of several Dialogues and 
a Friend, who is the chief Personage in 
1. Fable II, 101. 
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them, has not only explain'd and 
illdstrated his System, but likewise 
refuted his Adversaries: Him I have 
followed, and I hope the Reader will find, 
that whatever Opportunity I have hach by 
this deans, of speaking well of my self 
indirectly, I had no Design to make that, 
I 
or any other ill Use of it. 
Whether Gassendi actually wrote dialogues or notj 
2 Mandeville's 
comments hake it plain that he is eager to follow Gassendi's footsteps 
in exploiting the possibilities of dialogue as an effective way of 
1. Fable II9 21. Fxcept for "Gassendus" the passage is all in italics. 
2. Gassendi apparently wrote no dialogues and Faye's note "I find no 
such dialogues in Gassendi" (Fable II, 21, n. 1) seems to be still 
applicable. Mandeville's reference to Cassendi as his model for 
the use of dialogue is something of a riddle in Mandeville 
scholarship. even if the reference to Cassendi is a printing 
error, it is rather puzzling that under "Cassendus" in M4andeville's 
"Index" to the second part of the Fable it is noted that he "is 
the Example the Author has follow'd in these Dialogues" (Fable II, 
365). Broadly speaking, M'andeville's method of expounding ä 
"system" of sorts and refuting his adversaries at the same time 
is not dissimilar to that followed by : dalebranche in his dialogue 
entitled : ntretiens sur is rfeta h si ue (1688) and by Galileo in his 
Rialogo dei ": nssimi SistaTi (1632). Galileo's famous dialogue 
(the same one which aroused the Inquisition aryainst him) contrasts 
the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems and, in its subtle arguments 
and characterization, as well as in its vigorous baroque style 
in the Italian vernacular, is, indeed, a neglected masterpiece of 
the genre. Although both Malebranche and Galileo employ throe 
interlocutors, in both dialogues a "system" is defended and 
opposing systems attacked in informal conversations. The conver- 
sations are between two close friends and a somewhat more impartial 
"third party" in Malebranche and a simple-minded one in Galileo 
appropriately named "iimplicio. " ýihile Mandeville has no such 
"third party" In the second part of the Fable, except briefly in 
the first dialogue, 21ume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 
makes use of a "third party" with the novelty that he is neither 
an impartial intermediary nor a simple-minded observer of the 
main discussion but the fanatically close-minded Demea. For 
interesting observations en Galileo's style of dialogue see 
Galileo Galilei, Dialogue on the Great World Systems in the 
Salusbury Translation, revised and annotated by Giorgio de 
Santillana Chicago, 1953), pp. xxxi-xxxvi. 
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"refuting adversaries. " 
There can be little doubt that by 1729, when the first edition 
of the second part of the Fable was published, Mandeville must have 
felt harried on all sides. The Fable of the Bees had more than its 
fair share of adverse critioicm, from William*Law's distinguished 
critique of 1724, Remarks upon a Late Book, Entituled, The Fable of 
the Bees, called a "masterpiece of controversial writing" by 3Caye1 
to a scurrilous letter in the London Journal; 
2 from John Dennis's 
portentously rationalistic critique, Vice and Luxury Public Mischiefs 
(1724) to George Bluet's anonymous and substantially philosophical 
Enquiry (1725); 
3 
as well as many critical remarks in anonymous book- 
reviews. 
4 The scurrilous letter which, among other things, accuseäi 
Mandeville of immorality, Jacobitism, and "Railing under the 
Appearance of Reasoning ugdinat the best Things in the World"5 was 
dealt with in a vigorously straightforward manner in the "Vindication" 
found at the end of the first part of the Fable, and which includes 
the following dignified remarks 
1. For Kaye's analysis of Law's critique, see Fable II, 401-6. 
2. This letter was reprinted by Mandeville and is found in Fable Is 
386-401. Also see Kaye's listing of it in Fable II9 419. 
3. For Kaye's analysis of Bluet's critique, see Fable II9 409-11- 
4- See, for example, the excerpt from an anonymous review in the 
Tea-Table by Eliza Heywood extracted by Kaye in Fable II, 420. 
Kayo's edition provides a comprehensive, if not complete, list 
of "references to Mandeville's work. " For a list of articles 
and reviews published during Mandeville's lifetime, and which 
therefore may have influenced his defence of the Fable in the 
second part, see Fable III 418-26. 
5. Quoted by Mandeville in Fable I, 395. 
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If the ArCimanto I have mde use of are 
not convincing, I desire they may be 
refuted, and I will acknowledge it as a 
Favour in any one that shall convince 
co of q £. rror, without ill Langu e$ by 
chewing toe wherein I have been ni$tatcen: 
But Calunny, it so©rs3, is the shortest 
Way of confuting an Adversary, when Lon 
are touoh'd in a sensible Part*1 
Such a lofty tone, ordinarily uncharacteristic of Mandeville, is 
certainly an appropriate retort to crudely vituperative criticism, 
but for the sophiaticat©d critiques of Lax, Bluot, Dennis and othore, 
Mandeville needed a more pliable kind of defence eminently served by 
the "polite" method of philosophical dialogue. The central problem 
be faced was hoer to defend his hard-headed, and highly satiricalp 
analysis of morality in the Fable in auch a way as to invite serious 
consideration of bis ideas from educated readers who were all too 
likely to sympathize with his critics. This Is why the second part 
is far more straightforward in its appeal to the judgment and 
impartiality of the reader and, indeedf considerably lets satiric 
than tho first. 
2 
Cce of the most frequent satiric devices used by Uandeville in 
1. pe1s 410- 
2o This ha= Lean noted by, amonG others, Sterling Po Lamprechtt "I 
tool rather certain that in the six dialogues which form volume 
two of the Fable, ... L'. azrievillo deliberately coftoned the 
asperity of his earlier irprossiona and sought to make his state- 
Manta more clear and less likely to be misunderstood. But I find 
ho change in doctrine fror the ver3o and the remarks which formed 
the first volume of his work. " Its quote In from "The Fable of 
the Boas" Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1526), 565. 
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the first part is to take up the persona of an honest, plain-speaking 
man whose unpalatable "truths" are challenged by obviously prejudiced 
individuals. In Remark "T, " for example, a "good man" tries to stem 
the drift of 1 andeville's argument and fails abysmally in the process. 
The "good man" objects that even if "public benefits" are obtainable 
from the free-spending habits of harlots, as Mandeville's plain- 
speaking persona asserts, God would confer even greater benefits 
vastly exceeding "the Profits that are now got by'Rarlots"1 if 
prostitution were to be abolished. This immediately exposes the 
"good man" as a hypocrite more interested in profits than in virtue 
but Mandeville takes the irony further by admitting, the validity of 
the "good tan"'s insincere objection and then undercutting his own 
assent by pointing out that if trade is to prosper, it must nevertheless 
rely on the "vanity and fickleness" of women, be they harlots or not. 
This sort of ironic superiority over an imagined otjector was perhaps 
acceptable to L'andeville's audience but. it is probable that they 
were not quite as fond of his manipulation not of imagined objectors, 
but of the reader. Thus, in Remark "T, " again, if the reader had 
sophistication enough to detect the hypocrisy of the "good man" and 
laugh at it, or at the exposure of the "epicure" who because of his 
own gluttony, firmly believes that self-denial is not a prerequisite 
of virtue, he would probably not be very amused at the passage where 
Mandeville suddenly takes the reader by surprise in his insinuation 
that the reader himself is tainted with hypocrisy, unless he accepts 
the truth of Vandeville's _arpuments 
1. Fable I9 225. 
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These are the AF6lo; lies, the Fxcuo©a 
and cocoon Pleas, not only of those aha 
arg notoriously vicious, bum t tb: 
generality of L". ankind, whentipou touch 
the Copy-hold of their Inclinations; 
and taring the real Value they have for 
Spirituale, would actually strip thew 
of what their Minds are wholly bent 
upon. ltshamed of the many Frailties 
they 'feel within, all ? Sen endeavour to 
hide them elves, their Ugly Ida'cedness, 
from each other, and wrapping up the 
true Motives of their IToarts in the 
Specious Cloke of Sociableness, and 
their Concern for the publick Good, 
they are in hopes of concealing their 
filthy Appetites anti the Deformity of 
their Desires; while they are conscious 
within of the Fondness for their 
darling Lusts, and their Incapacity, 
barefac'd, to treat the arduous, 
rugged Path of Virtues 
(italics added) 
This eloquently sums up Man evi11e'o view of humaf nature but in 
auch a way that if the reader disagrees with him, he faces the 
possibility that his own views are nothing but "the Apologrios, 
the Ezcus®o ... etc. " It is precisely because L! andeville'o satire 
was so successful in the first part, that he had to turn to gentler 
1. Fable 1 234" 
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methods in the ®ooond. 
I 
At the very heart of Uandeville'a defence is the relationship 
which develops between the two interlocuttcs! Horatio and Cleomenee. 
That makes their discussion inherently dramatic in that both 
Horatio and Cloomenes are special-pleaders. Cleomenes is 
determined to defend the Fable and to expand on its implications. 
In his role &3 special-pleader for Shaftesbury, Uoratio's function 
is to be as critical as possible and to probe every weak point in 
Cleomones' arrum©nt. Horatio at one point oven admits Cleomenes' 
superiority in argument but with the playful zest of a rallying 
manner confirming his role as special-pleaders 
I don't thine qtr self a Match for you in 
in Argument; but I have a : irvi to be your 
Gentleman's Advocate against all your 
infallibilitys I never liked a Cause 
better in cry Life. Coma, I undertake to 
defend him in all the Suppositions you 
can rake, that are reasonable, and consistent 
1. It has boon plausibly argued by Philip Earth that the satiric 
target of the earlier sections of the first part of the Fable 
is Christian rigorism and that of the later sectional the 
benovolism, of Shaftesbury, Cibbor and Latitudinarian divines. 
Ilarth's conclusion is that "In the Fable, Cibberian benevolism 
takes its place in the essays added in 1723 without displacing, 
or so such as disturbing, the rigorism displayed full length in 
the earlier remarks. The concordia discors of satiric targets in 
Uandeville's book is the result of chance rather than original 
design, but it in nevertheless a-remarkable harmony. " Whether 
Harth'a observations are basically true or not, there can be 
little doubt that the first part of the Fable is far more 
satirical than the second and this seems to be indirectly 
confirmed by Earth in that he concentrates almost exclusively 
on the first part. See Philip Earth, "The Satiric Purpose of 
The Fable of. -the Boos, " Fiphteenth Century studios, 2 
(1969), 
321-"40. hereinafter to be cited as Earth. 
157 
with anhat you have said before. 
l 
C1eoionoa, for his part, 'has alrc q previously recognized that he 
tust accept Horatio' stringent scrutiny if he is to convince him 
not oorely of his ovn superiority in argument but of the truth of 
bin convictionot "Ravo Fationce, and I procaine you, that I shall 
take nothing for granted, ahioh you shall not allow of yourself. "2 
The burden of proof, then, is nl'caya on C1eosanes' shoulders. 
Mandevi11o'a draaatic technique of dialogue, how©verp includes 
more than the dialectics of special-pleading. Horatio and Clooaenee, 
In tact, are not more pawn3 in a dialectical chops game but fairly 
complex characters. 
3 Eoratio, according to l davilla, is a worldly 
wan or "honnvto hoi e" with many good qualitie9, though not 
necessarily rigorously "virtuous" ones 
1. Fable II, 81. In terms of Uandeville's "satiric" attitude to 
human nature, Iloratio in a special-pleader on behalf of humanity. 
As Cleomsnes puts it, "You labour hard, I sea, to vindicate the 
Honour of our Species" Fable II, 214). With the growth of 
sentimantaliom, satire came to be conaiderod as a viciously 
dishonest picture of human nature rather than a moral corrective. 
On this point use Bertrand A. Goldgar, "satires on han and 'The 
Dignity of Duman Natura, " Publications of the 1 ociern Lanpua 
Association, 80 (1965), 535-41. lt should be noted that though 
the second part of the Fable is, on the whole, not a satirical 
work, Cleocanes nevertheless displays an attitude to human nature 
considered to be "satiric" and true by 11andeville but "satiric" 
and false by his opponents. 
2., Fable It, 64- 
3- They are no more complex, however, than they need to be for the 
purpose of UUandevillo'a dialectic. Uandeville's philosophy is 
so psychologically orientated that the interlocutors in his 
dialogues are rarely more mouthpieces of certain attitudes but 
are actually paycholoiTical examples of such attitudes or, as 
has been noted in the chapter on the Lucinda-, 4rtesia rapers, 
"characters" of those attitudes. h'ume, perhaps, learned from 
Uandeville hero for the interlocutors in his Dialogues Concerning 
natural I e1i . ºion certainly behave not merely as 
rhetorically- 
skilful disputants but as psychologically-motivated ones. 
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He is a Ilan of strict Honour, and of Justice 
as well as Humanity; rather profuse than 
covetou39 and altogether disinterested in 
hie Principles. He has been Abroad, seen 
the Worlds and in supposed to be posseea'd 
®r the greatest part of the Accomplishments, 
that usually g:. in a Win the Reputation of 
bein' very caicli of a Gentleman. 
l 
lie is# in 2'act, very similar to the kited of leisured and refined 
aristocrat described by landeville in the first part of the Fable 
as an ideal companion: 
A Man of tolerable Fortune, pretty near 
accomplieh'd ... that still improve* 
himself and sees the World till he Is 
Thirty, cannot be dioagreesble to converse 
with ... When such a one either by 
chance or appointment meets with Three 
or 'Four of his Equals, and all area to 
pass away a few Hours together, the whole 
is what I call good company. There is 
nothing acid in it that is not either 
instructive or diverting to a an of 3enae. 
2 
Cloomones, on the other hand, is neither an "honnete hone" nor a 
paragon of virtue but a an of complex personality described at far 
greater length. than Horatio. As any "honnete honme"3 he has "great 
1. Fable 11,16. (all in italics) 
2. Fad It 339- 
3. Althouuh Landeville uses the adjective "worldly" rather than 
"honet" to describe one of the principal characteristics of 
both Horatio and C1oomenoa, it should be noted that in eighteenth- 
century usage the word "honest" sometimes denoted comformity 
to the standards of one's own class, as distinct from rely 
Christian ones, so that the values of an "honest tradesman" and 
an "honest gentleman" might well have boon totally opposed. See 
Pipis a tmpeon, The Structure of Complex cords (London, 1951), 
pp. 195-200. Interestingly enougbl the title of the French versions 
of the Fable of 1740 and 1750 was La fable des abeilles ou lea 
fripone devenus honnestes tans. See Jacob Viner's note in his 
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Regard ... for tho Opinion of Worldly 1! on"'l and enjoys the company 
of sociable ariatocrato but, at the same tiro, bolieves that 
In the very Politeneso of Converiation, 
the Complacency, with which fashionable 
Poople aro continually soothing each 
other's Frailtie8, anci in alnoat every 
part of a Contloran's i3ehaviour, .. * 
thero vas a DioaUrooment betwosn the 
outward Appeararce3, and what is felt 
within, that was olaahing with 
Upri htnoss and Sincerity. 
2 
Cleoiaonea, in other words, uharoa Uandeville's inaiatanco on a 
rigorouo interprotation of what constitutes a truly virtuous action, 
coupled with ecepticlam that virtue is easily acquirod in ordinary: 
sooiablo corzaorco with othero. loratio'a simpler and more 
conventional attitudaa, then, are a perfect foil for Cleo=nass 
cocaplax ones. Thus# Horatio ant Cleomanaa, though special-ploadora, 
are not totally opposed but at different levels of awaranoss of the 
complexities of human naturo und, appropriately enough in to= a of 
philosophical dialoCue, Horatio becomes only Gradually aware of thin. 
It 14 in tho first dialogue that Uar Ieville seta up the 
dra atic situation and dialectical technique to be applied in the 
3. contdo from previous pages 
edition of "iandeville's Letter to Dion, " Aupuetan Reprint society, 
W-41 (Los Ar oloa, 1967), 9. n2. For a corprohonaive study of the . notion of the "honnete ho=e" in France, see U. L'ogondie, La 
Zoliteo3e siondaino at lea theories do 1'honnotete an France (Faris, 
(1926)0 
1. Fable II, 19. 
2. Fable I I9 17" 
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far noro expository subsequent ones. Cleonones, accordingly, wastes 
no time in encouraging Horatio to state his case against the Fable 
which, at firetf is an emotionally-charged one: 
Nor. That Vileness of our Species in the 
refin'd Way of thinking you have of late 
been so fond ofj I call it the Scheme of 
Deformity, the Partizans of which study 
chiefly to make every thing in our Nature 
appear as ugly and contemptible as it is 
possible, and take uncommon Pains to 
persuade Men that they are Devils. 
' 
What disturbs Horatio most about the Fable, then, is its uncomprom- 
isingly "satiric" view of human natura, but his very vehemence 
betrays a fear that the Fable may not be very far wrong in its 
analysis. 
Because of Horatio's psychological inability to entertain any 
arguments in favour of the "satiric" view, Cleomenes is forced to 
adopt the deceptive tactic of pretending that he is a recent convert 
to Shattesbury's optimistic method of judging human actions: 
Cleo. But to remove all your Doubts of 
my Conversion, I'll show you some easy 
Rules I have laid down for young Beginners. 
Hore What to do? 
CCleo. To judge of bens Actions by the 
lovely System of Lord Shaftsbury, in a 
manner diametrically opposed to that of 
1. Fable II, 30. 
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the Pablo of the r3een. 
1 
At first, Cleomones' tactic seems too obvious to deceive Horatio, 
especially when C1eomenes goca so far a to praise the virtuous 
unselfishness of chiraney-sweepere, physicians and cler, y on, all 
of vhoc, according to hin ironic intoryretation of Shaftesbury, 
sorb colely for the benefit of mankind. Hioratio's reaction is to 
complain that 
I Verceive ycur Drifts Prosa the atrain'd 
Paneprrick3 you labour ate you would form 
Argutenta at ab s The Banter to 
ingenious enough, and at proper tides 
tight servo to raise aLa gh= but then 
you must own likewise, that thoee 
otudy'd Encomiums will not bear to be 
eorioualy exi in'd Into. 
2 
Although Tioratio'a complaint is an accurate description of Cleo aneo' 
tactic, the rejection of "panegyrick" it involves inevitably vo k©ns 
Horatio's resistance to the "satiric" view of human nature. An 
almnot i=odiate result is that Horatio finds hirae1P arguing against 
1. Fable 11s 43. For 1Say, deville's cutting description of Shaftesbury 
hi o1P as a worldly can whose own to orate habits, induced in 
youth by his tutor, John Locke, led him to an unwarranted optimism 
about human nature in general and the sturdiness of his own 
virtue in particular, see Fable I, 331-2. It is in this same 
essay, "A Search into the Mature of Society, " that 1ýandeville 
describes the worldly aristocrat as his favourite kind of companion. 
It is possible that he thought it very pernicious for a rhilosopher 
like Shaftesbury to elevate, as he saw it, the rundano values of 
the "honnete how" into an idealized system of morality. Neod- 
lace to say, «fandeville was no doubt unfair in considering 
Shaftesbury, one of the groat eighteenth-century moralinta, as 
doing no more than that in his philosophy. The vary popularity 
of Zhafteobury'a philosophy, however, indicates that it perhaps 
did attract many an "honnets home. For an aaaeoement of 
Shafteabury's popularity, see R. L. Brattq The Third Carl of 
Shafteabury (London, 1951), 186-207. 
2. Fable IT* 48. 
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Shaftesbury'a idoalisn when applied to the motives of those who are 
not leisured arictocratas 
Cleo. But if there be any Reality in the 
Social System 5f Shaftesbur7, it would be 
better for the Publick if Men in all 
Professions were to act from those generous 
Principles; and you'll allow that the 
Society would be the Gainers, if the 
Generality in the three Faculties would 
mind others more and themselves less than 
they do now. 
For. I don't know that; and considering 
what Slavery some Lawyers, as well as 
Physicians, undergo, I much question 
whether it would be possible for them to 
exert themselves in the same manner, tho' 
they would, if the constant Baits and 
Refreshments of large Fees did not help 
to support Human Nature, by contir_uailly 
stimulating this darling Passion. 
Cleo. Indeed, Horatio, this is a 
stronger Argument against the Social 
System, and more injurious to it, 
than any thing that has been said by 
the Author whom you have exolaim'd 
against with so much bitterness. 
l 
I 
In this exchange, C2eoxenes evidently outwits Horatio but, by 
quibbling on various minor points, Horatio nimbly avoids in outright 
rejection of Shaftesbury. From this point one nevertheless, be 
can no longer ignore Mandeville's ideas. 
C1eomenee, in any case, finally corners Horatio in words 
ironically echoing Horatio's earlier assertions about the "deformity" 
1. Fable Vii, 49-50. 
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of satire: 
... and now no Man can judge of Actions 
more severely, and indeed less charitably, - 
than yourself, ... I little thought, if 
once I quitted the Scheme of Deformity, 
to have found an Adversary in you; but 
we have both changed Sides, it seems. 
1 
After this, Horatio may justifiably point out that "I would not 
have you flatter yourself, that you'deceiv'd me by hanging out false 
Colours" but Cleomenes is equally justified in maintaining that "I 
did not lay on the Disguise so thick, as not to have you see through 
it, nor would I ever have discours'd upon this Subject'with any bcdy, 
who could have. been so easily imposed upon. "2 From a dramatic 
point-of-view, what Cleomenes' mildly deceptive tactic has achieved 
is for Cleomenes to regain Horatio's friendship without actually 
having to abjure Mandeville's ideas. The considerable effort that 
Cleocienes makes to achieve such a finely-balanced'objective is, in 
fact, Mandeville's dramatic representation of his own desire to 
regain the reader's good-will. 
In order to defend his "low" style, Mandeville briefly includes 
Cleomenes' "cousin" into the discussion. She is the charming but 
bluntly outspoken "FUlvia" and her views on painting and the opera 
have much bearing on Yandeville's use of the "low" style. 
3 
1. Fable II, 56. 
2. ' Fable II9 56. That both Horatio and Cleomene are not entirely 
serious in their arguments but positioning-themselves for the 
part of the cat in a friendly cat-and-mouse gam3 is especially 
evident in Horatio's impatient reaction to what he knows to be 
Cleomenes' parody of Shaftesbury's effusive style: "would you 
make a Test of this too? " (Fable'II, 44). ; 
3. As toted by Kaye, Mandeville was especially sensitive to criticismm 
from John Dennis on this score. See Kay`'s note in Fable II, L 
and Mandeville's Letter to Dion, ed. by. BonanyDobree Livcrpca?, 
1954), p"46. The Letter was first published in 1732. 
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Because Horatio is evidently a follower of shaftesbury"s, and 
Cleomones is rretendinR to bo ono, she is temporarily Uandeville'e 
mouthpiece. 
She joins in at an early stage of the diacuxsion when Cleornenea, 
still in his guise, criticizes a Dutch Nativity painting for its 
excessive realises "Put what a Fool the Fellow was to draw Ray and 
Straw and Cattle, and a Rack as well as at andors it is a wonder he 
did not put the Bambino into the ? Manger. "' Fulvia'e reaction Is to 
extol the truthfulness of its naturalistic techniques 
The Aambinoo? That is the Child, I 
suppoco; why it should be in the Langer; 
should it not? Does not the History tell 
us, that the Child was laid in the Danger? 
I have no Skill in Painting, but I can see 
whether third are drawn to the Life or 
not; sure nothing can be more like the 
dead of an Cz than that there. A 
Picture then pleases wo best when the Art 
in such aS anner deceives my 'yep that 
without n, inpj any Allowances# I can 
icagino I see the Things In reality vhIch 
the Painter has erdeavour'd to represent. 
I have always thought it an adairable 
Piece; our* nothing in the World can be 
more like Nature. 
2 
r^ulvia'o puzzlement at the word "bambino" shoes that, unlike Horatio, 
aha is not f iliar with the latest faahiona in painting based on 
Italian models. Her taste for Dutch painting, though evidently 
untutored, is far ahoal of its time. According to Jean #I. Hrstxum, 
1. Fable IT, 32- 
2* Fable III, 32-3. 
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in fact, "? dost eighteenth-century writers in Englani would have agreed 
with Bellori'r disparagement of the Dutch and Caravaggio 5n, of the 
few "realists" of Italian paintin$% and his praise of Raphael, Guido 
Rent, and the Carraci. "l It should also be noted that her notion of 
"nature" is not dissimilar to that of Addison who, in his Spectator 
series on the "Pleasures of the Imagination" combined "the ancient 
notion that sight is the greatest of the senses" with "lobbes's idea 
that imagination is the reflection of visible - and only visible - 
objects. "` As it happens, the Addisonian view$ though far less 
idealized than that of 3hafteabury, still conforms to the neo-classical 
imperative that poetry and other forms of literary composition should 
be strongly pictorial and, as will be seen, Mandeville does make use 
of "pictorial imagination" for dialectical and rhetorical purposes. 
3 
F lvia'a view of nature, in any case, Is countered by Cleomenes' view 
of it derived from Shaftesbury and, indeed, many a neo-ciassioal 
critics 
1. See Jean U. Uagatrum, The Sister Arts (Chicago, 1958), 142.1: ven 
as late as 1779 a critic of philoso; hical breadth like James 
Beattie could pronounce against the "particularising" realism of 
Ilcgarth and the Dutch and in favour of the "genoralieing" 
idealization of Reynolds and the Italians. See James Beattie, 
1saay3on Poetry atltusicp third edition (London, 1779), P"8. 
Beattie's remarks are also referred to in Cicely Davies, "Ut Picture 
Poesisl" ldodorn I. snruage Review, 30 (1935), 168-9. From hero on, 
f agstrum's book will be cited as Ua strum and Da vies' article as 
Davies. lellori's insistence on the idealisation. of nature was a 
great influence on Shaftesbury and Reynolds. See A Documentary 
Iiisto of Art ade by Elizabeth Be holt, vol. II Garden City, 
New York, 195619 P-94- 
2* 1 rum, 136. 
3. Decauee of his emphasis cn imagination as a faculty which 
reproduces "direct visual experience, " Addison's view of "nature" 
was undoubtedly more conducive to the descriptive "realism" 
desired by Mandeville. See Hutrum, 134--40. 
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It is not Nature, but agreeable Nature, 
In belle Nature, that is to be 
represented; all Thinas that are abject, 
low, pitiful and mean, are carefully to 
be avoided, and kept out of Sight; 
because to }den of the true Taste they 
are as offensive as Things that are 
shocking, and really nasty. 
1 
As painting was widely considered to be analoEue of poetry, it is not 
surprising to find C1eocienes referring to Drrrd©n's preface to Du 
Fresnoy's widely-read De Arteßrsphioa -a poem which expounds the 
ancient and latterly neo-olassical doctrine of "Ut pictura paisis" at 
great length. It is very probable, then, that Fulvia's advocacy of 
Dutch painting to intended as a justification of kandevillo's "low" 
style, especially when one considers that, as Cicely Davies points 
out about neo-classical art--criticism, "it had indeed been the 
tradition to rank as 'low' styles the Lcenres which seemed most concerned 
with particulars .,. 
3 
rah1A II, 33. For a discussion of the n©o-classical notion of 
"natura" in this highly-idealized sense, see fiazstrum, 141-50. The 
doctrine of "la belle nature, " in fact, described by W. H. Halewood 
as "one of the most enduring of the exports of French critical 
theory received in England" was an idealized form of neo--claasical 
pictorialism. See William U. Halewood, "'The Reach of Art' in 
Augustan Poetic Theory" in Howard Anderson and John S. Shea, eds., 
Studies in Criticism and Aesthetics, 1660-1800: assays in Honor 
of Samuel Holt'. Monk ! inneapolis, Minn., 1967)9 p. 201. 
2. Pablo II, 35. Also see Kaye'a note which, de onstrate3 that 
Dandeville borrowed from Dryden's preface, not, as he maintains, 
from Graham's. Richard Graham, according to Kaye, "contributed 
not a preface, but a supplement, to Du r^resnoy's Latin poem. " As 
in Mandeville's remark about Cassendi, this is another instance 
of his apparent carelessness with references. Thu r^resnoy's book 
was highly popular and frequently translated in the eightoonth 
century, including a version by Defoe in 1720, See }Tmgotrum, 175- 
3. Davies, 169. 
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The discussion of opera which follows makes a similar point, 
but far less against the grain, as Italian opera was considerably 
less popular than Italian painting. lvia reveals that she "never 
expected any thing Natural at an Opera" and that she attends them 
merely to watch the people of fashion. 
1 Horatio is much offended 
by this and reacts by rapturously describing the charms of such 
idealized elements of opera as the "solemn Composure of the Action" 
and the representation of love as always "pure and Zeraphick. "2 
Fulvia's attitude, however, corresponds more to the taste of the times, 
as the artificialities of Italian opera were attacked not only by 
magisterial critics like John Dennis, but in the pages of the Tatler 
and Spectator as well. 
3 
In addition, John Gay's Beggar's Opera, 
Which was first otaged in 1728, discredited Italian opera with much 
of the theatre-going publio. 
4 Because of this background of wide- 
spread hostility, Mandeville's choice of a discussion of opera to 
reinforce his implied advocacy of the "low" style in Fulvia's remarks 
about painting was, indeed, a very shrewd one. 
5 
The discussion of 
1. Fable Ili 37* 
2. Fable II, 39-40. 
3. See Siegmund Betz, "The Operatic Criticism of the Tatler and 
Spectator, " t'usical Quarterly, 31 (1945), 318-30. Betz concludes 
that the criticism was, for the most part, unfair: "As men of 
letters they judged it by the standards of classical drama. As 
Englishmen they looked upon it as a piece of foreign foolery. " 
4. Frank Kidson, The Beggar's Operas Its Predecessors and Successors 
(Cambridge, 1922)q P-36. Kidson quotes Pope's interesting obser- 
vation in one of his notes to the Dunciad that the Beggar's Opera 
"drove out of England for that season the Italian opera, which had 
carried all before it for ten years: that idol of the nobility and 
people which the great critic, Mr. Dennis, by the labours and out- 
cries of a whole life, could not overthrow, was demolished by a 
single stroke of this gentleman's pen. " The second part of the 
Fable, at any rate, was published just after its successful first 
rün and is mentioned in Mandeville's preface Fable, 6). 
5. In the preface, Mandeville ingenuously claims, but surely with 
intended irony, that he introduced Fulvia's discussions of painting 
and opera into the proceedings merely because he "had a Mind to say 
some things on Painting and Operas, which ... might by introducing her be brought in more naturally, and with less Trouble, than they 
could have been without her" (Fable II, 19). 
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opera cnda, in fact, with some playfully provocative banter comparing 
opera to boar-baiting an leading to Cleomenoa' serious point, no 
doubt applicable to the "low" styl© of the Fable, that "... after all, 
Vice and what is criminal are not to be confounded with Poughnosa and 
want of annere, no more than Politeness and artful Behaviour ought to 
be with Virtue or Religion. "1 
Although the discussion of painting and opera, and its dramatic 
framework of good-humoured repartee between Fulvia and the two mono 
is urbanely light-hearted in tone, it prepares the reader to seriously 
consider, if not accept, a reproach like the following from Cleomenes 
in the third dialogue: "You take no Delight in the Occurrences of low 
Life; but if we always renain among Persons of (uality, and extend our 
Enquiries no farther, the Transactions there kill-not furnish us with 
a sufficient Knowledge of every thing that belongs to our riaturo. "2 
Bearing in Hind Cleomenea' penchant for investigating "low" life, 
Mandeville's "satiric" attitude may well be not dissimilar to what 
we would now call naturalism of style. In this he in closer to a 
novelist delighting in realistic detail like Defoo than a concise 
satirist like Swift, a tendency already observable in The Virgin 
Unra a sk'd. Horatio, in any case, is, at one point, forced to 
acknowledge the appropriateness of a "lour" nicsilo to rake the point, 
and it is a central one in t"andeFille's analysis of the mechanics of 
political poor©r, that efficient government depends not on the 
application of lofty principles but on accu=latod experience in 
Coverniri: 
1. Fable II9 CO. 
2. Fable II, 110. 
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Cleo. The Wisdom I speak of, is not the 
Offspring of a fine Understanding, or 
intense Thinking, but of sound and 
deliberate Judgment, acquired from a 
long Experience in Business, and a 
Multiplicity of Observations. By this 
sort of Wisdom, and Length of Time, it 
may be brought about, that there shall 
be no greater Difficulty in governing a 
large City, than (pardon the Lowness of 
the Simile) there is in weaving of 
Stockings. 
Hors Very low indeed. 
Cleo. Yet I know nothing to which the 
Laws and establish'd Oeconomy of a well-order'd 
City may be more justly compared, than a 
Knitting-frame. The Machine, at first View, 
is intricate and unintelligible; yet the 
Effects of it are exact and beautiful; and 
in what is produced by it, there is a 
surprizing'Regularitys But the Beauty and 
Exactness in the Manufacture are principally, 
if not altogether, owing to the Happiness 
of the Invention, the Contrivance of the 
Engine. For the greatest Artist at it can 
furnish us with no better Work, than may 
be made by any Scoundrel by half a Year's 
ý Practice. 
nor. Tho' your Comparison be low, I 
must own, that it well illustrates your 
Yeaning. 
1 
This exchange is a good illustration of how Mandeville's stylistic 
emphasis on homely images, rather than idealized ones - and nothing 
wage - fully complements the can be less ethereal than a mechanical i 
1. Fable III 322. 
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empirical bias of his thought. Such an emphasis, in fact, also 
contributes to a strongly pictorial element in the dialectic of the 
second part of the Fable. 
1 
Apart from its relationship with the Addisonian notion of 
"ianacination" as perception of the actual, itself based on the 
sensationalist psychology of Hobbes and Locke, 
2 
«iandeville's graphic 
style of argument is also a homespun variant of the Lockean notion, 
already investigated in the first chapter of this thesis, of argument 
as a series of points-of-view in which truth command the highest 
"prospect. " Argument, in other words, is analogous not only to 
painting as such, but, more specifically, to its perspectival element. 
Thus, in a work like George Stubbes's A Dialogue on the Superiority 
of the Pleasures of the Understandintg, when "Socrates" searches for a 
strategic prospect, it is evident that he is also talking about the 
nature of philosophical ardent: 
We have passed by a variety of Lawns, 
and chrysta1 Lakes, a green with pendant Groves, 
and reflecting inverted Obelisques and 
floatinj Ornaments of Architecture. But 
amidst the Confusion of opening ? rospects 
1. In this context, the word "pictorial" is preferable to 
"picturesque" because the latter term was to acquire a very 
different tneaninj, suggesting the unusual rather than the actual, 
in the latter part of the eighteenth century. For neo-classical 
critics in the early eighteenth century, at any rate, the word 
"picturosquo" had two basic meanings: "like a picture" or 
"capable of being represented in a picture" and "pertaining to the 
visually particular. " These are the two basic mesninp in which 
the word "pictorial" is used for our purposes. See iiapstrum, 157--8- 
2, For Locke's and Hobbes's views on "imagination" and how they 
influenced Addison, see W. K. "umsatt Jr. and Cleanth Brooks, 
Literary Criticism: A Short History, revised edition, vol. II 
London, 1970), 253-7. 
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and inviting Avenues, misleading the uncertain 
Foot or wandring T'ye, it is not possible to 
form a Judgment of so extensive a Design, 
unless you lead me to the Principal Point of 
View, from whence only its Beauty can be 
understood; and permit me to survey your ample 
Territories from this peculiar Spot, perhaps 
enclosed from Sight and reserved as sacred to 
your own Contemplation. 
1 
Although there is much florid rhetoric and more than a hint of 
platonic idealism, in Stubbes's spatial analogy, it does essentially 
describe the same kind of pictorial imagination that Mandeville employs 
in his arguments. 
Mandeville's technique of pictorial description also includes 
adroit use of the "character" or, to use a more apposite term, 
"character-sketch, " which he had already employed extensively in his 
essays and dialogues for the Female Tatler. Cleomenes' highly 
pictorial disquisition on the "ideal gentleman" for example, makes 
Iioratio suspicious about his motives for "drawing" such a figures 
Hor. Thore lies your Faults It is this 
I cannot endure in you. 
Cleo. What's the matter? 
for. I know what you are about, you 
are going to give me the Caricatura of a 
Gentleman, under pretence of drawing his 
Portrait. 
Cleo. You wrong meq I have no auch 
Thought. 
2 
1. Geore 3tubbes, A Dialogue on the Superiority of the Pleasures of 
the Understanding London, 1734 i P-8. 
2. Fable 119 63. 
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C2oomenoJ' aaaWer is not entirely tontUe-in-check, as he believes 
his sketch to be an accurate portrait, not a caricature. Because 
his doacription of the characteristics and mode of life of the typical 
gentleman Is so detailed, and ooten3ibly impartial, in fact, Horatio 
is moved to remark that "This is a study'd Fioco; but I don't like 
it the worse for it, pray go on. "1 C1Go=enoo, however, i ip indeed, 
letting Horatio into a trap, especially when he baits Horatio with 
this description of the gentleman: "Tho' of every thing he has the 
bout of the sort, and night be call'd curious in Apparel; yet be 
leaver the Cara of it to others; ant no iisn ha3 his Cloatho put on 
better that soema so little to regard thsr. "2 At first glance, this 
sounds like an admirable trait but there is also a hint of hypocrisy 
in pretending to be indifferent about clothes. Horatio is so taken 
up with the accuracy of Clear ones' description that, des; ito his 
wariness, he ignores this implication and betrays his own identifi- 
cation with C1ooxenea' ironically-idealized gentleman: "Perfectly 
right; to be well-dresu'd is a necessary Article, and yet to be 
sollicitous about it is below a Person of Quality. "3 Thus, though 
Horatio is on his guard, C1oosenes' picture is so attractive that he 
cannot resist letting hic draw it to the last telling detail, and 
even assisting his in doing so. This is because Cleorneno3' 
ostensibly impartial character-sketch is really a discriminatingly 
Fable II, 68. Elsewhere Horatio even compliments Cloomanes with 
the revealing words, "You are a good Painter" (Fable II9 234). 
2" ? able il, 69. 
3. Fable 11,69. 
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ironic portrait of the image a gentleman projects in society - an 
image Horatio himself aspires to as an "honnete homine, "1 
Although he consistently finds it very entertaining, Horatio 
finally rebels against Cleomenes' pictorial method of argument by 
accusing him of deliberately emphasizing the nastier aspects of what 
he is describing: 
... The Reason why no Government can subsist 
without Laws is, because there are bad Men 
in all Multitudes; but to take Patterns from 
then, when we would judge of human Nature, 
rather than from the good ones that follow 
the Dictates of their Reason, is an Injustice 
one would not be guilty of to brute Beasts; 
and it would be very wrong in us, for a few 
vicious Horses, to condemn the whole Species 
as such, without taking notice of the many 
fine-spirited Creatures, that are naturally 
tame and gentle. 
2 
Cleomenes' answer is an elaborately detailed one, but the gist of it 
is in his retort that "What you call Natural, is evidently 
Artificial, and belongs to Education: no fine-spirited Horse was 
ever tame or gentle, without Lanagement. "3 Cleomenes' defence, in 
other words, suggests that his portraits are impartially accurate, 
emphasizing neither evil nor good in the sitter but making it evident 
that good is often skin-deep and artificially acquired rather than 
1. If, taking his cue from The Virgin Unmask'd, Mandeville had 
titled the second part of the Fable, "The Gentleman Unmask'd, " 
it would not have been a misleading description of much of its 
dialectic. 
2. Fable III 269. 
3. Fable III 270. 
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innate. Horatio, in short, confuses what are only intended to be 
meticulous descriptions with moral judgments. Mandeville undoubtedly 
assumed that his descriptive method accurately reflects what is 
observable in "nature, " as opposed to the "Flatterers of our Species" 
who "instead of separating what is acquired from what is natural, and 
distinguishing between them, they take Pains to confound them 
together. "1 As such, Mandeville's method of pictorial description 
subverts the idealized, neo-c1aszics1 notion of "nature" attacked by 
Fulvia and is an important facet of his dialectical technique. 
It is made explicitly clear that Cleomenea' pictorialism serves 
the purpose of making abstract concepts visible when, after a complex 
z 01, 
discussion pictorially contrasting j"illiam Temple's version of the 
"noble savage" to a hypothetically real one, 
2 
Horatio exclaims, "I 
have it now; you have open'd my Eyes, and I see the Origin of Society, 
as plain as I do that Table. " Although Cleomenes replies that "the 
Prospect is not so clear yet, as you imagine, "3 Horatio's reference 
to the table reminds one, as hinted at in Fulvia's comnients, ttiat 
Mandeville would probably have preferred to consider dialectical 
argument not as an analogue of landscape painting, but of realistic, 
and equally perspectival, Dutch interiors. 
There is perspectival realism even in the carefully-framed 
setting of each dialogue in the second part of the Fable and, indeed, 
these settings resemble nothing so tauch as theatrical "sets. " In 
1. Fable II, 301- 
2, Fable II9 192-202. 
3. Fable II, 202. 
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the first dialogue, for cx=p1o, C1eomenos discusaO3 paintin u 
daaoratinjj the walls of a room in what is probably his Town house, 
anal this after having; coaxed Horatio out of the utreet. 
1 
There is 
also a "scene" of friendly camaraderie where ' oratio curprises 
C1eomenes in his study. 
2 Aa for tho sixths dialogue, it takes place 
entirely inside a carriage because of the following invitation from 
Cleomenoss "I am obliged to dine at Windsor to-raorr. a; if you are 
not otherwise enZaged, I can carry you, where the Honour of your 
Company will be highly esteemfds t1y Coach shall be ready at : tine= you 
know you are in ray uay. "3 The illusion of movement 'which Mandeville's 
proscenium-oriented theatrical sottiiv o provide, isp in fact, a vivid 
contrast to the quasi-Platonic tice1o33noos of many philoaophioal 
dialo os. 
Broadly spec ing, the settines, of philosophical dialogues tend 
to be either elaborately eylvan or thinly perfunctory. Dialogues 
with elaborately sylvan ßettings usually attempt to create an 
atccoupb re of idealized diecuasion uninfluenced by the intrusions of 
7Landeville provides no "stage directions" but a careful readin. 
of the opening pages ebows that Horatio is bait, inducod to 
enter Cleomenes' dwollirv. See Fable 11,29-30 and 32-4. 
2. 'Fable I19 148-9. 
3. Fable II1 265. 
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the outside world. 
' British examples in this mode include More's 
Divine Dialogues (1668), Shaftesbury's The Moralists (1709), and 
Berkeley's Alciphron (1731)t the latter two of which will be 
extensively examined in subsequent chapters. More's opening to his 
Divine Dialogues is typical of the hint of an idealized world beyond 
the actual that such dialogues consistently conveys 
Philot hue. There is nothing 
more pleasant these summer-evenings than 
the cool open air. And I'll assure you 
it is very fresh here, and the prospect 
very delightsome. 
Cuphfophron 7. Vothinks I envy 
greatness for nothing so much as their 
magnificent houses, and their large 
gardens and walks, their quarters 
contrived into elegant knots adorned 
with the most beautiful flowers, their 
fountains, cascades and statues; that I 
might be in a more splendid capacity of 
entertaining my friends. This would be 
to me no small prelibation of the joys 
of paradise here upon earth. 
2 
1. Probably Plato's Phaedrus is the archetype of this kind of dialogue. 
It seems to have been deliberately set on the tranquil "banks of 
the Ilissus" because its discussion of the nature of rhetoric, with 
its mythic and transcendental elements, could thereby all the more 
readily be abstracted from merely political and superficially 
urbane notions of it. For an interesting analysis of the Phaedrus 
in terns of its explicit and implicit discussion of the nature of 
rhetoric, sea Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago, 1965), 
pp. 3-26. Addison perhaps had the charming qualities and static 
timelessness of this kind of philosophical dialogue in mind when 
he declared in the "Pleasures of the Imagination" (Spectator no. 411, 
June 21,1712) that "A beautiful prospect delights the soul, as 
much as a demonstration" even though he goes on to compare Aristotle, 
not Plato, unfavourably with homer, at least as far as their impact 
on the reader's "imagination" is concerned. 
29 Henry More, Divine Dialogues, Containing Disquisitions Concerning 
the Attributes and Providence of God, : vol. I, Glasgow, 17431t PP. 1-2. 
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Dialogues with thinly-perfunctory settings tend to be little more 
than essays of topical concern in dialo=gue form and, not surprisingly, 
rnny of these are found in periodical essays. Jeremy Collier's 
¬Iso ve Upon Several Moral Subjects (1703), many of which are in 
dialogue, contains some of the more interesting exr plea of 
philozophical disquisition in this mode, 
1 
of which perhaps the most 
distinguished example in Hume's "Of a Particular Providence and : Future 
State" which comprises Section XI of his 'nquir Concernin TTuran 
Understanding (1760). 7n'bringing Philosophical discussion to an 
urbanized "drawing-room, " i'andoville was no doubt to some extent 
influenced by Lucian and his brilliant French "imitator, " Fontenollo, 
but his distinction was to transfer the "drawing-room" into the full 
daylight of philosophical dialogue rather than "dialogue of the dead" - 
to strip the unaoz orld, in other words, of its transcendence and 
restore the "drawing-room" to the world as it is. M? andeville's 
preference for the "drawing-room, " rather than the sylvan setting, is, 
in any case, fully compatible with his intense interest in the 
actualities of human behaviour. As for the essay in dialogue form, 
even in the remale Tatler, as has been seen, Manievillo usually preferred 
to include some dramatic interaction and "drawing-room" setting in 
his dioquisition3.2 
Somo of tandevi11e'3 dramatic embellishments, ho'aever, also 
nubvort the inherent consorvatist of the aristocratic dramin-room. 
1. C1oo=oneo refers to Collier's book rather dis; aragingly in Fable 
lit 93" 
2. It may well be that 11andevill® had not a precedent for Fume and 
Ra v to follow in their adoption of the theatrical "drawinC-room" 
for their highly-poliohed ni aloyguss Concerning; ; Natural Religion 
and 1? ialog o on Taste. 
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The most outstanding example is Horatio and Cleomenes enjoying a 
pineapple at the beginning of the fifth dialogue and discussing the 
implications of doing so. After Cleomenes goes to some lengths to 
describe its taste as accurately as possible, they go on to discuss 
its cultivation and other "facts" pertaining to it: 
Cleo. This was the third I ever tasted, 
of our own Growths the Production of them 
in these Northern Climates,. is no small 
Instance of human Industry, and our 
Improvements in Gard'ning. It is very 
elegant to enjoy the wholsome Air of.. 
temperate Regions, and at the same time 
be able to raise Fruit to its highest 
haturity, that naturally requires the 
Sun of the Torrid Zone. 
Hor. It is easy enough to procure 
Heat, but the great Art consists in 
finding out, and regulating the Degrees 
of it at pleasure; without which it 
would be impossible to. ripen an Ananas 
here; and to compass this with that 
Exactness, as it is done by the Help of 
Thermometers, was certainly a fine 
Invention. 
They go on to mention Matthew Decker, a London merchant who first 
, -pioneered 
the raising of pineapples in England. 
l 
The effect of such 
'a discussion is to bring to the reader a vivid awareness of the- 
bustling world of commerce -a world outside the drawing-room and its 
1. Fable' -119 194-5. Also see $aye's note. 
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strict hierarchy of wits ai "honnlatos gens. "1 The pineapple, 
roroovor, is a fruit exotic enough to d©cerve a pastoral netting, 
such au the paradisial one of I"oro, but, in tlandeville'a hazuia, the 
roader is not allowed to forget the considerable human effort 
necossary for its avai1ab31itq. 
Although the world of co cerco is often alluded toi however, 
the ccnversation3 betwe3n Horatio and Cleomones have $om©thing of the 
aura of an aristocratic comedy of manners. The relationship between 
Horatio and C1eomene3, in fact, is a comic one and even develops 
dramatically. Thus} though Horatio at firnt treats Cleomenes in a 
curtly formal and supercilious maannorp he eventually ah-As hie 
atiftne3s and restores their old friendship, as in this exchange from 
the beginning of the fourth dialogues 
CLtOU N3. Your servant. 
or. That say you now, Cleomenes; is not 
this without Ceremony? 
Cleo. You are very obliging. 
For. When they told ma whero you was, I 
would suffer no body to tell you, who it 
was that wanted you, or to come up with me. 
Cleo. Thie it friendly indeed! 
t-tor. You see what a Proficient I aru in 
a little Tice you'll teach me to lay aside 
all good 1annera. 
C1Ro. You make a fine Tutor of me. 
2 
This works nicely as an entertaining bit of dramatic "buciness" before 
seriou3 disputation begins. Not only does Horatio surprise Cleoxonss 
1. For interastirZ observations about the role of the "honn©te ho =o" 
in Restoration comedy, see C. D. Cecil, "I'taille in Restoration 
Co ody, " Nuntin. ton Library uarterlyq 29 (1965), 147-59. 
Hereinafter to be cited as CAcil. 
z. Fable Ir, 148. 
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strict hierarchy of wits an "honnetos gon3. "1 The pineapple, 
iorcovor, is a fruit exotic enough to deserve a pastoral 3ettinc3, 
such as the raratiaial one of i"oro, but, in Uandevillo'n handa, the 
roaier is not allowed to forget the considerable human effort 
necessary for its availability. 
JUthough the world of cosmorco is ofton alluded to, how©vor, 
the conversation3 betwe-3n Horatio and Cleomanea have something; of the 
aura of an aristocratic comedy of mannor3. The relationship between 
Horatio and Cloonone3, in fact, is a comic one and. oven develops 
dramatically. Thus, though Horatio at fir3t treats Cleomones in a 
curtly formal and supercilious nasnor, ho eventually sheds his 
stiffn933 and ro3toro3 their old friendship, as in this exchange fron 
the beginning of the fourth dialogues 
CLWor. m-2 . Your Servant. 
; ýior. That say you now, Cloamines; is not 
this without Ceremony? 
Cleo. You are very obliging. 
Hor. When they told mo where you gras, I 
would suffer no body to tell you, who it 
was that wanted you, or to come up with me. 
Cleo. Thie It friendly indeedl 
Ilor. You see what a Proficiont I amt in 
a little Tice you'll teach me to lay aside 
all good ; tanners. 
C1A0. You make a fine Tutor of me. 
2 
This works nicely as an entertaining bit of dramatic "buciness" before 
aerioua disputation begins. 2: ot only does Horatio surprise C1eomenea 
1. For intero3tirZ obaervation3 about the role of the "honnete homno" 
in Re3toration comedy, see C. D. Cecil, "ßaille in Restoration 
Comody, " Huntington Library Quarterly, 29 (1965), 147-59" 
Hereinafter to be cited as CAcil. 
2. Fable li, 148. 
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in his study but makes use of raillery at its most courteous, for he 
does not really mean that he is in danger of losing his habitual 
politeness but that Cleomenes is such a good friend that he does not 
need to be overly formal with him. This is, indeed, the type of 
raillery that Swift favoured and defined as being complimentary while 
seeming to criticise. 
1 
There is, in any case, much good-humoured banter between Horatio 
and Cleomenes and it is subtle enough to include dialectical "leg- 
pulling. " Horatio complains at one point, for example, that Cleomenes' 
description of an ideal gentleman, which we have examined in the 
context of Mandeville's pictorialism, contains the seeds of its own 
refutation: 
I am persuaded that, where-ever you have 
put in this seeming and appearin , you 
have done it designedly, and with an 
Intent to make use of them as so many 
Back-doors to creep out at. I could 
never have taken Notice of these Things, 
if you had not acquainted me with your 
Intention before-hand. 2 
The Fact, however, that such "leg-pulling" is so transparent, as 
Horatio himself admits, shows that C2eomehef is not using unfair 
arguments but that he is needling Horatio in order to undermine his 
preconceptions. As Cleonenes declares on another occasion, "I aim 
at no Victory, all I wish for is to do you Service, in undeceiving you. "3 
1. See Eugene F. Timpe, "Swift as Railleur, " Journal of English and 
Germanic Philology, 69 (1970), 47- 
2. Fable II9 72. 
3. Fable II, 96. 
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Horatio's 881f-dolusion may be dialectically convenient but, 
payohologtc3117 and dramatically, there is nothing arbitrary about it. 
As the following exchange illustrates, ha is divided within hiaoalf, 
in that his genuine search for truth is undermined by his hedonistic 
unwillingnoaa to grapple with its 
Cleo. I thought you wa resolv'd to be 
bettor acquainted with yourself, and to 
scorch into your I. eart with Care and 
Boldness. 
For. That's a cruel Things I tried it 
three times since I saw you last, till it 
put me into a sweat, and then I waa 
--forced to leave oft. 
1 
Even when I: oratlo acknowledgee the validity of Cleomenea' reasoning, 
he finds it very hard to accept at the emotional levels 
I see groat tifficultiea, and now an4 then 
a G1im e of Truth, that makes ze starts I 
aoreticoa fool great ätxu les within; but 
I hnvo been so used to derive all 
Actions that are really Food from laudable 
t"otives, that as soon as I return to my 
accustoa'd V ay of thinking, it carrion 
all before it. 
2 
C1oononeo' ta3k, then, is to w+oan Horatio away from 2iio own self- 
deception and he does soy in Fart, by ra1lyini; him 
1. Table 11,107. Also see Kays's n. 2 which points out that though 
"The dlffioulty of self-knowledge was a co sonplace, ... a genuine 
psychological analysis of th3 causes for this such as is offered 
throughout the Fable was comparatively rare. " 
2. Fehle 1i, 74" 
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IIor. But is not that provoking? I'd give 
a hundred Guineas with all my Heart, that I 
did not know it. I can't endure to see so 
much of ay own Nakedness. 
Cleo. I never met with such an open 
Enmity to Truth in a Ilan of Honour 
before. 
I 
Cleomenes sometimos appeals, in short, not-to Horatio's reason, but 
to his sense of honour, which is very vulnerable to raillery. This 
is not only dramatically plausible but fully consistent with 
Mandeville's belief in the dominance of the pazsicns in matters of 
rational argument. Tie takes this conviction so far that Horatio's 
eventual acceptance of 'iandeville's analysis of human nature, as 
expounded by Cleo©enes, is not entirely a matter of being rationally 
persuaded of its truth, but also of becoming familiarized with new 
ideas and therefore finding then acceptable. As Cleomenes puts it, 
"You are now diverting yourself with a Truth, which eight Days ago 
you would have given an hundred Guineas not to have known. "2 
Horatio, however, is never ontirely convinced that he is really 
so self-deluded-and, apart from the considerable interest that this 
lends to his character, his scepticism about his own solf-delusion 
makes him amusingly wary and doubtful to Cleomones' fairness, traits 
which add piquancy to much of the repartee, as in this choice piece 
of sarcasms "I don't care to enter into these abstruse : attars; what 
have you further to say in Praise of Loney? "3 This is not dissimilar 
to the energetic raillery and banter employed by the "honnete komme" 
1, Fable II9 19S. 
2" Fable TIC 149" 
3. Fable II1 353. 
0 
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of Restoration comedy to defend him-: elf again3t the malicious and the 
vulgar. It can be said of Pioratio ani nie b , ntoring manner, in 
fact, what one recant critic has said about the "honnoto hoc.:: ®" in 
iiestoration comodyt "A good-humored, bantering manner, tinged with 
a certain reserve, help: 11honn; tn horºze to re -zain at ease aior - those 
, 4ho3a jud ant he cannot a1ijs trust= and in whos3 preas: ncc ho 
consequently risks his composers. "' 
De3pito bis bantering manner, r? oratio never succeeds In 
affactivoly ridiculing any of C1edn, nast arr=inta. 7 ven in this 
Horatio is ssalf-deluded if one a3 urss that his penchant for banter is 
partly encouraCed by Shaftesbury-'s notion that "a subject which would 
not boar r2121er wa 3u3piclau3. "2 Zhafte3burr, how©ver, aluo 
implied that such raillery, or ridiculo, io part of the reasoning 
process and theroforo a le&iti. ato code of dialectical arru nt, such 
is 1s often favoured by s3tiriatm. 
3 
This poti3iblo aspect of 
3haftesburj's notion aaz lator fully analyzed as "ar'ui ontative 
ridicule" by Allan ; c. ~ cay in hia ^saay on iitUcui+t in defence of 
3batto bury. He conzidored "ar mantative ridicule" as a kind of 
1. cam, 155- 
2. Quoted by Vnye in Fable II9 53 n. l. Shafteabury'U assertions 
about the value of raillery and ridicule (he used such te=a 
interchangeably) in discussion was subject to patch misrepras®n- 
tation and even sustained controversy throughout the eighteenth 
century. According to A. 0. Aldridgo, an acute analyst of this 
ccntrover3y, Shaftesbury lauded ridicule in order to advocate 
free and impartial debate on all subjects, free of solemn dogma 
or pedantry. See Alfred Non Aldridge, "hhaftesbury ani the Test 
of Truth, " h"ublicitions of thri s, odeºrn Lin . rrq Asseciation, 
60 
(1945), 129-56 and esp. 129-32. Hereinafter to be cited as 
Aldrirl ro. Also see Stuart L. Tavel The Amiable umoriet (Chicago, 
1960)# pä. 3 . xioreinafter to be cited as Tavc. 
Accordirg to A1dridga, "The chief value of ridicule to Shaftesbury 
wes its use as a teat of deooanor or attitude, as a weapon against 
irnpost: zre. As such Shaftesbury implied that At is as. ociated with 
reason although he made no clear statement concerning its operation" (Aldridjre_, 155). Shaftesbury, however, shrank from satire as such ini preferred "good-humoured raillery. " on this point, use , 37. 
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analogical reasoning, first perfected by Lucian. ' It is abundantly 
evident that Mandeville was no stranger to the use of ridicule for 
dialectical purposes but it does not appear that he equated such 
a use of it with 3haftesbury's observations. Thus, when Horatio 
reacts to C1eoienes' parody of Shaftesbury's ideas by making the 
petulant remark that "the best Things, you know, may be ridicul'd, "2 
Cleomenes' answer is highly derisory about Shaftesbury on ridicules 
whether I know that or not, Lord 
Shaftsbury has flatly denied it; and 
takes Joke and Banter to be the best 
and surest Touchstone to prove the Worth 
of Thin"* It is his Opinion, that no 
Ridicule can be fastn'd upon what is 
really great and good; his Lordship has 
made use of that Test to try the 
Scriptures and the Christian Religion by, 
and expos'd them because it seems they 
could not stand it. 
3 
dis answer, in fact, indicates that ! andev111e did not take Shaftesbury's 
1. ZA-Ilan Razrsa7, An rc: ssay on Ridicule (London, 1753), pp. 16-37. This 
edition is part of a collection of tracts entitled The Investigator 
(London, 1762). Also sea Aldridge, 149-56. Ramsay himself used 
"argumentative ridicule" as an ana1oeica1 ardent in his Dialogue 
on Taste (London, 1762) when "Col. Freeman" satirizes mathematical 
calculations of proportion for making aesthetic judgments: "... 
the rule of three or rule of proportion, might be applied so as 
to become a golden rule in comraring beauties as much as any thing 
also. It is performed, you know, by multiplying the first by the 
second, and dividing by the third; and beirr curious this morning 
to know with exactness how much ? rs. D ** excelled in beauty i&rs. 
C***, I thus stated the question, as a cat is to a wheel-barrow 
so is Kra. C*''* to firs. A* but though I tried till my brain was 
ready to crack, I never could contrive how to multiply a cat by 
a wheel-barrow; so I could Co no farther in my calculations" (p. 31). 
The Dialogue is also available in the same Investigator collection. 
2. Fable II, 52. 
3. Fable I?, 53" 
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theory of ridicule very seriously but refers to it merely to expose 
Shaftesbury's alleged irreverence towards religious matters - 
something he himself was often accused of. 
1 Cleomrnes, in short, 
opposes his own plain-speaking banter in the "low" style to Horatio's 
politely "good-humoured" one. 
C1eomenes' plain-speaking banter, however, is not incompatible 
with gentlemanly civility nor is it primarily poleaical, as is 
Fachard's banter in that philosophical dialogue much admired by Dryden, 
Vr. flobbs's State of Nature Considered. 
2 Eachard's aim was to refute 
Hobbes's philosophy of human nature, but his banter concentrated too 
much on quibbles, as in the following exchange: 
Tit3f thZ7. You talk, Philautus, of your 
Nunsne Nature containing the Elements of 
Folicy; there's one cunning reflexion (p. 5) 
concerning imagination, which is so full of 
novelty and subtilty, that it is enough 
alone to set up a man for chief Minister of 
State, vize that the absence or destruction 
of things once imagined, doth not cause the 
absence or destruction of the ir: apination 
it self. 
1. In making such an innuendo against Shaftesbury for his supposed 
irreligion, and even pandering to prejudices against Shaftesbury's 
theory of ridicule which, despite fears to the contrary from 
Berkeley and others, was not designed to undermine religious 
doctrines as such but only spurious cues, Mandeville was, undoubt- 
edly not entirely fair. On this point, see R. L. Brett, The Third 
1 arl of Shaftesbury (London, 1951), PP"º 66' 7. L andeville's unfairness 
is ccmpounded by Horatio, ostensibly a follower of Shaftesbury's, 
expressing unorthodox sentiments that Mandeville himself probably 
held. Cn this point, see Keye's n. 2 in Fable II9 21. It is only 
in matters of religious doctrine, however hat ; Wandeville seems to 
be deliberately unfair to Shaftesbury and uncandid about his own 
opinions. 
2. See Dryden's Life of Lucian in John Dryden, Of Dramatic Foes 
and Other Critical F'ssays, ed. by George Watson, vol. II London, 
1962 F, 211-12o Hereinafter to be cited as Dryden I or II. 
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Phi. thy, does it? 
Tim. Not For suppose I have a House in 
Cheapside, which I have sometimes seen, 
and sometimes imained; according as I was 
best at leisure; and this house, upon a 
day, either runs away from me or I from that; 
yet still I may hang my self trading in my 
own shop, and eating in my own House: nay 
though it should be burnt down to the very 
ground; yet for a need I can make shift 
once or twice a year to hansie it still 
standing, or at least to wish that it were. 
And surely upon this is founded that old 
friendly saying, vizo though absent in body, 
yet presAnt in nind. 
1 
This is undeniably entertaining but aftcr", many pages of similar banter 
one wonders to 'what extent, if any, it succeeds in decisively refuting 
Hobbes. 
2 The relationship between Timothy and Philautus, moreover, 
is not that between friends who respect each other but, in the succinct 
words of a modern editor of the dialogue, between "a bad-tempered old 
genius who continually veers between sublime self-assurance and 
startled defensiveness, and his pupil ... a pert, young jackanape 
with an exuberant fancy and a keen sense of absurdity. "3 Although 
Eachard's dialogue, because of its amusingly ironical and witty 
banter, was a considerable advance over the abusiveness of polemical 
1. John Fachard, )r. Fobbs's State of Nature Considered, edited by 
Peter Uro, Fn. 'lish Renrinta Sstries no. 14 (Liverpool, 1958), pp. 27-8. 
It was first published in 1672- Hereinafter to be cited as Eachard. 
2. Dryden, however, maintained that Fachard "has more baffled the 
Philosopher of Malmesbury than those who assaulted him with blunt, 
heavy arguments drawn from orthodox divinity" (i''rLdon II1212). 




lt is clear that uandeville went even further in the 
direction of turn3n- banter to dialectical uses. L&ri! ovj11o'u 
banter in the second part of the Fabia ins in fact,. mor" , ood- 
bu cured than satirical but distinct from Thatteabury'u because of 
its blunt plnln-ape t; in, . 
that 1. raventB S arievillv's bintor from beint; , sorely polemical 
is that, thoucb not quite as brtlli*nt as in ?? eutorition camp, there 
is genuiner d rnmatic repartee between 1? oratio and Cleo-nrnas, 
2 
The 
disquisition on self-love in the third dialogue iii as Cood a section 
as any in which to exarcine hca dra. Matic spart©o Urgas with 
dialectical argu cont. lt ' egiri with the following polite oxcha: ; es 
Vor. Tau havo, without doubt, tbouj; ht on 
this "ubjoct before nor ; would you co=unicato 
to me vo3 of your Cues3es? 
Cleo. With abundance of Plcawura. 
For. 'pouf ll rives Leave, now an4 thong 
when Thin es arg not clear to sae, to jut In s 
Word for Infoztation's Cake. 
CIAO. I desire you would: You will oblige 
zo with it. 000 
3 
P1aib1y beneath the surface of cuch obliging olitonota tbex9 is 
1. ? or a study of how they ahusive polendca of controversial : rove 
eventually gave Wir, durinC the Restoration and after, to urbane 
banter relying more on iron;, r, use }uEh l,? acllonald, "Banter in 
En i loh Controversial Prose After th º icutoration, " says and 
itu6ies bv }'pt: rArs of t: ̂ e r'n, r: 11sh A Urr . cation, 32 
(1946 s 21-39- 
2. Jccorüir * to Dryden's Tss ,v of a ra ltlo Foes,!, "As for cower, 
repartee is one of its chiefcst graces; the g , ro to t p1es3 rs of the ax. ier. co is a chase of grit kept up on both ticks, and swiftly 
sainrged" (rrrLdenn T, 60). The "chsse of wit" is not s "swiftly 
oanagadl" in the second part of the : Nb1e but its slower race is 
certainly more appropriate to Philosophical dialogue, 
3. ? ably fl, 128-9. 
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distinct, if gently subdued, raillery and although Horatio seems to 
be merely asking to be instructed, his rallying way of putting it 
implies that he does not intend to accept all of Cleom©nos' ideas 
without some argument. Thus, despite much exposition of ideas in 
what follows, the tension beneath the surface politeness of Horatio 
and Cleomenes makes for incidental dramatic and psychological interest 
worthy of philosophical dialogue at its best. In addition, it 
dramatically reinforces Cleomenes' explicit statements about the 
insincerity of much polite behaviour. 
According to Kayep the discussion, ao a whole, is a rebuttal of 
Butler's objections to ": andeville's theory that all conduct is 
motivated by self-love, "' Put as simply as possible, Butler's 
objection is that if self-love-motivates all conduct, then no 
distinctions can be made between calculated and imiulnive actions, as 
both are adequately explained in terms of self-love, which is 
demonstrably absurd. usandeville'a answer is to have Cleomenes make 
a distinction between "self-love" and "self-liking. " Cleomenss, 
accordingly, defines "self-liking" as a natural instinct by which 
"every Individual values itself above its real Worth" and "self-love" 
as simply the instinct for self-preservation. 
Z 
He also reinforces 
his definition of "self-liking" by pointing out that it exists even 
in horses, whose "self-liking, " "may be encreas'd ... by additional 
Ornaments, and the Presence of Man, whom he knows, to clean, take 
Care of, and delight in him. "3 Horatio reacts by objecting that 
1. See Kaye's note in Fable III 129-30. 
2. Fable IT, 230- 
3- Fable II, 131. 
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"what you call '"elf-liking; is evidenily Pride" but not before 
implicitly ordoryirg Cleomonoa' obsorvationj by uotin4; lontai e 
to the effect that "if irutea were to paint thr laity, they wculd 
all draw him of their own tecioa. "1 'hus, not only does I*oratio 
reinforce Z loomenos' point about "seif-likings' but, in identifying 
"solf-likinf1" with pride, to even falls into the trap of giving 
Cloonenna an opening by which he can demonstrate pride to be at the 
source of tech human behaviour. There is nothing of the "straw- 
men" in Horatio's linking of "celf likin? r" with pride for, in the 
context of the di ccua: ion on "self-love, " 41oratio is simply displaying 
hia rental alertness. As he preferz to say soraething which might 
actually ur . ar 
ine his own opposition to Cleornenes, and be considered 
intelligent, than to be silent and aeon foolish, tioratio's very 
repartee becccea a dramatic inatanco of what Cloor.: ones rears by "self- 
likinr. " 
In the next uta e of the arCurient, raillery pluya a uic. nificantly 
dru atic ar4 outoncibly dialectical part then Cleozonoe describes 
how "pelf--likine" hs3 fewer ciportunitie8 to aeeert itself anon 
savages bocau:: u of their unending struggle for survival and, Horatio 
retorts that " his is thinking very abstractly indeed. " 
2 This is an 
oblique reminder of an earlier exchan o in which Cleozenes asserted 
that his roaacnin"a Is always mainly eoýiricalt 
cam. ... then Thinge are vors obscure, 
I cometirýea w4ce Use of Conjectures to 
find my r, ay 
1. 'Pqb1A TT, 131. Ka), /O'a note rcints out that U'ontaigns derived bis 
observation fron Xeno; banes and acknowledged it. 
2. ' Fable II p 132. 
1; 0 
Hor. Do you argue, or pretend to prove 
any thing from those Conjectures? 
Cleo. No; I never reason but from the 
plain Cbservations which every body may 
make on Man, the Phaenornena that appear in 
the lesser world. l 
Dialectically, then, Horatio's retort implies that Cleomenes' remarks 
about savages are based on reasoning not sufficiently empirical, but 
only if one fails to take into account Cleomenes' advocacy of limited 
speculation in matters not easily amenable to purely empirical 
observations. 
2 
Probably because he expects Horatio to be well aware 
of this, Cleomenes ignores his objection and the discussion continues 
unabated. Mandeville, in fact, leaves it to the reader to judge 
whether Cleomenes' speculations about savages are solidly based on 
an empirical understanding of human nature, all the more so, as has 
already been noted,. in that his description of savage behaviour and 
motivation is pictorially concrete and in deliberate contrast to 
William Temple's idealized, and therefore far more "conjectural, " 
picture. Horatio's retort, then, is not a real objection but, 
rather, serves the draoatic function of giving Horatio the upper 
hand at raillery. Thus, to the extent that the reader identifies 
with Horatio's anti-Mandevillian stance, he can enjoy his sprightly 
rallying at Cleomenes' expense, all the more so as Cleomenes is always 
arguing against the grain. This strongly suggests that Horatio's 
raillery sometimes acts like a lightning-rod harmlessly deflecting 
the reader's hostility, in order to induce him to seriously consider 
1. Fable II, 128. 
2. As has been seen, it was in the Preatiec of the liypochonciriack 
and HHysterick risea. ses that Mandeville dealt very extensively ý. sZth 
the problems of empirical and hypothetical reasoning. 
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the validity of Clsansnss' $ arAovll. lian arguments, 
At other tiregp Horatio's raillery has t ho function cF' exter2ding 
the ccopo at the dialectic, vhiln also retaining the rhetorical 
illusion of S ilit4r conversation. Thus, when Horatio finally 
acccrt5 Cleo enoa' arguments about the distinction ' olf-lit(C ng" 
nrti "self-love, " be does so in a very grudj it ; winners 
I must own that your aerv3tion3 am 
ntGrtrArin'. 1 rar vary well plctaa'cI 
with your ? Jicccur3e, and I sees an 
r , reeiible Glimwr of : 'robibility that runs 
througyb it; taut you have said nothing that 
cri -e3 up to hilf : "roof on the "Ido o your 
Conjecturo, if it bo seriously conaithn" i. 
l 
This is, indeed, a BupMrbly comlo3cendind°; way or yleldir ° to 
Claomono3' superior r9: sonic which, at the as time, torce3 
Cleogacne3 to extend bis exro3ition of Mardeville's Ideas by applying 
bia "conjsctureri" about "self-liking" an» "soff-love" in animals and 
6av e3 to the more empirically ob3orvable civi1iz d atate of mans 
I told you teX'ore that I would lay no 
3tre3a upon' nor draw tiny Ccnolusior, 3 from 
it; : gut vhateve* Nature's agai n gras in 
bcstaarin, this Self-liking on Creaturea; 
and, whather it has been riven to other 
Arizaa1a beeide curd lvea or not, it is 
certain, that in our a-an Mweeies even 
individual ror on likes himself better 
` 
than he clogs a, other. 
1. Fable IX, 136. 
2. Table 77,137. 
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Although Cleomenea always triumphs aitainat F. oratio, he does no 
only at the expense of closely-reasoned argument defended in every 
detail and in ouch a way as to involve the reader, who is aware of 
the impending defeat but curious about how it will be accomplished. 
Horatio's dialectical function, then, is perilously close to that of 
a "straw-man" -a dancer Mandeville was fully aware ofs 
'hen partial Lien have a mind to demolish 
An Adversary, and triumph over him with 
little Expence, it has long been a 
frequent Practice to attack him with 
Dialogues, in which the Champion, who 
is to lose the Sattel, appears at the 
very beginning of the Engage! nent, to 
be the Victim, that is to be uacrifised, 
and seldom makes a better Figure, than 
Cocks on Shrove-Tuesday, that receive 
Blows, but return none, and are visibly 
set up on purpose to be knock'd down. 
1 
Uandeville sidesteps this perennial problem of philosophical dialogue 
by making ioratio's role dialectically aril dramatically complex; much 
more soy in fact, than the role of the opposing interlocutors in 
minor practitioners of the form previously alluded toi such as 
Eachard, Collier and Stubbes. 
2 
1. Fable III 8. Kaye's edition has this passage completely in 
italics, except for the word "Shrove-Tuesday. " Characteristically, 
Uandeville here employs a felicitously unexpected image culled from 
the pastimes of common people to make a point frequently, but not 
very interestingly, made by other critics of dialogue. 
2. Collier's "A Uoral Essay Upon Pride, " for example, like the second 
part of the Fable, deals with questions of morality and human 
behaviour but, as a philosophical dialogue, and despite a good 
number of witty exchanges, it is not nearly as effective au 
Mandeville's work. This is not so much because Collier's arguments 
are so much more orthodox and predictable, but because the 
relationship between "Philotimus" and "Fhilaletea" is devoid of 
any dramatic complexity or psychological interest. See Jeremy 
Collier, usaye Upon Several Loral Subjects, fifth edition (London, 
1703), PP-1-94- 
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To begin with, Poratio is dialectically woeful in his sustained 
weaving of Cleomones' strands of argument. Sometimes he does so 
by pinpointing just where he dissents from CXeomenes, as when he 
remarks that 
To enter into an Argument, concerning 
the Possibility of What you say, might 
occasion a long Dispute; but the 
Probability, I think, is very clear 
against you, and if there was such a 
Man, it would be auch more credible, 
that he acted from the Excellency of 
his Nature, in which so many Virtues 
and rare Endowments were assenbled, 
than that all his good Qualities sprung 
from vicious 1"otivese1 
Horatio's opposition here to Cleonenes' argument about how social 
virtues spring from pride rather than altruism makes it clear that 
Mandeville is offering to the reader a set of notion3 or "model" of 
human nature radically different from any conventional one, unless 
the reader happens to be a strict Calvinist. 
2 
It seems very likely, 
however, that the tyre of reader Mandeville addressed was an "honnete 
hocja,:, whether deist or Anglican with Latitudinarian tendencies, who 
l. Fable ii, 75- 
2. Although 11andovillo was probably not a Calvinist, there is little 
doubt that his analysis of human nature, though not his famous 
paradox about how private vices can be "dextrously managed" by 
politicians into public benefits, is not incompatible with the 
Calvinistic or Augustinian view of it. For an interesting 
observation on Liandeville's probable familiarity with Calvinism 
in Rolland and Europe, see Barth, 338-9. 
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leaned to a more amiable view of human nature. 
1 At other times, 
Horatio makes incisive remarks which instantly formulate the particular 
point Cloomenea is making. Thus, when Cleomenes expounds at some 
length on manse desire for "uncontroul'd Liberty, " Horatio makes the 
witty rejoinder, based on an ironic reversal of the Golden Rule, that 
"in short, i: an naturally will not do, as he would be done by. "2 
Such a rejoinder not only illuminates the point behind Cleomenes' 
elaborate observations, but also gives Horatio a certain autonomy as 
a good conversationalist not always bent on opposition for its own 
sake, as is generally the case with "straw-men. " 
More strategically, Horatio's raillery often clarifies the general 
direction of Cleomenes' dialectic. This is especially true of a 
reproach like the following from Horatio: "I can't help observing, 
that when human Understanding serves your Purpose to solve any thing, 
it is always ready and full grown; but at other tines, Knowledge and 
Reasoning are the Work of Time, and Wen are not capable of thinking 
justly, 'till after many Generations .0 Iioratio's reproach alerts 
the reader that Mandeville-Cleonienes is employing a very complex 
kind of reasoning which posits an evolutionary view of society and 
man's thinking powers. In the terminölogy of modern sociology, 
Uandeville's dialectic shifts "from purpose to function or from 
function to purpose with considerable effect, and he can shift 
1. For a masterly investigation of the pervasive influence of 
Latitudinarian divines and deists on religious and ethical 
attitudes in the eighteenth century, see R. S. Crane, "Suggestions 
Toward a Genealo of the '1: an of Feelings, 4l' 1? npliah Literary 
listo q1 (1934 205-30. 
2. Fable_ II V 271. 
-3- 
Fable 71 9 236. 
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adroitly from one purpose to another. "1 It is very likely, then, 
that the average reader of 2andeville'a time, even if highly 
cultivated, would have found much of i! andeville's reasoning in the 
second part of the Fable difficult to follow. Thus, Horatio's 
reproach not only m. es it plain that Cleomenes is reasoning about 
the origin and development of certain social and human phenomena, as 
well as these same phenomena in their present state, but also makes 
it possible for the reader to grasp and consider Mandeville's novel 
mode of reasoning, even if only to see whether Zloratio's reproach is 
justified. Horatio's rallying reproach, in short, serves the 
dialectical function of clarifying the strategic direction of 
Cleomenea' arguments and the engagingly self-effacing rhetorical one 
of obscuring the genuine brilliance of this mode of thinking and 
thereby, as has already been mentioned in another context, blunting 
any hostile envy on the reader's part. 
One last important aspect to examine in greater detail about 
Lanieville's skilful blending of dialectical and dramatic require.:. eents 
is that Horatio's dialectical contributions consistently sustain the 
rhetorical illusion of dramatic conversation. For that reason, 
lloratio often finds himself usefully summarizing the conclusions 
Cleomenes intends him to reach, as in the following passages 
If I have not misunderstood you, you would 
insinuate two 'hingst First, that the Fitness 
of Man for Society, beyond other Animals, to 
something real; but that it is hardly 
1. Louie Schneider, "lZandevvlle as Forerunner of Modern : sociology, " 
you of the Tßistory of Behavioral Science, 6 (1970), 227. 
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r tceptible in Individuals, before graut 
Numbers of them are joyn'd together, and 
artfully ruanag'd. Secondly, that this real 
Something, this Sociableness, is a 
Compound, that consists in a 
Concurrence of several Things, and 
not in any one palpable Quality, that 
Man is endued with, and Brutes are 
destitute of. 
1 
Here, Horatio's weaving of Cleomenes' strands of argument, instead of 
leaving it to Cleomenes to do so, makes little difference in terms of 
philosophical argument but rhetorically and dramatically it is very 
effective. This is because it makes Horatio an active contributor 
to the discussion, even in its more expository aspects, and makes 
Cleomenes' conclusions, as reached by Horatio, seem irresistible, as 
if they were derived from a minimum of reasoning and a maximum of 
empirical observation. 
Another dialectical device, activated by Horatio, which sustains 
the rhetorical illusion of conversation is Mardeville's pride-ran*ing 
use of digression. 
2 An exchange like the following, for example, 
leads the discussion from a digression back to the main strand of 
arguments 
1. Fable II9 188. 
2. Sometimes, however, it is Cleomenes who is responsible for 
digressions, and this is mainly due to his enthusiasm for 
detecting the hypocrisies of human behaviour at the expense Of 
furthering the argument. As Horatio puts its "I don't know any 
fan more expert in tracing human Pride, or more severe in 
humbling its than yourself; but when the subject comes in your 
Way, you don't know how to leave it" (Fable III 230)" This 
suggests that Mandeville was acutely aware that his penchant for 
satire could obscure and obstruct his philosophical analysis. 
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Her. ... I long to hear the Origin of 
Society, and I continually retard your 
Account of it arself, with new Questions. 
Ciro. Do you remember where we left off? 
Icr. I donut think we have made any 
Progress yet; for we have nothing towards 
it but a wild : fan, and a wild 1osan; with 
some children and grandchildren: which 
they are not able either to teach or to 
1 
govern. 
Cleomenea' absent-mindedness tu dramatically apt in that it captures 
the flavour of a conversation that leisurely veers off the main point 
but, in terns of dialectical exposition, poratio's raillery makes 
the whole exchange an adroit transition from one part of the argument 
to another. To sum ups beneath the surface of conversational 
polish, Cleomenes relentlessly observes and Horatio reluctantly 
concludes. 
As far as the dramatic relationship between Horatio and Cleomenes 
is concerned, all that remains to be noted is that after auch 
protracted argument, the nerves of the two protagonists begin to fray 
in the final dialogue. This emerges when Horatio exclaims peevishly, 
"Why don't you speak more openly, and say that there is no Virtue 
or Probity in the World? for all that the Drift of your Discourse is 
tending to prove that. "2 It must be assumed that this is an 
outburst of strained nerves, and a comic one at that, because in all 
of the previous dialogues Horatio, despite his occasional nisgivings, 
puts enough trust in Cleomenes to stay and listen to what he has to 
1. Fable II1 221. 
2. Fable 11,336. 
198 
say. Cleomenes protests his innocence and points out that he had 
already defended himself on this point and twists the knife deeper, 
as it were, by adding " ... and I am persuaded that you your self, 
in reality, don't believe that there are so many virtuous Men as you 
imagine you do. "1 Horatio's reaction is a sarcastic and abusing 
ones "flow come you to know my Thoughts better than I do myself? " 
Horatio's outburst temporarily puts his friendship back to the 
strained basis it had at the beginning of the first dialogue, as 
characterized in the following exchange: 
Cleo. ... There is no Man in the World 
whose Friendship I value more than I do 
yours, or whose Company I like better, 
yet I can never have it. I profess I 
have thought sometimes, that you have 
avoided me on purpose. 
nor. I am sorry, Cleomenes, I should 
be wanting in Civility to you. I come 
every Week constantly to pay my Respects 
to you, and if ever I fail, I always 
send to enquire after your Health. 
2 
There is a difference, however, and it lies in the fact that Horatio's 
temperamental outburst is a truer reflection of his friendly regard 
for Cleomenes than his previous rather calculating civility. Every- 
thing that develops after that first encounter, in fact, overwhelm- 
ingly suggests that Horatio is interested, even fascinated, by what 
Cleomenes has to say, despite its being against all his most 
cherished beliefs. This is, dramatically and psychologically speaking, 
1. Fable I?, 336. 
2. Fable 111 29. 
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mainly because, on the whole, Cleomenes allows Horatio to be witty 
at his own expense and, indeed, practises what he preaches about how 
friendship naeds to be carefully nurtured: "Affection never remain'd 
long uninterrupted between two Persona, without Art; and the beat 
Friends, it they are always together, will fall out, unless great 
Discretion be used on both Sides. "1 Because Horatio is no doubt 
aware of these efforts made by his friend, Cleonenes can afford to be 
somewhat brusque in their final conversation and it is not surprising 
that it ends on a note of full reconciliation: 
liar. Here's the Castle before un. 
Ciso. thioh I suppose you are not Corry 
tor. 
for. Indeed I amp and would have been 
glad to have heard you speak of Kings and 
other Sovereigns# with the same Candor 
as well as Freedom, with which you have 
treated Prime Ministers and their envious 
Adversaries. When I see a lean entirely 
impartial, I shall always do him that 
Justice, as to think that, if he is not 
in the right in what he says, at least he 
aims at Truth. 
2 
1. Fable II, 306- 
2* Fable lit 355. By this time Cleomenes had applied his anslysis of 
human nature, including adroit application of it to the case of 
Robert Walpole as Prime D: inister and dispenser of patronage. The 
following exchange is ty; 4cal in its acuteness and lively cynicism, 
not to mention the "Candor as well as freedom" alluded to by Horatio: 
Ror. You say nothing of his Virtue nor his 
Honesty; there is a vast Trust put in a prime 
Ministers If he should be covetous and have 
no Probity, nor Love for his Country, he might 
make strange Havock with the Publick Treasure. 
Cleo. There is no ran that has any Pride, 
but he has some Value for his Reputation; and 
common Prudence is sufficient to hinder a Man 
of very indifferent Principles from stealing, 
where be would be in great Danger of being 
detected, and has no manner of Security that be 
shall not be punish'd for it. Fable II, 333) 
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)tandeville, in short, exploits all the resources of dramatic repartee 
to convey the central dramatic situation of two frier u defending 
their own points of view with all the candour and good-humour they 
can muster, so that their relationship, even when at its most earnest, 
is in the realm of the conic rather than the satiric. 
By now it should be evident that in its technique of philosophical 
dialogue and condo characterization, the second part of the Fab1A is 
a very different literary product from the first part. This is 
something, however, not often considered by modern students of 
Uandeville. Cne of the cost perceptive, Thomas ß. P', dvarde Jr. t in 
fact, describes the second part of the ? able, as consisting "of six 
Dialogues which, in their relative dullness, suggest that V'ancieville's7 
inner dialectic of feeling lost its force when translated into open 
ideational debate. "1 This is true enough if all one looks for in 
the second part is satiric vigour, aril the manipulation of personae, 
but the lack of satirical edge is more than compensated for by virtues 
more appropriate to the philosophical dialogue; such as subtlety of 
repartee and involvement in philosophical questions universal enough 
to be still relevant today* There is, as well, certainly no lack of 
pleasing irony in Cleomenee' pictorial descriptions. 
A rather problematic desire to seek artistic unity in the two 
parts of the Fable ha3 led another critic to find both parts of it 
equally satiric and equally Lucianic, the whole forming the protean 
1. Thomas R. Edwards Jr., "P andeville's Loral Prop©, " Eng 
Literary History, 31 (1964), 196 n. 2. 
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genre of "menippean satire. "1 This ignores the fact, however, that 
satire and irony are almost all-pervasive in Lucian's dialogues. 
Neither Lucian nor Fontenelle, possibly his greatest imitator, and 
if we take only the Dialogues des V"orts into account, had any 
detailed philosophical system, as such, to propound. Although it is 
true, as Hind points out, that "Philosophy is fundamentally dialectic, 
and while the Venippean genre frequently puts forth philosophies of 
its own (usually cynic or skeptic), it does so by attacking others"2 
and also true that Mandeville defends his philosophy by attacking 
Shaftesbury's, Mandeville's dialectic, nevertheless, differs from the 
Lucianic in that it includes a large element of philosophical 
exposition in the tradition of Platonic and Ciceronian dialogue. 
Keeping in mind the Platonic Socrates, such exposition is not 
incompatible with comic and ironic touches, but it is incompatible 
with the fier6or Iucianio irony and its satirical edge, hence Hurdts 
attack on Lucian's method of philosophical dialogue alluded to in 
the first chapter of this thesis. Apart from what he had already 
declared in the preface, Mandeville's intention to include a 
considerable amount of philosophical exposition3 can be discerned in 
1. George Hind, "Mandeville's Fable of the Bees as llenippean Satire, " 
Genre, 1 (1968), 307-15. Find traces some of the characteristics 
of "menippean satire" as being "its occasional mingling of verse 
with prose" (p. 309), "extensive use of dialogue" (p. 310), "use of 
parable" (p. 312) and "use of comic dramatic scenes" (p. 313). 
From here on to be cited as Hind. 
2. Hind, 310-11- 
3- Hind points out that "The tendency of the dialogues to shade off 
into more purely moral questions iv no doubt partly responsible 
for the failure to see the satiric structure which underlies the 
FABLE as a whole" and that "Lienippean satire is not incompatible 
with serious thought" (Hind, 310) but that does not explain why 
the first part is so much more satirical, nor does it really 
illuminate the salient features of '; andeville's technique of 
dialogue. That the first part of the Fable is evidently far more 
"menippean, " even Hind seems to acknowledge in that at least two- 
thirds of his direct ' from the Fable are from the first part. 
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Horatio's very first co ent in Uandeville's last publication in 
dialogue form, Anr'nauiry Into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness 
of Christianity in Wart "I wonder you never attempted to guess at the 
Origin of Honour, as you have done at that of Politenesa, and your 
Friend in his Fable of the Bees has done at the Origin of Virtua. "1 
Horatio's remark makes even the first part of the Fable eeen mainly 
expooitory and, in fact, some of it is, such as the essay, "A Search 
into the Mature of Society. " The second part of the Fable, then, is 
not quite as amenable to critical evaluation in terns of the genre 
of "menippesn satire" as that of philosophical dialogue and, as such, 
is largely independent of the first part. 
1andevillo's emphasis on the comic and its attendant good- 
humoured repartee, in any case, was probably more pleasing to larger 
numbers of readers than the satire of the first part. The general 
terxiency by this time was certainly away from satire and towards the 
eg ntle humour of sentimental comedy and the sentimental novel, not to 
mention the good-humoured essay. As Th0m33 Lockwood puts it, "The 
movement away fron satire ... 
Zt-o co©edy7 ... appoars as a gradual 
change from the moral definition of the author-zudience relationship 
to a social one; the writer coces increasingly to identify with the 
audience on tho basic of social likeness of class ambitions and 
1. Bernard t5andeville, 
second edition (London, 19 
the fir3t edition of 1732. 
s is basically a reprint of 
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I 
manners rather than moral principles. "1 Mandeville, however, seems 
to have been a transitional figure in this respect; sometimes 
satirical and uncompromising, as in the first part of the Fable, and 
sometimes good-humoured and conciliatory, as in the second. He 
shares with the satirists the unsentimental sharpness of their humour 
and their pessimism about human nature, 
2 
but there is also a'comic 
detachment in many of his works which is reminiscent of the somewhat 
more tolerant attitudes towards human nature of an Addison or a 
Fielding. 
Certainly Cleomenes' relationship with Horatio is comic in the 
anti-satiric Addisonian sense, 
3 
for there is genuine friendship k 
. between the two. Cleomenea' task is not to humiliate Horatio for 
argr waywardness, as in a Jonsonian "comedy of humours" or in Eaohard's 
dialogue on Hobbes, but to expand his somewhat limited intellectual 
horizons. 
4 
The relationship, in fact, is very similar to that 
1. Thomas Lockwood, "The Augustan Author-Audience Relationship: 
Satiric Vs. Comic Forms, " English Literary History, 36 (1969), 
649. The change in audience and writers from a. preference for 
satire to one for comedy can also be discerned in the change of 
attitude towards "humourous" characters. As E. N. Hooker puts it, 
"To say that humour was being wrenched loose from satire is'another 
way of saying that at least certain varieties of actions character- 
ized by whim, Qccentricity, or individual willfulness had come 
to be regarded as amusing but harmless, as provocative of mirth 
but not scorn. " See Edward N. Hooker, "Humour in the Age of Pope, " 
Huntington Library Quarterly, 11 (1948), 366-7. 
2. On the pessimism about human nature displayed by Augustan satirists, 
see Louis I. Bredvold, "The Gloom of the Tory Satirists" "in" 
Ei hteenth Centu English Literature, ed. by James L. Clifford 
Oxford, 1971 v PP. 3-20. ' This is a. reprint of the first edition of 
1959" 
3, See Addison's Spectator papers on "humour, ", which are collected in 
Critical Ess s from the Spectator, ed. by Donald F. Bond (Oxford, 
T970), pp. 2 -35" Addison complains about satiric ridicule in 
Spectator no. 249 that if it "were employed to, laugh men out of vice 
and folly, it might be, of some use to the world; but instead of 
this, we find that it is generally made use of to laugh men out of 
virtue and good sense, by attacking everything that is solemn and 
serious decent and. praiseworthy in human life" (p"33 of Bond's 
edition). 
4This is true in a more obvious way in the relationship portrayed in 
The Virgin Unmask'd. 
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between Philopirio and Lisomedon in A Treaties of the Hypochorxlriack 
and Rynterick Dioeaaes, except that Cleomenes' "disease" is a more 
purely intellectual one. Interestingly enough, both Horatio and 
Uieomedon display symptom3 of intellectual laziness; in '4isoWodon's 
case, also physical. Landevills, in short, seems to have desired 
not so much a moral change in the "honnete ho=e" as a greater degree 
of self-knowledge within him. 
It may voll be concluded that largely because of the fruitful 
tension between his satirical analysis of human nature, as vividly- 
conveyed in a pictorial style, and his good-natured tolerance of it, 
as reflected in the dramatic repartee between Horatio and Cleomenes, 
Mandeville reached the peak of his powers of dialogue writing in the 
second part of the Fable. His Origin or Honour is not quite as 
accomplished, but the very austerity of its dramatic devices links 
it with Eerkeley's Three Dialot-ues Between Fylas and Philonous. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, a comparison of both usefully 
illustrates how "tandeville and lerkeley, though worlds apart 
philosophically, employed very similar dialectical devices derived 
from Augustan literary styles. 
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CHAPTN VI. PARADOX AS DIALECTICAL DEVICE AND RHETORICAL ILLUSION 
IN 1EML ; Y' S THR'n ; DI ALOWES AID MANDEVI LL!: ' S 
ORIGIN OP HONOUR 
"Sometimes the Ardour of Conversation, and 
Contention of Spirits runs high among us; 
but our mutual Friendship and Esteem 
preserves a perfect Equality, so that none 
offers to dictate to the rest. Such is 
the free Turn of our Society, that any one 
may propose what Paradox he pleases provided 
he do it with Decency, and defend it with 
Coolness and Modesty. And any one may 
contradict the clearest Maxim, provided he 
neither nske personal Attacks, nor pretend 
to take too much upon him. " 
"Sophronius" in Dialogue III of 




1. David Fordyce, 1`ialo ues Concerning F. ducation, vol. I (London, 
1745), p. 65. 
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Perhaps one of the most ironic characteristics of eighteenth- 
century philosophical dialogue at Ito beet is that, de3pito its 
emr, hasis on a "plain, easy and familiar" style of gxpositiont it 
tended to preserve an older tradition of literary paradox derived 
from Renaia8ance writers and rather inimical to the "plain style" 
advocated by the loyal Society. This is especially true in those 
dinloCuos where, unlike in the c9so of the FRbin of the l3ees, Parte o, 
dra iatic technique dons not play an important role in reinforcing 
dialectical argument. Taialoguea like the "sequel" to tho second part 
of tho Fable$ An 'ngsiry into tha Origin of ronour ntm 
Reason -tbl neu3 of Christianity in War,, ar I Berkeley's fa aus Three 
Dinlo zns Bejtwaen ! ylnn and Fhilonoui, for example, derive auch of 
their effect from their brilliant use of paradox both for rhetorical 
embellishment and as a dialectical device. That this is noticeable 
in the Origin of Honour mainly because it is dramatically crude compared 
to the second part of the Pablo and noticeable in Berkeley for the 
almost opposite reason that the arru; ^nt botween Hy1as and e hilonous 
is as te4, ersarentally civilizedI that one's attention is almo3t 
imtediately drawn to the paradoxical ideas discussed, does not 
vitiate the interesting fact that, despite their great differences in 
literary style and philosophical attitude al both L! antavillo a4 
Berkeley made extensive use of paradox in these two very different 
dialogues. 
1. Sao Donald Favio, "Berkeley an-4 the Z3tyle of Dialoi: ue" In The 
F'nclish k! a. nd: Studies in the iný-lish Moralists $res ntod to Basil 
V i1la , od. by l: ugh Sykes Davies aid George i±atson (Cambridge, 
196439 pp. 90-106. Mr. Davie convincingly argues that a unique 
combination of perfect n3nner3 and, what seems to be incompatible 
with its dialectical candour between the two interlocutors (not 
of the abrasive Landevillian kind) is what constitutes the dramatic 
technique of the `i'hre Dialogues and its considerable literary merit. 
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Before investigating further into Mandeville's and Berkeley's 
use of paradox, however, it should be noted that just as I. andeville's 
second part of the Fable and Origin of Honour are a defense of and 
elaboration on the philosophical content of the Fable of the Bees, 
so is Berkeley's Three Dialo? ues a defense of and elaboration on his 
Principles of Human Knowledge. Even allowing for the fact that the 
first part of the Fable is just as much satirical as philosophical 
does not invalidate the similarity of relationship between the Origin 
of Honour and the Fable of the Bees on the one hand, and that of the 
Three Dialogues and the Principles of Yuman Knowledge on the other. 
The Orin of Honour, in fact, even goes so far as to use the same 
interlocutors as the second part of the Fable and, moreover, they 
often refer to their previous "conversations" in the second part of 
the Fable. 
1 
The relationship between the Three Dialorues and the Principles, 
however, is not the same in every respect as that between Mandeville's 
two works. Berkeley, in fact, treats the Three Pialo. ues as a 
different way of expressing the same ideas he dealt with in the 
Principles rather than, as in the case of Mandeville's treatment of 
ideas derived from the first part of the Fable, an extension of them. 
Furthermore, where Mandeville often makes Cleomenes refer to the 
Fable of the Bees as an indispensable primary text to consult, 
1. That Mandeville was becoming careless about dramatic verisimilitude 
in his last work, the Origin of Honour, is borne out by the fact 
that one's sense of spontaneous conversation is con$idorably 
jarred when Cleom nes can say "I have told you already, in our 
Fifth Conversation, ... " See Bernard Mandeville? An T. nauirv into 
the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in dar, 
second edition, ed. by M. Y. Goldsmith London, 1971)p p"21. This 
is a facsimile reproduction of the first edition of 1732. There 
were no others subsequently. Hereinafter to be cited as Origin, 
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Berkeley almost iraylie3 that the reader need not read the Principles 
to learn more about the ideas discussed by the two interlocutors, 
fly1ns and I'hilonous. As Berkeley puts it, 
In this treatise, which does not presuppose 
in the reader, any knowle4fe of what was 
contained in the loser, f . Q. ý'he Principlns 
of Human Ynowloa? r*] it has been my aim to 
introduce the notions I advance, into the 
rind, in . 
the most easy and familiar manner; 
especially, because they carry with them a 
great opposition to the prejudices of 
philosophers, which have so far prevailed 
against the common sense and natural notions 
of mankind. 
I 
The "Prejudices of philosophers" Berkeley refers to are the ideas and 
implicItions of Fhiloso; blc, 'i1 "materialism" as aivocatod by, Paz ong 
others, Descartes and Locket but, from the literary and rhetorical 
point-of-view, ghat is in; ortant about Berkeley's declaration in 
savour of the "common sense and natural notions of mankind" is that 
he defends what he considers to be "common sense" in terms of a 
dialectical clash of ideas whereby one side attempts to demonstrate 
that the philosophical materialism of the other is untenably 
paradoxical. 
I* George Berkeley, Three ria1crues Petwee in 
uca 
and +.: Jeasep, vol. 11 Londons 1949 , pol 6F. The Three 
niglou es was first published in 1713. Although this text is 
based mainly on the expanded third edition of 1734, it includes 
the Preface which ap; oared only in the editions of 1713 and 1725" 
The quote from the Preface is entirely in italics in Jessep'e 
text. tereinafter this definitive edition of Berkeley's dialogue 
will be cited as _erkalov 
II. 
2. On this joint aee the charter on "lerkeley and Co=on SenDo" in 
I. C. Tipton, Porkeleys T. -. o Philosophy of Immaterialism (London, 
1974), Fp. 15-5` 6. 
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More specifically, what generates dialectic in the Three 
Dialogues is one basic paradoxical proposition, namely that matter 
does not exist. According to Berkeley, however, the proposition is 
not actually paradoxical but only appears to be so because it seems 
to contravene common sense. Thus, his dialectical strategy is to 
demonstrate that, on the contrary, it is the philosophical notion of 
matter which is actually contrary to common sense and therefore 
paradoxical. This dialectical strategy is declared very early on, 
in the following exchange between Eerkeley's spokesman, Philonous 
("Lover of Mind") and his friend, fylass 
HYLAS. You were represented in last night'a 
conversation, as one who maintained the 
most extravagant opinion that ever entered 
into the mind of man, to wit, that there is 
no such thing as material substance in the 
world. 
PHI LONOU$. That there is no such thing as 
what philosophers call material substance, 
I am seriously persuaded: but if I were 
made to see any thing absurd or sceptical 
In this, I should then have the same 
reason to renounce this, that I imagine I 
have now to reject the contrary opinion. 
i 
In this same exchange it soon becomes clear that Berkeley's use 
of paradox, itself, is strategic and not merely a tactical aspect of 
a broader dialectical strategy. Thus, when Hylas expresses his 
disbelief in the logical coherence of itamaterialisrn, and in a manner 
reflecting many a reader's hostility to such a belief, Philonous's 
answer is a tentative suggestion that there are more untenable 
1. Berkele III 172. 
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paradoxes In philosopbioal materialises 
EMUS, What! can any thin; be more fantastical, 
more repugnant to common sense, or a more 
manifest piece of scepticism, than to believe 
there is no such thing as latter? 
Pf IA , 'C}tlä. Softly, good }fylas. "`hat if it 
should prove, that you, who hold there is, 
are by virtue of that opinion a greater 
sceeptic, and maintain more paradoxes and 
repuCnancies to co=on sense, than I who 
believe no ouch thing? 
I 
ITylaa, however, is firmly convinced that ir. ateri. alicn cannot but be 
a paradoxical notion and reinforces his point with a logical paradox: 
"You may as soon perjuade no, the part is greater than the whole, as 
that, in order to avoid abourdity ani scepticism, I should ever be 
obliged to give up my opinion on this point. "2 Philonous's reaction 
is to shift his ground oliGhtly and, instead of claahin¢' head-on with 
}ylas, agrees to confine hi elf to "co -ion-sense" notions: "Well 
then, are you content to alait that opinion for true, which upon 
examination shall appear host agreeable to comuon sense and roxote 
from acepticicL2? "3 This seAns like a concession on the part of 
Philonoun but, in factq it gives him an opportunity to yut riylas 
through a rigorous inquisiticn by asking him to define the term 
"sceptic. " Philosophically speaking, £orkeley'e aim here is to show 
that Philonous's itr aterialiuu2 is not a "sceptical" notion und this 
1. Bei y II, 172. Scepticism, ituelf, 3arkeloy considered to 
lend to harmful self-doubt and destructive paradoxes, hence 
1'hilonou: z'e association of "absurd" with "sceptical. " or a 
concise account of Berkeley's attitude to philosophical : scepticism, 
see Richard ]i H. Popkin, "; er' e1ey and Pyrrbonisca, " Tho Pavieyt of 
tet9phyaic3,18 (1951), 223-46. Also see Eerkeley'a #'reface to 
the Thre, D1 1o. ýuos. 
2. Lerko1rv II, 172. 
3, B^Tirn Il s 172. 
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is why a clear definition of "sceptic" is necessary but, in order to 
accomplish such a purely philosophical aim, he employs a dialectical 
strategy designed to expose Hylas's "materialism" as an untenable 
paradox, rhetorically as well as logically. This is so because for 
Berkeley paradox is not merely the result of faulty logic but of 
atheistic frivolity as well. Thus, when the reader is forced to 
choose, as he is throughout the work, between Hylas's "materialism" 
and Philonous's "immaterialism, " his choice is based not only on 
diciding which set of notions is more logical but also on which set 
of notions is less likely to lead to atheism and "irreligion. " 
Rhetorical persuasion is inseparable from Berkeley's dialectical 
strategy in that he makes the debate between Hylas and Philonous an 
urgent one and it is fylas who puts it at this level from the very 
beginnings1 
I Was considering the odd fate of those 
men Who have in all ages, through an affectation 
of being distinýýuished from the vulgar, or 
some unaccountable turn of thou&ht, pretended 
either to believe nothing at all, or to 
believe the most extravagant things in the 
world. This however might be borne, if their 
paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after 
them soma consequences of general disadvantage 
to man': cind. ... 
2 
In short, to show one set of notions to be "paradoxical" is not 
merely to find them logically inadequate but also morally pernicious, 
1. In ter--s of dramatic situation this is a very adroit move on 
Berkeley's part because the sense of urgency really belongs to 
his spokesmen, Philonous, but by making it originate with Hylas 
instead he pays the reader the compliment of assuming that the 
reader, in identifying with Hylas, is fully aware of how morally 
pernicious erroneous philosophical ideas not directly connected 
with ethics can be. Berkeley, in fact, is almost humbling himself 
in implying that his own philosophical notions may have dangerous 
consequences and that it is up to him to prove otherwise. 
2. Berkele Ili 171. 
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an4 it is this which accounts for the rh®tcric of urgency behind 
Berkeley's dialectical strategy. Even the way Philonou3 eo3ettMe3 
phrases his questions is rhetorically loaded and leplios the 
Fsrad. cxica1 nature of Eylas's materialist notions. Tus, when 
Philonous asks "Can any doctrine be true that naceßaarily leads a 
an into an absurdity, " 
1 
the rhetorical nature of the question is 
plain in every sense of the term in that the quQation needs hardly to 
be asked, as the answer is ab is axiom cf logic. 
As for the role of paradox in Landeville's Ori -in of ITonour, its 
very title, in its full version, contains the rather provocative 
paradox of "the usefulness of Christi*nity in War. " This is similar 
to «: andeville's frnous paradox in the first part of the Fahl, where 
"private vices" are implicitly equated with "public benefits. " This 
paradox, however, is only a rhetorical device by which Vsndeville 
attracts the reader's attention in order to demonstrate how, by 
"dextrous manage-. ent, " politicians make use of anti tolerate private 
vices for the benefit of the public tood. 
2 
L? andeville's sustained 
aralysio of all that is implied by his paradox, in fact, transforms 
it into a rhetorical illusion rather than a true paradox as such. 
In tho case of the Origin of Honour, however, Iaradox becomes 
not only a rhetcricel illusion but a dialectical device a3 well and 
a subtle, side-rangjir one at that. It to lntereati n, - to note, in 
1. iorko1Ay 7T, 178. 
2. Thi: i hui been observed by rainy writers on ' andavillo but perhaps 
most succinctly by Franz From in his article on ":. andeville's 
Paradox" for h9ori as A wAi t sh Journal of : hi lo3ochq ani 
Psyý, 170 1944), 197-215. 
f 
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this connection, that in his anonymous political pamphlet in dialogue 
fort, The Visc hiefo that oui-ht Ju3tly to be Apprehended from Pi Whig- 
1 
Covornrcant, Vandiovillo a1reniy sows him3olf to be adopt at the use 
of paradox for dialectical Furrows. Fror, a polemical point-of- 
view, the dialogue very efficiently expoce3 the contradictions of the 
political principles espoused by the TO'J party. As Loveright the 
Thig euT. 3 up after much debate with Tantivy the Tory: 
rihat inconsistent Creatures these Tories aral 
At one time they complain that the Prerogative 
has been too rauch clipt and curtai]'d by the 
Whigs, at another they find fault with the 
King's Praceodin ; us If the Fine employs his 
Royal Authority against the Church, ought you 
not to thank Cod and the 'Whigs his Power is 
not greater? ... 
` 
These contradictions become a full-fledged paradox by the enr. I of the 
dia1ojuot 
Tnnt. Now I have I tyou in your 1en;? th 
without cantmMotinf? you, do you th vine 
you have any wa, yn convine'd mg 
Love. Noy I am rerswaded Tories are not 
to be convinc'd, or also the bare 
reflection on their Actian3 would be 
sufficient to chew them their rally; for 
how can a : tan more e, re iously contradict 
hiss principlos than by openly showing 
himself a 21alecontent at the sie time he 
defends the Doctrine of Passive Tbedisnce. 
3 
1. This pamphlet was firnt jublisheci anonymou. 31y in 1714 but for 
strong evidence in favour of i'andeville's authorship ooo ! I. P. 
Dickinson's introduction to it in Barnard -andeville, "Tho 
Mischiefs that ought Justly to be Apprehended fror a Whig- 
Governxant, " Aurustan Reprint äociaty, no-174 (Los Angeleau 1975), 
i-xii. t? erainarter to be cited as Mischiefs. 
2. Yia chiefs, 33- 
3- Uieý0chiefs, 40. 
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Thus far, and on the level of clasbirl political principles, the 
paradox Is very damaging to Tory principles but the paradox also 
becomes an adroit dramatic device in that the Tory potential for 
treason is implied in the verf last exchange that : ollowss 
Tant. You are an lr. corri;., -Ible Whig, and so 
fnre ouwall. (sic) 
Love. Remember ? asnive Obedience, and then 
fare you well iikewioe. 
l 
There is no t', irect threat or accusation against Tantivy from Loveright 
but the immediately preceding rhetorical, perhaps even oophistical, 
paradox of Tories being at the same tire "malcontents" and believers 
in passive obedience gives a cutting-edge to Loveright's parting 
words. Similarly, but in far greater detail and dialectical 
subtlety, paradox is a highly efficient rhetcrical instrumant in 
I andovillo's last work, the Orlizin of Fon our. 
-, he key to : andoville'u uco of paradox as dialectical device 
and rhetorical illusion lioa in him notion or reason as a faculty 
which, far from being independent, is subject to the paattinn3. As 
C1eomenoo tells Horatio, 
All Human Creatures are swr yr'd and wholly 
govern'd by their Passional whatever fine 
Notiory we may flatter our Celvea withi even 
those who act suitably to their Knowledge, 
and strictly follow the Dictates of their 
Reason, are no less compell'd so to do by 
some Passion or other, that sots then to 
V, ork, than otheri, who bid tofianco and act 
contrary to Both, and whoa we call Slaves 
to their Fa: oion3. ... 
2 
1. iris P3f 40" 
2, onE. In, 31. 
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Because of the dominance of the passions, then, reason tends to be 
corrupted and become what we would now call "rationalization" in 
the pejorative sense. 
In Mandevillian term, the process of "rationalization" may be 
described as a t4ndency to confuse ideals dictated by reason with 
realities imposed by the passions. Mandeville dramatically 
illustrates such a tendency by making use of paradoxes which one 
cannot easily "rationalize" away without becoming aware that the ideal 
and the real are always in conflict, yet intimately related. Such 
paradoxes are rhetorical in the sense that the reader is taken by 
surprise' and dialectical in that they occasion argument which 
eventually exposes them as rhetorical illusions. Logically, however, 
they are not, strictly speaking, paradoxes at all but statements 
which seem so because the uninitiated reader, as well as the opposing 
interlocutor, is deceived into considering them in tern. 3 of ideals 
instead of realities. 
The process is basically one in which the discussion leads to 
the impasse of paradox and the paradox, in turn, leads to more 
discussion. Thus, after a detailed discussion of the genesis of the 
principle of honour and its social function throughout most of the 
first dialogue, an impasse is reached when Cleomenes concludes with 
the ambiguous statement that "there are Allurements in the Principle 
1. Traditionally, the function of paradox as a rhetorical device 
was to elicit surprise and admiration. As Rosalie L. Colie puts 
it, "The rhetorical paradox was an ancient form designed as 
epic d ei is, to show off the skill of an orator ani to arouse the 
admiration of an audience, both at the outlandishness of the 
subject and the technical brilliance of the rhetorician. " See 
E. L. Colic, Paradoxie Ppidemica (Princeton, 1966)ß p. 4. Hereinafter 
to be cited as Colie. 
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of Ilonour, to draw in Men of the lowest Capacity, and. even the 
vicious, which Virtue has not. "2 Mecause he sees no conflict 
between the ideals of honour and those of Christian virtue, Horatio 
treats Gleom@ne ' statement as a paradox: º'I can't see, how aI : an 
can be really virtuous, who is not likewise a 'an of F? onour. ... "ý 
Clooiienes' answer only reinforces the paradox: 
... What I would domonstrato, is, that there 
are many A11owance3, gross Indulrcnces to 
Human Nature in tho Principle of 1 oncur, 
especially of modern Honour, that are arrays 
exxclain'd against by the Voice of Virtue, 
and diametrically opposite the Doctrine of 
Christ*3 
The impasse is complete when Eoratio counters by insistin; on the 
close inter-rolation3hip between Christianity and the principle of 
honour: "Tot the further we look back for these Seven or Eight 
Hundred Tears, the more we shall find Honour and 'Religion blended 
together. "A Thua far, either Cleomenes or }ioratio is guilty of 
holding an untenable paradox and, purely on the level of ideals, the 
argument can go no further. The reader may side with Horatio and 
hold that honour and Christianity are eminently compatible or side 
with Cleomenes and maintain th: 4t Christianity and honour are 
virtually incompatible. In both ce. sos it is a decision about Ideals 
but Uandeville'o strategy is to exxine the realities behiml ouch 
ideals. Because of such a surrte r, the first dialogue ends not 
with an impasse but a con3iderab1o extonaion of the ar, -um nt and, 
1. Oridno 44- 
2o Ori in, 45- 
3. origins 45- 
4- CrIpin , 45- 
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indeed, a trap for Horatio. 
The extension of the argument, in facts introduces what 
tandeville considered to be realities, such as the exploitation of 
honour by the "Church of Rome" for its own secular ends. The 
argument is highly involved but it is enough to note that Cleomenes 
frequently generates paradoxesp, as in the following observation: 
... for by this 'leans 
j. o. by systematic 
flattery and pandering to the sense of 
honour by means of hierarchical religious 
orders and elaborate coromonies7 the 
boldest and even the most wicked became 
Bigots. The less Religion they had, the 
more they stood in Need of the Church; 
and the farther they went from Cod, the 
more closely they stuck to their Priests, 
whose Power over the Laity was then the 
moist, 2absdlut. a ; *na uncontroul'd when the 
Crimes of These were most flagrant and 
1 
enormous. 
,: hat makes this observation disturbing and. Paradoxical to : Horatio 
is not what it assumes about the motives of the Roman Catholic 
Church but the way it implies that Bigotry can spring out of a sense 
of honour. After much ardent, in which the ideals of Christianity 
are contrasted to realities inimical to its spirit but not to the 
sense of honour, Horatio is finally forced to admit that there is 
nothing in common between taue Christianity, which is a set of 
spiritual ideals, and the principle of honour, which is a set of 
worldly ones: "I own, that in the Light you have put them, they seen 
to be, as you say, diametrically opposite. " The paradox, in short, 
1. Origin, 47. '` 
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that honour is incompatible with Christianity, even though associated 
with it, turns out to be literally true mainly because it is 
actually related not to Christianity, as such, but to the exploitation 
of honour by the Church for temporal eids. ThU3, Horatio is guilty 
of confusing the ideals of Christianity with the realities of Church 
power. The paradox, in short, is an apparent one and therefore 
purely rhetorical anal dialectically deceptive. 1 
Although such distinguished Renaiuasnco ficures as P-mbelaia, 
'! ontaigne, Thomas Browne an John Donne are famous for their ©kill 
in paradoxical arguments ironotin, a "cre. -ativa, r12 rather than 
pyrrhonian, philosophical ani religious scocticisnr, the evident 
playfulnOB3 an! relative superficiality of 2anleville's use of 
rhetorical paradox is more directly related to that displayed by such 
minor Renaissance writers as Crtonsio Lando in his Much-translated 
and much-imitated Faradcasi (1543). 
3 
For Lando the paradox was more 
a rhetorical device by which astonishing areux3nts can be generated 
than the reflocticn of a philo ophicAl and religious attitude as such4 
1. As Landeville's use of paradox does not differ substantially in 
the last two of the four diuloL'ues comprising; the Oricrin of honour, 
there are only a few brief points to to noted about the last half 
of it. Yost of the last two dialos-ues are taken up with an analysis 
of Crocwell's character and his role in the Civil 'A'ar in order to 
show how Churchmen and politicians deliberately encouraged false 
noticr3 about the compatibility of Christianity and honour, and this 
in order to sake effective fighting men out of soldiers. The 
effect of moving from relatively abstract discussion in the first 
two dialogues to the discussion of realities from the evidence of 
history in the last two is that of making the inescapable realities 
behind ideals oven more convincing and the paradox of the "useful- 
neso of Christi&nity in gar" to be considered so only in the realm 
of the ideal. 
2. As : 11argaret Wiley convincingly argues in The Subtle Knot: Creative 
Scepticism in Seventeenth-Century 1-'nrylr4mi(London, 1952) for such 
authors faith was not incompatible with scepticiom nor could truth, 
because of its complexity, be devoid of paradoxes. 
3. See Cello, 461-3. 
4. For an aasesssient of Lando'a influence and a list of books in 
imitation of the Parado ssi, see Warner C. Rice, "The I'aradossi of 





In this he followed an old tradition of "literary" or "rhetorical" 
paradox distinct from, yet closely related to, the "logical" paradox, 
such as the famous one of Zeno. 
1 
Like Lando, Mandeville does not 
treat paradox as of profound significance in relation to the complex- 
ity of truth, but more as an entertaining; and dialectically useful 
diversion* still less does he recognize, as Donne and Browne did, 
that truth can contain mystery, except possibly in strictly religious 
matters, and this is perhaps why Horatio's reaction to the "paradox" 
of Christianity being exploited to make men more warlike is to exclaim: 
"But this encreases the 'Mystery, and makes the Fact less intelligible. "2 
Although Manleville's use of rhetorical paradox is not quite as 
frivolously entertaining, it invites comparison with John Dunton's 
Athenian Sport, or Two Thousand Paradoxes rerrilyy Argued, To Amuse and 
Divert the Age, a work inspired by Lando. 
3 
The Paradoxes in Dunton's 
collection are sufficiently dialectical so as to suggest that, 
especially as some are in dialogue, even in the matter of employing 
rhetorical paradox, albeit for consistently dialectical purposes, 
mandeville aimed at reaching the same large public as John Dunton and 
other, more "respectable, " periodical essayists, including Mandeville 
himself in his days as contributor to the Female Tatler. Dunton's 
infrequent attempts at serious dialectical argument, however, tend 
to be stilted and this is often the result of a paradox too 
1. See Coliet 3-12 and her article on "iitorary paradox" in the 
Dictionary of the ! Iistary off Ideass (ed. by Isaiah Berlin et al. ) 
2. Ori, n, 157- 
3- See Colie, 5C8. She does not explicitly say that Dunton's work 
was influenced by Lando but she does mention that it is a late 
survival of the Renaissance tradition of formal paradoxy. 
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ideologically conventional and a dialogue too fo=al, Thus the 
"paradoxical" proposition "That 'tis harder for a virtuous Zan to do 
that which in TM Ithan for a vitioui Man to eo that which is Good"1 
is somewhat predictably resolvable in that one expects a "virtuous" 
man, at least in the conventional ssnse, rather than the 
! 'an1evillian one, to be able, 'definition, to resist evil better 
than other classes of man. The proposition, in any case, is argued 
out in a rather stiff am3 tepid manner by members of the "Athenian 
Society. " Fach amber contributes different observations which 
culminate in the eventual unravelling of the "paradoxical" proposition 
but there in little lively dialectic, as there are no clashes of 
opinion. Although not in dialotzue, Punton's paradoxes about cowardice 
are equally predictable and devoid of Mandeville's analytical 
subtlety. Thus he deals with the "paradox" o. * hair it is better to 
be thought a coward and avoid duels than to accept a challenge or 
rod rosa an Insult. 
2 
Another oni of Dunton'8 easily resolvable 
paradoxoo is that "only Cowards dare dio" - when to live entails more 
suffer1ng, 
3 
¬! owever predictable and uninteroutir Duntonto paradoxes 
about cowardice tend to bei however, they are an indication of how 
discussiono of honour and related subjects needed paradoxical 
exprescion. This is perhaps because, as Madeville makes far more 
explicit, the notion of honour was generally felt to be too easy to 
distort for-evil and anti-Christian ends, if not actually 
1. Hohn r? untoný, Ath*ni an Sport: or, Two Thousan adaxas 
'9rri2, y Arp. umd, To .: aus® and Divert the A; -f3 Loz0on, 1707)v P. 
478. 
I: eroinafter to be oited as runton. 
2. T! u nt e n, 264-8. 
3. r.., , 307-3. 
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intithetical to Christianity. 
Dunton, however, cannot match Mlandeville's dialectical subtlety, 
which sometimes even enables him to put Cleomenes in a position to 
demonstrate that Horatio's conventional and apparently unexceptionable 
notions are actually paradoxical. At one point, for example, 
Cleomenea remarks that a true "Canister of Religion" would have to 
admonish a duellist in this manner: 
... He would recorxnand to hire the Fable of 
the Bees, and, like that, he'd dissect and 
lay open to him the Principle of honour, 
and show him, how diametrically opposite 
the Worship of that Idol was to the 
Christian Religion; the First consisting 
in openly cherishing and feeding that very 
Frailty in our Nature, which the latter 
strictly commands with all our Might to 
conquer and destroy. 
1 
Thus, Horatio's notion of the harmony between Christianity and the 
principle of honour becomes an implicit, paradox; indeed, a logically 
untenable one. As far as paradox is concerned, then, Landeville's 
dialectical subtlety includes the more direct weapon of rhetorical 
paradox and the "hidden" one of logical paradox planted in the 
enemy's camp, as it were. 
As for Berkeley's dialectical subtlety, it lies in another 
direction, that of a fine balance in the weicht of rersuasiveness 
of both interlocutors. Thus, though Fhilonous has undoubtedly more 
of logic on his side, this advanta: e is almost cancelled out 
in 
that Hylas has more of : hat meta to be coon-sense, and, indeed, 
1. ori. nt 77. 
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still does to many peoplep laymen and Philosophers alike. 
I 
"van as 
late as the thins dialogue, when flylas has been reduced to admitting 
that hic "materialism! ' has leck to nothim; but para,? oxe3 and 
destructive scopticiar, he finds ''hiloncus's immateriali, 3i far more 
paradoxical and unziccex>tablea 
Put the dcnyinf; matter, 7-1i1lonoua, or 
corporeal substance; them is the point. 
You can never parjuacie ray that thlu is 
not re; utVnant to the univer3al sense of 
rr. adcincl. -""era our dispute to be 
deter: iined by goat voices, Z confident 
you would give up the point, without 
the votes.? 
., Ilonou3's roaction to r"yls3's p rsiotent doubts abut the validity 
of i=atori ilium Is to reiterate that a fair a nd Impartial im miry 
would reveal ram lox an1 acopticic to lie not in his on position 
but that of the ". iaterislista": 
1. wf ue1 Johnson's "refutation" of ii'orkeley by kicking a stone is 
only the most f ücus cane of 1 orceley's philo: orbica1 icleao being 
; erorallyº consider 1 to be contrary to common aenzoo "n this 
point, I. C. Tipton's ch: ptor on "kex elcy and Common *=enge" in 
rk n 1. v: `iii F }111o o by of Immaterialise is ar rain instructive. 
2.1 rknley I79 237. &1thoru h iu :e was actus-11y refarrin,; to the 
i'rinci 1s of ;? u-i=n Kno w1ed! L! m, it is not imp, cssible that he may 
have boon iti pIre i by }iy1a 'n stubborn rofusal to Accept 
irr, ateri; ili a, even after conce-iing- defeat for his own position, 
when he wide the following mischievous remarks about Ber', <oloy'a 
p hi1oio; hy 5nd code of argumi=t in a footnote to Fart 1, Section 
12 of his 1'n; uirrr "crrArnin; !, u. in i? nInrst&ndinrs "... and indeed 
most of the writin a of that very in;, enIoua author form tho boat 
loacon3 of Scepticism, t : ich are to be found either a on the 
ancient or modern i<hi1osophcra, DFayle not excepted. He professes, 
howavor, in his title-rate (and un3oubte<1y with great tint)2) to 
have conp, 03Ot3 his book ag, ajn3t thq ae ptico wolf as a ainat the 
atheists eni free-thinkers. : ̀ut that all his ar u nts, though 
otherii4e Intended, are, in reality, sorely sceptical, Iplears 
from this, th. t thy mIt of no . ns°, nr ß rroduce no conviction. 
Their only effect Is to cause that rc=nntary amazement and 
irrosolutiof and confusion, which is th, result of scepticism. " 
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I wish both our opinions were fairly stated 
and submitted to the judgment of men who had 
plain common sense, without the prejudices of 
a learned education. Let me be represented as 
one who trusts his senses, who thinks he knows 
the things he sees and feels, and entertains no 
doubts, of their existence; and you fairly set 
forth with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and 
your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly 
acquiesce in the determination of any 
indifferent person. 
1 
Later still, a similar exchange develops but this time Hylas is forced 
to concede that his refusal to accept immaterialism is the result not 
of common-sense, but of irrational prejudice: 
HYLAS. ... Nothing now remains to be overcome, 
but a sort of unaccountable backwardness 
that I find in my self toward your notions. 
PHHILOPNOUS. When a man is swayed, he knows 
not why, to one side of a question; can 
this, think you, be any thing else but the 
effect of prejudice, which never fails to 
attend old and rooted notions? And indeed 
in this respect I cannot deny the belief of 
matter to have very much the advantage over 
the contrary opinion, with men of a learned 
education. 
HYLAS. I confess it seems to be as you says 
2 
The above eihhange shows that Berkeley was fully aware of the strength 
of the materialist case and did not shirk in admitting it so that, 
despite Hyla3's total defeat, the arguments on both sides are evenly 
balanced. What tips the balance in favour of Philonous's arrant, 
1. Berkeley j 1p 237- 
2. Berkeley U, 256-7. 
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then, ißt not co much what Berkeley considered to be the outright 
falalty of r3storiI11s4 but its cuppcaedly greater vulnerability to 
paraM ox. 
Another way of putting it is that Berkeley's dialectical 
strategy employs pars ox in order to arouse doubt and perplexity 
about notionu associated with philosophical tater1a1iai and theroby 
render the reader tore amenable to his own immaterialism, Thus, 
even a3 early as the preliminary ata, os of the ar ent in the first 
dialogue Hylas is reduced to complaining, but not rofuting, about 
Philonous's method of arguments "You may draw as many absurd 
aoneequenoos a3 you please, a: d endeavour to lorplox the plainest 
things; but ycu shall never perau &ia sae out of cy senses. I clearly 
un orstaM my own aianing. "' It is in the second dialaue, however, 
that Ph: i1onous'ss rolent1o s reduction of TXy*1as"s arguriints to paradox 
results in his hopeless entanglement in the anarea or "ccepticisri 
and paradoxical notions. " 'T. y1as, nevertheless, still does not 
necessarily accept the validity of 'hilonous's arge--ants, but only 
the inadequacy of his own: "I freely own my self less fond of my 
notions, since they have been so accurately examined. But still, 
methinks I have some confused percepticn that there io ouch a thirki 
as utter. "2 That the dialectical atrate 7 of Berkeley--Pailonous 
is to consistently exploit the re: lucticn of argument to paradox is 
corroborated by ', ylas who declarea, in the beginning of the third 
dialoruo, his intenticn to fight back by dealin; 7 with 1 iloncus'$ 
arcumorts in the s=e manners "... suffer me to serve you in your 
on kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many 





perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism 
that I my self am in at present. "' 
This process in miniature can be seen to work in the following 
exchange, which is also a particularly good example of Berkeley's 
piercit ; clarity and imposing dialectical skills 
PHILONOU0. Well, then, let us examine the 
relation implied in the term substance. 
Is it not that it stands under accidents? 
UYLA3. The very same. 
PT. 1ILONOU3. But that one thing may stand 
under or support another, must it not be 
extended? 
HILAS. It must. 
P1! IL0NCU$- Is not therefore this supposition 
liable to the same absurdity with the former? 
HYLA3 . You still take things in a strict 
literal sense: that is not fair, Philonoua. 
PUT LONOU3. I a' not for imposing any sense 
on your Notrist you are at liberty to explain 
them as you please. Only I beseech you, make 
me understand something by them. You tell me, 
matter supports or stands under accidents. 
Howl is it as your legs support your body? 
HfLAS. No; that is the literal sense. 
PHILONOU3. Pray let me know any sense, literal 
or not literal, that you understand it in. - 
How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas? 
UTLAS. I declare I know not what to say. I 
once thought I understood well enough what 
was meant by matter's supporting; accidents. 
But now the more I think on it, the less 
can I comprehend it; in short, I find that I 
know nothing of its 
2 
1. Berk ole II, 229. 
2. Berkelfs I7,198-9. 
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Hero Berkeley insinuates that the philosophical term "substance" is 
actually a logical paradox and does so dramatically by making 
Philonous reduce i°ylas to an almost comic perplexity. Furthermore, 
Eerkeloy's absolute disdain of paradox is indirectly, but unzisatakably, 
revealed in Philonous's demand for the "strict literal sense" of 
philosophical tercia, which points to a view of language hostile to 
the rhetorical subtleties of paradcx. 
l 
A wider Implication of Berkeley's rather negative use of paradox 
is that it short-circuits all argument, in the sense that Philonous's 
refutationa of Hylas's argumints are not tentative but absolute. 
Unlike what happens in the relationship between Horatio and Cleomenes, 
rhilonous does not attempt to demonstrate that Uylas's notions are 
only partly than or imperfectly reasoned, but that they are totally 
false and misleading. Thus, at the end of the Three niaio,. runs, 
Philonous has this to say about the term "oubstance"t ". o. And in 
philosophical discourses it seeins the best way to leave it quite out; 
since there is not perhaps any one this that bath more favoured and 
strengthened the depraved bent of the sltxi toward atheism, than the 
use of that general confused term. "2 llylaa, in other words, is 
being exhorted to avoid using the term "substance" not m: rely because 
it is logically absurd but, and this, in Berkeley's mind, is 
inseparable from its paradoxical quality, because it is morally 
depraved as well. 
: Fand evills's use of Varadox, by contrast, is highly open-ended 
anti, together with his diverse repertory ci; dialoguni techniques, 
1. That Berkeley's view of language is anti-paradoxical is confirmed 
by G. J. "jarnock's analysis of The Principles of ? 3urin Knowledge 
in his book on Berkeley (London, 1953)t PP-58-85- 
2. Werkele II, 261. 
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designed to arouse a critical, even sceptical spirit. It may be 
objected that Perkeley also arouses a critical spirit in the reader 
but it is mainly for the purpose of preparing him to reject one net 
of philosophical notions ("materialism") in favour of another 
("immaterialism"). Mandeville, on the other hand, seems more 
interested in inducing the reader to think in a certain manner rather 
than merely accept certain doctrines. Thus, unlike Tfylas, Horatio 
is never demoralized by sceptical "cul-de-sacs" but stimulated to 
further arguments by them. The process by which Aandovillian 
paradox generates a critical frame of mind can be discerned in the 
following exchanges 
Hore ... When I ask'd what Cccasion there was 
for Divines in an Army, I was not Ignorant of 
the Necessity there is of having Religion and 
Priests of some sort or other, to humour as well 
as wire the 1ultitude; but I wanted to know the 
Wystery, and be let into the Secret, by which 
the Doctrine of Peace is made serviceable to the 
carrying on of War; for that Preachers of the 
Gospel have not only exhorted en to Battle, but 
likewise they have done it effectually; and that 
Soldiers have been inspired with Ccurage, and 
made to fight with C-bstinacy by their Sermons, 
the History of almost every Country can witness. 
Cleo. A little Accuracy will set us to Rights. 
That what you say has teen, and is often done by 
Sermons and Preachors, both Protestant and 
Popish, is certainly true. But I deny, that ever 
it was once done by a Preacher of the Gospel. 
I'or. I don't understand your Distinction. 
Are not all Christian Divines call'd Preachers, 
as well as Ministers of the Gospel? 
Cleo. But zany People are call'd, chat, 
strictly speaking, they are not. ... 
1 
1. Oriain, 156. 
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Here it is Horatio, not Cleomenes, who first perceives a familiar 
paradox that needs explaining. Cleoiienes' solution is to rigorously 
analyze the meaning of the terms leading to the paradox that "the 
Toctrine of Peace is made serviceable to the carrying on of War. " 
It should be noted, however, that though Cleoaenos' emphasis on "a 
little Accuracy" in the use of terms is similar to Philonous's 
emphasis on the "literal sense" of philosophical terms, the end- 
result is not the abject defeat of Horatio, as Is the case with ! lylan, 
tut an intensification of the ar ont, which culminates in Horatio's 
blunt question and Cleomenes' equally blunt retort. Even when, later 
on, Horatio is more decisively defeated, paradox generates argument 
in such a way as to induce wariness on Horatio's part rather than 
queroulous perploxity. The wariness, moreover, is expressed in 
pungent colloquialisms, as in the following exchanges 
Cleo. ... But as to the vilest Reprobates 
among the Vulgar, fron their very Curses and 
the most prophan© of their Oaths and 
Irprecations, it is plain, that they are 
Believers. 
Vor. That's far fetch'd. 
Cleo. I don't think so. Can a Man wish 
himself dacn'd, without supposing, that there 
is such a Third; as Damnation. Believe me, 
Horatio, there are no Atheists among, the 
Co=on People: ... 
1 
One argument, in short, leads to another, which clarifies and 
enlarges the prcviou3 one in an -almost endless aeries, and that is 
1. origin, 189o 
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ihy 'and©ville's use of paradox tends to be more open-ended than 
Berkeley's. 
Berkeley, nevertheless, was capable of using paradox in a 
manner similar to M: andeville's a n4 he does so brilliantly in the 
second dialogue of his Alciphron, which is a sustained attack on 
what he considered to to andeville's ethical views. The following 
exchange, for example, is highly Mandevillian in its use of paradox 
as a way of arousing the reader's attention just before the 
exposition of an important points 
CRITO. ... So that, upon the whole, it should 
seers those gentlemen who are called men of 
pleaaure, from their eager pursuit of it, do 
in reality, with great expense of fortune, 
ease, and health, purchase pain. 
L. TSICLES. You may spin out plausible 
arguments, but will after all find it a 
difficult matter to convince me that so 
many ingenious con should not be able to 
distin wish between thins s so directly 
apposite as pain and pleasure. h ov is it 
possible to account for this? 
CRI10. I believe a reason mV be assigned for 
it, but to men of pleasure no truth is so 
palatable as a fable. Jove once upon a 
time ... 
1 
The above exchange is also close to L'ande tille's method of paradoxical 
/ 
argument in that the raradox about pain, which is itself the conclusion 
1., George Berkeley, Alciphron, or The Virute Philosopher, in The Works 
of Oeorre Lerkelev, Bithop of Cle nos, ed. by A. A. Luce and T 
Jessop, vol. III London, 1950jýp. C 90. The text is based on 
the third edition of 1752. It was first published in 1732. All 
first three editicns were published "anonymously. " According to 
Jescop on p. 1, "the authorship v not in fact theraby concealed. " 
Hereinafter to be cited, as '2, qrýq In. 
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of a previous argument, generates dialectic in a manner very similar 
to )'athevi11e's use of paradox as a kind of dialectical short-cut. 
' 
Berkeley, however, not only borrowed Xar eville'u technique of 
paradoxical argument but also turned it adroitly against him, as 
in the following amusingly trenchant exchange: 
JP1mANOR. Your several arguments seem to centre 
on thief that vice circulates money and 
promotes induztry, which causeth a people to 
flourish. In it not so? 
LYZICLZ. It is. 
'ý: UPn, ANtrt. And the reason that vice produceth 
this effect is, becsu3e it causoth an 
extravagant consursption, which is the most 
beneficial to the manufacturers, their 
encouragement consisting in a quick demtr4 
and high price. 
LY3ICL! Z. "'ithout doubt. 
EUPH"'tr MiOR. Say, Lysicles, who drinks moot, a 
sick- an or a healthy? 
LYSICIä S. A healthy. 
! tJPri NVion. And which is healthiost, a soberzan 
or a drunkard? 
LYSICL!, .A sober can. 
FUFHRANO?. A sob3r man, therefore, in health 
may drin' more than a drunkard 'then he is sick? 
LYSICL S. He may. 
rUFI. I A. WI . What think you, will a man consumo 
tore meat and drink in a long life or a 
chart one? 
LY31 CIE . In a long. 
1. one other paradox occurs in the phrase "no truth is so palatable 
as a fable" if "fable" is taken to me=- "lie" and works here 
as a witty rejoinder with an almost =ildean sting to it for 
present-day readers. If there is any value in m3Aing such a 
laboured observation on such a minor play of wit, it is in 
nctirZ that Berkeley was not incapable of using, paradox with 
3! andevillian playtulneaa. 
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EUPlIRANOR. A sober healthy man, therefore, in 
a long life, may circulate mors money by 
eating and drinking, than a glutton or a 
drunkard in a short one? 
LY3ICL'. That then? 
EiTPiM, U-, 07. Why than it should seem that he 
may bei more beneficial to the public, even 
in this way of eating and drinking. 
LTSICLi3. I shall never own that ten erance 
is the way to promote drinic. irw. 
EUPHRANOR. But you will own sickness lessens, 
ani death puts an and to all drinking? The 
same argunwnt will hold, for nught I can see, 
with reipect to all other vices that impair 
don's health and shorten their lives. And, 
if wo admit this, it ai11 not be so clear a 
point that vice bath merit towards the public- 
As L! andevillo him3elf complained, 
2 Cu branor undoubtedly saisr©pre3ents 
!! anaeville's views about the alleged efficacy of vice in promoting 
prosperity but even if 1uphranor's opening statement is unfair to 
I, '. andevillo, yet ttardeville's faxous paradox about "private vices, 
public bensfits" is hero taken at its face-value and shown to be 
nothing but erroneous sophistry. The Fable of the Leos unravels 
the paradox very differently but it is certainly a tribute to 
. farkeley's 
dialectical ingenuity, and grasp of Eandeville's technique 
of rhetorical paradox, that he allows the paradox to generate a very 
1. Berkele III, 71-2. 
2. Son Vandoville's A Letter to Trion, ed. by Bona y Dobree (Liverpool, 
1954), PP-3-4. Also see Dobree's introduction, pp. vii-ix. The 
Letter was first published in 1732. Among other things, 1'andevill© 
protests that "if Dion had read the Fable of the Peas, he would 
not have uuffer'd such lawless Libertines as Alciphron and Ly icles, 
to have sheltered the--selves under cry Vi'ings; but ho would have 
demonstrates to then, that my Principles differ'd fron theirs, 
as Sunshine does from Darkness. " "Dion" is the narrator of the 
dialogues comprising the Alciphron. 
232 
different dialectic which puts i"andegi. lle's view in a highly 
unfavcurable light; moreover, Lysiclea' statement about temperance 
even allows Berkeley to introduce an effectively rhetorical paradox 
of his own. 
Berkeley also goe3 so far as to juggle with the paradox of the 
ultimate compatibility of "popery" and "free-thinking" so as to 
make It nears only nn apparent one: 
i JPILRANOR. I have another scruple about the 
tendency of your opinions. Suppose you should 
prevail, and destroy this protestant church 
and clergy: how could you come at the popish? 
I am credibly intortned there is a great number 
of emissaries of the church of Rome disguised 
in Fanglands who can tell what harvest a clergy 
so numerous, so subtle, and so well furnished 
with arguments to work on vulgar and uneducated 
minds, may be able to merke in a country 
despoiled of all religion, and feelingg, the want 
of it? Who can tell whether the spirit of free- 
thinking ending with the opposition, and the 
vanity with the distinction, when the whole 
nation are alike infidels; who can tell, I nay, 
whether in such a juncture the man of genius 
themselves may not affect a new distinction, 
and be the first converts to popery? 
LYZICL. ä. And suppose they should. Between 
friends it would to no great matter. These 
are our maxims. In the first place, we hold 
it would be best to have no religion at all. 
scondly, we hold that all religions are 
iindifferent. If therefore, upon trial, we 
find the country cannot do without a 
religion, why not popery as well as another? 
I know several ingenious man of our sect, 
who, if we had a popish prince on the throne, 
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would turn papists to-marrow. This is a 
paradox, but I shall explain it. A prince 
whom we compliment with our religion, to be 
sure must be grateful. 
k 1PItR&NOfl. I un erstand you. But what becomes 
of freethinking all the while? 
LY3ICLfi3. Pht we should have more than ever 
of that, for we should keep it all to ourselves. 
As for the azu3enent of retailing it, the want 
of this Mould be largely compensated by solid 
advantagos of another kind. 
1UMA, *7OR. It seems thong by this account, the 
tendency you ob3erved in the nation towards 
something great and new proves a tendency 
towards popery and slavery. 
1 
Ironically enough, i hhen Berkeley goes this rar in his use of paradox, 
he allows himself to be open to the saoe charge which his spokesman, 
Critop earlier made about the "freethinkers" rhetorical use of 
paradox: 
Light in itself is good, and th© s=n light 
vhich, ahem a man the folly of superstition 
might show him the truth of religion and the 
madness of atheism. But to =3k© use of light 
only to see the evils on one aide, and never 
to see, but to run blindly upon, th, worse 
extreme -- this is to make the best of things 
produce evil, in the same senao that you 
prove the worst of things to produce good, to 
wit, accidentally or indirectly: arid, by the 
same method of arguing, you : miy prove that 
even diseases are ueaful: but whatever benefit 
1. pari-0if x, 10 109-10. 
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seem. to accruo to the public, either from 
disease of rund or body, is not their genucne 
offoprinj, and may be obtained without them. 
l 
randeville's motives, including his advocacy of religious toleration, 
2 
in short, are consistently judged in the worst jcs3ible light and 
distorted either into untenable paradoxes or reforculated into 
apparent paradoxen damningly shorn not to be euch at all. This 
is not to suggest that Berkeley's use of paradox in the N1ciphron is 
more "unfair" than n andoville's in the Criarin of Honour but only 
that while Berkeley did not use rhetorical paradox as often as 
'an: evillo, he was every bit as dialectically skilful in his 
deployment of it. Unlike the erirln of Honourp however, 1orkoley's 
Alciphron cannot adequately be discussed solely in terms of its 
technique of rhetorical paradox. As a work of Christian apologetics 
rivalling Joseph Butler's Analo y of eliion in literary conception, 
if not in popularity and influence, its method of dialogue is, 
in fact, far more complex than , Dither that of the ? Sirin of ttor. our 
or of tho Three ni aloauog. 
Before dealiuj withetha Alciphron in the next chapter, however, 
it is necessary to point out that paradox continued to be an 
important component of many a philoso; hica1 dialogue in the later 
eighteenth century and ;, erhtps the most famcus in Diderot's 
Paraloxe our is Comedian (1713). In Diderot's dialoiue, to put it 
at its aicipleat, a "first interlocutor" and "second interlocutor" 
argue out the paradox of actors being most emotionally convincing 
in their roles when they have greatest control over their 
1. Be*sl III9 79" 
2. : Sandeville's advocacy of relifious toleration is espeoially 
evident in his Free Thoughts onRsli , one the very title of which, 
, with its suggestion of "free-thinkit;, " Ber'tceley would Novo 
porhapa fount to be auspiciously ambiguous. 
M '5 
emotion3. 
i ? ora relevant in terms of the influence of Bartvelo r and 
Landevilie on the dialcu^: uo fcru in the later eighteenth century is 
David Fume's A Saiaalorue, a minor masterpiece in dialectical aryl 
paradoxical tour-do-force. Eu-. 9's aim is to dezzonstrate the 
relativity of moral standards and be doez so not merely by comparing 
the customs of one nation with another but by letting paradox 
generate dialectic. One such paradox is a traveller's insistence 
on the considerable civility and intelli once of two nations de; S3ite 
their savagery and moral blindness, which the traveller himself 
describes In detail. One of the nations, for exaiplo, enth.. eiastically 
approved the asea3sination of a ©an by his most trusted friends. An 
a result, the following, exchange develops between the traveller and 
his friend, who is also the narrator of the dialogues 
To be eures, said Is you were but in jest. Such 
barbarous =-I aava o mannera are not only 
incon atible with a civilized, intelligent 
pasple, auch a3 you said these were, but aro 
scarcely can; atible with bumin natura. They 
exceed all wo ever read of aw- the 
4t relian3 aryl Tcpinaiaboues. 
fnvo a care, cried he, have a caret You 
are not aware that You are s eakiri blasphemy, 
=A are chuu1i ; your favourfte3, the Creek9, 
oafiecially the ºthenian3, whose I' have couchc3, 
all along, under the3e bizarre na. oe i 
1. It is interesting to note that Diderot's de: inition of ""paradox" 
in the reyoloj ýnot only Illuminates, an pointed cut by Ivon 
Bolaval, the dialectic of Diderot's dialogue but in also 
applicable to M: andoville's dialectical use of rhetorical paradox 
in the Orin of ITenour: "Cleat uni proposition absurde an 
apparanco, u cause quelle eat contraire aux opinions request at 
quit ndanzaoin3, cat vrai au fond, ou do moins pout recevoir un 
air do vorits. " See ivon idol oval, L' ^ atbotiqua sann Paradoxe do 
Diderot, third eä. (Paris, 1950), p, 168, 
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employed. It you consider aright, there is 
not one stroke of the foregoing character, 
which might not be found in the man of highest 
merit at Athens, without diminishing in the 
least from the brightness of his character. 
The amours of the Greeks, their marriages, 
and the exposing of their children cannot but 
strike you iaunediately. The death of Usbek is 
an exact counterpart to that of Caesar. 
l 
The paradox here, in fact, is both dialectically all-embracing as in 
Berkeley's Three Dialogues and rhetorically playful, as in the 
Origin of fonour. It is dialectically all-embracing in that 
throughout the dialogue, and this excerpt contains the essence of its 
dialectical strategy, the reader is forced to choose between two 
alternatives by deciding on whether a fixed standard of morality is 
a hopelessly paradoxical notion or whether moral relativism is 
actually so. The paradox is also rhetorically playful in that it 
does not entirely rely on logic but on a kind of rhetorical trick; 
indeed, a well-laid trap, and one which accounts for the traveller's 
mock-warning and obvious glee at his friend's discomfiture. Thus, 
it is very possible that Hume borrowed from Berkeley and Landeville 
in his use of paradox in A ? )ialof! ue 
2 
1. David fume, Hume's Ethical Writings, ed. by Alaisdair laclntyre 
(London, 1965)9 pp. l 0-l. A Dialogue was published originally 
in the first edition of the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals (1751)" Hume's footnote adds, "The laws of Athens allowed 
a man to marry his sister by the father. Solon's law forbid 
paederasty to slaves, as being an act of too great dignity for 
such mean persons. " Hereinafter to be cited as Ilume. 
2. From a broader perapective, it is evident that paradox generates 
dialectic in much earlier dialogues, such as Plato's Parmenides 
and Castiglione's The Courtier. For the role of paradox in both 
these dialogues, see Colie 22-3 and 33-4" Perhaps the earliest 
example is the Book of Job (barring some sections of the Hindu 
scriptures) and it is probably not entirely coincidental that the 
only book in the Old Testament that resembles a philosophical 
dialogue memorably generates dialectic by dealing with the 
theological paradox of good and evil. 
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It is interesting to note in this connection that both Berkeley 
and Hume used similar metaphors in their respective dialogues to 
describe what is basically their justification for the philosophical 
principles they espouser but which can also be considered as 
metaphors for the dialectical use of paradox. To begin with 
Berkeley, Rylas concludes the Three Dialogues with this metaphor: 
Tou see, Myles, the water of yonder fountain, 
how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to 
a certain height; at which it breaks and falls 
into the basin from whence it roses its asoent 
as well as descent, proceeding from the same 
uniform law or principle of gravitation. Just 
so, the same principles which at first view 
load to scepticism, pursued to a certain point, 
bring =on back to common sense. 
1 
The metaphor of gravity here could just as appropriately refer to the 
dialectical workings of paradox in th" immaterialism at first seems 
to be a paradox because it really does strain the limits of reason, 
but is not actually so because it does not ultimately break the 
bounds of reason but returns to its solid basis in common sense. 
iiume's metaphor, as jxpressed by the traveller's friend, is also 
that of gravitations "The Rhine flows north, the Rhone south; yet 
both spring from the same mountain, and are also actuated, in their 
opposite directions, by the same principle of gravity. The 
different inclinations of the ground, on which they run, cause all 
the difference of their courses. "2 The twist in t: ume's metaphor, 
however, is that it does not immediately strengthen his own position 
but at first seems to work against it. It is aiduced by the friend, 
De*ele II, 262-3. 1. 
2. Humes 165. 
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in fact, as a possible objection to Humes, and the traveller's, 
conviction of the relativity of moral standards. The objection 
implied is that different customs can still spring from different 
ways of applying the same absolute standard, based on social 
utility, to differing social circumstances. As the traveller's 
friend elaborates, 
It appears, that there never was any quality 
recommended by any one, as a virtue or moral 
excellence, but on account of its being useful, 
or acre eable to a man himself, or to others. 
For what other reason can ever be assigned 
for praise or approbation? Or where would 
be the sense of extolling a good character 
or action, which, at the same time, is 
allowed to be good for nothing? All the 
differences, therefore, in morals, may be 
reduced to this one general foundation, 
and may be accounted for by the different 
views, which people take of these 
circumstances 1 
The undermining of this position begins as soon as the traveller 
points out that the metaphor is applicable only to natural phenomena, 
not to the artificialities of human behaviour. As he puts it, 
Shat you insist on ... may have some 
foundation, when you adhere to the maxims 
of common life and ordinary conduct. ... 
But what say you to artificial lives and 
manners? How do you reconcile the maxims, 
on which, in different ages and nations, 
these are founded? 
2 
1. Huma, 168. 
Q. Fumes 172. 
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He elaborates by explaining that by artificial behaviour he means 
behaviour dictated by either philosophical moral codes, as in the 
case of the ancient Greeks and Romans, or religious ones, as in 
modern times. As an extreme example of the former he takes Diogenes, 
and Pascal as an extreme example of the latter. A comparison of 
the moral views and practice of both, which are directly opposite, 
produces an impossible paradox that militates against the existence 
of an absolute moral code recognized by mankind. Thus, the 
traveller concludes that 
In such a remarkable contrast do these 
two men stands Yet both of them have met 
with general admiration in their different 
ages, and have been proposed as models of 
imitation. Where then is the universal 
standard of morale, which you talk of? 
And what rule shall we establish for the 
many different, nay contrary sentiments of 
mankind? 
1 
In A Dialogue, then, the paradoxes arising from the presupposition of 
an absolute standard of morality behind the actual existence of 
various opposing modes of moral behaviour is resolvable in terms of 
whether one talks about man governed by reason, which dictates that 
morality should be based on social utility, or man dominated by. a 
religious or-philosophical moral code. For Fume, however, man 
dominated by reason was little more than a speculative abstraction) 
'and this is ironically confirmed by the last words of the dialogue, 
1. Hume, 174. 
2. The weakness of reason in determining moral standards is esPec- 
ially emphasized in Book III ("On Torale") Part I of the Treatise 
of i! urman Nature. See David Hume, A Treatise of human Nature, ad* 
by L. A. Selby Bigg© (Oxford, 1973), PP-455-7. This edition was 
first published in 1888. 
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spoken by the friends 
An experiment ... which succeeds in the air 
will not always succeed in a vacuum. When men 
depart from the maxims of common reason, and 
affect these artificial lives, as you call 
them, no one can answer for what will please 
or displease them. They are in a different 
element from the rest of mankind; and the 
natural principles of their mind play not 
with the same regularity, as if left to themselves, 
free from the illusions of religious superstition 
or philosophical enthusiasm. 
1 
The irony here lies in the fact that the reader is forced to ask 
himself whether man's behaviour can ever, like inert material 
phenomena, be in a vacuum or entirely free from "the illusions of 
religious superstition or philosophical enthusiasm. " There is 
nothing in man's moral behaviour, in short, equivalent to the force 
of gravity in the natural world, except reason, which is rarely the 
principal determinant of moral actions. 
It only remains to be noted that, as far as more recent dialogues 
are concerned, there have been at least two in which paradox 
generates dialectic in an interesting manner. The first, which is 
somewhat Mandevillian in dialectical technique, is Oscar tilde's 
The Decay of Lying. It consists of a aeries of paradoxical 
statements by the flamboyant "Cyril" which provoke the staid "Vivian" 
into challenging then. The paradoxes, however, are only apparent, 
and purely rhetorical, as can be seen from the following exchange about 
the paradoxical notion that "Nature imitates Art": 
1,, Hume, 174" 
241 
CYBIL. The theory 5. e. that Life Imitates Natür-e7 
is certainly a very curious one, but to make it complete 
you must show that Nature, no less than Life, is an 
imitation of Art. Are you prepared to prove that? 
VIVIAN. i'y dear fellow, I am prepared to prove anything. 
CTRTL. Nature follows the landscape painter, then, 
and takes her effects fron him? 
VIVIAN. Certainly. There, if not fron the Impressionists, 
do we get those wonderful brown fogs that come creeping 
down our streets, blurring, the gas-lamps and changing the 
houses into monstrous shadows? To whom, if not to them 
and their master, do we owe the lovely silver mists that 
brood over our river, and turn to faint forms of fading 
grace curved bridge and swaying barge? The extraordinary 
change that has taken place in the climate of London 
during the last ten years is entirely due to a particular 
school of Art. You smile. Consider the matter from a 
scientific or a metaphysical point of view, and you will 
find that I an right. For what is Nature? Nature is no 
great mother who has borne us. She is our creation. It 
is in our brain that she quickens to life. Things are 
because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, 
depends on the Arts that have influended us. To look at 
a thing is very different from seeing a thing. One does 
not see anything until one sees its beauty. Then, and 
only then, does it come into existence. At present, 
people see fogs, not because they are fogs, but because 
poets and painters have taught them the mysterious 
loveliness of such effects. There may have been fogs for 
centuries in London. I dare say there were. But no one 
saw them, and so we do not know anything about them. 
They did not exist till Art had invented them. ... 
1 
Here, it is evident that, in a manner similar to the "paradoxical" 
statements in the Orin of Honour, what first appears as a paradox 
1. Oscar Wilde, The First Collected Edition of the Torks of Oscar 
Yi} lde, ode by Robert Ross, vol. (London, 1969)-, pp. 41-2" This 
. 
is a reprint of Ross's edition of 1908. The dialogue was first 
published in 1889. 
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is actually no more than a dialectically deceptive and vividly 
rhetorical way of pointing out that works of art, because they are 
inevitably selective, can influence onets perception, which is 
itself selective, of the outflido world. 
The second relatively recent dialogue to use paradox in an 
interesting ray is the painter Plot T'ondrian's A Dialogue on 
Neoplasticiam. Because of the austerity of its dialectic, its 
technique resembles more that of Berkeley in the Three Dialogues 
than that of Mandeville in the Origin of honour. In it A ("A singer") 
and B ("Neoplaatio painter") begin their discussion with what at first 
seems to be a paradoxical statement of the painter's consistent 
intentions in both his earlier, representational compositions and his 
later, abstract ones 
As I admire your earlier work. Because it means 
so rauch to tue, I would like to understand 
your present way of painting better. I see 
nothing in these rectangles. ', 'hat are you 
aiming at'? 
B: At nothing different than bofore. Both have 
the same intention but my latest work brings 
it out more clearly. 
1 
That, in turn, generates a discussion in which the paradox is shown 
to be only apparent because "A" has misunderstood the real intentions 
of "B"i 
At And what is that intention? 
Bi The plastic expression of relationships 
through oppositions of colour and line. 
ý. ý. 
1. tondrian'a dialogue is anthologized in Hans L. G. Jaffe, Do Stijl 
(London, 1970), pp. 117-26. The dialogue was originally publ Sbed 
in the periodical De Stijl (Feb. 1919). Hereinafter to be cited 
as Mondrian. 
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C: But didn't your earlier work represent nature? 
B: I expressed myself by means of nature. But if 
you observe the sequence of my work carefully, 
you will see that it progressively abandoned 
the naturalistic appearance of things and 
increasingly emphasizes the plastic expression 
of relationships. 
A: Do you find) then, that natural appearance 
interferes with the plastic expression of 
relationships? 
B: You will agree that if two words are sung 
with the same strength, with the same 
emphasis, each weakens the other. One 
cannot expro3s both natural appearance 
as we see it and plastic relationships, 
with the same determinatenesa. In 
naturalistic fo=p in naturalistic 
colour and in naturalistic line, plastic 
relationships are veiled. To be 
plastically expressed determinately, 
relationships can be represented only 
through colour and line in themselves 
In the capriciousness of nature, form 
and colour are weakened by curvature 
and by the corporeality of things. To 
give the means of expression of painting 
their full value in my earlier work, I 
increasingly allowed colour and line to 
speak for themselves. 
At But how can colour and line in themselves, 
without the form we perceive in nature, 
represent anything determinately? 
Bs The plastic expression of colour and line 
alone is to establish Oppositions by means 
of colour and line; and these oppositions 
express plastic relationship. Relationship 
r-" 
is what I have always sought, and that is 
what all painting seeks to eapress. 
l. 
1.6: oný i rian, 118. 
244 
One could do worse than to consider Yondrian's quest for truth 
to nature in terms of "the plastic expression of relationships" 
as a useful analogy for the way that philosophical dialogue rejects 
concrete dramatic incident in favour of a more abstract play of 
opposing ideas, and the relationship between them. Keeping this 
in mind, what paradox often succeeds in doing is to intensify such 
a clash of abstractions and make it all the more, paradoxically, 
"dramatic" in terms of the expression of emotion if not of 
dramatic incident. 
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CIIAF T ;R VII. IK ARD COLLNUT AM M3, AI AL%CTIC Off, ''O^jlIUS" IN 
Slk'? 3jBURY' i PIfl }LORAUM 
Or that bright Image to our fancy draw, 
Which R'honclee in raptur'd vision saw, 
chile thro' Poetic scones the Cenius roves, 
Or wanders wild in Academic Groves; 
That MUR our Society micron, 
Where Tindal dictate*, and Silenus snores. 
Alexander Pope in ^he Dunoiai 
(ed. or 1743,11.487-92 
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More than any dialogue by Berkeley or 1aMeville, Shaftesbury's 
The ! 'oralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody1 seemau at firnt sight, little 
more than a dir3ot imitation of P1ato$s dialogues, at3pecially the 
S22po iua rind the Fhaidruo. Pefore establishin, whotber, like Berkeley 
and "andoville, Shaftesbury borrowed from other genres and utilized 
Augustan rhetorical devices to suit his own needs in the modification 
of an ancient genre, it is necessary, then, to examine hos Tho itoralists 
can be said to follow Platonic models of philosophical dialogue. 
There are two basic modals of Platonic dialoEuo that crust be kept 
in mind in rolation to 'he Voralists, the "eristic" and the "rhapsodical. " 
The "eristic" model includes auch early and middle-period dialogues as 
the Ion, Laches, (or.., ias and Protasoraa. In these Socrates demolishes 
whatever concept is maintained by an opponent by repeatedly asking him 
the kind of questions that force hire to eventually contralict his 
original position. What Socrates conducts, in other worda, is an 
"elenetic duel" or "oriatic match" for the purpose or exposing the 
logical inconsistencies of a conceptual opinion defend&d by the opposing 
side. 
2 The Tierpose, then, is a negative ono. In later dialogues, 
however, "elanctic duellirng" occurs far lees frequently and for tho 
positive purpose of 1eaIin to other, caoro fruitful concepts. In 
1. The title-pass also inoludes the informative phrase, "Being A 
Recital of certain Conversations cn Natural and Loral Subjects. " 
2. As Gilbert Ryla puts it, "The questioner ha3 to try to extract 
fron the answerer by a aeries of questions an answer or conjunction 
of answers inconsistent with the original thesis, and so drive him 
into an 'alerchua'. The quostionor has won the duel if he Succeeds 
in gettin the answerer to contradict his original thesis, or else 
in forcing hic to resign, or in reducing him to silence, to an 
infinite rogreas, to more abusivenoss, to pointless yammering or 
to outrageous paradox. " See Plato's Progress (Cacbridgo, 1966), 
r *10541 
247 
some of these later dialogues, such as the S3P possum and the Phan, 
Plato is at his most rhapsodical and rhetorically sublive. Although 
the Phaecirus contains very cooplex disputation, what is imrortant about 
it in relation to the dialoCue style of The "oralists is that the 
dialectical argument about. tho nature of rhetoric is eclipsed by 
Socrates' poetically rhapsodic description of the "sublimen concept of 
Love* As for the Svpj, osiurn, it is almost devoid of dialectical exchange. 
Its speeches on the nature of Love are hierarchically arrazkr; ed and and 
with Socrates' rhapsodic "encomium of Love. "1 
Although, as will be seen, it is the "rhapsodical" model of the 
Platonic dialogue that e t'oraliets tctually eaiul. ates, it does contain 
some elenctic argument. An early example occurs when "Philocies, " 
who is a sceptic2 and narrator of the dialogue, clams that true 
friendship does not depend on love of nan? kind by either party. 
"Theocles, " who is a "sociable enthusiast" (in the sense of "inspired 
philosopher" )3 and Shaftesbury's spokesman throughout the dialogue, 
counters T'hilocles' view by asking: "Do you, then, take bounty and 
gratitude to be =ow, the acts of friendship and good-nature? " This 
is the beginning of an elenchua because I'hiloclea In not left much room 
to raanoouvro. ', ''hatever the actual words used, Philocles' answer can 
1. That is how Socrates describes his speech on Love. Zee The 
Dialos tzees of Plato, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, fourth ed., vol. 1 
Oxford, 1953)9 P"544. 
2. As Shaftesbury ruts it in an early manuscript version of 
The Voralints presented to Lord Borers, "'Tis a Scoptick recites 
and the Hero of the Piece passes for an fntkusiast. " Zee John G. 
H ayna, n, "The ; volution of 'The `: oraliats, ' Modern Language Review, 
64 (1569), 728. Hereinafter to be cited as Tiay an. 
3. The early manuscript version of 'J'he '. "oralists presented to Lord 
Somers was entitled The Sociable Enthusiast. See Hayman, 728. 
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only be basically "yes" or "no. " When Philoclea answers in the 
affirmativer "Undoubtedly, for they are of the chief, " more elenotic 
quoations follow until finally Fhilooleo is driven to contradict his 
original position: 
... And as to bountyi tell mo, I beseech you, 
is it to those only who are deserving that we 
should do good? Is it only to a good neighbour 
or relation, a good father, child, or brother? 
or does Nature, reason, and humanity better 
teach us to do good still to a father because 
a father, and to a child because a child, and 
co to every relation in human life? I think, 
said I, this last is riigbteat. 
0 Philooles, replied he, consider then what it 
was you said when you objected against the love 
of mankind-because of human frailty, and seamed 
to scorn the,, rublia because of its misfortunes. 
1 
°i`he relative unimportance for shatteabury of euch a rational rotutation, 
hoaover, is made evident in that soon after Philocles confesses that 
As for a plain natural love of one single 
person in either sex, I could compass itt 
I thought, veil enough; but this complex, 
universal sort was beyond my reach. I 
could love the individual but not the 
species. This was too r terious, too 
metaphysical an object for me. In short, 
I could love nothing of which I had not 
some sensible, material ie. 
2 
1. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, Charactaristias of Van, 
rarnsrs, anions, 'rimes, edo by John M. Robertson and introduced 
bStanley Green, vol. 11 (flew York, 1964), PP. 37-8" IXereinafter 
to be cited as Characteristics I or Il. The Characteristics, which 
is a collection of Shaftesbury'a treatises, was first published in 
1711. The fobertson edition was first published in 1900. The 
isorall to was first published in 1709- 
2* Characteristics III 38-9. 
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It is not enough, in other words, for ihilocles to be merely convinced 
that love of individuals necessarily ontailu love of mankind but to 
learn how to feel love for iian'kind. In terra of the dramatic 
situation of The : 'aralists this moans that Theoclee must convert 
1'hiloclea to his own "enthusiasa" for philosophical truth and not 
merely gain his intellectual tcquieecence. 
For Theocleu, then, olanctic argument is an inferior mode of 
reasoning that blocks the way to higher truths; indeed ho prefaces one 
round of elenctic argument with "Take demonstration then ... if you 
can endure I should reason thus abstractedly and drily. "1 At a later 
stage of the dialogu®, when I'hilocles has already been converted to 
Theocle3' "enthusic81, " Theocles eirnificsntly introduces an olenchu3 
Then Philoolea, on finding himself unable to follow Theoclos' rapturous 
mode of argument exclaims: ".: oldt hold! ... good T 0ocle3p you take 
this in too high a key above my reach. If you would have to accompany 
you, pray lower this strain a little, and talk in a more : ani liar way. " 
Thug, elenchus in The ! 'mallets Is a "more familiar way" of arrumont 
subordinates to "oublim&" ideas arrived at by other means in which, as 
will be seen, "enthusiazn" playe a large role. 
The relative unimportance of elenctlc arg hont in The ! -"orali2tz 
bccono3 especially evident when contrasted to Ieikoley's uss cf elonchus 
in his dialogues. r, 1en4'hua is especially prevalent in tho first two 
dialogues of the `i`hrAm nin1o ; uas where i'; zilonouus seta cut to prove that 
"3 "thera is no such thin6r a3 what philoao; bcro call 'material substance' 
1. Chartcttr3ätics III 109. 
2. Charactcristics III 131. 
3. The Works of Goor ß Lerke1P , Tim of C1o nm, ed. by A. A. Luca 
and To-. ** Jesaop, Vol. II (London, 194)'), p. 172. 
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and does so by a series of el©nctic arguments, the purpose of which is 
to demolish fylas's view to the contrary. It is precisely because of 
philonoua's subtle handling of elenctic ar intation that, as has been 
seen in chapter six, flylas to always 'orced to acknowledge his own 
views as paradoxical and contrary to co=on sense. 
In the Alci hron, elencliun is a satirical wea; on' as well a3 a 
mode of argument, a3 in the following; exchanges 
T33MRJ?; C3, You sayr, if I caletako not, that a 
visa man ; urauoa only his Private interest, 
and that this consists in zeru ua1 pleasure; 
: or proof whereof you appeal to natura. Is 
not this what you advance? 
LXýICLI ä. +t is. 
113M AIM . You concluie, thmreforo, that, ns 
other animals are guided by natural instinct, 
an too ought to follow the dictates of sense 
and appetite. 
I, YSICL'. r. 3 do. 
MIRATIOR. But in this do you not argue as if man 
had only sense and appetite for his guides, on 
which supposition there might be truth in what 
you say's But what if he kath intellect, roazon, 
a higher instinct and a nobler life? If thla 
be the case, and you, being, man, livo like a 
brute, is it not the way to ba defrauded of 
your true ba; pincss, to be mortified and 
diaapcointcd? Consider nowt costa of brute3: 
you shall jetha s find them have a greater 
abgre of sensual hsppin3s3 than man. 
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LYSICLtZ. To our sorrow wo do. This kath made 
several gentlemen of our sect envy brutes, 
and lament the lot of human-kind. 
CRITO. It was a consideration of this sort which 
inspired F. rotylus with the laudable ambition 
of wishing himself a snail, upon hearing of 
certain particularities discovered in that 
animal by a modern virtuoso. 
UJPHRANOR. Tell men Lysiele3, if you had an 
inexhaustible fund of gold and silver, should 
you envy another for having a little more 
copper than you? 
LYSICLES. I should not. 
EUPiIRANOR. Are not reason, imagination, and sense, 
faculties different in kind, and in rank 
higher one than another? 
LYSICLE. S. I do not deny it. 
EUPHRANOR. Their acts therefore differ in kind? 
LYSICLES. They do. 
EE"UFFP? ANOR. Consequently the pleasures perfective 
of those acts are also different? 
LYSICLES. They are. 
EUPiIRANOR. You admit, therefore, three sorts of 
pleasures pleasure of reason, pleasure of 
imagination, and pleasure of sense. 
LYSICLI Z. I do. 
i UFHRAN01t. And, as it is reasonable to think the 
operation of the highest and noblest faculty to 
be attended with the highest pleasure, may we 
not suppose the two ferner to be as gold or 
silver, and the latter only as copper? Whence 
it should seem to follow that man need not 
envy or imitate a brute. 
LTSICL. S. And, nevertheless, there are very ingenious 
men who do. And surely every one may be allowed 
to know what he wants, and wherein his true 
happiness consists. 
1ý ,A tivorks of Ceor e Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. by A. A. Luce 
and T. E. Jessop, Vol. III London, 1967)9 pp. ö5-6.. 
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The dialectical function of the elencbue initiated by Euphrazior hors 
is to demolish Lysiclea' position that the pleasures of sense aro the 
highest good. Lyaicles' viers hcwever, Is not entirely bated on 
rewon but an a temperamental whin ha is forced to reveal when correred 
in olenctic debate. Xe Crito's remark makes clear, then, the whole 
alenctic duel in not so much a dialectical out"ard -thrust of opposing 
opinion3 as a rhetorical device for directing satirical contempt 
a. ainet Lyaiclea' Position. 
If olenctic argument is not at the beirt of 3hafte3bury'B 
dialectical strategy, as it is in Berkeley's dialogues, neither is the 
expository and open-ended mode of argument, with its emphasis on 
draratic repartee and convert stional banter, of Mandeville's dialogues. 
Like elenctic argument, however, dramatic repartee dco8 Play a minor 
role in The Werkliste, especially in Part It which sets the stage for 
the later appearance of Theocles, the "virtuoso" Philosopher. The 
two prota; oniota of Part I are the sceptical Philocles, and Palemon, 
who is disillusioned with the world and of a melancholy temper. The 
poraliuta, in fact, is in the form of an "ejiatle" to Palot on. 
Philoc-l, s begins by remarking on the contrast between his recent 
convorcatione with Theoolea and that of "polite" circlest "All must 
be laid before you und summed up in one cocpleto account; to remain, it 
ceoii, a monument of that unsezconable conversation to opposite to they 
reigning genius of gallantry and pleasure. "' fib goes on to reflect 
on the impoz oibility of philosophical dialogu© In his own are because 
of the low ýuality of converzaticn in general: 
V14 neue not wonder, therefore, that the sort of 
moral painting, by way of dialogue, is so euch 
4. 1. cbaraetgrist1t i Ili 
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out of fashion, and that we see no more of 
these philosophical portraitures nowadays. 
For whore are the originals? Or what though 
you, Palenon, or I, by chance, have lighted 
on such a one, and pleased ourselves with the 
life? Can you ima; ino it should make a Food 
picture? 
I 
A second$ related reason adduced by Philoolea for the doclir. 3 of 
dialogue is tho Feneral preference for dogmatism In philcooph. ical 
ratterst 
You know, too, that in this academic 
i. hilocophy I am to proaont you pith, there is 
a certain way of questioning and doubting, 
rhich no nay cuita the geniun of our ago. 
teen love to take part instantly. They cannot 
bear being kept in suspense. The examination 
torments the-o They want to be rid of it upon 
the easiest terms. 'Tis as if men fancied 
themselves drowning %henorer they dare tru:, t 
to the current of reason. They seem hurrying 
away they know not whither, and are resAy tc 
catch at the timt twig. There they choose 
afterwards to hank;, though ever no innecurely, 
rather thin trust their strength to bear them 
above water. ... 
2 
Philocles' plea for scepticism here haa, as in the case of Tryden'o 
and fiurd's thoorizing on dialogue, 
3 
to do with an attitude of tolerant 
impartiality. Although both convorsational docorun and sceptical 
impartiality play a rolo in The Moralists, these do not-ýco; nprise, 
1. CharsctAristics 119 7. ? 13th a somewhat different emphasis, 
ähaftesbury's views on philosophical dialogue are also discussed 
in tho first chapter of this disuertation. 
2. Characteristics II, 7-8- 
3- The views of Dryden and P. urd are discussed in the first chapter of 
this discertation. 
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however, as in the dialogues of Berkeley and }Aandeville, 
l 
the essence 
of what makes it a philosophical dialogue. This is one important 
reason why the conversation between Philooles and Pale on, though on 
a supposedly higher level than that of the "Beau-monde, " leads to no 
philosophical conclu3ion2 but rarely paves the way for Philocles. 
The dramatic situation of Part I consists of ^hiloclas' attempt 
to coax Palemon out of his melancholy misanthropy: 
... What foreiCner (the inhabitant, suppose, 
of some near planet) when he had. travelled 
hither, and surveyed this outward face of 
things, would think of what lay hid beneath 
the man!? But let hin stay awhile. Allow 
him loinuro, till h' has gained a nearer view, 
and following; our dissolved assnnblieo to 
thoir particular recesses, he has the power 
of aeoinC them in this new aspect. ... Here 
he may behold those great men of the '3nistry, 
who not an hour ago in public appeared such 
friends, now plotting craftily each other's 
ruin, with the ruin of the State itself, a 
sacrifice to their ambition. Here he may ooe 
too those of a softer kind, who knowing not 
ambition, follow only love. Yet, rhi locles, 
%ho would think it? . t. 
2 
Philocles aarnumes this to be the harangue of a thwarted lover and acts 
as a friend attempting; to dispel Pale: 'on'a melancholy through rallying 
philosophical disc: zsaion: 
1. If 'andeville's, dialogues do not always display conversational 
decorum, they are at least highly convoruational in te; za of prose 
style and drazatic effect. 
2. Characteristics I1# 13. The punctuation within the quotation is the 
se. o as that of Eobertaon's edition of the Characteristics in 
Grean's reprint, so that the quotation: is: complete and'no t: QMissions 
are implied. It is interesting to note that Palemon contemplating 
society. contrasts very sharply with Theocles contemplating Nature. 
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*at At first I looked on you as deeply in the 
spleen, but now I concluded you in love$ and 
so unhappily on. -aged as to have reason to 
complain at infidelity. " . ie, " thought I, 
"has moved Pale. -on thus3. Hence the awl woxld t 
x ere was that corruption, and thojo disorderu 
he le=, ntetii" 
Aftor I had bei god pardon for my rude mirth, 
wich had tho good fortune however to r ., *o 
ßoize clh mQ in your hwscour, we tell naturally 
into cool roaaoning about tho nature and cause 
of ill in general$ ... 
i 
Whore is, than, a promise of rozintic intrigue2 but ite purpose is to 
draw the rozär'e attention to the different Y. -irxie of love, ran5irv 
frcra "love of the fair sex" to an anticipation of Tioocles' "tnthusic m" 
for Nature., 
Although the promise of ror ntic intrigue iu never fulfilled, 
even in their serious diocus3ien of the nature of evil, Philoclen in 
really rallying Palezon. T ; ua, at a point when Talorion bcccrac 
convinced that evil in mature is only apparent, rhilocla2 suddenly 
switches cideai 
For hors I took up your own part o ainat you, 
and setting all those villairina and corruptiona 
of human kind in the urine light you hßä done just 
berara, I put it upon you to tell where po oi"bly 
1. Charict, riat1C3 17,14. 
2. Tlzo hints of romantic intrigue of a courtly kind also includes 
brief mention of popular novels of lcvr -Lntrj e euch au, 
pro us ably, tho3o of Aphra Bonn and :! ad-=3 da Scudar7s "YOU 
dannei even our favourito novalu: those dear, swat, natural 
pieces, grit most of then by the fair sax themselves" 
(Characteristics Il, 11). 
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could be the advantage or good arising hence, 
or what excellence or beauty could redound from 
those tragical pictures you yourself had drawn 
so well after the life. 
1 
Philocles attributes his decision to his own scepticism on the question 
but Palemon is not amused and accuses him of pyrrhonism. Philocles' 
reaction is to a4mit that his rallying mode of argument can easily be 
misconstrued: "... by this loose way of talking, which I had learnt 
in some fashionable conversations of the world, I had given you 
occasion to suspect me of the worst sort of scepticism, such as spared 
nothing, but overthrew all principles, moral and divino. "2 It is at 
this point, in fact' that Philocles reveals that he is no longer a 
sceptical railleur as a result of spending two days of leisurely 
conversation with Theocles, an "enthusiast" who "had nothing of the 
bigot. "3 As this ends Part 1, and Palemon does not appear again, 
even the sceptical raillery between Paleaon and Philocles, then, is 
not quite the kind of discussion that Shaftesbury considered suitable 
for philosophical dialogue; indeed, this is how Shaftesbury describes 
his motives for including the rallying exchanges between Paleion and 
Philoclesa 
Palemon the man of quality, and who is first 
introduced as speaker in the piece, must, for 
fashion-sake, appear in love, and under a kind 
of melancholy produced by some misadventures 
in the world. Row else should he be supposed 
so serious? Philoclea his friend (an airy 
gentleman of the world and a thorough railleur) 
must have a home charge upon him, and feel the 
1. Characteristics II, 16-T. 
?. Characteristics III 19. 
J, Characteristics II, -25. 
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ancer of hic grave friend beforo he can be 
suppaaod crave ancuch to Rntor phiiocophica1 
diacouru®. l 
When ascertaining to what extent tho "rhapsodic" element In 
The "Koraliats derives from Plato, one cut be careful to distin uish 
between the "rhapsodic" elenont as a technique of rhetorical lyricism 
and=as the expression of Plato's doctrine of r-roa. : urtin Price's 
analysis in To the Palgce of Wisdom of the "rhapsodic" element in 
The Uorxl1ats concentrates more on hoer cloaely Shaftesbury follows 
Plato's pMloaopbical doctrines and how far he departs from there than 
on dialogue technique as such. This le&ls him to imply that the 
Platonic model for The "oralists was The Sympo¬siur: " ... in ' he Mloral ists. 
Palemon's melancholy proves to be disapYointed love of a kind not at 
first onvisagcd, 'but a nobler love than such as common beauties 
inspire'; and Philocles' discussion of love shows the same pattern of 
ascent as the speech of Diotima in Plato's 11y"poaiui. 12 It is true 
that Theocloc' "enthusiasm" for Natur© in similar to Socrates' rhapsodic 
outbursts on Love and that there is a kind of "pattern of ascent" in 
hq H'cralists from the raillery lootýrcen hilacloo and aaleaong to the 
sublin3 di3cu3Zion3 between Philocles and Thoocles, which is formally 
analc, ical to the increaao in sublimity between the initial opeeehes on 
1. Chgraotnrintiee III 335--6. Those remarks occur in the 111sco11annou8 
Reflections;, which were first yubliehed in 1711 as the third volume 
of the Chnricterietinl. Robertson note that Shaftesbury has 
"Raillyer" for "railleur". S ftaobury's intention to have Part I 
deal with "fashionable" topics before serious philosophical argument 
begins ie confirWcd by the fact that, as Hay. -an points out, the 
discussion of romance litersture (Characteristics 11,11) did not 
appear in The ociable 'nthußiast but was one of the additions to 
The '. 'craliets. See iii, 729-30. 
2. l: artin Price, To the Palace of 'Zizdons 5tulies in Order and 
rn r from 7=An to isIgkis (New York, 1064), p" 8" 
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Love in the Symposium to Socrates, eloquently "rhapsodic" one. In 
terra of dialectical and rhetorical structure, however, the Fhaor? rus 
seems a closer model for The "orali13ta. This is mainly because the 
relationship between Socrates aunM : 'haedrus is very similar to that 
between Theocles and Fhilocles. 
I 
Socrates' subject is the nature of 
true rhetoric and his way of showing Phaodrus that it consists of is 
by examples of it in his oratorical descriptions of Love. Phaedruo is 
to reject false rhetoric not just on rational grounds but because of 
an motional conviction in: huced by Socrates' rhapsodic speeches. 
Similarly, ''haoclos does not merely argue in favour of the harmony of 
nature and the hunan soul but lets his "enthusiasm" in the fora of 
apostrophes to Nature induce a similar feeling in Philoc1eo. 
!! nothcir way of putting it 13 that the relation8hir bstweon 
1'hiloc1os and ''heacle3 is not so roch a driatic Pr%cowork for 
dialoctical argument, as in the dialoCuca at LZandeville and ? e: eseley, 
but a dramatization of conp1qr. vntery states of wind. The ro elementary 
relationship beten Fhilocles awl Theoclos is perhaps best encapsulated 
by Philoclou' poetic description of hic ovn rolos 
I find, then, said I (rousing myself fron 
my musing posture), you expect i should servo 
you in the saxe capacity as that musician, 
whom an ancient orator ma-le use of at his elbcw, 
to strike such moving notes as raised him when 
ho was parceived to sink; and calmed him again 
when his impetuous spirit was transported in 
too high a strain. 
2 
1. As Adern Smith put it, "^iheocla3 in his 1 hapaody is exactly copied 
from Socrates. But a Socrates' humour is often too coarse and 
his sarcasma too biting for this age, he has softoned him in this 
respect and made his Theoclcs altogether polite, and his wit such 
as suits the character of a gentleman. " sea Adam smith, Lectures 
on Rhetoric and nAlles Lettres, ed. by John N. Lothian (London, 1963), 
P"55. The Lectures are extant only in the form of notes by an 
anonymous studont, who reported them in 1762-63 at the University of 
Glasgow. 
2. Characteristics Ii, 1155. 
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Fhtlocle3' role, then, is to succumb to Theoclas' "enthuai m" but 
the quo3tion rOlZino that precisely Shafta3bury meant by th-3 word if 
it w not * eroly a Platonic borrowir . 
The tir t thing to note about tae wort! "onthudia3r" Is that it 
referred to a mods offoaling considered to be totally incompatible 
with ration31 discourse of any sort *n usually a3snc1atod with 
reUic icuw fanaticism. Az Susi4 Tucker points out in her nano raph 
on the term, "Anabaptists ... tw'ruticaf Puritans, äuakar3, -Methodiuta, 
und ? aristß were all enthusiasts in the tecanierl an 4 derogatory sonne 
of the wori. The stan arl of judgement may be role: * or Ar licinitm, 
r. ni there are naturally degrnc3 or disparagement in proportion to the 
co ituent of the critic. " It is this kind of "enthu3ia s" that 
Chn£tnsbury, as a hoisto attacks in the ?. ett+mr Conc!! rnin, r'nthuciasm 
and considers arc beine duo to "mtlancholy`º and "ill-. humour. " In th+ 
samo T. , however, he, diatin uishes between "divine" or "nob1, " 
enthusiasm-9 m2io possible by a "rood-huzourod" tom; er=Onto from 
"onthursinam"' in its dl spara it . sense. Shaftcuburz'o analyzia or ghat 
8cparato2 ordinary "cnthuaiaca" from the "noble"' variety dcirivad fron 
Plato'o doctrine of "divira inspiration" in a zubtly Psychological one 
und, especially a3 it is highly relevant to his method of dtalo uo 
in This Normkots, nD0d3 to be quctc . in it3 entirety: 
nzethia ; there will be of extravagance and 
fury, when the ideas or iº as rocs vai are too 
t, ig for the narrov human va3soi to contain. äo 
that inspiration nip be just2, y called divine 
enthuaia. m; for tan vord itself aienifiez divine 
presence, and wa made use of by the p'l ilooo;. her 
1. rush: I. mocker, T"nthuof aams A Stu: dr in Ses: ir ntie ChanY10 (Ctbridct,, 1972), p, 5?. 
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whom the earliest Christian Fathers called 
divine, to express whatever Uraa sublime in 
human passions. This was the spirit he 
allotted to heroes, statesman, po©to, orators, 
muolcians, and even philosophers themselves. 
or can we, of our own accord, forbear 
ascribing to a noble enthusiasm whatever is 
greatly performed by any of these. So that 
almost all of us know something of this 
principle. But to know it as we should do, 
and discern it in its several kinds, both in 
ourselves and others; this is the great work, 
and by this means alone we can hope to avoid 
delusion. Vor- to Judge the spirits whether 
they site of rod, wn muust antacedontly iudt*o 
our own spirit, Whether it be of reason aryl 
sound sense; whether it be fit to judge at all, 
by beim sedate, cool, and impartial, free of 
every biassiq pa331nn, every giddy vapour, or 
melanchol fu. o. This is the first knowledge 
and rrevious judgments 'To understand ouraalves, 
and know what spirit wo are of. ' Afterwards we 
may judge the spirit in others, consider what 
their personal merit is, and prove the validity of 
their testimony by the solidity of their brain. 
By this means wo : ay prepare ourselves with some 
antidote againat enthusiasm. And this is vbat I 
have dared affir. i is best performei by keeping 
to good-humour. For otherwise the recodv itself 
may turn to the disease. 
1 (italics added) 
The italicized aertencs is especially significant because, as will be 
demonstrated, it describes a process of self-analysis ihs }. 'aralists 
is a kind of dran atiz tion and which, In fact, sakes 
haftesbury's notion of "noble enthusiasm" not quite identical to 
1. Char cterioticsi I, 38-9. 
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Plato's doctrine or "divine in3piration. "1 
The genuinely "divine" quality of Theocles' ''enthusiasmf - in any 
case, reveals itself in his sociability because he treats Fhilocles 
with unfailing, courtesy and "good-humour"; so much so that Philcclos 
is drawn into the saxo state of "entbu3irastic" feeling. As 11hiloclea 
reports to Paleson, "For though I was like to be perfectly curd of 
my scoptici cup 'twain by Achat 1 thought wor. 3e, downright enthusiazx. 
You never knew a morn agreeable enthusiast. "2 Philocles is also open 
to Theoclea' "enthusiasm)"'. however, because just as Theoclcs is the 
"sociable enthusiast, " he is the "sociable sceptic, " so that both share 
the temperamantal trait of beim, "good-hunºourod" in their philosophical 
attitudes. As ºheocles puts it, about rriloclos' mode of argumenti 
"Your wit a1lowo you to divert your3elf with whatever occurs in the 
debates and you can pleasantly improve even what your antagonist brings 
as a support to his ovn hypothesis. This, indeed, is a fairer sort of 
practice tann that is common ncwadnys. gut 'tis -no more than suitable 
to your character. "3 
TL"at the "good-humoured" attitudo to philosophical argument is an 
important trait shared by Fnilocles and 7heocles becomes especially 
evident when thoy confront the inquisitorial dogmatism and taciturnity 
of an "old gontleiun" who is one of Treocles' dinner-nieste. During; 
1. 'or the philosophical ani theological inplicationa, dorivod mainly 
from the Cambridge Platonists, of Shaftesbury's notion of "enthusiasm" 
see Stanley GrEnn, Shafte3burv'n Philosophy of Helirion and "thicss 
A study in Fnthusinscz GOhio, 1967)j pp. 19-3 . h3reinafter to bi cites an Grnnn. -' 
2. Charactarintice Iii 24. 
3. Chtarnctortatic$ Ixe 75. 
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a discussion on miracles, for example, the "old gentlemann" berates 
the "young gontletang" hie companion, for letting Philoclest arguments 
influence him too much: "And are you so far improved then, replied 
the severe companion, un{ler your now sceptical master (pointing to me) 
that you can thus readily dlscusa all miraclec ss uooless? "1 T'hiloclss, 
"stuge directions" are a sufficient indication of the "old gentleman&s" 
atrociouo manners, which reflect the dogmatic crudity of his orthodox 
thinking. The discussion with the "old gentleman" takes a sinister 
turn when Philoclos proposes to argue, thou., h still against the 
possibility of miracles, in Theocles' Deistic vein: 
But now, continued I, since S have bean 
thus loth; the defendant only, I am rsaolvari 
to take up offensive arms arä be aggressor 
in my turn, provided Theocios be not an ry 
with me for borrowing ground from his 
hyrpothesi$. 
"hatovor you borrow of his, replied may 
Antagonist, you are pretty cure of spoiling 
it; and as it passes thrcugh your hand3 you 
had best bowaro lest you seem rathor to 
reflect on hic than me. 
2 
The "old gentleman" hereoin3inuates that 3heocles himself may be tainted 
with Philocles' supposed infidelity. He iss thus, obstinately 
opinionated and not given to "free and impartial" debate. He in a 
representative of the intolerant mode of argument of a religious bigot, 
and in this he may well be a precursor of flume's much more subtly- 
conceived "Derzea" in the Nalorues Corcerniný-, Natural religion. 
11th: ugh 1'heocles doso give an after-dinner `"sexton" on the 
1. Characteristics 11t 91. 
2. Cha_,, racteriaý 1I,, 92. 
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ovidence of divine dezi n in Nature, 
' 
he Is hindarod from the full 
expression of his "enthu$iazi" in Part IT by hin datates with the 
rallying Philoole3 and the hostility between Philocion and the "old 
gentleman. " Once Fhilocles' "goad-huxoured" Code of ' arzuaatent and 
that of Theoolee' is firmly established and contracted to the bigotry 
or "false enthuaiaat+" of the "old gentler an, " the scene is cat for 
Theoelee to give free rein to his "enthusiastic" rapturee in the taco 
of mature. Before relating Shaftesbury's dialectical strategy to 
x°heocles' "enthUsiaaro, " howeverp it should be rated that Palawan 
represents yet another ccecies of "false nnthusla ." This is because 
Palemon's melancholy tcm; er blinds him to the sublimity of Nature. 
flia "disease" is diagnoses in the follo^ it 
, strikin ; manner by the 
newly-enlichtered 1hilocles: 
This, Palcmon, Is tho labour of your soul, and 
this its melancholy whon, unsuccessfully rursuin, 
the uuprs. a beauty, it moets v1th darkoning clouds 
which intorcdyt its night. 7on3ters arise, not 
those from Lybian dssorts, but fron the heart of 
1. According to Shaftesbury's own. gloss on 'she Moralists in the 
Liseellttrrnous Feflections, he had to sake Thooolza at "feigned 
preacher" in order to amuse his "polite" audience, who could not 
tolerate philosophical discourse otherwise. -As Shaftesbury put it, 
in the third person, "e firth these subjects (as he confesses) so 
wide of co=on conversation, and by lone custom so appropriated to 
tte school, the university chair or pulpit, that he thinks it 
hardly safe or practicable to treat of them elsewhere or in a 
different tone. He is forced therefore to raise particular machines,.. 
and constrain his principal characters in order to carry a better 
face and bear hiaaalf out c ainst the appearance or pedantry. 
Thug his gentleman philoaoýher Theoclea, before he enters into his 
real character, becomes a feigned proacber. " '. no must give due 
allo, aanco to satirical exagreration in t: 1u passage but it does 
confirm Shaftesbury's bolief in the "Impossibility" of philosophical, 
dialogue in his own ego. t, eo Characteristics 119 334-5. 
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an more fertile, and with their horrid aspect 
cast an unseemly reflection upon Nature. She, 
helpless (as she is thought), ani workinr,, thus 
absurdly, is contemned, the govern-ient of the 
world arraigned, and Deity mido void. 
1 
Palemon'8 "false entbudiasra" is not that or the rDI; gious bight but, 
u3 F'h11ncies" insinuateu, of the potential atheist with hic "cclancholy" 
worship of ratter. 
2 
It is in Part III or The Yoralista that it becomos clear that 
Fhilcclea' "sociable scepticism" io only a stage in an arc: u ent that 
1ea13 to ecstatic affirmation of ? sture. This is especially so when 
an exchanie lice the folloainir is keil in minds 
... And now, good Thoccle:, that Io become 
co willing a disciple, I want not so rcuch to 
be convinced, rnethiriks, as to be confirmed 
and strengthened. And I hops this last work 
may prove your ea3iest task* 
rot tanless you help it in yourself, replied 
Pheoclcw, for this is necessary as well a3 
bncoriintw. It had been indeed shameful for you 
to have yielded without making Good resistance. 
To help oneself to be convinced is to prevent 
reason, and bespeak error and delusion. But 
upon fair conviction to give our heart up to the 
evident cide, and roiniorco the impre33ion, this 
is to holp reason heartily. Ana thun we may be 
said honestly to Ferausde ourselves. Show Sao then 
how I 13y best persuade mysalf. 
3 
I. Characteristics IT, 21-2. 
2. In the Bett-+, r Concernins* '^ntbuaiasra, Shaftesbury lino athoism and 
111-humours "I very auch question whether anything besides ill- 
humour can bo tho cause of atheism" (Charactoriaties Is 17). Also 
ceo Grpan, 30. Crean shows that Shaftesbury's notion of athoism 
as being onccuragod by ill-humour and melancholic ctatea of mind is 
derived from Henry More. 
3. Characteristics TI, 138. 
265 
Phtlocles, in other wands, is taking- part in a process, beginning 
with a sceptical, inxartial attitude, ark ersling with "enthuaias-i" 
for nature, that T eocles had already cxperianced, but entirely on 
his own. 'hat "aeocles is descrribint,, in fact, is what whafteabury 
called the "inward colloquy" and his relationship with l'hiloclas to, 
as will be eosn, a dramatization of it. 
As Shaftesbury describes it in Soliloquy or Melvico to an author, 
the rroceco of "inward colloquy" or welf-3nalysiu consists of dividing 
the gelt into two dmmatic "characters, " as it werd, one of which is 
tho rational self and the other irr the irrational part of the self 
pray to fluctuating desires and passions. The end-result in the 
triut .h of the raticnzil self bceaute the person under ^oinr such a 
process Is thereby able to recognize his own moral weaknesses and thus 
fulfil the Delphic Injunction "Know thyself" orl as Ehattesbury terw 
it, "recognize yourcolf. "1 Pis most succinct description of the 
procezus dearite its overblown rhetoric, 
2 as tho followings 
AM here it is that our $ovorelgn remedy and 
and gymnastic method or soliloquy taken its rise; 
when by a certain powerful ricuro of inward 
rhetoric the mind apostrophisea its on fancio3, 
raiue3 them in their proper shapes and personages, 
ari adclrense3 their familiarly, without the 19a3t 
ceremony or res,. "aat. By thiu moans it will noon 
happen that two force i partioa will erect them- 
1. Chsracteriatios 11 112. 
2. Althau, &h Shaftesbury', notion of "in-ward colloquy" implies much 
more than t. u; h Blair seemed to be aware of, the excessive verbo; aity 
by which It io described tempt one to agree with Blair when he 
complairs that "2elf-ex: uiinaticn, or reflection on our own conduct, 
in an idea conceived with aase; but when it in wrought into all the 
fors of 'A man's dividing hiozalf into two parties, hecomini; a 
eelf-dialcefst, entering into partnership with hinsoll, forming the 
dual n er practically within hinsoll; ' we hardly know what to M ce 
" of it. " Sao Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric arx! Belles Lattree (London, 1823), p. 120. 
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selves within. For the iwa¬rinations or fancies 
being thus roundly treated are forced to declare 
themselves and take party. ... 
i 
Ile especially recommends such a "gymnastic method" to writers: "1e 
who deals in characters must of necessity know his own, or he will 
know nothing"2 and strongly implies that it is impossible to be a 
genuine philosopher without it: "Tie the hardest thing in the world 
to bo a good thinker without beim; a strong self-examiner and thorough- 
paced dialogist in this solitary way. "3 
The process of "inward colloquy" drmatized in The Moralists is 
one at the advanced stage of self-reflection when inspired "enthusiasm" 
develops out of rational self-knowledge. To Soo what this consists 
of in terms of dramatic technique, it is necessary to return to 
Shaftesbury's words linking "enthusiasm" to divine inspiration and 
"inward colloquy" near the end of the Letter Concerning 1"nthuslasm: 
"For to judge the spirits whether they are of God, we must antecedently 
judge our own spirit, whether it be of reason and sound sense; whether 
it be fit to judge at all, by being sedate, cool, and impartial, free 
of every biassing passion, every giddy vapour, or melancholy flame. 4 
1. Characteristics 1,123. 
2. Characteristics 7,124- 
3. Characteristics 11 112. Shaftesbury's notion of "inward colloquy" 
goes some way in explaining his apparent dislike of the conversation 
of "polite" circles and why The M. 'ori1ists, despite his emphasis on 
"good-humoured" sociability, is much less "conversational" in style 
than the dialogues of Mandeville and Berkeleys "But 'tis a certain 
observation in our science, that they who are grant talkers in 
company have never been any talkers by themselves, nor used to 
these private discussions of our home regimen" (Characteristics It 
111). 
4. Characteristics I, 39. 
26.7 
rivinely-inzpired "enthusta &t is precisely that is precente'i for 
juu wont in They Yora1i ta. Theac1ma per. -onifles this kiwi of 
ahthusies; " nmi it is the extent to which he convincingly refutes 
Phiioclea' objocticna which cn blen the rear er to judge vahether his 
"onthuaitiam" is truly inspired, irraäpectiv, of the fact that ? hilocle3 
cuccuzta to hiu "Spell. "1 
: 'hero is another a cent by which 'enthusiazm" and "in, "*az' colloquy" 
are intimately cornccte(i arvi that is ähaftoawury' s definition of 
"enthusiasm" as a "divine pros n ce": "... inspiration tray be juotly 
callod divine enthusinan; for the word itaolf OiCnifies divine presence, 
and was r Me use of by the philosopher whom the earliest Christian 
Fathers called divine, to express whatever via sublimo in human 
passions. "2 The I'divine presence, " in fact, is very ich coon rotel 
with the concept of the "Coniua loci" or "genius at placo, " which, 
apart from Its a'plication to l, andscapo gardening, 
3 
and derivation 
from o1anaicnl literature and mythalo 9,4 also occurs in the haha 
1. According to groan, The 'oraliite "represents ühattesbury's major 
zttem, t to describe the character of true enthusiasm. It is bis 
arnxor to the charge, implied in the coon uns of the terra 
'enthusiast' in his time, that a religious enthusiast must and 
cculd only be a fanatic. " See ms n, 23. 
2. ChFtr'ctmristicf I$ 38. 
3. As in Pope's lines in the "a'ýpistle to Burlington" (11.57 ff. ), 
"Consult the Genius of the Place in all; /mat tells the Waters or 
to rise, or fall" and so on. 
4. Xillia Blake's definition of the "Ceniuu of place" as understood 
by the class ical Greeks and Romans is especially succinct: "The 
ancient Poets animated all sensible objects with Goan or Goniuse3, 
callin ; them by the names and sdornirvi then with the propoerties of 
woods, rivers, mountains, la' o3, cities, nations, ant whatever 
their enlarged & nu. 2crOU3 senses could . percie 
Blake's re --aft 
is ißt The ; larringe of Reavnn anri ße11. (sic) 
Z69 
.ý 
Sac. ... And now, dear Phaedrue, I shall 
pauee for an instant to ask whether you do 
not think me# as I appear to myself, inspired? 
Fhb. Yes, : ocrates$ you zoom to have a 
very unusual floc of words. 
Soc. Listen to coo, then, in silence; for 
surely the place is holy; co that you must 
not wonder, if, as Z proceed, I appear to 
be in a divine fury, for already I acs getting 
into dithyra bics. 
Ph . Lathing can be trucr. 
l 
As it, h: 4ppansq the "holy place" is a plane-trey by the ban! ca of the 
Ilisnua "sacred to Achelous and the Vyaphs. "2 Tbust there is a kind 
of "divino presence" that stiaulatea Socrates$ rapturous speech on 
Lovs, So: ethinf; similar hcppena in Thi Yorslists when Thoocles is 
about to begin his final, ant most sustained., apostrophes to Nature: 
I? ern, 1'hilocle3, we shall fins our sovereign 
genius, if pro can charm tho genius of the place 
(pore chaste and sober than your Silenus) to 
inspire us with a truer sorw of Nature, teach 
us sor. ýo celestial hy: rn, and m? co us fecal divinity 
present in these solemn places of retreats 
3 
Tneccleo here is vearin ; F: i1oc1ou away from his oarliei paatoral 
playfulneae in, tho Vir3111rin mode, : pence the reference to the god of 
wine, Silenus, who appears to give a rhapsodic speech in the sixth 
1. Thn Dialopuns of Pl4to, trans. by Benja-ain Jowett, fourth od. 
(London, 1953), p. 144. Hereinafter to ba cited as ? ha . 
2. Fha, 136. 
3. Gharacteriatics Si, 97. 
2Cog 
Eclogue of the I3uccolics. 
1 
He iss in addition, invoking the "genius 
of place" and inducing Philooles to do the owe in order to fall into 
an "enthusiastic" mood. Thus, like Socrates, Theocles is also 
inspired by a "divine presence" and enchanted by the place in which 
he feels it. Philooles' response to Theoclee' invitation confirms 
that the place is "holy"f indeed, as will be shown, a Virgilian 
"sacred grave": 
Haste then, I conjure you, said Ip good Theocles, 
and stop not one moment for any ceremony or rite. 
For well I see, methinks, that without any such 
preparation some divinity has approached us and 
already moves in you. We are come to the sacred 
groves of the Hamadryads, which formerly were 
said to render oracles. We are on the most 
beautiful part of the hill, and the sun, now 
ready to rise, draws off the curtain of night 
and shows us the open scene of Nature in the 
plains bolow. Begin: for now I know you are 
full of those divine thoughts which meet you 
ever in this solitude. Give them but voice and 
accents; you may be still as much alone as you 
are used! and take no more notice of me as if I 
were absent. 
2 
1. That Philocles' awakening "enthusiasm" should reveal. itself in 
pastoral playfulness is in keeping with Shaftesbury's views on a 
good-humoured attitude as a prelude to "noble enthusiasm" but 
its dramatic effectiveness, even to those who enjoy pastoral 
poetry, seems questionable again, as so often in Shaftesbury, 
because of the excessive rhetorios "My jealousy and love regard 
you only. I was afraid you had a mind to escape me; but now that 
I am again in possession of you, I want no nymph to make me happy 
here, unless it were perhaps to join forces against you, in the 
manner your beloved poet makes the nymph Aegle join with his two 
youths in forcing the god Silenus to sing to them" (Characteristics 
II, 96). 
2. Characteristics II, 97. 
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Philoclea' response Is a key one because it c kea clear that, 
though both Socrates and Thecoles are inspired by a "divine presence" 
in a specific place, the rnlationahip between ihiloclee and Theocles 
is not quite the same as that between Phaedrus and Socrates. Phaedrus's 
reaction to Socrates is much more reatrainod, and tends to be so 
throughout the Pbaedrua. Philoolea, on the other harAq is not merely 
receptive to what Theoolea has to any but also echoes Theooles' 
"enthusiastic" rhetoric. Where Socrates requests silence from I'haedrus, 
Theccles finds Philocles almost demanding that he be ignored. that 
results is that Theocles and Philooles are so complementary to each 
other that Philoolos' individuality almost disappears, so that Theooles' 
soliloquies bold the stage. It could be said that Socrates' speeches 
similarly dominate the Phß but Socrates and the youthful, and 
somewhat conceited, Phaedrus are much more highly-individualized than 
Theocles and Philooles. The relationship between Theooles and Fhilocles, 
in any case, is within the tr=ework of a dialectical at rý rather 
than a series of rhetorical speeches, as in the 'pharm. 
It is e3pocially in Part III, Section I that Thoocles' basically 
rhetorical decoriptione of Nature begin to turn into dialectical 
argumont in which "enthusis &' for Nature bocomea a higher form of 
ressoninz. Theocles begins with a lengthy and rapturous strain on 
the icxaensity of 2fature, which includes the following observations 
"Thun having oft essayed, thus sallied forth into the wide expanse, 
when I return again within myself, struck with the aoneo of this so 
narxow being and of the fulness of that i=enge one, I dare no more 
behold the amazing depths nor count the abyss of Daity. "' Hare, 
1. Characteristics 7T, 98. 
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Theocles' sense of a "divine presence is not only the result of an 
"inward colloquy" in the face of f'ature but begins to imply an 
argument about the existence of God. This is especially so when it 
is recalled that in the immediately preceding exchange, Theocles talks 
of seeking "our sovereign genius. " 
Theocles' rapture, in any case, leads to an exchange where 
Philocles expresses doubts about the argument implied: 
I only wish, said I, that you had been a 
lithe stronger in your transport, to have 
proceeded as you began, without ever minding 
aye. For I was beginning to see wonders in 
that Nature you taught men and was coming 
to know the hand of your divine Artificer. 
But if you stop here I shall lose the enjoy- 
ment of the pleasing vision. And already I 
begin to find a thousand difficulties in 
fancying such a universal genius as you describe. 
l 
Philooles, in other words, is more than willing to share in Theooles' 
"enthusiastic" raptures but is somewhat sceptical that they can prove 
the existence of God ("universal genius"). 
At this stage, Theocles abandons his rhapsodies and, instead, 
argues in a neo-Platonic vein for the individuality of all natural 
phenomena. It is the individuality of a tree or a human being (or a 
place for that matter) which Shaftesbury, following a quasi-religious 
concept derived from the Greeks and Romans, calls its "genius. " He 
gives no actual proof that all things are individual but strong 
indirect evidence, at least in the case of human beings, when 
1. Characteristics III 99. 
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Philoclos challenges h1m on the points 
That you philosophers are, replied It may 
be bard perhaps to determinet but for the 
rest of mankind, I dare affiri, that fear are 
so long themselves as half seven years. 
OTis good fortune if a an be one and the 
same only for a day or two. A year waken 
more revolutions than can be numbered. 
'Prue, said he; but though this may 
happen to a cyan, and chiefly to one whose 
contrary vices not him at odds so often 
with himself, yet when be comes to suffer 
or be punished for those vices, he finds 
himself, if I mistake not, still one and 
the same. Anti you, rhilocles, who, though 
you disown philosophy, are so true a 
proselyte to Pyrrhonism, should you at last, 
feeling the power of the Genius I preach, 
be wrought upon to own the divine hypothesis, 
and from this now turn of thought admit a 
total change in all your principles and 
opinions, yet would you be still the self- 
same Philooles, though better yet, if you 
will take my judgments than the present 
one, as ich as I love and value him. You 
seas therefore, there is a strange 
simplicity in this you and men that in 
reality they should still be one and the 
same, when neither one atom of body, one 
passion, nor one thought remains the same. 
As the multiplicity of psychological states In Philooles are all 
experienced by him, this not only proves to Philoalee his own 
irAividuallty but hints at the nature of Theocles' ardent, for he 
1. Characteristics I2,101. 
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is about to demonstrate that one's own individual "genius" is 
affected by the "genius of place" due to a "sovereign Cenius" who 
accounts for the unity in all the multiplicity of Nature. 
Later a subsidiary argumorxt develops about whether evil is 
actually illusory. 
1 The argumant is an elenotio one and Theoalea 
proves to Philoolos' satiotaction that "thero is but OR" 2 overall 
active principle in the world to which all others, including apparent 
evil, are subordinated. It is at this point that Theoclen begins a 
long series of rhapsodical effunions which culminate in dreg 
that the "inward colloquy" induced by the "genius of place" crust be 
the result of a "sovereign Qonius. " 
As Samuel H. Uonk points out, these passages anticipated the 
later eighteenth-century vogue of the "sublime" because they "nerved 
as an incentive to the appreciation of the wild and savage in nature. "3 
The consistent implications of an infinite deity, in and case, makes 
such passages both rhetorical anl dialectical in aims Dialectically, 
such paasages coneist of describing "sublime" prospects from shich 
the universe, arks the earth can be surveyod. It should be noted at 
this point that for Shaftesbury the "sublime" was not primarily a 
rhetorical device but a state of mind related to "enthusiasm. " As 
)! arjorie Nicolson points outs 
1. Characteristics III 106-10. 
2. Characteristics III 109. 
3. Sautet Holt w°onic, The Sublirs A Studv of Critical ': 'heori. s in 
XVTIT-Century Vnpland A. nn Arbor, kichigan, 2960)9 p. 209. 
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Shaftesbury's "Sublime" was not Longinian. 
Indeed Longinus' name appears in his works 
so infrequently that a modern editor did 
not find it necessary to include it in his 
index. To Shaftesbury the true "Sublime" 
was not a rhetorical principle. Its source 
was not in Style, but in God and in the 
manifestations of Deity in the superabundance 
and diversity of His cosmic and terrestrial 
works. Rebelling against a word that was 
coming to cast a hypnotic spell upon his 
contemporaries, Shaftesbury like Dennis 
deliberately chose terms that were even more 
dangerous: "enthusiasm" and "enthusirustic. "l 
Nicolson's observation implies a kind of dialectic in the "natural" 
(as distinguished from the "rhetorical" or Longinian) sublime because 
the experience of the "natural sublime" reveals a Deity and if this 
process is to be dramatized in a written description (that is, in a 
rhetorical way), it must also include a dialectic in order to 
reproduce the revelatory aspects of the process. 
2 
1. Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Gloryl The 
Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite Ithaca, New York, 
1959)t p"295. What Nicolson says about the "aesthetics of the 
infinite" inherent in the "natural sublime" confirms the dialectical 
nature of such an aesthetics and also serves, broadly speaking, 
as a good description of the dialectical process dramatized in The 
Moralists: "From Infinite God through vast Nature to the soul of 
man ; from the soul of man through vast Nature back to Infinite God - 
here is the process that was becoming characteristic of 'The 
Aesthetics of the Infinite"' (p. 315). Hereinafter to be cited as 
Nicolson. 
2. For the distinction between the "natural" and "rhetorical" sublime 
see R. S. Crane's review of S. H. Monk's The Sublime in Philological 
quarterlY, 15 (1936), 165-7. He points out about advocates of the 
"natural sublime, " including Hume, Burke, Akenside and, presumably, 
Shaftesbury, that "Though their vocabulary was borrowed in part from 
Longinus, their essential preoccupations separated them sharply from 
that ancient rhetorician and his modern disciples; their character- 
istic subject-matter was not compositions and authors but 'the 
pleasures of the imagination' - the varied responses of men's feelings 
to stimuli from the outer world; they were psychologists inquiring 
about the emotions, not critics investigating the sources of high 
excellence in art. " 
27{S' 
3hatto3bury's do5cription3 of sublime prozp®cte, in any cane, 
can be divided into two stages. In the first, and more rhetorical 
one, the vastnoss of the universe is described, 
l 
as in this excerpt: 
... that seats shall we assign to that fierce 
eletaent of tires too active to be confined 
within the compass of the sun, and not 
excluded even the bowels of the heavy earth? 
The air Itself oubnits to its and serves as 
its interior instrument. Even this cur sun, 
with all those humorous euz , the glittering 
host of Heaven, seem to receive from hence 
the vast supplies which keep theta ever in 
their splendid state. The invisible ethereal 
substance, penetrating both liquid and solid 
bodies, is diffused throughout the universe. ... 
2 
The first stage, however, does not provide a conveniont prospect for 
reseoninz about divinity adq indeed, rhilooles objoota to Theoclee' 
rhetorical flightet "... you tight well expect the fate of Icarus 
for your high-soaring. 3 
It is in the second stage that Theocles provides a "prospect" or 
framework for reasoninn. Thus, the following (an "interruption") Is 
a key exchange s 
... I could wish you would go a little 
furtber with de in the map of 1sture, 
e$pociall7 if, descending from your 
lofty flights, you would be content to 
1. Nicolson pointo out that "Shaftesbury's journey in The Voralista 
follows the structure of the 'cosmic voyage' he had izihmrited 
from the seventeenth century and anticipates the 'terrestrial 
excursion' of poets like David ; fallet and Janas Thomson Vicolson, 293)" 
2. Characteristics Ill 117. 
3. Characteristics IS, 118. 
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ii tc i 4p'öh th z't 6nb1e spat of Birth, 
where I could better accompany you, 
wherever you led ms®. 
But you, replied he, who would 
confine me to thin heavy earth, must 
yet allow tie the came wince of fancy. 
How else whall I fly with you through 
different climates, from pole to pole, 
and from the frigid to the torrid zone? 
Oh, said To for this ; Crposo I will 
allow you the Pegasus of the poets, or 
that winged Griffin which an Italian 
poet of the moderns gave to one of his 
heroes; yet on this condition, that you 
take no such extravagant flight, as his 
wasp to the moon; but keep closely to 
this orb of earth. 
time you will have It sop replied 
Th8ocle3t lot us try first on the 
darkest and aast imperfect parts of 
our r p, and as* how you can endure the 
prospoct. 
l 
By making his "prospect" more earthbound bero, Shaftesbury is making 
hie rhapsodical descriptions more subject to human reason and, at 
the same timet comes ouch closer to the "genius of the place" There 
Theocloa end Philocles are discoursing. Each succeeding "praepeot, " 
in tact, focuses on a smaller area of space and time until, at last, 
the aharpost focus is on the "sacred grove. " 
At first, in any case, Thmoc1e3' earthbound and Imaginary "prospect" 
1. charactoristic3 II, 118-9. 
0 
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Is on top of a mountain1 from which hui; nity and the wonders of Nature 
can be surveyed, and at different seasons: 
... The sea, which elsewhere is scarce 
confined within its limits, lies here 
icuaured in walls of c7stal. ... 
2 
................ 
... But let us turn our eyes towards 
these smaller and more curious objects, 
the numerous and devouring insects on 
the trees in these wide plains. flow 
shining, strong, and lasting are the 
subtle threads spun from their 
artful mouths. ... 
3 
............... 0 
... Innumerable are the dubious forms and 
unknown species which drink in the slimy 
current; whether they are such asp leaving 
the scorched deserts, satiate here their 
ardent thirst, and promiscuously engendering, 
beget a monstrous race; or whether (as it is 
said) by the sun's genial heat, active on 
the fermenting ooze, now forms are generated 
and issue from the river's fertile bed. 
4 
1. That mountains could induce "sublime" feelings was only a recent 
development in Shaftesbury's time and, indeed, the whole of 
Marjorie Nicolson's )fountain Gloom and Mountain Glory io'devoted 
to the question of how the revolutionary change in attitudes to 
mountains, when up to that time they were considered mainly as 
ugly protuberances on the face of the postlapsarian earth, came 
about. Nicolson considers, among other works, Thomas Burnet's 
Sacred Theory of the Earth (1684) and the writings of the Cambridge 
Platonist, Henry 11ore, who strongly influenced Shaftesbury, as key 
documents in attitudes to mountains and the emergence of the 
"natural sublime. " As for Shaftesbury's "mountain rhapsody" in 
The Loralista, Nicolson speculates that it was probably based on 
notes he might have made while crossing the Alps during his Grand 
Tour in 1686 (Nicholsorip 289). 
2. Characteristics III 119. 
3. Characteristics II9 120. 
4.. Characteristics 119 121. 
6 
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Rhetorically, these descriptions are all contrived to engender 
"enthusiasm" for the vastness and variety of Nature and culminate in 
the numinous mystery of the "sacred grove. " 
The "sublime prospect" of Natures in other words, is especially 
intensified at the "sacred grove" described by Theoclest 
... But here, mid-way the mountain, ... a 
different horror seizes our sheltered 
travellers when they see the day diminished 
by the deep shades of the vast wood, which, 
closing thick above, spreads darkness and 
eternal night below. The faint and gloomy 
light looks horrid as the shade itself; 
and the profound stillness of these places 
imposes silence upon men, struck with the 
hoarse echoings of every sound within the 
spacious caverns of the wood. Here space 
astonishes; silence itself seems pregnant, 
whilst an unknown force works on the mind, 
and dubious objects move the wakeful sense. 
Mysterious voices are either heard or 
fancied, and various forms of deity seem 
to present themselves and appear more 
manifest in these sacred silvan scenes, 
such as of old gave rise to temples, and 
favoured the religion of the ancient world. ... 
1 
1. Characteristics II9 123. Cecil A. Moore's gloss on this passage in 
his essay entitled "The Return to Nature in English Poetry of the 
Eighteenth Century" is an interesting one because he compares. it to 
the "mood of Wordsworth" and, by implication, links "inward colloquy" 
to Romantic poetry: "Instead of the humanistic love of solitude 
as merely a retreat favorable to examination and discipline of self, 
one finds much more frequently in Shaftesbury an express statement 
of nature's spiritual power over man. Instead of being objects of 
hatred, mountains are the special dwelling place of the Great Spirit. " 
See Cecil A. Moore, Bac unds of English Literature: 1700-1760 
(Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1953), p"74" Hereinafter to be cited as 
Moore. 
27q 
Echoes of Virgil'o "dark rood" of the Ae neid, Book VI (11.179 ff. ), 
and perhaps even Dante's, abound here. As Curtius points out, 
Virgil's "dark wood". leading to the underworld "trembles with rumen, 
the porvadIng proasnce of deity; it is the way to the other 'world, as 
it is in Dante +.. "1 The same can be said of Shaftesbury's "sacred 
grove" and, although what Theocles describes to Thilocles is an 
imaginary scene) its numinous "genius" cannot be much different from 
the "saorod groves of the Uw adryads" in which Theoclea' discus3ion 
with Philocles takes place. 
2 
The "divine presence, " in other words, 
is felt strongest in the "sacred grove. " In terms of the dialectic 
of Th" kora1Ssts, Theocles' "inward colloquy" searches dee; cst where 
"space astoniubes" and "silence itself seems proßnant, whilst an unknown 
force works on the mind. " 
It is at this point, when Theocloa gives the strongest hint that 
the "sovereign genius" is at his moat numinous in the "sacred grove" 
that Philocles suddenly reveals what has finally made him succumb to 
Theocles' "spell"t "Tour genius, the genius of the place, and the 
1. Ernst Tobert Curtiue* uro an Literature in the Latin '. iddls 
Aeaq tranno by Willard R. Trask (New York, 1953), p. 192. 
2. Characteristics 119 97. When Phtlo0le3 first moeta Theoclea on 
his own, he finde him reading Virgil$ "To return therefore to 
that original rural scone and that heroic Feniue, the companion 
and guide of my first thou ; hta in those profounior oubjectn; I 
found him the firnt morning with his beloved Mantuan Luse, roving 
In the fields, where, tI had been infcmcd at his house, he was 
, ono out, after his usual way, to recd, ( iracteriotlcs fl, 27). 
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Great Genius have at last prevailod. " - That has happened, in other 
words, Is that Philoclos has experienced "genius" in all its traditional 
maaninga as defined in classical mythology and medieval rhetoric. 
7'hooclea' "genius" is his "higher self. "2 The "genius of the place" 
is the "divine present)" evident in all. places, but especially so and 
in an intensively numinous way in the Virgilian "sacred grove. " The 
Groat Genius is, for tbaftosbury, the Creator himself but the word 
"Genius" capitalised also refers to the goddesSof Nature, "that spirit 
of nature which produces all things, from which generative power has 
its nate. "3 Strictly in Terms of the dialectic of "genius, " than, 
and laying aside the vexed question of Shaftesbury'a apparent pantheism, 
it can be said that the "Great Genius" refers to the "personal 
1. Characterfotice 1T, 125. rhilooles continues with, "I shall no 
longer resist the passion growing in as for things of a natural 
kind, where neither art nor the conceit or caprice or man has 
spoiled their geniune order by breaking in upon that primitive 
state. !; von the rude rocks, the mossy caverns, the irregular 
unwrought grottos and broken falls of water, with all the horrid 
graces of the wilderness itself, as representing Nature more, will 
be the more engaging, and appear with a magnificence beyond the 
tormal mockery of princely gardens. " Such passages have had much 
influence on English landscape gardening in the eighteenth century 
and this ones in particular, is widely-quoted by students of the 
period as an example of how the notion of "genius of place" was 
applied to the kind of landscape gardening, especially approved 
by Popes which avoided the strict formality and geometrical design 
of Continental ones. Sea Edward Lalý icy,, "nglich Landscaping and 
Literature 1660-1840 (London, 1966), p. 20 and Christopher Hussey, 
The Pictures ues Studies in a Point of View (London and Vow York, 
1927), p"54" 
2. As C. Z. Lewis notes, "pr. V. Wade Fowler (in his Rsl ua 
Facperience of the Ro: aan People, p. 74) finds the origin of the 
, Gefiu3' of early Homan belief in the world-pride conception of a 
=an's spiritual double or external soul which constitutes his 
higher self. " Lovia'a indiroet''° is from his article on 
"Genius and Ccniua" in hic Studios in )2adieval and Rennicagnce 
Literature, collected by Valter cooper Ctx bridge, 19 , p"1 9" 
Hereinafter to be cited as Lewis. 
3. Andrer Tooke, The Pantheon of the Heathen Coda (London, 1819), 
245-6. "Genius" as the "god of generation" appears in Spsnoer's 
Theorie c`u: e See Lewis, 171-2- 
(, 6 ý. 3, C. c) 
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God"1 perceivod in Nature by those who are "enthusiastically" aware 
of the divinity inherent in all its manifestations. 
To sum up, the dialectic of The Moralists consists of Theocles 
re-enacting the process by which he fully discovered his "good genius" 
or higher self and, by doing so, becomes a model for Philocles to do 
likewise. This inevitably involves recognition of Nature as the 
"sovereign Genius" which the "good genius" must follow. Thus, when 
Theocles compliments Philooles with "You do well ... to give me the 
midwife's part only, "2 he is certainly alluding to his Socratic role 
but his method of "inward colloquy" also includes the conversion of 
the concept of "genius" into a dialectical argument. It is the 
"dialectic of genius, " and its Virgilian echoes, in fact, that make. 
The Moralists peculiarly sui generis and not merely Platonic as a 
philosophical dialogue. 
The )!! oraliits also contains Horatian allusions but these are not 
quite as important as the Virgilian ones because they lead to no 
dialectic but, rather, serve the purpose of showing that Theocles' 
love of Nature, though "enthusiastic, " is that of a polished gentleman 
1. without going into the question of Shaftesbury's "pantheism" in 
great detail, it is worth noting that, according to Crean, 
Shaftesbury does not always distinguish clearly between "Cod" and 
"Nature" because of his "stress on the divine immanence" but, 
espewially In the Characteristics, "usually makes a distinction 
bbfiv6dh ThdIP (Green, 66)e Although Groan does not agree with 
Leslie Stephen, the qualifications he makes about Shaftesbury's 
identification of "God" with "Nature" suggest that Stephen's 
inconclusive remarks about Shaftesbury's'"pantheism" are accurate 
and judicious: "Though at times Shaftesbury uses language which 
would fit into an orthodox sermon about a"personal God, ' his 
teaching seemsf. to adapt itself more naturally to the pantheism of 
Spinoza. " SeeAEeslie Stephen, Histo of English Thought in the 
Nineteenth Century, third ed., vol. II London, 1902)p p. 25. 
2. Characteristics II, 135. 
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with philosophical inclinations; hence the famous Horatian ter; about 
the "groves of acaäerne" as an eciEraph for m"oralistss "Inter 
cilva3 Academi*4e. rero var y" (Hor. !: p. Ii, i1)1 and, also, this 
interesting exchange botween Philocles any? Theocles, whore Shaftesbury 
seers to be soma*hat on the defen3ive: 
... he ahowcd zto his poet, and locking 
plea., antly, I ow tell me truly, said last 
Palloclcc, did you not expect soma more 
mysterious book than this? I owned I did 
considering his character, which I took 
to be of so contemplative a kited. Ant do 
you think, said ho, that without boing; 
contemplative, one can truly relish those 
diviner poets? In load, said It x nov3r 
thought there was any need of growing 
contemplative, or retiring from the world, 
to road Virgil or UorAce. 
You have naxed, two, said hot %ho can 
hardly be thought so vary like, though 
they were friends and equally good poots. 
Yet joining, them as you are pleased to dog 
I would willingly learn from you shothar 
in your opinion there be any dispcoition 
to fitted for readrlr them as that in vhich 
they writ themselves. In this, I spa sure, 
they both joined heartily: to love 
retirement; % hen for the sako of such a life 
and habit as you call contemplative, they 
were willing; to sacrifice the highest 
a(vantaj cs, plea ures, uni favour of a court. 
2 
1. In the rvtr nrmn'e Library translation, this is rendered as ".. * 
ani to so©k for the truth/Among the grove: of 0. ca3et u3. " See 
Iiorace, ß`o11 ctoi Works, trans. by Lord Dunaany =4 ". ichael 
Oakley (i, ondon! 1-9Z-17-1p. 278. 
2. Chnract4ristias III 27-8. 
283 
V'y revoalin. Thsoclest a11ogiance to Horace arid VirGil, 3naftesbury 
perhaps indicates that the urbanity of the former is not incompatible 
with the sublimity of the other an-i. thus undorcuta any critician that 
Theooles is a more "enthusiast" of tbs Platonic persuasion. Horace's 
urbane love of Nature, in any caaep in appealed to when, in Advice to 
an Author, Shaftesbury rococo one s "some thick Wood" or "some high 
rill" as the beat places for authors, especially poets, to practice 
"inward colloquy"z "3criptoruxn chorus omnis aiat nomus of fulgrit urbes" 
Nor. ": p. IT, ii). By quoting UIorraca here, Sha, fteabury ettrha3izes 
the practical rather than the nucinou3 aspects of the process. The 
"tick wood" in more of a quiet retreat that a "33crsd grove" arni9 
in less "enthusiastic" coientss the asca© is tare cf the "sylvan scenes" 
in Tho torali3t3. 
Although Diderot's L reveu de RaaoSu and 7'ho T"oralists aro vary 
different in their ut7lo3 of dialogue, it is intorestinc to note that 
in both, though much 1033 so in 5hafts3bury's dialogue, mime plays a 
significant role. Just befcrs and after one of Thsoclas' rhapsodical 
outbursts, for example, Philoclss makes the following obsorvations: 
Just as I had said this, he turned away his 
eyes from met muting while by himself; and 
soon afterwards, stretching out his hand, as 
pointing to the objects round hirm$ he beans - 
6*a60*a00*0*0*0*09 
Here ho stopped short, and starting as out of 
a dream: now, Philoclcs, said ho, inform use, 
how have I appeared to you in my fit? eomed it 
a sensible kind of raadness, like those transports 
which are permitted to our poets? or was it 
downright raving` 
1. Characteristics Ip 107. This is rondore(I by the editor as "The 
erhole band of authors loves a wood and shuns a city. " 
2. (haractsristica III 97 and 99. 
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hero, evidently, the workings of the "sovereign Genius" in Thooelos 
involve a gestural c nifostation of "enthusiaum. " Diderot, however, 
take3 such Ostures auch further, as in the nephew's mime of artistic 
genius in the followinýý. y description by " : oi" doubling ;s narrators 
11 ptcur3it, il rialt, 11 soupirait, il 
regnrdait ou attan1ri, ou tranquille, ou 
furieux; c'etatt un maihoureux 1ivre ä. 
tout son desespoir; un temple qui o'el©ve; 
des oiooaux qui so taiuont au soleil 
ccuchrnt; des eaux au qui uurr-rurent dann 
un lieu solitaire at frail, cu qui 
descendent en torrent du haut deo 
montagnaof un orMo, une tempIte, 1a 
plainto do ceax qui vont peri. r, Alec au= 
cif; le: xint des vents, au fraca3 du 
tonnerre. C'etait la nuit avec c®, 3 
tenebreos, c'ctait l'o: nbro at lo silence, 
car lo silence mäma co point par do 3 sons. 
': ')a tote ©tait tout a fait perdue. 
' 
Far from boing; inspired by a diving "genius, " however, the nerhew's 
frenzied gooturin; hero in onlyt a3 Otis Pollowo points out, a poor 
substitute for tbo process of artistic creation which properly belongs 
to the true "genius" -a word whoßo roaniztg for Diderot van much closer 
to thq modern one as applied to a human beine with highly exceptional 
1. (uotod in Otis U. Fe1loV3, "The 'heme of Coniua in Diderot's 
! tnvnu as, Rnne -Au, " D1dc rot . turlinap 2 (1952), 193. Heroinafter to , 
2. Sea Follows 193.5" Follor. s maintains of Le Neveu de Ra.:. eau., as 
a whole, that "through tho codiun of the Eaphow Diderot has 
prosonted us with bri121i: nt pantoximo ci the inspired artist, 
but it is still and only pantoatra. " 
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creativity. 
1 There is, nevertheless, a hint of pathos, and much 
philosophical and dramatic interest, in the fact that the nephew's mime 
is genAinely (if not "divinely") inspired in that it does convey 
something of the "enthusiasm" of artistic creation. The technique of 
describing gestures to convey "enthusiasm" in philosophical discussion, 
in any case, becomes a much more complex and sophisticated one in 
Diderot's hands than it ever does in The Moralists. 
That Shaftesbury's apostrophes to Nature had a considerable 
influence on later nature poets, including Thomson and Akenside, 
2 
and 
on Romantic poetry has been a critical commonplace at least since the 
publication of Cecil A. Moore's "The Return to Nature in English 
Poetry of the Eighteenth Century" in 19173 and needs no elaboration 
here, except to suggest that the "dialectic of genius" in The Moralists 
strongly anticipates the Romantic attitude to "genius. " This is 
because just as in The Moralists, Theocles is a kind of "poetic genius" 
inspired by the "genius of place, " so do many Romantic pooms, as 
Geoffrey Hartman points out, exhibit a relationship between the 
1. As Herbert Dieckmann points out, Diderot follows Edward Young in 
equating "genius" with "original" but Diderot's analysis, which is 
scattered throughout many of his critical and literary works and 
not always consistent, of the "original genius" is intimately 
connected with "enthusiasm" as a psychological and even physiological 
process rather than a divinely-inspired one. In Edward Young's 
Conjectures, on the other hand, the "original genius" is similar to 
Shaftesbury's "higher self" and, indeed, at times takes part in a 
kind of "inward colloquy, " albeit a far more egocentric one than 
Shaftesbury's: "Therefore dive deep into thy bosom; learn the depth, 
extent, bias, and full forth of thy mind; contract full intimacy 
with the Stranger within thee; excite, and chrish every spark of 
intellectual light and heat, however smothered under former 
negligence, or scattered through the dull, dark mass of common 
thoughts; and collecting them into a body, let thy Genius rise (if 
a'Genius thou hast) as the sun from Chaos; ... " See Herbert Dieckmann, 
"Diderot's Concept of Genius, " Journal of the History of Ideas, 2(. 19.4j), y5A2 
and Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition London, 1759), p. 53" 
2. See Amy Louise Reed, The Background of Gray's Elegy (New York, 1962), 
pp. 130-9. This is a reprint of the edition of 1924- 
3- It is available in Moore, 53-103. 
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"poetic geaiua" sui the "genius loci. "' in Romantic pootryr, whore 
"genius" has the =re restricted rcoanin; of roferrin to an isolatod 
Individual of outstandingly "original" ima 1 ration, howrover, thin 
relationship is not entirely harmonious but often with at least a 
hint of "demonic" tenaion. 
2 Shaftesbury's more harmonious verziong 
which confoxu to his older and more protean notion of "genius, " 
nevorthole3o, does anticipate the characteristic presentation of 
landscape and persona in fomantic poetry. When Blake gives a polenical 
definition of "genius" in The 'arriare of foavenand dell on evidently 
t$etorical principles, at any rate, he co: oa close to giving an exact 
description of the "dialectic of genius" in The toralßstas 
The ancient roots animated all sensible 
objects with Gods or Ccniuaca, calling 
them by the na=3 and adorning them with 
the properties of woods` rivers, mountains, 
lakes, cities, nation3, and wbatover their 
onlar, od &r zmerous senses could porcieve. 
(Sic;. ) 
And particularly they studied the genius 
of each city & country, plaoin, it under 
its mental deity; 
Till a system was formed, vhich some 
took advanta, c of, & enslav'd the vulgar 
by attempting to realize or abstract the 
mental deities from their objectsi thus 
begin Priesthood; 
14 See Gooffrey U. flartr an's . 
"Rozantic Petry and the Genius loot" 
in Peter Dornetz at al. +s~s., The 1Msci 1inAa of Criticise (row 
Haven and London, 1968, pp. 289- 15. tiorainaftor to be cited as 
Hartman* 
2. As Hartman points out, even in one of the greatest of Romantic 
poeat Wordsworth's ''intern Abbey, the "genius loci" is not entirely 
h saonious but haunted by a hermits " Tintsrn Abbey, the perfect 
instance of a ceditstion on Fngl1eh lariecape as a2 ma matter, still 
shows Wordsnorth's wird moving toward ,a ghostly figure, that of the Hermit" 1iartman, 311). 
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-Choosing forms of worship from poetic 
tales. 
And at length they pronouno'd that the 
Gods had order's such things. 
Thus men forgot that All deities reside 
in the human breast. l 
The merging of "genius loci" and the "deities residing in the human 
breast" d3scribed by Blake here is equally applicable both to one of 
the central concern3 of Romantic poetry and the direction of 
Shaftesbury's "dialectic of genius" in The 1oralists. 
2 
The uniqueness of The Moralists as a philosophical dialogue becomes 
especially evident when contrasted to Dialogue TX of David Fordyce's 
Dialogues Concerning riucation, which deals with subject-matter very 
similar to 3haftosbury's in The 'oralists. 
3 
As in Shaftesbury's 
work, a rapturous apostrophe to Nature plays a very important part in 
the dialogue. There is no sense of "inward colloquy, " however, 
because "Hiero's" soliloquy, far from overwhelming the dialogue with 
"sublime" rhetoric, is just an incident in it. The dramatic situation, 
1. William Blake, The Complete lyritings, edo by Geoffrey Keynes 
(London, 1966), p. 153. 
2. Flake's tone in the passage also echoes both Shaftesbury's 
militant deism and the "revolutionary""political attitudes of the 
Romantic poets at the beginning of their careers. 
ý. Fordyce was Professor of Philosophy at Larischal College, Aberdeen 
and his work is a veritable compendium of eighteenth-century 
styles of dialogue. In its combination of gravely-polite 
disquisition and rigorous reasoning, it is reminiscent of 
Berkeley's dialogues but it also contains (notably in Dialogue IX) 
rhetorical effusions in Shaftesbury's vein. Thus Chalmers' 
Biographical Dictionary describes the Dial as "of very 
considerable merit, but somewhat tinged with the fopperies of the 
school of Shaftesbury, although entirely free from its more 
injurious notions. " : 'See Alexander Chalmers, Biographical Dictiona , 
revised edition, vol. 14 (London, 1814), pp-4-0-70- 
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in fact, is not one where the solemn "enthuciasf" of a Theocles 
causes Philocles to e iulato him but the somewhat 8, -ausir1r,, one of a 
"Simplicius" opyin; on "Tiaro" and t-&kin doi n his soliloquy. 
1 
Theocles' soliloquies induce a oerse of the numinous but that of 
: iero, thou, Th it cliuplays "enthusiasm" in the face of Nature, seems 
more like a series of doctrinally orthodox utata=ents eloquently 
stated, as in the followin^° excerpts 
... But whence th3 u: uicknas and Rang of 
Thou, t? This Flicht of Ina ination and 
Divinity of fea3on': Whence but from the 
`3ource of all intellicence and WIudoi; 
But a while, since, his "4inister, the Sun, 
spread a choarful ", math throu, 7h r mortal 
divine Scnsation3 p rvaling my im. ortal 
Part. Who then kindlei thin celestial 
Firer k4 ho lighted up this Consciousness 
of rar highor Ralation, and t¬ ht my 
moo; om to beat with inaxprosaible Joy? 
? ho but (: od, inspirinj Cod, that kind and 
gentle Laing, shoso supreme Delight is to 
diffu3o flappinas3 for over, and whoao 
Bounty axtoncs to all, without Partiality 
or Envy`t2 
". 3iaro" rz10doatly treats kiff "rixaroody" as an "enthusiastic" 
outburst which is "rhapsodical" precisely becau3e, when the then 
prevailing ojorativ sae nini of the word "rhs,, sody" is taken into 
1. David Fordyce, Dialouuea Conc rnina rducation, Vol. 2 (London, 
1745), p. 237" Hereinafter to be cited 3 ca. 
2. Tord-, rcm, 241. 
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account, of its incoherence: 
' 
I MUCH doubt, Gentlemen, that the Rhapsodist 
is not a little obliged to the Reciter O. e. 
"Simplicius" who is reciting Hiero's soliloquy 
to a club of debaters], for the Distinctness 
and coherence of the Rhapsody. I am afraid the 
Heat of an extempore Transport would scarce 
have produced a piece of Reasoning, which 
seems to hang together, and which does not 
want in Colouring and Imagery, unless it had 
been laboured and wrought up by the cool 
Touches of the Closet. 
2 
"Sophron, " on the other hand, assumes, in his reply to ßiero's doubts, 
that a "rhapsody" need not necessarily be incoherent: 
... nor do I think it, with my Friend's Leave, 
quite polite, to assert positively, that a 
warm Imagination kindled to an uncommon Degree, 
by the mild Splendour of a morning Sun, and a 
full Prospect of Nature, in its most verdant 
Dross and amiable Attitudes, amidst the 
consenting Chorus of the Animal Creation, may 
not have cast off a beautiful and well- 
c. tnected Rhapsody. 
3 
In this exchange, in facts Shaftesbury's rehabilitation of the word 
"rhapsody" can be seen at work. 
1. Dr. Johnson's definition of "rhapsody" as "any number of parts 
joined together, without necessary dependence or natural connection" 
was a meaning often applied disparagingly to literary works by such 
diverse figures as Addison, Defoe, and Horace eialpole, the best- 
known oxample being, according to Pat Rogers, Shakespeare's usage 
in Hamlet's phrase "A rhapsody of words" (III. iv. 48). Rogers 
maintains that "this shade of meaning dominated all others for a 
long time. " See Pat Rogers, "Shaftesbury and the Aesthetics of 
Rhapsody, " British Journal of Aesthetics, 12 (1972), 246--8. 
2. Fordyce, 247- 
3. Fordyce, 247- 
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Saafte3bur7, hicselt, explained his motive* for subtitling hio 
mozßc a "rhilosophicil r: iap3ody" in the follouinn a nner: 
"r*. our author himself ". " to conceal ". " his 
strict imitation of the ancient poetic dialogue, 
has prefixed an auxiliary title to his work, and 
given it the surnazn, of Rhapsody. As if it wer© 
rarely of that essay or nixed kind of works, 
which come abroad with an affected air of 
negligonce and irregularity. But what®var our 
author my have affected in hieß title p ep 
'tvra3 co little his intention to write after 
that mode, of incoherent uorkainship, that it 
appoare oorely against his will if this dialogue 
piece of his has not the just character and 
correct form of those ancient poems described. 
I 
Although in the above remarks from the ltisol11rnQaus Rcfleotion3 
Shartosbux7 repudiates any notion that The Loralisto is actually a 
"rhapsody, " but only labelled ao to avoid alionating aristocratic 
roaaors uninterested in deep philosophical speculation, Tot these 
rema*S are a footnote to a atateyont which implies that the dialogue 
does contain a certain "rhapsodical" element in the ncu obsolete 
sense of the text 
... it attempts to unite the eaveral 
personages and charaoteri in one action 
or story, within a determinate compass 
of time, regularly divided and drawn 
into different and proportioned scenes; 
and thin, too, with variety of ctylo3; 
tho cimplo, comic, rhotorioal, and even 
the poetic or sublime, ouch an Is the 
Aptost to run into enthusiasm and 
1. Ch*ract, %ristlca Ili 334, n. 1. 
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extravagance. So much is our author, 
by virtue of this piece, a poet in due 
form, and by a more apparent claim 
than if he had writ a play or dramatic 
piece in as regular a manner, at least, 
as any known at present on our stage. ' 
The unified structure of The Moralists that Shaftesbury insists one 
then, is the dramatic unity of philosophical dialogue as an ancient 
genre; otherwise there is a diversity of styles which makes it a 
"rhapsody" in the obsolete sense but, since the "poetic or sublime" 
element Shaftesbury refers to 1s the dominant style, 
2 it is a 
"rhapsody" in the sense almost discarded by Augustan writers and 
rehabilitated later in the eighteenth century. 
At this point it should be evident that Shaftesbury's method of 
dialogue is radically different from that of Berkeley and Mandeville 
and, basically, for three reasons. These are, the dialectical 
function of the setting as "genius of place l" the dominance of the 
rhetoric of the "natural sublime" over logical argument, and the 
dramatization of complementary states of mind rather than 
irreconcilable attitudes. Put another way, dialectical argument is 
1. Characteristics III 334. 
2. According to Ernst Cassirer, "The style of Shaftesbury's 'Moralists' 
is not abstract and dialectical, but rhapsodic and hymnic; and in 
this hymnio style the original force of the Platonic doctrine of 
Eros was revived for modern times. " Cassirer, however, lays too 
much emphasis on Shaftesbury's "enthusiastic" rhetoric, so that 
Leibniz's evaluation of The 1oralists, though equally favourable, 
is a more balanced one: . "The turn of the method of arguing 
through questions, but, above all, the grandeur and beauty of the 
ideas, their luminous enthusiasm, the apostrophe to deity, 
ravished me and brought me to a state of ecstasy. " See Ernst 
Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. by James P. 
Pettegrove Edinburgh, 1953)9 p. 19 and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 
Philosophical Papers and Letters, Vol. III trans. and edited by 
Leroy E. Loemker (Chicago, 195 9 pp. 1029-30. 
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subordinato to rhapsodical. feeling in The Moralists. It looks 
forward, in fact, to the decline of philosophical dialogue in Britain 
after reaching its apex in flume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 
Seen in this light, Shaftesbury's true English heir may well be Walter 
Savage Landor in his series of lmaginazy Conversations. This is 
especially true of Landor's "expository" Conversations, such as 
"Rousseau and Malherbes, " a political discussion, and "Epicurus, 
Loontion and Ternissa, " a dramatization of Epicurean ideas. These 
are distinguishable from his more strictly dramatic onesI such as 
"Tiberius and Vipsania, " which focuses on the emperor's tragic love- 
affair, and "Peter the Great and Alexis, " a melodramatically fatal 
confrontation between the Czar and his son. 
As in The iioralists, close dialectical argument is never very 
strong or long sustained in the expository Conversations. Even more 
than in the case of Shaftesbury, however, rhapsodical prose is Landor's 
forte. In "Epicurus, Loontion, and Terniaaa, " for example, Landor 
dramatizes the Epicurean state of mind by allowing Epicurus to become 
rhapsodical at appropriate moments, as in this exchan e: 
TFIRNI5SA. 
0 what a thing is ace! 
LEONTION. 
Death without death's quiet. But v9 will 
converse upon it when we know it better. 
I; PICURU3 
2iy belovedl we will converse upon it at 
the present hour, while the harshness of 
its features is indiscernible, not only 
1. The distinction is Usefully and convincingly made by Shafik H. 
Legally in "Landorts Dramatic Dialogues, " Cairo Studies in English 
(1963-66), p. 171. 
X93 
to you, but even to mot who &a auch nearer 
to it. Disa roeablo thief , like disaCreoable 
men, are never to be spoken at when they are 
present. Do we think, as we may do in auch 
a morning as this, that the air awakens the 
leaves around us only to Pain and perish? 
to weg what is certain, think that every 
note of music wo over hoard, every voice 
that ever breathed into our bosons, and 
played upon its instrument the heart, only 
matted us on a little nearer to the tomb? 
Lot the ido3 not oaddon but compose us. 
Let u yiold to it, just as season yiolds 
to season, hour to hour, and with a bright 
serenity, ouch is Evening is invented with 
by the de; artirr Sun. ... 
1 
Landor here evokes an ele; 7iec mood which bas its philosophical 
implications but is further removed from dialectical ardent than 
shaftesbury'a "rhacoodi®s. " Landor'a diatogueo, then, can be 
classified as Romantic vez ions of philosophical dialogue, the 
salient characteristics of which are already found, to a large extent, 
in The 1loralieto. 
" Although William Gilpin'e A Dirtlo uc Centsinins a Description of 
the Cnrdsºn: z of thw Right ionourtblo tb. Lord Viscount Cobham is better 
knovn a3 one of Ci1pin's early treatises on l xdecapo gardening than 
as a philosophical disloaue, 
2 
yet it is one of the Bost felicitous 
1. «alter : 3avsa Landor I, rinar Conviraationi of Greeks anti 
Aamn (London, 1653), pp"2 Q-5" 1 
2, ccarpta from Cilpin'a dialogtop for example, ara anthologized 
in a recent collection of excerpts fro= treatiuoa on lTInd3Cane 
gardening. Soo John Dixon Eunt and Peter Willis * eda. 'ihm CAniua 
of thh P1acas The rn, lish Lan oca e Carden 1620-1620 (London, 
1-975)t pp"254-9. 
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examples of the genre in the eighteenth century, with the added 
interest that its use of the "genius of place" is similar to 
Shaftesbury's and arguably more successful as a setting for discussion 
and enthusiastic rapture. Part of Gilpin's advantage over Shaftesbury 
is that the "genius" he invokes is that of a real place, Cobham's 
famed garden at Stowe which Pope admired as "a place to wonder at. "1 
On the whole, Gilpin is less solenn than Shaftesbury, as can be 
seen in the following exchange induced by an "artfully" contrived 
"genius of place, " the Temple of Contemplation at Stowe: 
... This Building stands retired in a thick woven 
Grove upon the Banks of the Serpentine River. 
Here Callophilus, sitting down, begged his Friend 
would excuse him ono Moment; for he had an 
Inclination, he said, to tempt the Genius of the 
Place. An agreeable Retreat, says he, always 
inspires me with a Kind of Enthusiasm -I must 
indulge the thrilling Transport. Coma, my Friend, 
sit down; and tell me if you do not admire the 
Taste of these buzzing Insects, retired from a 
glaring Sunshine into this peaceful Shade? - Nay, 
said Polypthon, if you are in this Strain, I'll 
leave you to invoke your Egeria alone: I never 
interrupt Lovers - Callophilus protested he should 
not stirs You mistake, says he, the Nature of 
my melancholy. It is not of the sequestring 
Kind. It never disqualifies me for the 
Conversation of a Friends How indeed should 
it? it is not the result of a cowered Humour, 
but of the utmost Self-enjoyment - Take carer 
1. Pope's remark is quoted in Christopher Eussey, English Gardens 
and Landscapes 1700-1750 (London, 1967), p. 89. 
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take care, roply'd Folypthon, how you dally 
with auch `'elf-enjoyment. ... 
I 
; ith its polished livolinaza ant decultory bantor, the above exchan, 
sugge3tu that Gilpin is tar more interested in the dramatic offact 
of the scene than in infecting the reader with "enthusiasm. " It in 
almost as if Mandeville hai a hand in subvertin,.; the "sublime" purpose 
of the invocation at tho "Conius of place. "2 
'Whore Cilpin&a dialogue, doapite some aimilaritieu of technique, 
tends to subvert $hatte3bury'a method cf dialacuo, 3haftosbury's 
influence as a dialo uo writer is much more direct not in any tng1ish 
writer but in J. 13. Htarder's reit Z'122 Cnnvariattons .3 iiarclar'a 
dialogue is ba3iaally a defence of Spinoza and an exposition of his 
own theolo . 
ical viowe. 
4 
It is somewhat morn systematic in its 
r: resentation of ideas than 'nip) t'oralinta but, as in Shafteabury'a 
dialogues rhapso1ic bnthusiae: a plays a large part. farrier, himself, 
1. Willi= Gilpin, A Dialocruet Conte eaa Tencription of the 
Ca der. 3 of the ?? i , ht Fyonourablo the 
Lord Viscount Cobham at Stow 
in l3uckin ohim'hire, third od. London, 1751)t p. 12. The "K, ori&' 
refers to a nyaph-like goddess of v+ater, as d®ccribod 
in Charlton 
T. Lovio and Charles Short, A t. 3tin 'Dictionary (Oxford, 1966). 
She is also montionod by Fhilcoles, but not invoked, in 
Charactgrioticu II , 27. According to legends as described in the 
Oxford Comns-ion to Classical Literature, ehe regulnrly not King 
tu beside a sacred opring at night and, ln: 3pired him with har 
counsels. It iss this legend that Fhilooles (as gell as Polypthon) 
alludes to when he mantiono how his dream of being inspired by an 
unseen'Theocles reminds his of the "Roman sago" and his FCeria. 
2. As Barbier, vho ra13te3 Oilpin'z d. iraloCue to The Voraliats, Auto 
it, "Au for ähafte3bury's 'enthusir m, ' Gilpin waa too well 
balancod for this notion to boil him over ... " Soo Carl Paul Barbier, 
Vi1li irn Gil . in, ilia Ara ingal Tea ng, ani Theory of OR 
r%icturo3 P2' (Oxfords 1963), p. 23" 
: +hafteabury's technique of dialoguo is also evident in the dialogue 
sections of Barrier's Sacra 'Postar of the VobrewEs. An 1x lieh 
translation of these ßoctiona, entitled Orient4lPia ryas 
published in London in 1MU1. 
4. Soo the translator's introduction in Johann Gottfried Eerder, Q, 
SOT Conversetions, trans. by Frederick il, iurkhazdt (thew York, 
1949, pp"3-11. Herdor's work was first published in 1787. From 
hereinafter to be cited as Vardar. 
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alludes to Shaftesbury'a work at the and of his Preface to the second 
edition of the Conversations and calls it "those amiable dialogues. "' 
In addition, the fifth and last conversation ends with Shaftesbury's 
"Hymn to Nature" which is one of Theocles' rhapsodic outbursts in 
the last part of Thr Loralists. 
Each conversation ends and is interspersed with "hymns" about the 
nature of God but, unlike Theocles' rhapsodic outbursts, the hymns are 
culled from poets. The hymns are the result of argument which 
develops into enthusiastic rapture, as in the following excerpts 
TiiEOPMON: ... I at least, my friend, feel so 
enervated by every philosophy which plays with 
that type of symbolical words without ideas and 
without objects, that I cannot soon enough return 
to nature, to existence, just to become aware again 
that I am alive. We, too, Philolaus, in our 
discussion have often had to use the name of God 
as a more symbol. How would it be if we interrupted 
it now, and you played to men in your expressive way, 
a gentle song or a hymn by which our soul might be 
refreshed again? 
PHILOLAUS: I desire the same. 
2 
At this point Philolaus sings a hymn by Ewald von Kleist (1715-59) 
and, at the end of it, Theophron is moved to say: "Thank you, 
philolaus. Through your harmonious singing you have inwardly 
refreshed me with Kleist's thoughts. I should like to say of music 
what Vanini said of his straw. 'If I were so unfortunate as to 
doubt of the existence of Cod, and had music, then it alone would be 
1. Harder, 71. 
2. Herder, 147" 
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proof enough for a4. '"1 v This exchange, in taotv is a more sophisticated 
version of Thmocles' manner of interrupting rational argument to 
rhapsodize about his own intuitions induced by a contemplation of 
Nature. : "heophron here implies that rational argucaont can bo too 
abstract for discussing the natura of God and. that, sooner or later, 
one must rely on an outburst of feeling adequately represented only 
by poetry. %hore Herder is more subtle than Zhaftesbux7 in his 
technique is in his fine gradations of "enthusiasm, " for what causes 
Thoophron to requoat a hymn from Philolaus is not a fit of "divine 
enthusiasm" but his sense of an emotional gap in philoaiophioal 
discussions of God, and this leads him to become "enthuaiastic, " as a 
temporary, but defiant, reaction n against rational argument* 
Another Romantic dialogue, which is auch more of an "inward 
colloquy" than Tho ! ra1ieta! maven up a section of the Gorman 
philosopher J. Q. ? iohto'a The Vocation of Man. Although it in Fichte'o 
own popularization of his idealist philosophical syatcr, 
2 
hiGhly 
abstract arruraont provailo over litcrsry tochniqua. In style, 
noverthOles3, it has some affinity with ähsfteabury"a soliloquizing 
node of writing in the Charactnristico, especially Advice to an Author, 
!, Kiecollnneoun Reflactiona, and The "orallata. 
1. Jerlar, 149. 
2. Ficht, remarka in the Preface that "This book is ... not intonded 
for philoso; her3 by profeaaion, vho hill find notbini, in it that 
has not been already sat forth in other writings of the samo 
author. It ought to bo intelliCiblo to all readora who aro able 
to undcratar4 a beck at all. " Soo Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ro puls? 
a, fourth ad., Vol, I (London, 1ME9}, p. 321. The vocation of 
van was first publishod in 1CCO. ttorcinafter to be cited as 
Fichte. 
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The Vocation of an makes no attexnpt at creating characters to 
represent different states of mind, as in The Moralists; instead, the 
reader in confronted with an "I" who converseo with a "Spirit" in a 
drean. As the "Spirit" hints at, the conversation is a process of 
self-questioning: 
... I bring thee no now revelation. What I 
can teach thee thou already knoweot, and thou 
hast but recall it to thy rene: nbranoe. I 
cannot deceive thee; for in every step thou 
thyself wilt acknowledge me to be in the right; 
and ahouldst thou still be deceived, thou wilt 
be deceived by thyself. Take courage; - listen 
to met and answer my queations. 
I 
Elsewhere, the "Spirit" reiterates that "Thou hast well understood me, 
or rather thyself. "2 and "I say nothing in my own name. Examine, - 
help thyself! "3 and, as hie final words, "I leave thee alone with 
thyself. "4 Inward colloquy in The Vocation of ! an, however, finally 
leads to self-deception, in which the "I" finds that the only 
conclusion he can reach is that "All reality is transformed into a 
strange dream, without a life which is dreamed of, and without a mind 
which drea. a it; - into a dream which is woven together into a dream 
1. Fichte, 355" In the Preface, Fichte exhorts the reader, in a 
manner highly reminiscent of Shaftesbury's promotion of the 
"gymnastic method" of "self-converse, " to "rally and truly hold 
converse with himself, deliberate, draw conclusions and form 
resolutions, like his imaginary representative, and thus, by his 
own labour and reflection, develope(oio,, ) and build up within 
himself that mode of thought the more picture of which is presented 
in this book. " See Fichte, 322. 
2. richte, 387- 
3. Fichte, 398. 
4. richte, 382. 
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"ofitself. "1 It is no accident, then, and, indeed, an adroit 
literary touch, that the dialogue takes place in a disembodied dream 
with no recognizable setting or "genius of place. " Where in The 
Moralists Philocles' broadmindod scepticism leads to enthusiastic 
rapture, in The Vocation of Man, "I"'s willingness to examine his own 
basic assumptions only leads to pyrrhonism. 
2 
Viewed aa Romantic dialogue, it is appropriate that this section 
of Fichte's work should end on such a note because philosophical 
dialogue dons not really lend itself to an emphasis on the subjective 
but on ideas that can be discussed within the sociable environment of 
an animated conversation. In Shaftesbury's dialogue, conversation 
still plays an important part, if only as a necessary prelude and 
dramatic foil to enthusiastic rapture induced by soliloquy in the face 
of Nature. In Fichte's, however, the whole emphasis is on the 
subjective consciousness which finally "surrenders" to faith in Book 
III of The Vocation of Man. It participates in dialogue not as a 
social activity but as a dream of inward colloquy leading to self- 
deception. Since the Romantic dialogues of Landor and Fichte are 
the two logical extremes of different elements in Shaftesbury's style 
of dialogue, it is not surprising that his influence is much more 
important in Romantic poetry-than in philosophical dialogue. 
1. Fichte, 402. 
2. This is more explicitly stated in Fichte, 410. 
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CIIAF M VIII. DIALECTICJ\L CHO "ZOGT. ' MY tUM rOL . uCAL DR't ?t 
IN B7=11; 7717! ALCIPHT. ZO? +
... an attentive reader will find that 
there is scarcely a single argument that 
can be urged in defence of Revelation but 
what is here placed in the clearest light, 
and in the most beautiful diction: in 
this work there is a happy union of 
reasoning and imagination. The two 
difforsnt characters of the two different 
sorts of free-thinkers, the sensual an3 
the refined, are strongly contrasted with 
each other, and with the plainness and 
simplicity of ! uphraner. " 
Joseph Warten in An 'essay on the 
Genius and Zritin5s of Pope (1782) 
1. Joseph Yyarton, An r: osay on the Genius and Writinim of Pope, vol. II 
(London 1782), p. 205. 
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Berkeley's Alcipbron, or The b'inute Philosopher1 is not only one 
of the greatest philosophical dialogues of the eighteenth century 
but a work of Christian apologetics; indeed, a bold and aggressive 
defence of Anglican Christianity. He is almost unique in combining 
the "disinterestedness" of argument and dramatic flair essential to 
the genre with the polemical aims of an apologetic work. The 
tradition of "the defence of Christian faith on intellectual grounds 
by trained theologians artI philosophers, "2 in fact, does not include 
many formal dialogues. There are, nevertheless, some distinguished 
ones in the corpus worth mentioning. One of the earliest is Justin 
Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, in which the "Apologist, " a converted 
philosopher of the Platonic persuasion, either records a genuine 
conversation or fictionally recounts his own arguments in favour of 
Christianity against Trypho the Jew. 
3 
Although Louis 'Jives' 
De Veritate Fidei Libri V includes discussions between a Christian and 
a Jew and a Christian and a Lohammedan, among medieval scholastics 
perhaps only Abelard's unfinished Dialogus inter Philosophum et 
Christianum can be considered as a true philosophical dialogue in an 
apologetic vein. The very title of Abelard's dialogue hints at a 
philosophical broadmindedness in that he finds no difficulty in having 
a Christian discourse with a Jew and a philosopher instead of dealing 
1. Berkeley wrote the Alciphron in 1731 during his enforced leisure 
in Rhode Island waiting in vain for his project to establish a 
university in Bermuda to come to fruition. See T. E. Jessop's 
introduction to the Alciphron in The Works of Geore Berkeley, ed. 
by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, vol. III (London, 1967)9 polo The 
text is based on the third edition of 1752. Hereinafter to be 
cited as Berkeley III. 
2. The definition comes from The Oxford D4 ! , ýyý 
e4" 
3. See James Donaldson, A Critical History of Christian Literature 
and Doctrine from the Death of the Apostles to the Nicene Council,.:. 
'vol. II (London, 1866)9 pp. -90. 
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with them separately, as Vivea does with the Jew and the Mohazaedan. 
l 
Berkeley, in any caae, is admirably successful at sublimating 
polemical bias into a lofty not vigorous drama of ideas. Ilia target 
is every variety of Deist and enemy of Christianity of his dry. As 
he puts it in the ", dvertiscment, " "Tha author's design being to 
consider the free-thinker in the various lights of atheist, libertin®, 
erthiaaiast, scorner, critic, metaphysician, fatalist, ani aceptio, 
it must not therefore be imagined that every one of these characters 
careee with every individual free-thinker, no more being implied than 
that each part agrees with some or other of the sect. "2 In his 
apologetic attack on the Deist& Berkeley was not alone, for Peisu 
was the chief philosophical opponent of Christian orthodoxy in the 
eighteenth century. 
3 Aa Deism was not entirely anti-Christian but 
a kind of rationalistic belief in a remote God re3pon3ible for the 
"nichaniaal" laws which govern the universe ani an advocacy of 
morality for its own sake, rather than in terms of future rewards and 
punishments, the many apologetic works of this period emphasized the 
"reasonableness of Christianity, " itself the title of Locke's defence 
of it. The toot distinguished of these works, however, such an 
Law's The Case of Rcaaon (1731) anä Butler's Anaiopr of feliEicn (1736) 
were not in dialogue fora. Es eci ally when one considers £erkeloy's 
impeccable philosophical creientials, his Ale_ iphron, then, is unique 
in desaonstrating, as will be seen, the "reasonibleneoa of 
1. According to J. Ramsay McCallum Abolard's Dialogue "exhibits a 
p nehantt for religious reconciliation that truceo been as 
unusual in the riddle Ages aas it has bean until vary recent years*" 
Sog Abelard'o Cbriatian Theolcvy (Oxford, -194B), p. 2. 
2. IArkele 777' 23. 
3. See "Englands The Fiae and Fall of the Cult of Reason" in Gerald 
R, Cragg, Thew Church and the Aim of Reason 1646-17E, 29 vol. 4 of 
Th_elican Hietory of the Church Uarondsxorth, 1972jß 1, p. 157-73" 
Hereinafter to be citedl Cri. 
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Christianity" in terms of brilliant conversation; in terms, indeed, 
of dramatized rational discourse* 
Berkeley's concern for dramatic presentation is almost 
immediately apparent in that "Dion, " the narrator of the seven 
dialogues which make up the Alciphron, is, much like Hume's "Pamphilus" 
in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, a very self-effacing 
presence but one which gives us essential information about the 
interlocutors as characters within the dramatic context of the 
dialogues, which may be more dramatically direct but seem somewhat 
less dramatically self-contained because he is forced to provide 
information about the interlocutors in the prefaces. "Dion"'s 
descriptions, in any case, vividly recreate the scenes, and that 
because he wants to "entertain" his friend "Theages" with some 
"amusing; incidents" rather than dwell on the failure "of the affair 
which brought c, e to this remote corner of the country. "2 
Dion's carefully-detailed description of the protagonists in the 
discussions prepares the reader for the mode of argument each will 
adopt. To begin with Euphranor, he is the host of the discussions 
and an independent landowner. nion's description of him is basically 
that of a thoughtful and retiring person who, to paraphrase Voltaire, 
"cultivates his own garden" and is not much affected by fashion: 
"He kath read much, and thought more; his health and strength of body 
enabling hin the better to bear fatigue of mind. He is of opinion 
that he could not carry on his studies with more advantage in the 
1. One of the chief Deist works attacked by Berkeley in the 
Alci hron, Matthew Tindal's Christianity as Old as the Creation 
(1730). is in the dialogue form. It contains, however, very 
little attempt at dramatization and little of conversational style. 
Tindal's representative, in fact, tends to be assigned long, 
expcsitory paragraphs unrelieved by any enlivening hint of character. 
2. Berkeley TII, 31. This is a thinly-disguised allusion to the 
failure of Berkeley's Bermuda project which, in fact, resulted in 
his writing the Alciphron. 
304' 
closet than the field, where his min is seldom idle while he prunes 
the trees, follows the plough, or locks after his flocks. "1 This is 
in great contrast to Aleiphron, a jaded and widely-travelled 
aristocrats "Alciphron is above forty, and no otranger either to 
men or books. I knew him first at the Temple, which, upon an 
estate's filling to him, he quitted, to travel through the polite 
parts of T; urope. Since his return he bath lived in the amuse-zenta of 
the town, which, being grown stale and tasteless to his palate, have 
tlun, T hilt into a sort of splenetic indolence. "1 h*t is perhaps most 
damning In the contrast between Mphranor and. klciphron io that the 
former is no more contemplative but a highly-productive roan in his 
farming activities. Alciphron, on the other hand, haar the unproductive 
Sccial role or a conuu er of plea urea. Crito is simply described 
as "a noighbourin! ^; gentleman of dintinguiahed merit and estate, who 
lives in great friendship with F: uphranor. "2 One can infer from such 
a description that Crito is much more of a man of the world than 
1"aphranor, thought ao his friendship with ! uyhranor suggests, one not 
corrupted by'it. It should be noted at this point that the 
dejaription of flciphrcn is not a direct one of L`ion's but a report 
of Crito's description of him. T= is enhances the fictive Illusion 
that Dion is a lively letter-writer faithfully reporting every detail 
of the discussions in which he was a modestly marginal participant. 
, By 
doing so, Berkeley keeps his distance from all the "dramatis 
personae, " whether Christian or othorwisie, aal that, in itself, tend$ 
to reinforce a reading of this dialogue as a kind of dramatic 
presentation. As for Lysicles, Crito describes him as "a near 
i. ,,, a * po Ia II79 32. 
2.3 rkolý Ill, 32. 
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kinsman of mine, one of lively parts and a general insight into 
letters, who, after having passed the forms of education and seen a 
little of the world, fell into an intimacy with men of pleasure and 
free-thinking, I am afraid much to the damage of his constitution 
and his fortune. "1 Although both are anti-Christian, Alciphron's 
"splenetic indolence" and Lysicles' contrasting "lively parts" make, 
as will be seen, a great deal of difference in how each one argues 
his case against Christianity. 
Before investigating the dialectical structure and polemical 
aims of the Alciphron, however, it is interesting to note that 
Berkeley often makes argument scintillating in its effect by 
including subtly dramatic touches distinct from, yet not unrelated 
to, the treatment of the interlocutors as well-defined characters. 
In the Third Dialogue, for example, Euphranor alludes to the chair 
Alciphron is sitting on to make a complex point about aesthetics in 
a simple and clear-cut manners 
EUPIRANOR. ... Could the chair you mit one think 
you, be reckoned well proportioned or 
handsome, if it had such a height, breadth, 
wideness, and was not so far reclined as to 
afford a convenient seat? 
ALCIPHRON. It could not. 
EUPHRANCT. The beauty, therefore, or symmetry 
of a chair cannot be apprehended but by knowing 
its use, and comparing its figure with that 
use; which cannot be done by the eye alone, 
but is the effect of judgment. It iss therefore, 
one thing to see an object, and another to 
discern its beauty. 
ALCIPHRON. I admit this to be true. 
2 
1. Berkeley III9 32. 
2. Berkeley III9 124. 
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Fuphranor'n example could not be more dramatically appropriate as it 
reminds the rea3er that this Is a "tea-table" discussion, as 
described by Dion at the beginning of the Third Dialogue when he 
informs T'heagee that : tlciphrcn was at his ease "reclining in his 
chair. "l It is almost as it Alcipbron 2s paying for his indolence 
in assuming that he dove not have to be on his guard against 
:u phrinor's arguments* 
Cenerally speaking, Euphranor and Crito reinforce each other's 
arguments. Alciphron and Lysicles, on the other hand, actually 
undermine each other despite their alliance against the Christians. 
This makes for a very lively and complex dialectic based on a 
highly-charged dramatic situation; coreover, there is nothing arbitrary 
about Alciphron and Lysicles undermining each other because, whereas 
Alciphron represents the more idealistic free-thinkers of the reist 
persuazion, such as Ehafteabury and his followoro, 
2 
Lysiclea represents 
the more cynical and, in Eerkoley's eyes at any rate, atheistic 
freethinkers, Mancleville being apparently conaidered one of the cost 
notorious. 
3 I3erkeley's concern with both of these kinds of 
infidelity" in the same work strengthens the case for considering it, 
in common with Joseph Butler's far more famous Anulo'y' of Religion, 
1. Barkele III9 112. 
2. The Third Dialoive, for example, is a sustained and, at tires, 
satirical attack on $haftesbury's ethical and aesthetic ideas 
and conducted mainly between Alciphron and : "uphranor. 
3. As has been noted in chapter siz of this dissertation, thin is 
especially evident in the Second Dialogue, which attacks i! andeville's 
ethical and philosophical ideas and is conducted mainly between 
Crito and Lyraicles. 
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as a definitive work of Christian apologetics for its age. 
l 
Berkeley's "Advertiaemont, " at any rate, wastes little time in 
striking a polemical note which hinto at the nature of the dialogues 
to follows 
Whatever they preterd, it is the author's 
opinion that all those who write either 
explicitly or by insinuation against the 
dignity, freedom, and immortality of the 
human soul, may so far forth be justly said 
to unhinge the principles of morality, and 
destroy the means of making men reasonably 
virtuous. 
2 
Berkeley'saiSressive tone here leads one to expect a kind of "straw- 
man" situation in the dialogues to folloev, such as Mandeville himself 
wittily complained of as a basic defect of the Alciphron as dialogue: 
No Mortal ever saw such Disputants before; they 
always begin with swaggering and boasting of 
what they'll prove; and in every Argument they 
pretend to maintain, they are laid upon their 
Backs, and constantly beaten to Pieces, till 
they have not a 1nord more to say; and when this 
has been repeated above half a Score times, 
they still retain the same Arrogance and 
mal-a-pert Briskness they were made to set 
out with at first; and immediately after every 
Defeat, they are making fresh Chall©ngesp 
seemingly with as much Unconcern and Confidence 
of Success, as if Nothing had pass! d before; 'or 
1. As Jessop points out about the relative obscurity of the 
Alciphron in relation to Butler's Analog, "This disparity of 
reputation is not altogether just to Berkeley. Both works are 
magisterial, each in its own way - with the striking difference 
that the one is plainly literature and the other plainly is not. " 
wee Berkeley III, 7.. 
2. Berkele III9 31. 
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they remember'd Nothing of that had happen'd. 
Such an Undauntedness in assaulting, and 
Alacrity in yielding, as you have made them 
display, never met in the same Individuals 
before. ' 
Mandeville's criticism is just to the extent that Berkeley's 
essentially "apologetic" or polemical purpose leads him to systematic 
refutation of every idea advanced by Alciphron and Lysicles. 
Berkeley's dialectical method, however, is not as simplistic as 
Idandeville implies and this is because Berkeley's polemical purpose 
is far subtler than the Advertisement would lead one to expect. 
His polemical subtlety, which also affects his dialectical method, 
consists not merely in forcefully demonstrating the falsity of the 
freethinkers' anti-Christian ideas but dramatically showing that 
their very mode of thinking is logically and even psychologically 
deficient. 
The process by which Berkeley's polemics are simultaneously 
directed against allegedly false notions and a specific mode of 
reasoning is a highly complex one but it is possible to isolate it 
for purposes of analysis in a few "sections"2 where the flow of 
argument tends to be more purely polemical. This is true, for 
example, of sections sixteen to eighteen of the Fifth Dialogue in 
which Alciphron argues with Crito against Christianity on the grounds 
that its lofty principles were originally a cunning device to gain 
political power: 
1. Bernard Mandeville, A Letter to Pion, ed. by Bonamy Dobree 
(Liverpool, 1954), PP-52=3--. It was first published in 1732. 
Hereinafter to be cited as Dion. 
2. These are Berkeley's own, which he enumerates and captions in the 
"Author's Table of Sections. " See Berkeley III, 25-9. 
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ALCIPIMON. ... But it is the observation of 
one of our great writers, that the first 
Christian preachers very cunningly began with 
the fairest face and the best moral doctrines 
in the world. It was all love, charity, 
meekness, patience, and so forth. But when 
by this means they had drawn over the world 
and got power, they soon changed their 
appearance, and sheaved cruelty, ambition, 
avarice, and every bad quality. 
1 
Crito'S` reaction is to rephrase Alciphron's answer *a that its 
logical fallacy becomes apparent: 
CRITO. That is to say, some men very cunningly 
preached and underwent a world of hardships, 
and laid down their lives to propagate the 
best principles and the beat morals, to the 
end that others some centuries after might 
reap the benefit of bad ones. Whoever may 
be cunning, there is not much cunning in the 
maker of this observation. 
" 
it would seem here that Alciphron is guilty of blaming the early 
Christians for the faults of later ones who were Christian in name 
only. Crito's deflation of the logical implications of Alciphron's 
observations also includes a heavy tinge of sarcasm as he echoes 
Alciphron's disparaging use of the word "cunning" to show up his 
deficiency in logic. Aloiphron, however, is not stung by this as 
Crito is referring to what Alciphron called "the observation of one 
of our great writers"; 
2 indeed, far from being offended, he adduces 
another point which seems to be considerably more substantial: "And 
1. Berkeley III, 190- 
2. According to Jessop's footnote to the passage, the writer alluded 
to is either Shaftesbury or Tindal. 
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yet ever eine this religion bath eppoared in the world we have had 
eternal feuds, factions# mas13aore3, and warn, the very reverao of 
that hymn with 'hich it Xe introduced in the Cospe1t - 'Glory be to 
Cod on high, on earth pace, good-will towards zone'"' Crito 
actually chits the validity of this point but in such a w&7 a3 to 
demonstrate that it is no argument again3t Christianity as nuchs 
CRITO. This I will not deny. I will even 
own that the Gospel and the Christian 
religion have been often the pretexts for 
these eviler but it will not thence follow 
they were the causa. On the contraary, it is 
plain they could not be the real proper 
cause of these evils; because a rebolliouo, 
proud, revengeful, quarrelsoen e spirit is 
directly opposite to the whole tenor aal 
kost express precepts of Christianitys a 
Dint so clear thtt I aha11 not rove it. 
Atd, secondly, because all those evils you 
mention were as frequent, nsy, tauch more 
frequent, before the Christian religion was 
known in the world. Th, y are the co=on 
product of the ps ions and vices of 
maankindq which are sometimes covered with 
the mask of religion by ricks son, haw, 
the form of godliness without the Power of 
it. This truth seocs co plain that I am 
aurprf aw1 how any gran of a1 knowledge, 
nnA Cnnicur cRn make a doubt of it. (ita1ico added) 
Crito's rejoinder is not so much a denial of Alciphron's assertion an 
a refutation of Its applIcabilitr to the worthlessness of 
1. Pmrkk%]@ III1190. 
2. Torkele ITI9 190-1. 
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Christianity. Thisis so on one level but on the 'level Implied by 
the italicized phrases it polemical edge is discernible. The 
implication, in other woria, is that Alciphron's arguments are not 
entirely ei hers. As a philosophical dialogue, then, the Alcýon 
may best be described as a polemical draxa of ideas. 
Although one may accept that there in a genuine polemical drama 
of ideas in the Alciphron, the queotion still remains whether 
it is "impartial" enough to be considered a true philosophical 
dialogue. Considering that neither Alciphron nor, especially, 
Lysioles are intended to be honest incuirors after truth, the 
inevitable answer seems to be timely in the negative. Such an 
anower seems even firmer when one recalls that in 1'andeville's 
dialoj ues the opposing interlocutor Is usually naive and misguided 
rather than morally or intellectually corrupt. Bearing this in 
mind, it seems appropriate that Mandeville had the following complaint 
to make about the Alciphrons 
I know, sir, that in drawing those Characters, 
you design'd them for Tonstare to be abhorr'd 
and detested; aus! in this you have succeeded to 
Admiration, at least with tae; for I can assure 
you, that I never saw any two Interlocutors in 
the aamo Dialogue or Drama, whose Behaviour 
anal Principles I execrate more heartily, that I 
do theirs. 
1 
Despite the way that 1andeville'e thinly-dieguieed Tetularce at the 
way his ideas were treated in the A1ciphron confirms one's suspicions 
about its lack of impartiality, it ist nevertheless, a distortion of 
1" Pion, 53. 
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Berkeley's dramatic technique. 
The main thrust of Berkeley's attack, in fact, is not so much 
on Alciphron and Lysioles as persons to be abhorred (Euphranor and 
Crito have, after all, stimulating discussions with them) but an 
investigation into their mode of thinking. The keynote of this aim 
is struck at the very beginning when this exchange occurs between 
Crito and Tuphranor just after Lysicles and Alciphron depart from 
the scene: 
They were no sooner gone but Euphranor, addressing 
himself to Crito, said he believed that poor 
gentlemen Z: -i. e. Alciphroi2n had been a great sufferer 
for his free-thinking, for that he seemed to 
express himself with the passion and resentment 
natural to men who have received very bad usage. 
I believe no such thing, answered CRITO, but 
have often observed those of his sect run into 
two faults of conversation, declaiping and 
bantering, just as the tragic or the comic 
humour prevails. Sometimes they work themselves 
into high passions, and are frightened at 
spectres of their own raising. In those fits 
every country curate passes for an inquisitor. 
At other times they affect a sly facetious 
manner, making use of hints and allusions, 
expressing little, insinuating much, and upon 
the whole seeming to divert themselves with the 
subject and their adversaries. But, if you 
would know their opinions, you must make them 
speak out and keep close to the point. 
1 
The above exchange is an important one because it makes it evident 
that the discussions to follow are going to be conducted in a spirit 
i. Berkeley III9 37. 
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of ill-concealed boatility, as the opposing net of interlocutors do 
not moroly disagree about certain doctrines but even about hoer one 
is to conduct an argument. Cue of Berkeley's important aims, in 
short, and one fully consonant with Christian apologetics and 
philosophical dialogue, is to reveal the method of reasoning of the 
freethinkers. 
In the four-way discuaaiona, it is Ephranor and Alciphron who 
are most philosophically "disinterested. " Euphranor, however, is 
"disinterested" in a very different way from Alciphron, as can be 
seen in this exchax ge from the Third I.? ialoL e on whether the "moral 
nense" Is a useful philosophical concepts 
ALCIflt CN. I tell ycu, Euihranor, we contemn 
the virtue of that an who computes and 
deliberates, and must have a reason for being 
virtuous. The refined moralists of our sect 
are ravished and transported with the abstract 
beauty of virtue. They disdain all forenaical 
motives to it, and love virtue only for virtue's 
sake. Ch rapturet Oh the quintessence of 
beauty! L ethinka 1 could dwell for ever on 
this contemplations but, rather than entertain 
myself, I rust endeavour to convince you. 
Make an experiment on the first an you meet. 
Propose a villaincus or unjust action. Take 
his first some of the natter, and you shall 
find he detests it. He nay, indeed, be 
afterwards misled by arguments, or overpowered 
by temptation; but his original, unprewoditated, 
and genuine thoughts are just and ortbodox. flow 
can we account for this but by a moral sense, 
which, left to itself, kath as quick and true a 
perception of the beauty and deformity of human 
uticns+ as the eye bath of colours? 
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FJPHRANOR. May not this be sufficiently accounted 
for by conscience, affection, passion, 
education, reason, custom, religion; which 
principles and habits, for aught I know, may be 
what you metaphorically call a moral sense? 
ALCIPflRON. What I call a moral sense is strictly, 
properly, and truly such, and in kind different 
from all those things you enumerate. It is what 
all men have, though all may not observe it. 
I 
Both Euphranor and Alciphron here are philosophically "disinterested" 
in that both are genuinely concerned with how the value of virtue 
is to be defined. The flaw in Alciphron's disinterestedness, 
however, is that he refuses to be consistently rational, and this, 
in turn, is a flaw in his character, for he is impetuous and wilful. 
Thus, when he rejects any rational definition of virtue and, instead, 
professes a quasi-mystical belief in its value as, a kind of 
aesthetic beauty, he is entirely consistent with his wilful mode of 
argument. 
2 
Euphranor, on the other hand? is a solid reasoner who 
is very sceptical of the notion that virtue has an aesthetic dimension 
divorced from its social and moral utility. He rejects Alciphron's 
formulation not so much because he considers it false but because 
be prefers arguments based on meticulous reasoning rather than 
impulsive rhetoric. Thus, in the exchanges between Euphranor and 
Alciphron there is not only dialectical opposition but dramatic 
clash of character as well because the confident solidity of one is 
contrasted to the nervous obstinacy of the other. 
1. Berkeley III9 120-1. 
2. Alciphron's arguments are derived from Shaftesbury and l: utcheson. 
According to Jessop, the term "moral sense" "was introduced to 
express the view that moral distinctions are apprehended neither 
by revelation nor by reason, but by a natural sensibility 
analogous to aesthetic taste" Berkele III, 120 n. ). Needless 
to say, Berkeley hakes the doctrine of "moral sense" seem to be 
as irrational as possible. 
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Lysicles 1s generally wittier than Alciphron but his wit is 
often at Alciphron's rather than the Christians' expense. He 
serves both a dramatic an4 dialectical function. Drataticnlly, 
his witty sallies enliven much of the serious discussion. 
Dialectically, his un4erv ining of Alciphron is no sheer whirs on 
lorkeley'a part but a way of drassatioa1ly shoainb that reist 
principles, as such, are logically inconsistent and a pale echo of 
Christianity which unwittingly confirms the truth of it. This is 
perhaps most felicitously done in the Fifth Dialogue where Lysicles 
berates Alciphron for attempting to assort the validity of natural 
religion independently of that of Christianity. As Dion reports its 
LT $ICL1 ;, instead of answering Crito, turned 
short upon Aloi; hron. It was always my 
opinion, said be, that nothing could be 
sillier than to think of destroying 
Christianity by crying up natural religion. 
'hoover thinks highly of the one can never, 
with any consistency, think meanly of the 
other] it being very evident that natural 
religion, without revealed, never was and 
never can be established or received 
anywhere, but in the brains of a few idle 
speculative men. I was aware what your 
concessions would come to. The belief of 
Cad, virtue, a future state, aM such fine 
notions are, as every one may see with halt 
an eye, the very basis and corner-atone of 
the Christian religion. Lay but this 
foundation for them to build on, and you 
shall soon see what superstructures our men 
of divinity will raise from it. The truth 
and importance of those points once 
airitted, a man need be no conjuror to 
i 
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prove, upon that principle, the excellency 
and usefulness of the Christian religion. 
And then to be sure, there must be priests 
to teach and propagate this useful 
religion. And if priests, a regular 
subordination without doubt in this worthy 
society, and a provision for their maintenance, 
such as may enable them to perform all their 
rites and ceremonies with decency, and keep 
their sacred character above contempt. And 
the plain consequence of all this is a 
confederacy between the prince and the 
priesthood to subdue the people; so we have 
let in at once upon us a long train of 
ecclesiastical evils, priestcraft, hierarchy, 
inquisition. ... 
1 
In spite of his evident hostility to Christianity, the points 
Lysiclea makes actually reinforce the Christian side of the debate, 
even to the point of being a summary of Berkeley's arguments in 
favour of the Anglican Established Church, ani this for the highly 
ironic reason that it-is Alciphron who has made all the concessions 
which Lysicles claims can only strengthen the arguments on the 
Christian side. 
As far as Berkeley's portrayal of Alciphron as a Deist is 
concerned, there is one grave inconsistency in that in the First 
Dialogue he actually proclaims himself to be an atheist: 
Atheism therefore, that bugbear of women 
and fools, is the very top and perfection of 
free-thinking. It is the grand arcanum to 
which a true genius naturally riseth, by a 
certain climax or gradation of thought, and 
1. Berkele III, 208-9. 
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without which he can never possess his soul 
in absolute liberty and repose. For your 
thorough conviction in this main article, 
do but examine the notion of a God with the same 
freedom that you would other prejudices. 
1 
Taking into account the general hostility towards atheism at the 
time, including legal sanctions against its it is possible that some 
self-professed Deists were disguised atheists. Alciphron, in fact, 
goes on to remark that 
This is all, take my word for its and not mine 
only but that of many more the most ingenious 
men of the age, who, I can assure you, think as I do 
on the subject of a Deity. Though some of them 
hold it proper to proceed with more reserve in 
declaring to the world their opinion in this 
particular than in most others. And, it must 
be owned, there are still too many in England 
who retain a foolish prejudice against the 
name of atheist. 
2 
Alciphron'o words fulfil Berkeley's observation in the Advertisement 
to the effect that "A gentleman in private conversation may be supposed 
to speak plainer than others write, to improve on their hintan and 
draw conclusions from their principles .. 
3 It is not likely, however, 
that Berkeley shows Alciphron to be an atheistic "Deist" for purely 
polemical reasons. The dramatic process by which Alciphron develops 
from a nominal Deist, jrhicb is indicated by his disagre©ments with 
ILysicles, to a Deist almost Christian in outlook, as indicated by 
1. Cerkeley III9 208-9. 
2. Berkeley I??, 44- 
3- Berkeley III, 23. 
w1- 
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his gradual assent to almost all of the arguments emanating from 
Euphranor and even Crito, is the result of dialectical and dramatic 
requirements. Dialectically, it is necessary to refute the most 
extreme form of "infidelity, " atheism. Dramatically, however, 
Berkeley also found it necessary to show that atheism is not only 
morally repugnant but a kind of illogical fanaticism as well. Thus, 
the more "reasonable" and idealistic atheist, Alciphron, soon leaves 
it behind, whereas the cynical Lysicles steadfastly remains one. 
Crito differs from Euphranor in his acerbic wit which, as has 
been seen in the observations on the Second Dialogue in , chapter 
six, is more than a match for that of Lysicles. Furthermore, where 
Euphranor at least seems to be curious about the ideas of thn 
freethinkers, Crito barely hides his contempt for them and dismisses 
their mode of argument in this manner: "Tour free-thinkers, without 
offence be it said, seem to mistake their talent. They imagine 
strongly, but reason weakly; mighty at exaggeration, and jejune 
in argument 1'l 
1 Often, as well, he proceeds not so much to develop 
an argument as to make a stinging rhetorical assertion, as in the 
following interruption to the aforementioned discussion on the 
"moral sense"s 
CRITO. To bear Alciphron talk puts me in 
mind of that ingenious Greek who, having 
wrapped a man's brother up in a cloak, 
asked him whether he knew that person; 
being ready, either by keeping on or 
pulling off the cloak, to confute his 
answer, whatever it should be. For my 
1. Berkeley III9 209. 
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part, I believe, it matters were fairly 
stated, that rational satisfaction, 
that peace of mind, that inward comfort, 
and conscientious boy, which a good 
Christian finds in good actions, would not 
be found to fall short of all the ecstasy, - 
rapture, and enthusiasm supposed to be the 
effect of that high and undescrib©d 
principle. In earnest, can any ecstasy be 
higher, any rapture more affecting, than 
that which springs from the love of God 
and clan, from a conscience void of 
offence, and an inward discharge of duty, 
with the secret delight, trust, and hope 
that attend it? 
Uhat Crito is hinting at is that Alciphron's "enthusiasm" for the 
aesthetic beauty of virtue is rather hollow and not even worth 
arguing about. This reinforces, and is in vivid contrast toi 
F, uphranor's painstaking attempt to make Alciphron recognize the 
inadequacy of his notion of "moral sense" but it does so rhetorically 
rather than dialectically. 
The consistency of dialectical counter-thrust and characteristic 
mode of argument of each interlocutor suggests that a common 
dialectical thread runs throughout the Alciý. It is, in tact, 
the dramatic presentation of the "minute" way of arguing. It is 
Euphranor who proposes to call Alciphron and Lysicles "minute 
philosophers" rather than "freethinkers" which, according to 
Euphranor, connotes a freedom of argument which he, as a Christian, 
does not object to. Crito agrees and adds that 
1. Berk= I1I9 122. Needless to say, Bark ly here seems to make 
Crito adopt the lofty, high-minded tone of a bishop's sermon. 
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... the modern free-thinkers are the very 
13 ame with those Cicero called minute 
philosophers, which name admirably suits 
them, they being a sort of sect which 
diminish all the most valuable things, 
the thoughta, views, and hopes of men; 
all the knowledge, notions, and theories 
of the mind they reduce to sense; human 
nature they contract and degrade to the 
narrow low standard of animal life, and 
assign us only a small pittance of time 
instead of immortality. 
1 
Alciphron agrees to the use of the term but only because he gives it 
a very different meanings 
... As to what you observe ... of those 
we now call free-thinkers having been 
anciently termed minute philoý q it 
is my opinion this appellation might be 
derived from their considering things 
minutely, and not swallowing them in 
the gross, as other men are used to do. 
resides, we all know the best eyes are 
necessary to discern the minutest 
objects: it seems, therefore, that 
minute philosophers might have been so 
called from their distinguished 
Ferspicacity. 
2 
The burden of Berkeley's overall dialectical strategy, then, is to 
demonstrate that the non-Christian freethinkers argue only in the 
1. Berkeley 1119 46-7. Crito's`formulation alludes to Cicero's 
use of the term "minute philosopher" in De Lene ctute and De 
Divinatione. 
\ 
2. Berkele III1 47" 
321: 
first, disparaging, sense. 
1 
By the end of the Sixth Dialogue, the exposure of the 
freethinkers as very clack ones is turned into the paradox of 
freethinkers being not merely defective in their mode of argument 
but positively bigoted, and prejudiced rather than open-minded and 
rational: 
CRITO. ... Lut it has often been remarked by 
observing men that there are no greater 
bigots than infidels. 
LYSIC r". Whati a free-thinker and a bigot - 
Impossible! 
CRITO. Not so impossible neither, that an 
infidel should be bigoted to his infidelity. 
Methinks I see a bigot whereever I see a 
man overbearing and positive without knowing 
why, laying; the greatest stress on points of 
smallest mocront, hasty to judge of the 
conscience, thoughts, and inward views of 
other men, impatient of reasoning against 
his own opinions, and choosing them with 
inclination rather than judgment, an enemy 
to learning, and attached to mean 
authorities. How far our modern infidels 
agree with this description, I leave to be 
1. In sections 19-25 of the Fifth Dialogue the issue of "minute 
reasoning" is merged with a discussion of Scholastic abuses of 
iiarning and logical hair-splitting. Loth sides accuse each 
other of being the true heirs of all that was worst in 
Scholasticism. It is interesting to note, however, that, in 
refuting the Deist claim that Scholasticism gras still flourishing 
in the universities, Crito offers a definition of its deficiencies 
very Baconian in wording and attitude: ". 'here was indeed a time 
when Logic was considered as its own object: and that art of 
reasoning, instead of being transferred to things, turned alto- 
gather upon words and abstractions; which produced a sort of 
leprosy in all parts of knowledge, corrupting and converting them 
into hollow'verbal disputations in a most impure dialect" 
IIerkele II19 203). Thus, even in such a minor but striking 
stylistic detail, Berkeley makes sure that his attack on Deistic 
"minute reasoning" is not liable to be construed as a bigoted, 
hostility against any kind of empirical reasoning, especially 
that of the natural sciences. 
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considered by those who really consider and 
think for themselves. 
LYSICLES. We are no bigots; we are men that 
discover difficulties in religion, that tie 
knots and raise scruples, which disturb the 
repose and interrupt the golden dreams of 
bigots, who therefore cannot endure us. 
l 
Crito's reaction to Lysicles' retort justifying his own mode of 
argument is to propose an alternative mode which is not solely 
negative in its effects. It needs to be quoted in full as it is 
both an eloquent summing-up of the broad scope of Berkeley's 
dialectical strategy in favour of Christianity and a justification 
of it as exemplified by the arguments of Crito and Fuphranor in the 
Alci phrons 
CfITO. They who cast about for difficulties will 
be sure to find or make them upon every 
subject; but he that would, upon the foot of 
reason, erect himself into a judge,, in order 
to make a wise judgment on a subject of that 
nature, will not only consider the doubtful 
and difficult parts of it, but to take a 
comprehensive view of the whole, consider it 
in all its parts and relations, trace it to 
its original, examine its principles, effects, 
and tendencies, its proofs internal and 
external. Be will distinguish between the 
clear points and the obscure, the certain 
and uncertain, the essential and the 
circumstantial, between what is genuine and 
what is foreign. Tie will consider the 
different sorts of proof that belong to 
different things; where evidence is to be 
1. Berkeley III, 283" 
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expected, where probability may suffice, and 
whore it is reasonable to suppose there should 
be doubts and scruples. He will proportion 
his pains and exactness to the iar, ortanco of 
the inquiry# and check that disposition of. 
his mind to concludo all those notion groundless 
prejudices, with which it was imbued before 
it knew the reason of them. He will 
silence his passions, nnn listen to truth. 
He will endeavour to untie knote as well 
ao to tie then, and dwell rather on the 
light parts of things than the obscure. Ire 
will balance the force of hin understandin, S 
with the ditficultyof the subject, and, to 
rarer his judgment impartial, bear evidence 
on all aides, and, so for as he is led by 
authority, choose to follow that of the 
ho: ieotest and wisest man. 1.110, s, it is gay 
sincere opinion, the Christian religion miy 
well stani the test of such an inruiry. 
l 
The "com rchonsive view of the vhole, " at any rate, to what 
Fuphranor and Crito try to achieve and evidently it la not a 
dogmatic view but one baoed on a logic of probable arrament very 
similar to I. ccke'a notion of the "balancit ; of argumanta" doacribed 
in the Conluct of the Urde+rata-Ainax 
By an Interesting twist of dtalectic'l irony, it to Alciphron 
an3 uyaioles who are shown to be the real dogmatists, as they 
rotu3e to weigh and balance the probability-of various arguments in 
favour of Christianity. This is especially clear in an exchange like 
1. Berkeley 111,283-4- 
20 As hao been described in the first chapter of this dissertation, 
the Lookean notion of the "balancing of arguments" is one of the 
key characteristics of. the philosophical dialogue in the 
eighteenth century. 1' 
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the following from the Sixth Dialogue: 
ALCIPURON. After all, Day what you will, this 
variety of opinions raust needs shake the 
faith of a reasonable man. there there are 
no many different opinions on the same 
point it is very certain they cannot all be 
true, but it is certain they may all be 
false. And the means to find out the truth! 
When a man of sense sets about this inquiry, 
he finds himself on a sudden startled and 
amused with hard words and knotty questions. 
This makes him abandon the pursuit, thinking 
the game not worth the chase. 
CRITO. But would not this man of sense do well 
to consider it must argue want of 
discernment to reject divine truths for the 
sake of human follies? Use but the same 
candour and impartiality in treating of 
religion that you would think proper on 
other subjects. We desire no more and 
expect no less. 
1 
Alciphron here shows himself unwilling to test the basis of any 
argument in favour of Christianity. His reason for such an attitude 
is the inadequate one that some of the arguments in favour of 
Christianity are necessarily and self-evidently False, which betrays 
close-minded dogmatism and an unwillingness to teat the truth of 
any set of arguments in its favour. A close investigation of the 
dialectical role of each interlocutor, then, reveals that, in spite 
of iandeville's ironical strictures, there is a genuinely 
dialectical development of ideas in the Alciphron, and one closely 
integrated within a dramatic context. 
1. Berkeley III, 275" 
t 
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Significantly, much of the subject-matter dealt with in the 
Alciphron had already been investigated years earlier by Berkeley 
in Steele's Guardian. As A. A. Luce puts it, "The connection in 
both thought and phrase between ierkeley's assays and his Alciphron 
is close, and there can be no doubt that the work done for Steele 
opened out later into that fine defence of Christianity. "1 
Berkeley's essays, in fact, were attacks on the freethinkers and 
written in a very lucid style of exposition and argument. Although 
no essay in the Guardian corresponds exactly with any specific section 
of the Alciphron, fruitful comparisons can be made between Berkeley's 
methods of treating similar subjects in essay and dialogue. His 
last contribution, "The Bond of Society, " is especially instructive. 
The essay is an excellent piece of expository reasoning in the 
analogical mode. That Berkeley sets out to demonstrate is that 
just as the Newtonian "laws of attraction" account for the order of 
the universe, so does the "force" of benevolence hold society 
together. 
Although most of the essay develops such a demonstration, its 
real importance seems to lie in the "corollaries" to the demonstration, 
as developed at the end. At the beginning, however, the reader is 
only prepared to anticipate tho development of an ana]ogy between 
the order of the universe and that of morality, as in the opening 
paragraphs 
If we consider the whole scope of the creation 
that lies within our view, the moral and 
1. A. A. Luce, The Life of George Berkeley, Eishop of Cloyne (London, 
1949), p. 63. Also see p. 132 of Luce's biography where he 
observes that "his copy of the Cuaardian must have been at hand, 
I think, and in use When Berkeley penned the Alciphron. " 
Hereinafter to be cited as Luce. 
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intellectual, as well as the natural and 
corporeal, we shall perceive through a certain 
correspondence of the parts, a similitude of 
operation and unity of design, which plainly 
demonstrate the universe to be the work of 
one infinitely good and wise Being; and that 
the system of thinking beings is actuated by 
laws derived from the same divine power 
which ordained those by which the corporeal 
system is upheld. 
1 
Berkeley, indeed, floes on to develop the analogy and though it is a 
traditionally Christian one, he develops it in effectively Newtonian 
terms, so that this part of the argument ends on an eloquently 
assertive note: 
And as the attractive power in bodies is the 
most universal principle which produceth 
innumerable effects, and is a key to explain 
the various phenomena of nature; so the 
corresponding social appetite in human souls 
is the great spring and source of moral 
actions. This it is that inclines each 
individual to an intercourse with his species, 
and models every one to that behaviour which 
best suits with the common well-being. Hance 
that sympathy in our nature whereby we feel 
the pains and joys of our fellow-creatures. 
Hence that prevalent love in parents towards 
their children, which is neither founded on 
the merit of the object, nor yet on self- 
interest. It is this that makes us 
1. The Works of Geore Ferkele , ed, by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jescop, vol. VII London, 1953)v edo by A. A. Luce, p. 225. Hereinafter 
to be cited as Berkeley VII. All the essays appeared anony- 
mously between April and August of 1713. "The Bond of Society" 
(no. 126) appeared on red., Aug. 5. For Luce's detailed evidence 
in favour of the essays he considers to be by Berkeley, see 
"Berkeley's Essays in the Gua_' in Mind, 52 (1943), 247-63" 
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Inquisitive concerning the. affoirs of 
distant nations which can have no influence 
on our own. It is this that extends our 
care to future generations, and excites us 
to acts or beneficence towards those who 
are not yet in being, and consequently from 
whom we can expect no recompence. In a 
word, hence arises that diffusive sense of 
humanity so unaccountable to the selfish 
man who is untouched with it, and is, 
indeed, a sort of monster or anomalous 
production. 
l 
The repetition of prepositional phrases ("hence, " "it is this ..., " 
"in a word ... " etc. ) in the assertive mood is rhetorically 
effective not only because it lends an air of excitement to the 
demonstration, almost as if it were a blinding "revelation, " but 
also because it has a certain formal similarity (but one stripped of 
pedantry) to the "Q. E. D. '"s of irrefutable logical demonstration. 
The last sentence of the "demonstration" is especially 
interesting in that it suddenly introduces a note of censures and 
one which leads directly to the "corollaries, " the first of which is 
that "in promoting ... the common good, every one doth at the came 
time promote his own private interest. "2 Though on the surface 
the first "corollary" seems to follow from the demonstration in a 
canner analogous to Euclidean reasoning, the note of censure makes 
acceptance of the first corollary not merely a matter of deductive 
reasoning but of "conscience" as well. Otherwise the reader has the 
unpleasant task of reflecting on whether he himself is "a sort of 
1. Berkeley VII1" 227. 
2. Berkeley VII9 227-8. 
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monster or anomalous Frc uotion. " The process, in any cane, is 
almost unconscious as I3erkoley's sentonoe3 have great P1utnoy and 
clarity. The aeconi corollary is much isoro atrlkin and ingoniouse 
Another observation I shall draw from the 
Fxeý^. iee3 iss That it makes a signal proof of 
the divinity of the Christian religion, that 
the main duty which it inculcates above all 
other is charity. Different maxima and 
precepts have distinguished the different 
seats of philoao; hy and religion: our Lord's 
peculiar precept iss "Love thy neighbour as 
thy; ielf. By this shall all man know that 
you are `ly disciples, if you love one 
another. "1 
Thin seconi corollary, in feat, Is a theological point reacted 
with the aid of philosophical reasoning and it loads naturally into 
a conci3O suarxary of the main intent of Varkeley's virtuoso 
rsasoninV;: 
I will not say that what is a , =03t shining 
proof of our religion is not often a reproach 
to its professors; but this I think very 
plain, whether we regard the analog of 
nature, as it appears in the mutual 
attraction or gravitation of the mundane 
system, in the general fr=o and 
conutitution of the human soul, or lastly, 
in the ends and aptnesses which are 
discoverable in all parts of the visible and 
intelloctual world, we shall not doubt but 
the precept 'which is the characteristick of 
our religion case fron the Author of nature. 
2 
1. ParkR1AII2 228. 
2. BATiCa1 y ! I, 228. 
12 1 
This is not, however, the end of the essay. It ends with an 
attack on the freethinkers: 
Somo of our modern Free-thinkers would indeed 
insinuate the Christian morals to be 
defective, because (say they) there is no 
mention made in the gospel of the virtue of 
friendship. These sagacious men (if I may be 
allowed the use of that vulgar saying) 
"cannot see the wood for the trees. " That a 
religion whereof the main drift is to inspire 
its professors with the most noble and 
disinterested spirit of love, charity, and 
beneficence to all mankind, ors in other 
woxda, with a friendship to every individual 
man, should be taxed with the want of that 
very virtuo, Is surely a glaring evidence of 
the blindness and prejudice of its adversaries. 
l 
Although the freethinkers have not been mentioned previously, the 
attack is neither surprising nor out of place as the essay is the 
last in a series of contributions to the Guardian whose main purpose 
is to undermine the ideas of the freethinkers. Apart from this, 
however, this parting-shot is brilliantly placed because it 
disposes of one objection to Christianity as an afterthought to 
reasoning which is so broad in scope that the objection of the 
freethinkers is made to seem too trifling to be dealt with centrally. 
That, at any rate, is the overall polamical impression that the 
essay leaves. In "The Bond of Society, " then, Berkeley already 
shows himself adept at his distinctive mixture of high-minded 
reasoning and sharply polemical rhetoric. 
In order to determine how Berkeley achieved a similar result in 
1. Berkeley VII9 228. 
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the Alciphron, tut one suited to the dre atic requirements of 
philosophical dialcj; ue, it is in3tructive to compare the aßcor! d half 
of section 16 of tho fi irst Dialogue with "The BonM of Society. " 
Alciphron at this roint deci ! eu that he Is goin,,, to argue in favour 
of the individual "pursuit of tap ineso"Z 
ALCI? FIRCTN. ... the individual happiness of every 
man alone constitutes his own entire good. The 
happineaa of other eon, miking no part of mine, 
is not with reapoct to mo a good: I mean a true 
natural good. lt cannot therefore bo a 
reasonable end to be proposed by ma, In 
truth and nature (for I do not speak of 
Political ; retencoa), since no wies can 
will pursue an end which doth not concern 
him. This is not the voice of nature. 0 
naturel Thou art the fountain, crieinal, 
and pattern of all that Is good and wiee. 
1 
. Alciphron'a point, 
in tact, in the negative of the first "corollary" 
in "The Pond of Society. " Lscauae the philosophical dialogue, 
unlike the periodical essay, is rauch more of a potentially dramatic 
form, it seers appropriate, in prei-raring Scr the subsequent 
discussion of the parallels between the natural and moral orders, 
for Alciphron to begin with a point which can be taken as a poseible 
sign of his propenaity for defending outright selfishness. As 
one's suspicions are arcused, one is immediately in-M, lved with 
what Alcithron, as a character, has to say. As for Alclphron's 
apostrophe to "nature, " it is an adroit move on Berkeley's part 
bcc'ause it makes it possible to introduce into the discussion the 
1. Pf *n1e 111,62, 
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parallel between moral order and natural order which he had 
previously expounded on in "The Bond of Society. " It also exposes 
the manner in which Alciphron's reasoning tends to degenerate into 
Deistic "enthusiasm. " 
Fiphranor, in any case, soon forcos Alciphron to continue in 
the mode of strict reasoning: 
E'UPIIRA. NOR. You would like then to follow nature, 
and propose her as a guide and pattern for your 
imitation? 
ALCIPIIP. ON. Of all things. 
EUPEUANOR. Thence do you gather this respect 
for nature? 
ALCIPIM01N. From the excellency of her 
productions. 
1 
This, In turn, gives him the necessary opening to expound on the 
parallel between the natural and moral orders. Heb-egizls by 
establishing the order of natures -; 
EUPHRANOR. In a vegetable, for instance, you 
say there is use and excellency; because the 
several parts of it are so connected and 
fitted to each other as to protect and 
nourish the whole, make the individual grow, 
and propagate the kind; and because in its 
fruits or qualities it is a3apted to plaase 
the censer or contribute to the benefit of 
man. 
ALCIPRflON. Evan so. 
EUPIMANOR. In like: manner, do you not inter the 
excellency of animal bodies from observing the 
framo and fitness of their several parts, by 
1.1; erkal© TIT, 62. 
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which they mutually conspire to the well-being 
of each other as well as of the whole? Do you 
not also observe a natural union and consent 
between animals of the saue kind; and that 
even different kinds of animals have certain 
qualities and instincts whereby they contribute 
to the exercise, nourishment, and delight of 
each other? Even the inanimate unorganized 
elements seem to have an excellence relative 
to each other. Where was the excellency of 
water, if it did not cause herbs and vegetables 
to spring from the earth, and put forth flowers 
and fruits? And what would become of the 
beauty of the earth, if it was not warmed by 
the sun, moistened by water, and fanned by air? 
Throughout the whole system of the visible and 
natural world, do you not perceive a mutual 
connexion and correspondence of parts? And is 
it not from hence that you frame an idea of the 
perfection, and order, and beauty of nature? 
1 
The order of nature meticulously propounded here from the particular 
example of the vegetable to the general variety and diversity of 
examples in the natural world is along more traditional lihes than 
that in "The Bond of Society" where the emphasis is on the Newtonian 
"laws of attraction" but the direction of the argument is the same, 
which is to establish the parallel. One significant stylistic 
difference, however, is that whereas in "The Bond of Society" there 
is, apart from the concluaion, a dominant tone of coolly placid 
rationality, Fuphranor's assertiveness in the form of rhetorical 
questions achieves the effect of heated controversy. 
1. Berkeley III, 62-3. 
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After Alciphron's brief capitulation to Euphranor's barrage 
("All this I grant") he goes on to establish the aforementioned 
parallels 
EUMAROR. And have not the Stoics heretofore 
said (who were no more bigots than you are), 
and did you not yourself say, this pattern 
of order was worthy the imitation of 
rational agents? 
ALCIPITRON. I do not deny this to be true. 
EUPIIR. %NCR. Ought we not, therefore, to infer 
the eame union, order, and regularity in 
the moral world that we perceive to be in 
the natural? 
ALCIFHRON. we ought. 
l 
Euphranor establishes the parallel, in other words, by arguing that 
if it is desirable for morality to be based on reason then the 
parallel must exist, as the order of nature is evidently rational. 
He mentions the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius because, presumably, 
he was respected by the freethinkers and to show, albeit in a highly 
combative way, that the parallel between the rational order of 
nature and that of morality can be agreed to by all reasonable mon 
without the aid of Christian doctrine. In "The Bond of Society, " 
however, Berkeley relied neither on polemical assertiveness nor 
classical authority to implicitly establish-, much the same point about 
the parallel. 
Euphranor's next deduction corresponds to the first "corollary" 
in "The Bond of Societys" 
1. Berkeley TIT, 63. 
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'EUPIfRA"1ßR. Should it not therefore seem to 
follow, that reasonable creatures were, as 
the philosophical Emperor observes, made one 
for another; and, consequently, that man 
ought not to consider himself as an 
independent individual, whose happiness is 
not connected with that of other men; but 
rather as the part of a whole, to the 
common good of which he ought to conspire, 
and order his ways and actions suitably, if 
he would live according to naturo: 
l 
Unlike the "corollary, " however, the similar point made here is not 
clearly distinE,, uished from the mainstream of a homogeneous argument. 
It iss instead, the culmination of a long, sustained ani dramatic 
exchange of ideas in a polemical vein. 
If one compares the essayistic style of "The Bond of Society" 
and the dialogue style of the Alciphron, then, it becomes evident 
that though the former is superior in the elegance of its almost 
Euclidean reasoning, the latter is superior in dramatic and polemical 
effectiveness. The former is static and probably designed for a 
passive "coffee-table" reader; the latter is dynamic and designed for 
a reader whose vita and capacity to visualize dramatic argument are 
constantly on the alert. 
The overall effect of the Alciphron is to give a sense of the 
philosolhical grandeur of Christianity, an effect which is already 
there in embryonic form in the opening paragraphs of a Cuardian 
contribution entitled "Minute Philosophers" (no. 70): 
]. Berms I1I9 63. 
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As I was the other day taking a solitary walk 
in 3t. Paul's, I indulged my thoughts in the 
pursuit of a certain analogy between the fabrick 
and the Christian Church in the largest sense. 
The divine order and economy of the one seemed 
to be emblematically set forth by the just, 
plain, and majestick architecture of the other. 
And as the one consists of a great variety of 
parts united in the same regular design, 
according to the truest art, and most exact 
proportion; so the other contains a decent 
subordination of members, various sacred 
institutions, sublime doctrines, and solid 
precepts of morality digested into the same 
design, and with an admirable concurrence 
tending to one view, the happiness and 
exaltation of human nature. 
In the midst of my contemplation, I 
beheld a fly upon one of the pillars; and 
it straightaway came into my head, that 
this same fly was a Free-thinker. For it 
required some comprehension in the eye of 
the spectator, to take in at one view the 
various parts of the building, in order to 
observe their symmetry and design. But to 
the fly, whose prospect was confined to a 
little part of one of the stones of a single 
pillar, the joint beauty of the whole or the 
distinct use of its parts were inconspicuous, 
and nothing could appear but small 
inequalities in the surface of the hewn 
stone, which in the view of that insect 
seemed so many deformed rocks and 
precipices. 
l 
1. Berk®1e VII, 2C6. 
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Berkeley here strikingly conveys the narrowness of outlook of the 
freethinkers, ani in such a way as to anticipate the eloquent 
reasoning and rhetorical spaciousness of the Alciphron. The 
dialectic in this passage consists of the manner by which Berkeley 
-concludes, after an elaborate process of analogical reasoning, that 
freethinkers are too narrow-minded to appreciate or understa xl the 
largeness of spirit of the Christian religion. This train of 
dialectical reasoning, however, is inseparable from Berkeley's 
rhetoric, which conveys, with its emphasis on grandeur and 
impressiveness, the architectural space of the interior of the 
Church to the reader. 
It is, in fact, highly appropriate that Berkeley should have 
chosen Wren's masterpiece for his train of analogical reasoning 
rather than a Gothic cathedral, auch a3 Westminster Abbey. As is 
well known, ät. Paul's aas built during the Restoration and after 
the Great Fire of London to replace the charred ruins of medieval 
Old St. Paula. It was therefore more likely to appeal to the 
architectural tastes of 1orkeley's readers, and undoubtedly his 
own, 
l 
than any Gothic church, as the adjective "gothic" itself 
represented all that was wildly irregular and undesirable to the 
Augustans. At the same time, however, it represents the 
continuity of Christianity in Britain, as it was built on the same 
site as Old St. Paul's and according to conservative, high Anglican 
specifications. 
2 
St. Paul's, nevertheless, is more "classical" 
1. One of Jessop's footnotes in the Alciphron points out that 
"Berkeley's knowledge of architecture came fror his travels in 
Italy, as well as from books ... " Berkeley's fondness for classical 
architecture is, in any case, amply confirmed by the discussion of 
architectural principles in the Alciphron (Berkeley III, 123-8)- 
2. Among other things, Wren was forced to employ a traditional Latin 
rather than his favoured Greek cross as the groundplan. See 
Margaret Whinney, wren (London, 1971), pp. 81-96. 
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than "gothic" and, keeping in mind its "humanist" architectural 
proportions, 
1 it should be noted that it is not a "divine immensity, " 
such as that of Shaftesbury's "natural sublime, " that Berkeley's 
passage seeks to convey but a humanized one because the "observer, " 
Berkeley himself, is able to grasp this immensity. 
2 
The "flies" 
are unable to do so because they are less than human. 
3 
As in the passage from the Cuardian, Berkeley's Alciphron 
studiously avoids "enthusiasm" and relies, instead, on eloquent 
reasoning. This can be especially discerned in an exchange like the 
following from the Sixth Dialogue: 
UMRANOR. Tell me, Alciphron, do you not 
acknowledge the light of the sün to be the 
most glorious production of Providence in 
this natural world? 
ALCIPHRON. Suppose I do. 
TI]PHR: tNOR. This light, nevertheless, which 
you cannot deny to be of Cod's making, 
shines only on the surface of things, 
shines not at all in the night, shines 
Imperfectly in the twilight, is often 
interrupted, refracted, and obscured, 
1. The proportions of classical architecture, it is generally agreed, 
are based on those of the human body. See Geoffrey Scott, The 
ArchitActure of Humanism, second ed. (London, 1961), pp. 210-39. 
'his is a reprint of the edition of 1924. 
2. In the Alciphron Euphranor's classical architectural tastes are 
especially evident when he maintains that "Those who have 
considered the theory of architecture tell us the proportions of 
the thre© Grecian orders were taken from the human body, as the 
most beautiful and perfect production of nature. " See Berkeley 
III, 126. 
3. For an assessment of the predominance of insect imagery among 
Augustan writers as a satirical device expressing contempt for 
"anti-humanist" values, see Paul Fussell, The Rhetorical'Werld 
of Augustan Humanism (Oxford, 1965), pp. 23 1. 
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represents distant things and small things 
dubiounly, imperfectly, or not at all. Is 
this true or no? 
ALCIPHRON. It is. 
EUFItR. WOR. Should it not follow, therefore, 
that to expect in this world a constant, 
uniform, light from God, without any 
mixture of shade or mystery, would be 
departing from the rule and analogy of 
the creation? and that, consequently, it 
is no argument the light of revelation is 
not divine, because it may not be so clear 
and full as you expect, or because it may 
not equally shine at all times, or in all 
places. 
1 
In an exchange like this the impression is gained that Berkeley 
barely avoids expressing gentitine deep feelings about the wonders of 
creation in a more "entht3iastic" manner. As it iss Euphranor's 
eloquent description of the workings of the light of the sun is 
strictly subordinated to an analogical argument about the nature of 
revelation. Even Alciphron's reaction treats Euphranor's analogy 
of the sun; as an effective argument rather than a striking description. 
As, even at their most polemical, the arguments in the Alcihron are 
generally at this high level of eloquence, the overall effeot is one 
of impressive and all-but-overwhelming dignity unaffected by the two 
"flies, " Lysicles and Alciphron. 
Despite the eloquent reasoning and expansive rhetoric, however, 
Berkeley's dialectic never merges into "enthusiastic" rhapsody, as 
1. Aerka1 III1 235-6. 
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happens in Shaftesbury's The toralists. This is so because he 
preserves conversational decorum in the form of an elaborately 
polished "choreography" of conversation. 
1 
Such a "choreography" 
can be discerned in a discussion on duelling in the Fifth Dialogue, 
at one point of which Alciphron has this to say: 
Give me leave to observe that what you 
now say is foreign to the purpose. For the 
question, at present, is not concerning the 
respective tendencies of the Pagan and 
Christian religions, but concerning our 
manners, as actually compared with those 
of ancient heathens, who, I aver, had no 
such barbarous custom as duelling. 
2 
Aloiphron's objection is a serious one but instead of stating it in 
an abrupt manner, as a L'. andevillian interlocutor would, he observes 
the punctilio of prefacing his remarks with "Give me leave to ... " 
Crito's reply is a direct one and invites immediate response from 
Alciphrons 
CBITO. And I aver that, bad as this is, they 
had a worse: and that was poisoning. By 
which we have reason to think there were 
many more lives destroyed than by this 
Gothic crime of duelling: inasmuch as it 
extended to all acesq sexes, and 
characters, and as its effects were more 
secret and unavoidable, and as it had more 
1. Pope's famous couplet from the 'Essay on Criticism (11.362-363) 
is especially applicable to the Alciphrons "True Ease in Writing 
comes from Art, not Chance, / As those move easiest who have 
learn'd to dance. " 
2. Berkeley ? II9 186. 
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temptations, interest as well as passion, 
to recommend it to wicked men. And for 
the fact, not to waste time, I refer you 
to the Roman authors themselves. 
I 
Dramatically and dialectically, however, something more choreograph- 
ically graceful develops because, instead of yet another objection 
from Alciphron, Lynicles takes up Crito's point and twists it to 
suit his own prejudices: 
It is very true. Duelling; is not so 
general a nuisance as poisoning, nor of so 
base a nature. This crime, if it be a crime, 
is in a fair way to keep its ground in spite 
of the law and the Gospel. The clergy never 
preach against it, because thacaselves never 
suffer by it: and the tian of honour must not 
appear against the means of vindicating 
honour. 
2 
Although Lysicles here is being ironic in a L: andevillian manner, he 
is not quite as blunt and direct in expression as 11andeville's 
interlocutors often tend to be. Classical grace and decorum thus 
is preserved and, at the same time, the irony is not allowed to go 
much further, as Crito immediately deals with it as if it were a 
plainly-stated objection rather than a veiled insult against the 
clergy: 
CRITO. Though it be remarked by some of your 
sect that the clergy are not used to preach 
against duelling, yet I neither think the 
remark itself just, nor the reason assigned 
1. Berkolm III, 1C6-7. 
2. Eork9le I1I9 187. 
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for it. In effect, one half of their 
sermons, all that is said of charity, 
brotherly love, forbearance, meekness, and 
forgiving injuries, is directly against 
this wicked custom; by which the clergy 
themselves are so far from never suffering 
that perhaps they will be found, all 
things considered, to suffer oftener than 
other man. 
1 
Crito, in short, does not allow himself to be goaded into intemperate 
language by Lysicles. A nimble "dance of ideas" results and even 
thoughphranor does not take part in this excerpt, he is "waiting 
his turn" as it were. Thus, the dialectical grandeur and classical 
grace of Berkeley's dialogue is reinfo? C dby the way he presents 
discussion in which all arguments contribute to an overall, unified 
aesthetic effect where the movement of dialectic is actually subject 
to an elaborate plan analogous to the choreography of a dance. 
When the remarkable combination of expansive rhetoric and 
choreographed conversation in the Alciphron is kept in mind, it makes 
even John Ilervey's Some Rembr': cs upon The Minute Philosopher (the most 
effective of the attacks on it) seems misdirected. 
2 This is because 
it can easily be discernod that the reader's attention is obviously 
being distracted from the structured coherence apparent beneath the 
1. Eereley ? II9 187. 
2. Harvey's pamphlet and Liandeville's Letter to Dion were not the 
only attacks on the Alciphron but both are very instructive in 
their explicit and implicit criticism of Berkeley's style of 
dialogue. For a description of the contents of the published 
attacks, see Luce, 163-4" On the whole, however, the Alciphron 
was, at least initially, well received. As Luce points out, 
"Within a week of its publication it was 'the discourse of the 
Court, ' and the Queen publicly commended it; a second edition was 
called for within the year. " See Luce, 154. 
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surface polish and graceful repartee of Berkeley's dialogue. In the 
Remarks, Farvey, sophisticated and cynical courtier that he is, 
masquerades as a country clergyman of sturdy simplicity. As far as 
Berkeley's style of dialogue is concerned, his main points are "That 
he is monstrously and manifestly partial, with a Profession of 
Candour; Rhapsodical with a Pretence to Method; Inconclusive, with 
an Affectation of Argument ... "1 The sheer sweep of the Alciphron 
makes it particularly vulnerable to such criticism but, since 
Ilervey ignores Berkeley's deliberately polemical and dramatic aims, 
it is the kind of criticism far more applicable to a much more typical 
dialogue in an apologetic vein, the prolific controversialist Charles 
Leslie's The Truth of Christianity Demonstrated (1710). 
Leslie's work is in the form of a dialogue between a Christian 
and a Deist. It exhibits little attempt at characterization and is 
more expository than dialectical, as in the following excerpts 
Deist. - By the account you have given, there 
is but One Religion in the world, nor ever wass 
for the Jewish was but Christianity in Type, 
though in time greatly corrupted: and the 
Heathen was a greater corruption, and founded 
the fables of their gods upon the Facts of 
Scriptures and the : Sahometan, you say, is but a 
Heresy of Christianity. So that all is 
Christianity still. 
Christian. - It is true that Cod gave but one 
Revelation to the world, which was that of 
Christi and as that was corrupted, now 
Revelations were pretended. But Cod has 
1. John Hervey, SomRemarks upon the Minute Philosopher (London, 
1732), p. 6 ý'he Pamphlet was published anonymously. 
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guarded his Revelations with such evidences, as 
it was not in the power of men or devils to 
counterfeit or contrive any thing like them. 
Some bear resemblance in one or two features, in 
the first two or three Rules of Evidence that I 
have produced; but as none reach the fourth, so 
they are all quite destituta of the least 
pretence to tho remaining four. So that when 
you look upon the face of Divine Revelation, 
and take it altogether, it is impossible to 
mistake it for any of those delusions, which 
the devil has set up in imitation of it. 
Deist. - It is strange, that, if the case be 
thus plain as you have made its the whole world 
is not immediately convinced. 
Christian. - If the seed be never so good, 
yet if it be sown upon stones or among thorns, 
it willibring forth nothing. There are hearts 
of stone, and others so filled with the love of 
riches, with the cares and pleasures of this 
life, that they will not see; they have not a 
mind to know any thing which they think would 
disturb them in their enjoyments, or lessen 
their opinion of them; for that would be taking 
away so much of their pleasures therefore it is 
no easy matter to persuade men to place their 
happiness in future expectations, which is the 
import of the Gospel. ... 
1 
"Christian" here seems to make no attempt to meet "Deist" half-way 
and make his discourse more philosophical. Instead, he alludes to 
1. Charles Leslie, "The Truth of Christianity Demonstrated in a 
Dialogue Betwixt a Christian and a Deist" in The Christian, no. 
VI, Dec. 18,1819, PP"134-5. It was reprinted in a series of 
pamphlets published in London by the "Association for the 




the devil, the existence of whom he does not attempt to prove, and 
becomes highly moralistic in his allusion to the parable of the sower. 
Unlike the interlocutors in the Alciphron, whether Christian or Deist, 
Leslie's "Christian" is more of a preacher than a cultivated 
conversationalist. There may be some truth in Harvey's contention 
that Berkeley is "manifestly partial, " but he does, at least, givo 
his Deists Good arguments and meats them on the level of philosophical 
argument, rather than merely that of doctrinaire hectoring. 
1 
As 
for Hervey's stricture that the Älciphron is inconclusive and 
"rhapsodic, " its allegedly rhapsodical, or unmethodical, inconclusive- 
ness, which is really nothing worse than the panoramic vista of a 
philosophic Christian, is far preferable to the "conclusive" 
circularity of Leslie's arguments. As the Dictionary of National 
Biography points out about Leslie, "lie argues in a circle at every 
turn, and the monumental and cerocionial evidence which he adduces to 
prove the authenticity of the scriptures really presupposes their 
authenticity. "2 Hervey's criticism of the Alciphron, in any case, 
though it contains some truth, is wide of the mark because it 
deliberately ignores the fact that it is not merely a philosophical 
treatise but a semi-dramatic and deliberately polemical work of 
considerably subtlety in literary conception. 
The only dialogue of Christian apologetics that can stand 
1. It is intere3ting to note the great contrast between "Christian"'s 
observations on the naturo of revelation and those of Euphranor, 
whore he uses the sun as an analogy, quoted a few pages earlier 
in this chapter. By this test, Berkeley certainly seem3 a far 
more skilful and generously open-minded dialectician. 
2. The author of the article was James McMullen Rigg. He also makes 
the interesting observation that Samuel Johnson declared about 
" Leslie that he was "the only reasoner among the nonjurors, and a 
reasoner who was not to be reasoned against. " 
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comparison with the Alcihron is Henry Lore's Divine Dialogues. It 
is just as dialectically acute as the Alciphron and perhaps more 
impartial in the way the discussions are presented. Instead of 
Berkeley's adroit quartet of protagonists, however, More has a 
somewhat unwieldy seven. These seven represent many finely-graded 
shades of opinion and, to that extent, the Divine Dialogues seem3 
to be more convincingly im? artial than the Alciphron, but that also 
tends to slow down the flow of argument and to lessen the dramatic 
force of it. It is almost as if reading the Alciphron is like 
listening to a virtuoso chamber-music quartet; the Divine Dialogues, 
like music excellent in parts but somewhat diffuse in overall effect. 
Another way of putting it is that the "choreography" of conversation 
in the Divine Dialogues is somewhat defective. 
At his best, nevertholess, More does achieve an impartiality not 
found in Berkeley's more sharply polemical style, as in the following 
exchange between "Cuphophron, " "Iiathynous" and "Philopo. Ila, ': ' 
Cuph. Gell be the future state of things what it will, 
I doubt not but Cartesius will be admired to all posterity. 
Bath. Undoubtedly, 0 Cuphophron; for he will appear to 
man a person of the most eminent wit and folly that ever 
yet trode the stage of this earth. 
Cuph. Why of wit and folly, Bathynous? 
Bath. Of wit, for the extraordinary handaom semblance he 
makes of deducing all the phaenomena ho has handled, 
necessarily and mechanically, and for hitting on the more 
immediate material causes of things to a very high 
probability. 
Cuph. This at least is true, Lathynous. But why of folly? 
Bath. Because he is so credulous, as not only to believe 
that he has necessarily and purely mechanically solved all 
the phaenomena he has treated of in his philosophy and 
-1 
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meteors, but also that all things also may be solved, the 
bodies of plants and animals not excepted. 
C_ uph. Posterity will be best able to judge of 
that. 
Philop. Cuphophron is very constantly zealous 
in the behalf of the mechanic philosophy, tho' 
with the hazard of losing those more notable 
arguments deducible from the phaenomena of nature 
for the proving the existence of a Gods and yet 
i dare say he is far from being in the least measure 
smutted with the spoil of atheism. 
Cuph. I hope so. 
I 
The debate at this point centres on whether mechanistic conceptions 
are adequate to explain the overwhelming evidence of "design" in 
the universe. The argument is, on the whole, good-humoured rather 
than polemical, and this despite the intransigence between Cuphophron, 
who is described by More as "A zealous, but airy minded, Platonist 
or Cartesian"2 and resembles Alciphron, and Bathynous, who resembles 
Crito and is described as "the deeply-thoughtful or profoundly thinking 
man. " The reason for this is that Philopolio's ("the pious and 
loyal politician") role here is to defuse a potentially explosive 
situation by suggestink; that Cuphophron's advocacy of the mechanistic 
philosophy is not necessarily a sign of atheism. iphranor resembles 
Philopolis to the extent that he is less combative than Crito but 
Philopolis is the more genuine conciliator. wore, in other words, 
sets up the argument in such a way that there is no actual 
1. Henry More, Divine Dia1o e3, Containing Disquisitions Concerns 
the Attributes ani Providence of Gods "". vo1. 'T. i'r Glasgow, 1743), 
pp. 38-9. It was first published in 1668. Hereinafter to be 
cited as More. 
2. See More's description of the interlocutors in More, xii. 
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confrontation between Christians and infidel 1`eists but, as far as 
possible, an amicable eichange of views. The force of each 
protagonist's arguments is left for the reader to judge. The 
Divine Dialogues, in short, seems to present argument with greater 
impartiality but the Alciphron is more dramatically polemical and 
sharply dialectical. 
The Alciphron has often been compared with Butler's Analogy of 
Religion as an apologetic work and with good reason. Both rely on 
rational argument and the logic of probability to erect an imposing 
defence of Christianity and both had considerable impact in their 
time. 
I 
Unlike the Alciphron, however, Butler's Analogy remained an 
influential work for a long time and is still, according to Jessop, 
"remembered with respect in theological circles. "2 Part of the 
reason for this is undoubtedly because the Deistic protagonists may 
have seemed anachronistic to subsequent readers. 
3 
Butler escaped 
this dilemma by not even mentioning his opponents but confining 
himself to an attack on their ideas in such a way that they seem, 
in the words of a Victorian commentator who will soon be introduced 
in another context, "difficulties which had arisen in his own mind. "4 
Another reasons perhaps, that the Alciphron neuer 1444 tha e Te 
1. See Jessop's comparison of both works in Berkeley III, 74- 
2. Berkeley III 9 7- 
3. More perceptive readers, however, recognize the universality of 
Alciphron and Lysicles as characters. A. D. Ritchie, for example, 
remarks that "In Alciphron Berkeley deals with the, fashionable 
idols of the 'bright young people' of the early eighteenth 
century, who. were remarkably like their successors of the 1920's 
and 1930's. Lysicles and Alciphron could then be found in Staff 
Commonrooms at Oxbridge, Redbrick and other universities as well 
as in lower haunts. " See his reorge Berkeley: A Reappraisal 
(Manchester, 1967), p. 130. 
4. H. R. Huckin, Dialo ies Founded upon Butler's Analogy of Religion 
(London, 187379 P-8. Hereinafter to be cited as Iiuckin. 
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popularity as the An  1ory is that Eerkoloyfs u39 of dialogue demands 
more participation from the romier in approciatine the dratatic 
nuances of the arguments. Considering; that it has often been said 
that Butler is difficult to follow anr3 even obscure, 
I it may be 
objectsi that the . Ani demands just es rauch participation from the 
reader. This is true as far as it Goes but it is a participation 
that involves only the reasoning powers rather than reason and 
imagination together. 
The contrast between butler's atyle of apologetics ani 1ovkelay's 
can perhaps beat be appreciated in their respective discussions of 
free-will and necessity. A coi carison of paragraph 69 cha; ter 6 
of the first part of the ; ra1o . and section 19 of the Seventh 
Dialo rue of the Alc iphron is e; ipocially inzstructivo. Both Io*e1oyy 
and Butler seek, to daconotrate the fallacy of the doctrine of 
"necessity" or determinism but their mannor of doing uo is different 
in emphasis. To bejin with Butler, his emphasis is on the practical 
consoyuencss of a belief in daterainiaii 
... Cr suppose this scheme of fatality, in any 
other way, applied to practice, such practical 
appliortticn of it will be found equally absurd; 
equally fallacious in a practical senses for 
inatanco, that if a man be destinod to live 
such a time, he shall live to it, though he 
take no care of his on preservation; or if be 
be destined to die before that time, no caro 
1. Baehot and Gladstons, a'on4 others, complained of the 
concentrated "obscurity" of Butler's Arosa. George ältson, 
however, attributes the "obscurity" to Butler's honesty in 
refusing to ignore the real difficulties involved in quentions 
of religious ethics and philoaorhy. On this point, see George 
iratson, "Joseph Butler" in The ''n*lloh Lint ": tucliea in the 
rnx, 1ish Voraliete Presentcl to Basil ilirzq, eds by George 
Watson and Eu &h Lykes Davies Cambridge, 1964), r. P. 11C-13. 
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can prevent it: therefore all care about 
preserving one's life is to be neglected: which 
is the fallacy instanced by the ancients. But 
now on the contrary, none of these practical 
absurdities can"be drawn, from reasoning upon 
the supposition, that we are free; but all such 
reasoning with regard to the common affairs of 
life is justified by experience. And therefore, 
though it were admitted that this opinion of 
necessity were speculatively true; yet, with 
regard to practice, it is as if it were false, 
so far as our experience reaches; that is, to 
the whole of our present life. For, the 
constitution of the present world, and the 
condition in which we are actually placed, is, 
as if we were free. And it may perhaps justly 
be concluded, that since the whole process of 
action, through every step of it, suspense, 
deliberation, inclining one way, determining, 
and at la. 3t doing as we deternine, is as if we 
were free, therefore we are so. But the thing 
here insisted upon is, that under the present 
natural government of the world, we find we are 
treated and dealt with, as if we were free, prior 
to all consideration whether we are or not. 
Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted 
to be ever so true; yet such is in fact our 
condition and the natural course of things, that 
whenever we apply it to life and practice, this 
application of it always misleads us, and cannot 
but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with 
regard to our present interest. ... 
1 
Sutler's; reasoning here proceeds with magisterial inevitability. 
Ilia are=ant centres on how "practical absurdities" result from a 
The 'Works of I ishopEutler, ede by J. H. Bernard, vol. II 
London, 1900 , pp. 107-U. 
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belief in the doctrine of "neoeesity. " He rover lets the reader 
keep the Practical conaequences of such a belief cut of his mind, 
even to the point or painutakingly sayinw?, - that "perhs; s" we are 
froe but it does not matter because even if we act as if we were not, 
it must yet be e4citted that if we do no we are bound to be misled 
and possibly barred in our social relations. The rhetorical affect 
is to convince the reader, especially if he values colon-sense, 
that he to, indeed, himself a free agent whatever the philosophical 
cubtletimc of the question. 
Berkeley, in the guise of ý'ujhrsnor, on the other hand, mates 
a different point to underrine determiniezii 
If we consider the notions that obtain in the 
world of guilt and merit, praise and blaze, 
accountable and unaccountable, we shall tint 
the coon question, in order to applaud or 
censure, acquit or ccnder. n a nan, is, whether 
he did such an action, ant whether he was 
himself when he did it. Which corns to the 
n=a thin,. It should seam, therefore, that, 
in the ordinary co=erce of marnkind, any person 
is esteemed accountably simply as he is an 
agent. M, though you should toll mo that 
man is inactive, and that the sensible objects 
not upon his, yet my on experience assures me 
of the contrary. I kna-s I act, and what I act 
I an accountable for. And, if this be true, 
the foundation of religion and morality remains 
unshaken. Religion, I any, is concerned no 
farther than that man should be accountable: 
and this he is according to my sense, and the 
cc= on lenze of the world, if be acta; and 
that he doth act is self-evident. Thm grounds, 
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therefore, and ends of religion are secured, 
whether your philosophic notion of liberty 
agrees with man's actions or no; and whether 
his actions are certain or contingent; the 
question being not, whether he did it with a 
free will, or what determined his will; not, 
whether it was certain or foreknown that he 
would do it, but only, whether he did it 
wilfully, as what must entitle him to the 
guilt or merit of it. 
I 
Unlike Butler, Berkeley here does not insist on the overriding 
importance of the practical consequences of a belief in determinism 
but on the more abstract question of whether blame and merit can be 
apportioned to human actions. Butler, in fact, concedes the 
theoretical possibility of the truth of determinism, whereas Berkeley 
first rejects it on empirical grounds, quite distinct from Butler's 
emphasis on practical expediency, and then only makes a rhetorical 
concession of its possible theoretical truth in order all the more to 
demonstrate its irrelevance in ascertaining the guilt or merit of an 
action. Berkeley, in short, is much more combative than Butler. 
The greatest difference between Berkeley and Butler as 
apologetical controversialists, however, is that Berkeley's style of 
argument is an intensely dramatic one. This is especially evident 
in the way that Berkeley is just as concerned with exposing the 
psychological reasons that Deists favour determinism, as in refuting 
their arguments. Thus, soon after Euphranor's argument against 
determinism, the following exchange develops: 
1. Ee*nler IH, 315. 
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ALCIi1ir O::. Lut still, the question reoars, whether 
man ba free. 
FAJPI11ANOR. To determine this question, ou, rht we not 
first to determine what is reimt by the word free? 
ALi I P3? C "o ouetht . 
JPTi t Q1. In my otlnion, a man Is said to be free so 
far forth an he can do what he will. Is this so, or 
is it not? 
ALCI i 1O: t. It soe is go. 
'11M kV^P. )an, therefore, actinT according to his Rill, 
is to be accounted free. 
ALC10112'1',. This I admit to be true in the vulgar sense. 
"ut a philosopher goes hi , her, and in.; uirea whether 
rann be free to will. 
SUPIM NOR. That Is, whether be can will as he wills? I 
know not how philosophical it may be to ask this 
question, but it seems very idle. The notions of guilt 
and aorit, justice and reward, are in the minds of men 
antecedent to all motaphysical disquisitions; end, 
according to those received natural notions, it is 
not doubted that maxi Is accountable, that be acts, 
and is self-determined. 
1 
', 'here Is a note of exasperation on Cuphronor'sr side ani obtuseness on 
A1cithron'o; furthermore there is a hint that Alci thron believe: i in 
"necessity" becausae of a kirrt of intellectual snobbery which refuses 
to tike at face-v, Rlue what almost everyone else does. For loIphrcn, 
gerhapa, the doctrine of "froe-gill" irs hold by so many in the lower 
orders, incluiing obscurantist Christians, that it must be hold 
suepoct. TThuso there Butler assumes that the reader himself may be 
a Feist who needs to be handled with tact and earnest roseonablenesus 
1. Borrco2AV III3315-6. 
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Berkeley invites the reader to visualize the Foists in his own 
unflattering terms. Though the Alciphron is more of a literary 
work, then, the Analogy is probably more effective as a work of 
Christian apologetics because it addresses the reader in a more 
personal, and less polemical, manner. 
It is interesting to note that the Victorian corarnentator, 
ß. A. fucking a clergyman, wrote the highly-entertaining, but now 
little-read, ? )ialogues Pounded upon Butler's Analogy of Religion. 
This work, in fact, is not only a commentary on the Analogy but also 
an attempt to restate its arguments in contemporary, Victorian, terms, 
which also involves a certain amount of dramatic technique. Thus, 
in the "Dialogue on the Doctrine of Necessity, " which echoes the 
chapter on the same subject in the knalo , this lively exchange takes 
places 
A. I have been tallinj B. that you and he will 
not agree. 
Co You make us out to be very quarrelsome 
people, then. I suppose you are tired of the 
purely peaceful and dispassionate inquiries in 
which we have been occupied, and want a little 
excitement for a change? For my own part I 
prefer to be regarded as a rational animal, 
and not to be viewed in the light of a gladiator 
or a bull-dog* 
l 
"C" is, in fact, a scientist anti it is very appropriate that it is he 
who expounds on the doctrine of "necessity" as scientific determinism 
1. Fucking 176. 
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Is the closest Victorian equivalent to neistic "nacessity. " stare 
than that, by this time natural eciencA, as is well known, seemed 
to be the chief chal1om7or to Christianity and the causa of many 
apo3tasiea. 
1 
Despite the dramatic touches, hovovor, the dialogue does little 
morn than clarify and simplify .! utlor's Ani_ lof^y. Thus, the sinuous 
complexity of Butler's argument about the practical consequences of 
determinism 1s reduced to the following short exchange, xhich only 
reproduces the taro bon©s of Butler's arguments 
Z0 ... the doctrine of neces3ity, applied to 
practico, invariably leads to an absurdity. 
CO FicWso? 
Be Let us take an instance, tat a an suppooe 
that he iss fated to live a certain time, and that 
no effort on his own part will envble him to 
cuca, a his fate, no ra3hnes3 will precipitate it: 
to such an opinion rractically reasonable? 
C. I shculd think any man a madman who 
acted upon it. 
11. Yet it is strictly in accord with the 
principle of necessity. But if the can who 
so acts to justly accounted iad, he who acts 
on the opposite principle is a reasonable can. 
The result iat that, whether the principle of 
necessity or of freedom be speculatively true, 
the ' foyer is practically false. ... 
2 
1. On the impact of science on Christinn belief in the nineteenth 
century, see Alec Vidler, The Church in the Ae of Ravolution 
(London, 1961), pp. 112-2?. Iuckin, himself, justifiea. the inclusion 
of a scientist in the dialogue on the following groundcs "The 
groat development of scientific investigations during the last 
half century has orened many questions, of which the ad, © of Eishop 
Butler knew but little. With great diffidence the present writer 
hasp in a few places, introduced this new matter into the work. It 
was indeed impoosible to avoid references to these questions. To 
discuss them fully Is the work of a lifetice, and to view them in 
their bearings on religio7v forms one of the most vital duties in 
these our, days" (F? uckin, 10). 
2, I? uckin, 189-90. 
A 
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Iluckin, nevertheless, is well-. killed In the art at dialogue, 43 in 
the followim-T paaaa;; oz 
D. ... Imaeins a society con3tituted upon the 
principle that all action were rcceaaary. 
Could euch man have any idea of justice? 
C. Why not? 
B. If every motive warpe of necessity obeyed, 
it is difficult to Be 4what should Gauss such 
an idea to arise, as that certain action are 
juxt and others unjust. 
CO Not at all. '. an find by experience that 
certain action. are aiv3ntazeou3 and othora 
disadvantaj eou3. To the former they , ivy, the 
name just, and the latter they call unjust. 
H. So that mankind attach no idea of blame 
to the one or praise to the other. 
CO Too % but they do. 
Upon what principle? 
C. chy, that injury to society merits 
Funiehxont, and benefits lea rye reward* 
B. ! eritai dessrvel r. hy, what lanF; aaie is 
ttial A necepairr action dos4rvAnr,, praiue or 
bisne1 If it were voluntary, you could not 
use stror3ar lantu3Co about it. If there is no 
freedom, thore is no ocrit or demerit. And 
olunlly we runt give up any idea of virtue and 
vices our actions have no character about the: t 
they *ro quite indifferent as far as all moral 
relations go. 
l 
warm, tho scientist falls into a trip which la ,, On him to contradict 
his cwn doctrinc3 of "nece: 3a1ty. " As such, the exchin r h&3 a 
distinction of its awn, inde; ýen ort of any ar ti nt in the . tnaloý , 
1. rnicki n, leg-go. 
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which has to do with the reader's enjoyment in seeing the scientist 
confuted within his own premisses -a device favoured by Mandeville 
and Hume and often used by Berkeley, not to mention many other 
practitioners of the genre, including Plato. 
Berkeley's achievement, in any case, is the result of an 
elaborate design of exposition and argument hidden by an effortless, 
and often eloquent, flow of fine conversation. The following 
exchange not only exemplifies the scintillating quality of conversation 
recreated by Berkeley but also stands as an apposite analogy for the 
overall effect of the Plei'hron as a literary work in a "neo-classic" 
could: 
ALCIPERON. Suppose now a dr&ding finished by the 
nice and laborious touches of a Dutch pencil, 
and another off-hand scratched out in the 
free manner of a great Italian master. The 
rutch piece, which hath cost so much pains and 
time, will be exact indeed, but without that 
force, spirit, or grace which appear in the other, 
and are the effects of an easy, free pencil. Do 
but apply this, and the point will be clear. 
EIJPHR IOR. Pr-, %y inform me, did those great Italian 
masters begin and proceed in their art without 
any choice of method or subject, and always draw 
with the same ease and freedom? Or did they 
observe some method, beginning with simple and ' 
elementary parts, an eye, a nose, a finger, which 
they drew with great pains and care, often 
drawing the same thing, in order to draw it 
correctly, and so proceeding with patience and 
industry, till, after a considerable length of 
time, they arrived at the free masterly manner 
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you spoke of? If this were the case, I leave 
you to mako the application. 
1 
Berkeley's achievement a3pecially deserves wider recognition when 
compared with Shaftesbury's The Moralists, which, as has been 
demonstrated in the preceding chapter, is excessively "sublime" in 
design and insufficiently dramatic. 
1. Berkeley III9 49. There is an intriguing possibility that 
Berkeley here, in the First Dialogue, is alluding to and 
refuting L'. andeville's advocacy of the realism of Dutch art, as 
opposed to the idealizations of Italian art, in the opening pages 
of the First Dialogue of The Fable of the Bees, Part Two. 
Mandeville, indeed, as suggested in chapter five of this 
dissertation, probably implies a favourable analogy between his 
own homespun style and the vivid realism of Dutch painting. 
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ClAP7'71 IX. CC1«CL11; SIC%. 't "ffll 217-t1-CUSSICAL b3^. I"' OF 
PitIL. "OP! 1CAL DIALC'C1J , 
"" ... it is a onj the niceties of 
dialogue-uniting to order the 
speeches in such a way, as to bring 
the conver2iticn naturally to the 
point you aim at. " 
: ills Cilpin in "On Dialogue 
Writing, " the Introductory essay 
to Iii alospues on Vsriois ubjecte 
(1801 )1 
1. William Cilpin$ Tialopu 3 on Varicus Subjects (London, 1C07)ß 
p. 12. 
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The significance of Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and 'Berkeley as 
dialogue writers is that they revitalized the ancient genre of 
philosophical dialogue to suit eighteenth-century tastes. They 
did so either by borrowing from other, more flourishing, genres, as 
in the case of Mandeville, or by adhering to an idesl model of 
philosophical dialogue based on neo-classical principles, as in the 
dialogues of Shaftesbury and Berkeley. 
L: andovill© arrived at his own kind of philosophical dialogue, 
which is at its beat in no Fable of the Eaes, Part Two and A 
Trwttise of thn TIypochoruiriack eni T1yaterick T: iseaaes, almost 
haphazardly by exploiting the amorphousness of dialogue as an 
independent genre - an amorphouanoss due to the fast that dialogue 
is an important o1ement in the draia, the novel, and the short-story* 
1 
The Mandevi11tan kind of philosophical dialogue in fact, emerged by 
the modification of other genres. Before experimsnting with genres, 
however, 114'andeville first mastered the art of polemical and 
informally dicquisitional dialogue with his contributions to the 
Female Tatler and his political pax hlet, The eYischiefs That Ought 
Justly to be Apprehended From aT Government. This is why all 
bis dialocues have a strong polemical and dioquisitional element 
derived from the controversial pamphlets and popular periodicals of 
the time. In his book-length dialo6ues, however, he borrows from 
other genres to enliven his presentation of philosophical arent. 
Each one of them, in fact, combines elements of a popular genre with 
the depiction of dialectical argument. The Virf''in Vnm. ask'd 
1. Its amorphousness becomes even more undefinable when it is 
considered that it is an important element of the epic or any 
lon!, narrative poem and even, occasionally, the lyric. It 
occurs, as well, in satirical prose and poetry. 
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experiments with novelistic realism and casuistical discussion in 
the two moral tales that are part of the dialogue. In The Fable of 
thy, Part Two, dialectical arrumant is transformed into the 
witty repartee and conversational exuberance of Restoration comedy. 
In The Orrin of Ponour the rhetorical paradox, popular as a didactic 
device in periodicals, is extensively used to generate discussion. 
As for the Treat1se of the F? ypochontlriack and T? vsterick 1; iseases, it, 
too, has elements of Restoration comedy but, more than any other 
dialogue of : wandeville's, it is a unique example of successful 
philosophical dialogue in English. This is because its aims of 
providing a medical juuido to the treatment of nervous diseases a 
draiatization of the doctor-patient rolationahip and a diacusaion of 
the issues involved in rival theorios of medicine are in complete 
harmony. ! andeville's modification of other genres to suit 
philosophical dialoruo, in any case, anticipates Diderot's achievement 
in Le 2`eveu an Raueau which can be read simultaneously as a novel, 
a satire and as a play. Needless to say, this makes it very rich 
as a philosophical dialogue. 
1 
1e i: e1©y'e disloCuea are neo-classical mainly in their depiction 
of idealized conversation which has just enough abrasiveness to 
convey the flavour of real conversation at its most lively. Thus, 
as has been pointed out by tonsld Aavie, 
2 his dialogues dra=atize 
1. These aspects of Diderot'o dialogue are all discussed in Herbert 
Jose; hs, riderot's Malor'ue of Lan uaIe and ( sture (Ohio, 1969). 
2. Donald 3)svi©, "Berkeley aM the : style of D1alow*ue" in Hugh Sykes 
Davies and George Watson, edo., The Flash winds Stulfes in the 
, n, lish 1, 'oralists Presented to Basil Willey Caabridge1964), 
pp. 102-3. Herein9fter to be cited as Imo. 
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two mutually-exclusive kinds of conversational discourse. In the 
Threo nialogues BstwASn ftylas ani rhilonous lt 3a discussion at its 
beat and In the Alciphron, conversational debate at it© most vigorous. 
The dominant tons of the Three t)ialoý-ues is one of earnestness and 
canriour. neither amusir banter nor quirks of character are allowed 
to deflect the flow of argument. In the 47clphron, the opposite 
kind of aargurn nt is presented in which hostile raillery and polemical 
sarcasm predominate. All parties, however, stay within the bounds 
of "Food-breeding" and decorum. any of their arguments may be 
"ad honer" but, as in parli aentary debate, insults are more often 
veiled than direct. 
As for 5hafte3bury's The üoraliota, it is noo-classical mainly 
in the gentlemanly mode of argument or Horatian "fine raillery" that 
it depicts. The soliloquizing mode of its pattern of dialectic, 
however, is more akin to the introspection of Romintic poetry than 
conversational prone. Shaftesbury, in fact, turned philozophical 
dialogue into a kind of prose-poem which directly influenced Thomson 
and other eighteenth-century nature-poets who anticipated the 
Romantics. Where L arAeville borrowed from other genreg for his 
version of philosophical dialogue, the uniquen33s of Shaftesbury'a 
dialo ue lies in its poetic element, which in, t1uence4 other genres 
more strictly poetic. 
While all three authors, faced with the problem of reviving an 
ancient genre, ani going beyond the-limits of the highly-popular, 
but roetly ephemeral, polemical and expository dialoguae of the time, 
solved ih in different ways, all the dialogues in question have 
strong neo-classical elements and moat'incorporate techniques from 
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other genres. Thus, Mtandeville's dialogues are neo-classical in 
that, like those of Berkeley and Shaftesbury, they do give a "natural 
and spirited representation of real conversation, " which is one of 
! Iugh Blair's requirements for philosophical dialogue. 
1 
Mandeville's 
colloquialisms would no doubt have offended Hurd, whose predilection 
for a lofty and dignified conversational tone in philosophical 
dialogue is especially emphasized by his insistence on distinguished 
historical personages as interlocutors, 
2 
but a later neo-classical 
critic, William Gilpin, was not in favour of such an extreme 
interpretation of conversational decorum. In his own words, "a 
dialogue should be natural, easy, and carried on with the unrestrained 
freedom of conversation. 
3 
The liveliness of conversational banter 
in landeville'a dialogues certainly fulfils Gilpin's requirement. 
Berkeley's Alciphron shares with Landeville's dialogues the 
zincorporation of subordinate genres, the most important of which is 
the "character. " The Second Dialogue of the Alciphron is especially 
rich in "characters, " both of the more generalized Theophrastan 
variety and the individualized ones patterned after those of La 
Bruyere. The following Theophrastan one of the English "man of 
pleasure" is especially interesting: 
1. Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (London, 
1823), p. 499" Hereinafter to be cited as Blair. 
2. Richard Turd, ? Loral and Political Dialo es with Lett©rs on 
Chivalry and Ramancep fourth editions vol. 1 Londons 1771 , 
pp. xxvl-vii. 
3. William Cilpin, Dialo`ue3 on Various Subjects (London, 1807), 
p. 12. Hereinafter to be cited as Gilpin. 1 
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... There In a cast of thought in the conploxion 
of an i n, lishman which renders him the most 
unsuccessful rake in the world. He is (ac 
Aristotle expresssth it) at variance with himself. 
lie is neither brute enough to enjoy his appetites, 
nor min enough to govern them. He knows an4 
feels that what be pursues is not hin true good; 
bis reflexion serving only to show him that 
misorj shich his habitual sloth sni indolence 
will not suffer him to remody. At lnngth, being 
grown odiou3 to himself, and abborrinx; his own 
company, he rum into every idle ac erbly, not 
fror: the hopes of pleasuro, but merely to 
reopite the pain of hiai own mina. Listless 
and uneasy at, the irescnt, he hath no delight 
in reflecting on %hat is ia3t, or In the ; roapect 
of anything to co-. a. This can of ploa2ure, whon, 
r aftor a wretched soon* of vanity and woo, his 
animal nature is worn to the stumps wizheQ and 
drerio death by turns, and Is sick at living, 
without ever havi trie3 or known tha true 
life of m3n. 
x 
Hare tbera in acute social observation anri precXao description that 
rival8 the satirical "character" of the Teen of honour" In The 
Pablo of thso i! a rq Part rß. 
2 
The Second Dia1o u also contains an entire gallery of "minute 
; 112ooo; hor5" doscrib3d after the anecdotal canner ct La 73ruycro, 
a3 In the following 1oraliatia account by Crito of the different 
"aharacter&" of two brotheras 
I. 'S'hy, cIrkn of (pone, t3ar*-alpy, D1 he of C1oyn , od. by ;.!:. Jo o vol. III Lorgnon, 19G7)9 pp. 91-2., Sereinartor to btu 
cited a3 BAr nlnv M. 
2. Bernard Manieville, Thy Pablo of th* Bee9t ed. - by F. B. Kaye, 
vol. 21 (London, 1966)9 FPS -72. Aleof see chapter fivo of . this dissertation. 
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I have often reflected on the different fate of 
two brothers in my neighbourhood. Cleon, the 
elder, being designed an acoomplished gentleman, 
was sent to town, had the first part of his 
education in a great school: what religion he 
learned there was soon unlearned in a certain 
celebrated society, which, till we have a better, 
may pass for a nursery of minute philosophers. 
Cleon dressed well, could cheat at cards, had a 
nice palate, understood the mystery of the die, 
was a mighty man in the minutes philosophy; and 
having shined a few i3 ars in these accomplish- 
ments, he died befcra thirty, childless and 
rotten, expressing the utmost indignation that 
he could not outlive that old dog his father; 
who, having a great notion of polite manners, 
and knowledge of the world, had purchased theca 
to his favourite son with much expense, but had 
been more frugal in the education of Chaerephon, 
the younger son; who was brought up at a country 
school, and entered a commoner in the university, 
where he qualified himself for a parsonage in 
his father's gift, which he is now possessed of, 
together with the estate of the family, and a 
numerous offspring. 
1 
Berk3ley's technique hure is so much like that of a periodical 
essayist employing the "character" to make a moral point that it 
serves as a good example of how the incorporation of techniques from 
other genres is not incompatible with the neo-classical mode of 
philosophical dialogue. 
It should be noted that Mandeville was also adept at applying 
1. T3erkeloy 111,97-8. 
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the technique cf character-writing to ro11tica1 portraits, inclutiing 
Louis XIV in fli Virgin t, 'nna3k! d, Robert Jalr, ole in Tho Fable of the 
iieei, Part and Crnnell in Thn Orrin of Ponour. What =Tikes 
these portraits similar to the Theophrastan character is that they 
are not descriptions of f=oul historical p rsonalitie3 but 
Conoralized analytical descriptions of certain kinds of political 
Con. 17"hufl, Louis 71V. to a "charactor" of the haughtily arahiticus 
monarch with absolute power, Malpole, the conaumr ate l: olitician hoe 
very mediocrity as a statesman makes hic fit for the office of 
l Prime ": inister, an. i Croio11,, , the politically--p-mäitious hypocrite. 
With Ito mixture of admiration for hie political sa acity urd 
contempt for his tyrannical ambition, thi character--3ketch of Cro wall 
probably owes soßotbini to C1aran on's "historical character" of 
h1a. 2 Thu8, Clarendon concludes about Cromwoll that 
In a aorde, as hi had all the wicksdnesce3 against which 
damnation is denounccd and for which ? ell Tyro Is 
praepareci, so he harf Bono virtueaf which have caused 
the cozaory of some m on in all ales to be celebrated, 
and he will be looked upon by pcoterity$ a3 a bravo, 
bald man. 
3 
1. See I. T. Dickinson, "The rolitics of Barnard 'gandevilla, " in 
Varrievilln Stuile3: Now 'x 1orAtic)n3 In the Art ani Thought of 
Sir. I'nrnt 17Avllle, od. by Irwin rimer (The Hague, 1915 , 
pia.. 4. Althcuj, Dickinson's article does not concern itself 
with the "character" as auch, it includes some intorostin 
obcervation3 on 1: sr4cvilla'a ; crtr al of Louis XiV and º alpole 
that Illuminats his use of "chsraotcr. p- 
2. For an analysis of how the portrayal of s a1or and minor 
participants in o: the Civil Tar by aevonteetLth-century, hiotorian3 
and memoirists were often ba3od on tho, technique cP charactor- 
writingt son David xsicol'. ith, ed., Characters from tha Histories 
ad : ̀o. -. oiro of tho Seventeenth Centur; { Oxford, 1963)9 Pp. xix-zxx. 
Nicol Smith's anthology was Eirot published in 1918. , 
1ereinaftor 





Though worded in more secular terms, I1and©ville's conclusion to his 
"character" of Cromwell is basically similar: 
... the most enormous of his Crimes proceeded 
from no worse Principle than the best of his 
Atchievements. In the Midst of his Villanies 
he was a Slave to Business; and the most 
disinterested Patriot never watch'd over the 
Publick Wolfare, both at Home and Abroad, 
with greater Care and Assiduity, or retriev'd 
the fallen Credit of a Nation in less Time 
than this Usurpers But all was for himself; 
and he never had a Thought on the Glory of 
Fn . land, bofore he had made it inseparable 
from his own. 
1 
Even in the portrayal of historical persons (two of whom were his 
contemporaries), however, : amlevillets use of "character" is never 
independent of dialectical argument about the nature of politics and 
society. With both Berkeley and Ltandeville, in short, the "character" 
becomes one of the many rhetorical techniques and dialectical devices 
of philosophical dialogue adapted to neo-classical taste. 
it is especially in their methods of characterization that 
itan eville, Shaftesbury and Berkeley follow neo-classical requirements. 
Basically, what neo-classical critics desired of philosophical 
dialogue was both convincing portrayal of character and that the 
characteristic traits of the interlocutors should not distract the 
reader's attention away fron the flow of dialectic. They considered 
philosophical dialogue, in other words, to be pre-eminently a 
1. Bernard Landeville, An Vn ui into the Origin of Honour and the 
Usefulness of Christianity in War, ade by M. M. Goldsmith London, 
1971)9 p. 231. 
x 
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semi-dramatic cenrerl and it is Gilpin who defines this aspect of 
it most auccinctlys 
... these characters, whatever they are, should 
be n. sturallZsupported. This, however, appears 
to be a point of no groat difficulty, because 
much on this head will not be expected. In 
drmiatic writing, the peculiarity of manners 
must be illustrated by a variety of incidents; 
and it requires great skill to support a 
character through all the intricacies of a 
well-contrived drama. tut the object of the 
dialogue is rather tho invostig: ition of truth, 
than the display of character; and the speaker 
is introduced chiefly as the vehicle of the 
author's opinion. . «. 
2 
Character convincingly depicted in terms of dramatized conversation, 
In fact, was the neo-classical solution to the problem of the "straw- 
ran" that has always bedevilled writers of philosophical dialogue. 
As Blair put it, dialogues in which the opposing; interlocutor is 
merely a "straw-ccan, " have "the form without the spirit of conver- 
tation. '3 Thus, in the dialotyuen of Mandeville and Berkeley, even 
though tie opFoainr, interlocutors invariably lose their arguments, 
dramatic intorest and dialectical suspenso is nevertheless sustained 
in that all the opposing interlocutors are interesting as characters 
and there is genuine dramatization of conversation. 
In the later, more neo-classical, dialo; ýuos of i andoville, the 
1. See, for example, the observations on Richard 
'Hurd 
in the first 
chapter of this dissertation. 
2. Gilpin, 8. 
Blair, 500. 
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solution of the "straw-man" problem takes the form of witty repartee 
between the two interlocutors, who are also genuine friends and 
dramatically presented as such, and the characterization of the 
opposing interlocutor (in the Treatise, or medical dialogue, as well) 
as the worldly "honnete homme" dominated by the passions, as 
described in moral treatises and presented in Restoration comedy. 
Mandeville's dialogues are especially conducive to such treatment 
of character because the very philosophy he expounds largely consists 
of an analysis of the behaviour of worldly persons rather than an 
exposition of ideal morality. In Shaftesbury's The Moralists, 
Philooles is as much of a gentlemanly "honnete hornme" as Horatio in 
1Randeville's later dialogues but there is a flatness to his character 
due to the fact that his open-minded scepticism is equally present 
in Theocles., He ! a, indeed, an unfulfilled Theocles or unconverted 
A te homme. "1 As a result, the problem of the "straw-man" "honne 
is not no much solved in The Moralists as entirely eliminated because 
Philocles' central role is not to be defeated in discussion but to 
be induced into a state of feeling that can only be expressed in an 
"enthusiastic" and semi-poetical manner. Berkeley's Three Dialogues 
has very little characterization but, in Blair's words, it is "an 
instance of a very abstract subject, rendered clear and intelligible 
"2 by means of conversation properly managed. 
In the Alclphron characterization is fuller than in either the 
dialogues of 1'andeville or Shaftesbury's ThA u'oralists and is 
1. In Mandeville's dialoc, ues, incidentally, there is no attempt to 
convert Horatio to anything but to make him arrive at a greater 
degree of self-awareness, the purported moral aim of 1'andeville's 
philosophy. 
2. Blair, 501. 
3t- 
reflected In the varyin, r degrees of hostilo raillery and sarcasm 
resorted to by the prot8 oni3ta. This is boaru3e Berkeley's ai. n 
Is not only to refute the Ido-3 of the ''mate but to Rx ORS, their 
charanter`aº well. <xuch a atror 7 polemvio 1 vleont in its style 
of" dit1ogue would seam to militate ajuinst a solution of t? 4e "straw- 
man" problem In the Alclrhrcn. Be iceley, however, c1o. 3elg patternn 
the mode of er}a=int of P_nch protagonist to his own character, eo 
that it is the very nethod of rea3onfn, g of the I! eß t that is s 
attacked, not merely their beliefs. As a result, the Alriphron is 
intensely dramatic, and in a manner that illux inatea -wothods of 
reasoning, including, in the Christian protaonista, two ways of 
arguing in favour of Christianity. Its characterization, in short, 
is oubordinated to dialectical ro; uire^enta. It is tocause the 
Aici Phmn contains the maximum of characterization compatible with 
dialectical ariument anA conversational verisimilitude that it may 
well be the acct ne -classical of philosophical dialoCueo in tngliuh. 
The emphasis on corvoruutiona1 dialectic to so strong; in the 
neo-c1asicdl conception of ; hi1oco bica2 dialoeuc that it loaves 
little room for than function of setting. In . 
hiu re arks on the 
"dialoC, ue of the deai, " however, Gilpin Implies that the function of 
setting In ph32osopl»ical dialo4 io 13 to unobtrucive'ly enhance the, 
illusion o conversations 
... I cannot any In jxch pleased with laying 
the scene of a dialo, uo in the other world. 
The great beauty of dialogue--writing con3lste 
in the, ea3e, and : robabilityt with which the 
dialogue is carried on. But thiel in a treat 
Beasure,.. 1s. 3^ tw then the scene and characters 
are both unnatural. 
1 
1. t31_ li n, 6. 
-J 
In the dialogues of Mandeville, the setting is always indoors and 
in the city, thus resembling the Restoration drawing-room in which 
witty repartee can be conducted. This kind of setting is especially 
effective in the opening dialogue of The Fable of the Bees, Part Two 
where a charming lady given to puncturing intellectual pretence 
joins the two male interlocutors in discussing morality and the 
arts, with special reference to paintings hanging on the wall. In 
Berkeley's Three Dialo'ues the setting is a garden in which the 
interlocutors take a leisurely walk. As has been shown in chapter 
six, the fountain in the garden is used by Fhilonous as a convenient 
metaphor for the essence of his argument. Otherwise, the setting 
is rarely alluded to, but when it is, Berkeley's manner of doing so 
is both strikingly descriptive and dialectically ingenious, as when 
Philonous exclaims, "Whatl are then the beautiful red and purple 
we see on yonder clouds, really in them? Or do you imagine they 
have in themselves any other form, than that of a dark mist or 
1 
vapour? " 
In the Alciphron and The Moralists, the setting is considerably 
more detailed than in the Three nialop*. ues or any by L: andeville. In 
both cases the setting is rural. In the Aleilhron, however, it 
consists of a well-cultivated countryside, while in The t.: oralists 
it is "untamed Nature. " As has been seen in chapter seven, the 
setting, as "genius of place, " decisively contributes to the 
dialectical strategy of The f. ', orallsts. In this respect, Shaftesbury's 
dialogue goes beyond neo-classical requirements for the function 
of setting because the "genius of place" encourages not sociable 
1. The Works of Geore Berkeley Bishop of Clo ne, 'ed. by TOE. 
Jessop vol. II London, 1949), P-184., hereinafter to be cited as 
Berkeley II. 
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conversation but soliloquizing contemplation. The satttr ; in the 
Alciphron In just as Important but its role in Berkeley's dialectical 
strategy is subtler and more in the spirit of n+, o-classical criteria. 
It is also closer to tim role of cattinzi in ? »andeville'a dialouueo. 
This can beat be appreciated in the pioturesque oienir to the Fifth 
Dialotus. It finds the protaa, 'anists on top of a hill enjoying fine 
weather, and a variety of Pleasing pros; cots, Including arcaiian 
"groan pastured, flocks and herds, " "flahit oats and lijhteri, 
gliding up and down on a surface as smooth and bright a glues, " and 
a tumultuous fox-hunt'* 
I in the aftoru ath of the fox-hunt, the 
following; exchange occur3, u3 narrated by 7Jions 
Now Lysiclou, beine a nice can and a bol esprit, 
had an infinite conte t for the rough rannte and 
conversation of fox-hunters, and could not reflect 
with patience that ho had lost, as he called it, 
so many hours in their company, I Clattered ryself, 
said be, that there haus been none of this species 
ro=ainir,, along us: strange that men should be, 
diverted with such uncouth noise and hurry, or fin 
pleasure in the society of dogs a; i horsesl slow 
auch more olej; ant are the diversions of the town! 
There seemal replied l. u hranor, to be some 
rcesenblsnco between fox hunter: and, free-thine, ors! 
the former oxertit their a. -Amal faculties in 
pursuit of game, as you , entlemon ooploy your 
intellectuals in the ; -ursuit of truth. The kind, 




The ir2pliaation of, ; hranor'a raillery is that tho. soaxcb for 
truth of team "minute Philoacph, r" is nothing more than a divortinf; 
1. ZerkýPýl4Y IITI, 174. 
2. B owls TI? r 175" . 
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game rather than a serious occupation. Because Lysicles betrays his 
contempt for the healthily-physical diversions of the countryside, 
however, there is also the implication that Lysicles detests the 
simple, rural virtues. It is significant, in fact, that both 
Crito and . iphranor seem to be ccuntry-squires, so that the rural 
setting is no mere arcadian embellishmont but Berkeley's oblique 
way of showing his allegiance, which he shared with Pope, to the 
simple life and rural virtues as most conducive to Christianity. 
Keeping this in mind, it is fiendishly ironic that Hervey's merciless 
critique of the Alciphron is that of a townsman and a polished 
courtier disguised as a plain-speaking country-parson. It is wholly 
appropriate, in any case, that the settings of 'Mandeville's dialogues 
should be urban and those of Berkeley, rural, because, to a large 
extent, to contrast the dialogues of Mandeville and Berkeley, both 
formally and in terms of philosophical content, is to contrast the 
values of Town and Country, or Whig and Tory in the early eighteenth 
century. 
As has been noted in the first chapter, the "insinuation of 
truth" advocated by Hurd for philosophical dialogue resembles 
Locke's dialectic, which consists of the "balancing of arguments" 
not in the Ciceronian tanner of comparing the level of eloquence of 
each argument but by evaluating the strength of the logic of each 
one. The dialogues of Ulandeville, Shaftesbury and Berkeley all 
display variations of this pattern of dialectic. In the dialogues 
of ! dandeville, the L'andevillian persona constantly generates 
argument by initiating paradoxes, or provocative statements, which 
force the opposing interlocutor into arguing, against them. Each 
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provocative or paradoxical statement, however, is a carefully-laid 
trap because the logic behind the apparently paradoxical or 
outrageous statement in invariably shown to be sounder than the logic 
behind the opposing interlocutor's. Deception, in short, is the 
eaaence of 'andeville's dialectical method. In Berkeley's Throe 
i)ialo ues, there is no dialectical deception. Instead of clusters 
of paradoxes generating; argu'ent, there Are two sets of statements. 
The reader must decide which at of statements is logically consistent 
throughout and which reduces itself to paradox because of logical 
inconsistency. In the Alciphron, it is two distinct modes of 
argument that are contrasted, the broadly open-minded Christian one 
and the narrow, "minute" one of the ! 'eists. 'i'hm contrast is made 
in an explicitly polemical way but this still implies that the 
logical consistency of each mode of argument rust be Judged. 
In The 1*oralists, Lockean dialectic occurs only in the rallying 
exchanges tetween Palemon and 'hilocles in Part I vbaro, in a manner 
similar to %andeville's version of Lockean dialectic, Philocles plays 
an elaborate deception on Palecion by Pretending to be a ryrrhonist. 
3haftoatury's aim, however, is to de=onstrate that while open-minded 
scepticism is indispensable in the search for truth, an an end in 
itself it merely loads not to truth but fashionable raillery, 
similar to that compared by Berkeley to . fox-hunting, and atheism. 
As for Conuins debate of ideas between fhiloclos and ; heocles, it 
occurs in the restricted form of Socratic elencbua rather than the 
more informal Lockpan dialectic. The true source of a dialectic 
that loads to truth for Shaftesbury, in fact, is not the Lockean 
"balancing, of ar, 'uments" but inward colloquy in the face of nature 
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or the "dialectic of genius. " It is, in short, a dialectic that 
involves semi-Wstical communication between the human mindd and the 
divine rather than sociable discussion. Thus, it is another aspect 
of the uniqueness of The 'loreliets that it spans a wide spectrum of 
dialectical argumentt the ocratic elvnchus of Platonic dialogue, 
Loc' can dialectic, and the Inward dialectic of the eighteenth- 
century and Romantic nature-poet. The effect on the reader, however, 
is of a unified whole because of ShsfteSbury's s1herence to the neo- 
classical requirements of conversational liveliness and decorum. 
All that rettain3 to be said i: i that philosophical dialogues of 
the eighteenth-century ought not to be read simply as works of 
philosophy but as dra atic works in which dialectic is turned into 
urbane conversation. Though not as great, perhaps, as Pope's 
eriutles and Swift'asatire3, they are, in their emphasis on the value 
of lucid conversation, examples of an intensely neo-classical genre. 
It is the emphasis on informal convtriation, in fact, that 
distin¬uishes them from the dialogues of Plato and Cicero. This 
is so because classical culture was centred, broadly stye cin, I, on 
public rhetoric rather than on private conversation. Talus, the 
Socratic elenchus is more of a device of rublic debate than a 
conversational gambit and the emphasis in Cicero's dialogues is on 
the rhetorical eloquence of the speakers rather than plain-spoaking 
and conversational ability. Gilpin oven went o far as to declare 
about the Platonic dialogues that "In philoso; hic subjects, the 
Socratic dialogues are supposed to be master-pieces. I doubt 
whether they may not co=stimcs be found captious, uninteresting, and 
f 
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not convincing. "' The Inherent difficulties in the writing of 
illoaa,; hical dia1oj ue, as observed by neo-classical critics, in 
any case, were st ummal up in ono . pt phraee by '°Iiward FitrCeraid s 
"it is not easy to keep to 9004 dialectic, zni yet keep up the 
diujected sway of natural converratjon. "2 Though i°itzGerald Eoea 
on to praise Plato for surmounting ouch a difficulty, and belittle 
Lardor for fuilin. ±q to do soy ; pct it is even truer of the nco- 
classical mods of philosophical dialotue that it tranifor= "rocd 
dialectic" into the "die jetted sway' of natural conversation. " 
1. oll pins 3. 
2. Lnttcr rnn-1 t. iterrr-r Btn°rdeia of "dward Fitz-gcrald, vol. I 
London, 1}42)p p. 244" FitzGerald'a phr; ao is taken from a 
lettor to nO, Cowell probably written at tbo "end of 1046. " 
Fitzgerald la referring to his difficulties in writing 
': uphrenor (1851)0 a dialogue which has coma of the converaa_. 
tional eae and poleiical acerbity of äer*e]ey'u Alc ." 
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